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2ABSTRACT
This th e s is  fu rn ish es a survey o f  Portuguese ru le  over 
th e  no rthern  , western and south-w estern  p la in s  o f  Ceylon 
from 1617 to  1638, The f i r s t  chapter surveys th e  sources 
u t i l iz e d  and makes an assessment o f previous h is to r ic a l  
w ritin g  on the  subject* I t  a lso  contains a b r ie f  /(h is to r ic a l 
in tro d u c tio n  o u tlin in g  Portuguese a c t iv i ty  in  Ceylon from 
1505 to  l6 l6 ,  The th re e  events th a t  demarcate th e  period  
under consideration  from th e  previous e ra , namely th e  re b e llio n  
o f N ikap itiya  Bandara, the  f i r s t  t r e a ty  o f  peace between 
the  Portuguese and th e  Highland kingdom o f  Kandy and the  
Portuguese conquest o f  th e  kingfom o f  Ja ffn a  a re  examined in  
d e ta i l  in  th e  second chap ter which tra c e s  p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  up 
to  1623# The th ird  chap ter i s  ex c lu siv e ly  concerned w ith 
events in  Portuguese Ceylon during  the  cap ta in -g en era lsh ip  o f  
Constantino de Sa de Noronha (second term 1623-1630).The 
survey o f p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry , and o f the  economic and s o c ia l 
reasons which underlay p o l i t i c a l  dec isio n s i s  continued 
up ta  th e  Portuguese d e fe a t a t  Gannoruwa in  1638 in  the  
fou rth  chapter* The ad m in is tra tiv e  su p e rs tru c tu re  e s ta b lish ed  by 
th e  Portuguese in  Ceylon and the  armed fo rc e s , th e  u ltim a te  
b asis  o f Portuguese power form$j& th e  su b jec t o f  the  f i f t h  ch ap ters 
while in  the  next a£re considered th e  p r in c ip a l sources o f  revenue
3and th e  probable revenue and expenditure o f  th e  Portuguese 
s ta te  in  Ceylon* The seventh chapter dea ls  w ith m issionary 
a c t iv i ty  and r e la te s  i t  to  Portuguese p o l i t i c a l  fo rtunes 
while th e  main themes o f  the  study are  summed up in  th e  
conclusion*
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8CHAPTER I
P a r t I  -  The su b jec t and the  sources
The period  1617-1638 forms a n a tu ra l u n it  in  th e  h is to ry  
o f Ceylon* During the  two preceding decades th e  Portuguese 
had e s tab lish ed  a seemingly secure hold over th e  lowlands 
o f Kotte* During a l l  th is  time they  had a lso  been continuously  
a t  war w ith the  S inhalese ru le r  o f  Kandy in  an attem pt to  
conquer th a t  highland kingdom* The years 1616-1619 heralded 
th e  b eg in iin g  o f a new era* A form idable re b e llio n  in  
Portuguese t e r i t o r y  compelled them to  rev ise  th e i r  p o lic y  o f 
r e le n tle s s  h o s t i l i t y  to  Kandy and conclude a t r e a ty  o f  peace 
w ith  i t s  king* The a r r iv a l  o f an e n te rp ris in g  cap ta in -genera l 
enabled them to  make use o f  th ^ is  r e s p ite  and conquer J a ffh a ,
which had so f a r  remained v i r tu a l ly  independent* With th e
{
lowlands o f  the  w est, south-w est and no rth  in  th e i r  hands, 
w ith  revenue fo r  th e  f i r s t  time exceeding expenditure and 
w ith m issionary a c t iv i ty  more f lo u rish in g  than ever, th e  
Portuguese had on ly  one major problem -  the  conquest o r the  
establishm ent o f  a la s t in g  accord w ith Kandyj The re la tio n s  
between th e  Portuguese and Kandy th e re fo re  provide th e  dominating 
theme in  th i s  th esis*  The year 1638 marks an even more d ec is iv e  
break than  1617* I t  saw nofmerel# th e  unsuccessfu l end o f
19
th e  l a s t  Portuguese attempt to  conquer Kandy but a lso  th e
a r r iv a l  o f  a new European power -  th e  Dutch in  Ceylon.
The coming o f  th e  Dutch meant a rev o lu tio n  in  th e  balance
of power in  Ceylon. The days o f  Portuguese dominance were
ended and from then  on fo r  th e  most p a r t  th e  Portuguese were
on th e  d efen siv e .
The main ta sk  o f th i s  th e i i s  w il l  be to  exp lain  why
in  th i s  p eriod  o f  th e i r  g re a te s t  power in  Ceylon, th e  Portuguese
fa i le d  e i th e r  to  m aintain f r ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  w ith Kandy o r
a l te rn a t iv e ly ,  to  conquer i t .  The explanations w ill  be
sought both in  th e  m il i ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  events o f  the  time
and in  th e  economic, ad m in is tra tiv e  and re lig io u s  a c t iv i t i e s
o f  th e  Portuguese, some o f which ran  counter to  the  p o l i t i c a l
aims they  pursued. An attem pt w i l l  a lso  be made to  show the
impact o f Portuguese p o lic ie s  on th e i r  S inhalese and Tamil 
tra c e  the
su b jec ts  and to/changes in  n a tiv e  so c ie ty  which ensured.
The h is to ry  o f  the  is la n d  during  th ese  two decades 
have been touched on by sev era l h is to r ia n s  w ritin g  in  th e  
tw en tie th  cen tury . Chief among them are  A lfredo Botelho de Souza, 
P .E .P ie r is  and F r. S .G .Perera. A ll o f  them have consulted  
many o f th e  ch ron ic les and near contemporary accounts as 
w ell as some o f  the  contemporary documents r e la t in g  to  the
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period* Botelho de Souza’ s in te r e s t  in  th e  is la n d  i s  u n fo rtu n a te ly  
lim ite d  to  Portuguese m il i ta ry  a c t iv i t i e s  in  Ceylon* The 
is la n d  i s  viewed simply as a d is ta n t  ou tpost o f th e  estado da 
In d ia  and as such given l i t t l e ( though perhaps p ro p o rtio n a te ) 
space* Moreover, Botelho de Souza adds l i t t l e  comment to  th e  
m a te ria l he has gathered  from th e  sources and indeed on
( i )
occasion some o f  th e  m a te ria l seems i l l-d ig e s te d *
P*E*Pieris devotes some two hundred and s ix ty  pages
o f  h is  work -  Ceylon* th e  Portuguese era* f fo l.I I  to  consider
th e  p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  o f  th i s  p a r t ic u la r  p erio d , i t s  economic
background and th e  ad m in is tra tiv e  s tru c tu re  o f th e  Portuguese
regime* P ie ris ,u n d o u b ted ly  an in sp ire d  w rite r  w ith  considerable
h is to r ic a l  im agination , was th e  f i r s t  Ceylonese to  seek to
w rite  the  h is to ry  o f  Ceylon from the  S inhalese -Tam il p o in t o f
view from Portuguese records and deserves reco g n itio n  as a
p ioneer in  th i s  fie ld *  His work however su ffe rs  from th e
same d e fec t as th a t  o f  h is  major source, Queyroz's Temporal
and s p i r i tu a l  conquest o f  Cey Ion* fo r  i t  i s  both leng thy  and
badly organized* P ie r is  fs unorthodox use o f  sources has
(2)
sub jected  him to  considerable c ritic ism *  Also much o f  the  
documentary sources on which th i s  th e s is  i s  based was not
(1) A. Botelho de Souzas Subsidios para  a h is  t o r i  a m i l i ta r  m aritim e 
da In d ia , Vol*111.248,265355
(2) Fr* S .G .Perera (The conquista o f  Ceylao by Feraao de Queyroz* 
in  CALR I I .  Colombo 1916.
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a v a ila b le  to  him when he made h is  study f i f t y  years ago*
Fr* S .G .P ere ra 's  sh o rte r  review  o f  th e  whole Portuguese 
p e rio d  may be considered a sound work o f  h i s to r ic a l  scholarehip* 
Ft . P e re ra 's  q u a l i t ie s  as a c r i t i c a l  h is to r ia n  f a i l  him only
(3)
where h is  re lig io n  i s  involved* Future h is to r ia n s  however
w i l l  be indebted  fo r  h is  work in  p u b lish in g  much o f th e
m a te r ia l in  th e  Vaticah Archives r e la t in g  to  Ceylon*
In  ad d itio n  to  th e  above mentioned work T.Abeyasinghe's
ex c e lle n t study o f  P o rtu g u ese  ru le  in  Ceylon* 159^1612*
has much m a te ria l r e la t in g  to  land  te n u re , m issionary a c t iv i ty
and economic conditions which could w ell ap p lied  to  th i s
period* To avoid r e p e t i t io n  i t  has been decided to  ignore
aspects o f  h is to ry  adequately considered in  T.Abeyasinghe's
study  as w ell as in  o th er works even i f  they  do come w ith in
(*>
th e  scope o f  th is  th e s is * I f  th i s  has forced  the  p resen t 
study  to  be more lo p -sid ed  than i t  o therw ise might have been, 
i t  has a t  th e  same time provided a g re a te r  opportun ity  to  
concentrate  on problems s t i l l  l e f t  unresolved by th ese  e a r l ie r  
w riters*
(3) Fr* S .G .Perera -  Portuguese m issionary  methods o r th e  myth 
o f forced conversion and th e  J e s u i t  l e t t e r s  tra n s la te d  by
Fr* P erera  h im self in  CALR I-V  g ive d if fe re n t  p ic tu re s  o f  
Portuguese m issionary ac tiv ity *
(4) Perhaps the  most im portant among th e  o th e r works on Ceylon 
h is to ry  r e la t in g  to  th is  period  i s  F r. W.L.A.Dom P e te r 's  
S tudies in  Ceylon church ftistorfr*
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This study i s  based p rim arily  on Portuguese sources# 
However use has a lso  been made o f  E nglish  and S inhalese 
books and manuscripts# My lack  o f  knowledge o f  Tamil 
prevented me from using  sources in  th a t  language bu t th is  
d id  not prove too g re a t a handicap as th e  only Tamil document 
o f  h i s to r ic a l  value fo r  th is  period  -  th e  Ja ffn a  chron ic le
y
o r th e  Yalpana Vaipafta K alai g ives l i t t l e  inform ation  th a t
cannot be obtained from Portuguese sources#
The English sources too were only o f m arginal use#
These consisted  c h ie f ly  o f th e  records o f  the  English East
In d ia  Company and l i t t l e  o f i t s  employees# They were u se fu l
however in  p lac in g  Portuguese Ceylon in  th e  p ersp ec tiv e  o f
the  po litico-econom ic stru g g le  th a t  went on in  th e  Ind ian
( 6)
ocean in  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f th e  seventeenth  century#
The S inhalese m a te ria l too i s  d isa p p o in tin g  fo r  th e
arch ives o f  K otte and Kandy l ik e  those  o f  Ja ffh a  have not
(7)
survived# The major S inhalese ch ro n ic le , th e  Cfalavamsa gives
(5) I  am indebted  to  Mr# S#Pathmanathan o f th e  Department o f  
H isto ry  o f th e  U niversity  o f  Ceylon fo r  p rov id ing  me w ith  h is  
t r a n s la t io n  o f th e  re la v en t sec tio n s  o f  th e  chronicle# An 
EngLisjJ. t r a n s la t io n  o f  th i s  ch ron ic le  has been pub lished , 
(Yalpana Vaipatfa Malai tran s# C#Brito#Colombo 1879) bu t I  was 
unable to  lo c a te  a copy#
(6) Calander o f  s ta te  papers V o ls# II,IH ,V I,V III.ed # b y  
W.N.Sainsbury. Vaduz, 196^. L e tte rs  received  by th e  E ast In d ia  
Company from i t s  servan ts in  th e  East# V ols.III-VI.ed#W . F o ste r, 
London# 1899-1902# The English fa c to r ie s  in  In d ia# I6 l8 -l6 frl# 
ed. by IS#Foster, Oxford, 190o-1912#
(7) Ctfulavamsa tra n s la te d  by W*Geiger,II#
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sc an t a t te n t io n  to  th e  Portuguese and i s  o f  l i t t l e  p r a c t ic a l  
va lue  fo r  t h i s  p erio d .
The Ra.javaliya though o f g re a te r  va lue , o r a t  l e a s t
(8)
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry , i s  u n fo rtu n a te ly  a l l  too b r ie f .  The
P (9)
th re e  war poems the  K ustantinu Hatana, t h e garang i Hatana and
th e  Haha Hatana f i l l  in  some o f th e  d e ta i l s  o f  m il i ta ry
h is to ry  w hile two o th e r documents th e  Mandarampura puvata
and th e  Matale Disave Rada^im Pota give an in k lin g  o f th e
po litico -econom ic conditions w ith in  Kandy in  th e  re ig n  o f
((9)
S enerat (1605-1635) but on th e  whole^ th e  S inhalese  documents 
though u se fu l as a means o f checking and co rrab o ra tin g  
evidence from Portuguese sources, are  in s u f f ic ie n t  to  provide 
a d e a r  p ic tu re  o f th e  period  on th e i r  own.
The Portuguese sources can be d iv ided  in to  fou r
d i s t in c t  ca teg o ries  (a) o f f ic ig ^  l e t t e r s  ,  rep o rts  and p e t i t io n s
(b) se m i-o ff ic ia l l e t t e r s ,  re p o rts  and records
(c) b iographies and d ia r ie s
(d) chron ic les and h is to r ie s  
O ff ic ia l  l e t t e r s ,  rep o rts  and p e t i t io n s  -
O ff ic ia l  l e t t e r s ,  rep o rta  and correspondence on Ceylon 
during  th is  period  emanated from four d i f f e r e n t  p laces -  th e
(8)Hardly two pages a re  devoted to  the  events under co n s id era tio n ,
(9) These two poems have been tra n s la te d  in to  English and 
published in  R ib e iro fs H istory  o f  Ceilao ( t r a n s .  P .E ,P ie r is )  
209-220, 246-270
(10) Two panegyries o f  Senerat (EH O r,6606 (126) and Or*6611
(55) ) which are  in  th e  B r itis h  Museum are  o f  no h is to r ic a l  va lu e .
k&ng&s oeu*t in  Spain, L isbon, Goa and Colombo* The i t in e r a n t
iV.
conselho da P o rtuga l which moved w ith  th e  ro y a l court considered 
any problems on Ceylon when these  were re fe r re d  to  i t  from 
Lisbon and se n t in s tru c tio n s  on th i s  m a tte r to  Lisbon or more 
rarely^ d i r e c t  to  th e  v iceroy*In Lisbon th e  po litico-econom ic 
problems o f th e  Portuguese estado da In d ia  were d iscussed  in  
th e  council o f  revenue o r conselho da fazenda and re lig io u s  
problems in  th e  mesa de consciencia a f te r  which orders were 
se n t to  th e  viceroy  a t  Goa w ith o r  w ithout co n su ltin g  th e  
conselho de Portugal in  Spain* The v iceroy  in  Goa in  h is  
tttrn  conveyed royal in s tru c tio n s  to  th e  cap ta in -g en era l and 
th e  vedor da fazenda or th e  c o n tro lle r  o f  revenue in  Ceylon 
and o ccasio n a lly  d i r e c t  to  th e  captain-m ajor o f  Jaffna* While 
o rd e rs , in q u ir ie s  and d ire c tiv e s  flowed from Spain to  Ceylon 
v ia  Lisbon and Goa, th e re  was a t  th e  same tim e a  stream  o f 
re p o r ts , p ep lie s  and suggestions from Colombo to  Europe 
through th e  same channels* Apart from th e se  l e t t e r s  th e re  were 
innumerable rep o rts  produced by th e  councils concerned a t 
Goa and Lisbon and in  Spain* These records -  o r  rather^  what 
remains o f  them -  form th e  main source o f  th i s  study*
Of the  proceedings o f  th e  conselho de Portugal* 
the  u ltim a te  p o licy  making body and i t s  correspondence w ith 
th e  a u th o r it ie s  a t  Lisbon l i t t l e  has survived* What remains
( l i )
in  th e  bound volumes a t  th e  Arquivo G eral de Simancas and
(125
th e  Arquivo N aeional de Torre de Tombo however i l l u s t r a t e  
th a t  many o f  th e  le s s  weighty problems too were re fe rre d  
to  Spain a t  times* The Arquivo H isto rico  Ultram arino codices 
31 and 32 have provided a sample o f  rep o rts  sen t up to  the  
k ing  e r  the  governors o f  Portugal by the  conselho da fazenda 
in  Lisbon w hile codices 459,460 and 645 a t  the B ib lio teca  da 
U niversidade de Coimbra provide a s im ila r  in s ig h t in to  th e  
re p o rts  o f  th e  mesa da coasciencia*
Most im portant o f  a l l  however are  the  records o f 
th e  correspondence between the  a u th o r it ie s  in  Europe and 
th e  v iceroy  in  India* These are  preserved in  a c o lle c tio n  
known as th e  Books o f  th e  Monsoon (L ivros das moncoes)* The 
bulk o f th e se  records are  av a ila b le  in  th e  c o lle c tio n  o f 
s ix ty  two volumes found in  th e  Arquivi R ational de Torre de Tombo 
in  Lisbon o f  which the  volumes 9 to  45 cover th e  period  
under consideration*The Torre de Tombo c o lle c tio n  however 
i s  incom plete fo r  th e  years 1629-1638 and has to  be supplemented 
by volumes 12-20 o f  th e  Goaj! c o lle c tio n  o f  th e  L ivros das 
moncoes which are  av a ila b le  in  m icrofilm  a t  the  Filmoteca
 T '
Ultgamarina Portuguese in  Lisbon* Copies o f  the Torre de Tombo
(11) Simancas SB 1508, 1509,1 5 1 5 tl5 l6 ,1519,1520,1522,1523 
These documents have been catalogued in  the  Boletim de Film oteca 
v o ls . 14-16.
(12) TT.Collecao de S .V icente XIX
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c o lle c tio n  a re  a lso  av a ila b le  both in  th e  B r itis h  Museum*
(13)
London and in  th e  In d ia  O ffice  L ib rary , London.
A sm all p roportion  o f  the  Goan records have been
published  in  J.H.Cunha Rivara*s Archivo Portucuez O rien ta l 
f-v/i
volume^ and in  th e  appendices to  th e  Assentos do conselho
do estado da In d ia , volumes I  and I I  ed ited  by Panduronga
S .S .P is su r le n c a r . The documents in  Lisbon covering th e  period
up to  7 March 1619 have been published in  th e  Document os
Remettidos da In d ia , volumes I-Vit. The is su e s  d iscussed  in
the  Lisbon-Goa correspondence vary g re a t ly  in  importance
from th e  f a te  o f  a baby elephant born in  a convent in  Colombo
to  th e  q u estio n  o f  th e  monopoly o f cinnamon o r th e  resumption
o f war w ith  Kandy, bu t they  a re  u se fu l in  i l l u s t r a t i n g
aspects o f  Portuguese p o lic y  in  Ceylon. AH th e  records o f
th e  Portuguese council o f  s ta te  av a ilab le  in  th e  Goan arch ives
(1*0
have been ed ited  by Panduronga S .S .P issu rle n ca r . In  th i s  
study , two volumes o f  h ith e r to  unpublished records o f  th e  
proceedings o f  th i s  council covering th e  y ear l 62^ - l 6j 6 now 
lo c a te d  in  th e  B ib lio teca  N aclonal. Lisbon have a lso  been
(13) EM.Add Ms.20,861-20,900; In d ia  O ffice L ib rary , Portuguese 
Records 71-74
The copies a t  the  B r it is h  Museum made ou t in  th e  1750#s ,  are  
g en e ra lly  accu ra te . Less r e l ia b le  are  th e  more recen t t r a n s c r ip ts  
a t  th e  In d ia  O ffice L ib rary . Some id ea  o f th e  contents o f  th e  Goa 
c o lle c tio n  could be obtained from th e  comprehensive summa/ries 
o f  documents published  in  th e  Bolettm de Film oteca.
(14) Panduronga S .S .P issu rlen ca r -  Assentos do conselho do 
estado da In d ia , v o ls .1 -2
1 7
(15)
used* The records o f  th e  council o f  revenue a t  Goa have
provided some inform ation  on the  economic b as is  o f  Portuguese 
(16)
ru le  in  Ceylon#
JDue io  th e  complete lo s s  o f  Portuguese archives in  
Colombo, l i t t l e  o f  th e  correspondence between th e  viceroy  
and h is  subord inate  o f f i c ia l s  in  Ceylon has survived# What 
records th a t  remained are  copies o f  some o f  th e  regimcntos 
o r s tan d in g  o rders  issu ed  to  th e  cap ta in s-g en era l and the
(17)
vedores o r  c o n tro lle rs  o f  revenue. S ix  suzh regimentos 
issued  between 161*4- and 1639 have been u t i l iz e d  in  th is  work# 
This reg u la r  exchange o f l e t t e r s ,  orders and rep o rts  
between one le v e l  o f  au th o rity  and another can be supplemented 
by th e  correspondence o f  th e  camara o r m unicipal council o f  
Colombo# Although th ese  l e t t e r s  r e la te  c h ie f ly  to  the  e f fo r ts  
o f  th e  Portuguese m arried s e t t l e r s  o r casados to  gain  o r 
p reserve sp e c ia l p r iv ile g e s  fo r  them selves, they  also  revealzdt 
much in form ation  on th e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  conditions o f  
the  time# Many o f  th e  m anuscripts r e la t in g  to  the  camara 
are to  be found in  th e  unbound co lle c tio n  (documentos so lto s )
(15) BNL*PG#1982 and 1983
(16) Goa Assentos do conselho fla fazenda I-V#
(17) Goa Regimentos e instruccoes#  Goa c a rta s  pa ten tes e 
a lv a ra s# Goa l iv ro s  dos segredos* AHU Caixas#
d*A.e to Mr .J.&'ffaf/Tfcr*/ ^  ^U- ^cJitrC <fi Qt\AmJ*U 
Y<~ AsLIa&U Jo -ifcjl H&Lo
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o f  th e  Arquivo H isto rico  Ultramarino in  Lisbon* They are  
s to red  in  m etal cab inets ( caixas) and roughly c la s s i f ie d  by
country and then  by date* A ll documents r e la t in g  to  Ceylon
( 18)
are found in  th e  In d ia  caixas* These caixas contain  a varied
c o lle c tio n  o f  m aterial*  S ig n if ic a n t among the  documents are  
some o f  th e  ap p lic a tio n s  fo r  rewards( requerim entos)o f  so ld ie rs  
who were se rv in g  o r had served i$  the  Sast*These inc lude
d e sc rip tio n s  o f  th e  campaigns they  had engaged in  and th e
se rv ices  th ey  had rendered, c e r t i f ie d  by th e i r  commanding
o f f ic ia l s  and thus provide an inva luab le  check on th e  p ic tu re
o f m il i ta ry  h is to ry  as depicted  by ch ron ic lers  o f  l a t e r  times*
Copies o f  p e t i t io n s  fo r  rewards are  a lso  found in  th e  archives
a t  Simancas w hile summaries o f  a la rg e  nubtrvof such p e t i t io n s
are  recorded in  codices 435 and 501 o f th e  Arquivo H isto rico  
(19)
Ultramarino*
One more type o f  o f f i c i a l  document remains to  be considered
-  th e  re p o r ts  sen t by sp e c ia l em issaries on the  varied  aspects 
o f  Portuguese ru le  in  Ceylon* An ex c e llen t examjile o f  th is
(18) Twenty e ig h t caixas contain ing  documents on Ceylon d a tin g  
from 1610-1635 were examined* The caixas are  not indexed and 
are  arranged by th e  d a te  o f  the  documents- not th e  ^period JLtl\4 
coverf .  Thus documents in  In d ia  caixas 26(1664-1665) con tain  
re feren ces to  events in  Ceylon as ea rly  as 1622*
(19) Codice 436 i s  a copy o f  435*
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type o f  m a te r ia l i s  av a ilab le  fo r our p erio d . In  l a te  1619
th e  b ishop o f  Cochin v is i te d  the  is la n d  on the  request o f the
king  o f  P o rtu g a l. He remained in  Ceylon fo r  almost two y ea rs ,
and d u rin g  th a t  period  subm itted c r i t i c a l  rep o rts  on the
conduct o f  Portuguese a f f a i r s  in  the  is la n d . Many o f h is
suggestions were tu rned  down by h is  su p e rio rs , but h is  views,
i f  t r e a te d  w ith  cau tion  provide considerable l ig h t  on Portuguese
(20 )
p o lic y  and ad m in is tra tio n .
S e m i-o ff ic ia l l e t t e r s  and rep o rts
Dr. T.Abeyasinghe a p tly  described  th i s  category as
'( £ l )•w ritin g s n e i th e r  fcholly p r iv a te  nor y e t o f f i c i a l ;  7 To th is
category belong the  annual rep o rts  o f  the  re lig io u s
o rg an iza tio n s  and the  l e t t e r s  o f  in d iv id u a l m issionaries to
t h e i r  su p e r io rs . Many o f  th e  J e s u i t  l e t t e r s  and re p o rts , a
valuab le source fo r  th e  re lig io u s  h is to ry  o f  th e  period>have been
tr a n s la te d  and sy m p a th itica lly  in te rp re te d  by a fellow  J e s u i t ,
F r. S .G .P erera . O thers are  av a ilab le  in  th e  B r itis h  Museum,
(22)
London. S im ila r records are  not known to  e x is t  e i th e r  fo r  
the  F ranciscans o r fo r  the  Dominicans and fo r  an account 
o f  th e  a c t iv i t i e s  o f  these  orders i t  i s  necessary  to  re ly  
g re a t ly  on Paulo da T rin idadefs Conquista e s p ir i tu a l  do O riente
(20) AHU 33. f f *11-23
(21) T.Abeyasinghe 5 
(22Jp BM.Add Ms s . 9853
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and Luis C acegas^  H is to r ia  de 5 .Domingos P a r t  IV* Contemporary
documents r e la t in g  to  the  Augustinians have been found in
th e m anuscritos da l i v r a r i a  co lle c tio n  o f th e  to r re  de tombo*
These have been used in  conjunction w ith a work composed by
(23)
Fr* Manoel da Ave Maria in  1817*
Biographies and d ia r ie s
Of th e  v iceroys o f  In d ia  in  th e  l630fs and the  l630*s
i t  was undoubtedly the  conde de Linhares who had the  most
im portant in flu en ce  on Portuguese p o licy  in  Ceylon and he
m aintained a d e ta ile d  personal d ia ry  during h is  period  o f
o ffice*  However, only  p a r ts  o f  th e  d ia ry  are s t i l l  ex tan t.
A se c tio n  covering the  period  6 February 1634 to  February
(24)
1635 hav^ been published by th e  B ib lio teca  Nacional* Lisbon* 
Another two sec tio n s  to g e th er extending from ea rly  March 1630 
to  the  end o f  October 1631 are  av a ilab le  in  m anuscript a t
the  B ib lio teca  Nacional and th e  B ib lio teca  da Aiuda in  Lisbon*1,1 ■■■ 1 " ■ ') ■ —
(25)
Is
The d ia ry  has to  be tre a te d  w ith cau tion  when taken as a
(23) Manual Erem itico da Congregacao da In d ia  O rien ta l dos erem ites
de N .P.S.Agostin& ^dforms codice 1650 o f the  B ib lio teca  da Universidade 
de Coimbra and has been published in  Rego XI*95-833
(24) D iario  do 3°conde de Linhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia  I - I I  
P ro fesso r C*R.Boxer has pointed out th a t  th e  t i t l e  should read 
4 and not 3°*
(25 ) ENL.FB 9 3 9 .f f .la -8 6 a ; Ajuda 51-VIII-51.fF* 1-434
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source, fo r  th e re  are  c le a r  signs th a t  i t  was intended to  be
read i f  no t by p o s te r i ty  a t  l e a s t  by h is  superio rs in  Europe*
However, i t  con tains a g re a t dea l o f  u se fu l inform ation
regard ing  f l e e t  movements, p o licy  making and th e  like*
I n  th ie  category may a lso  be p laced an account o f the
t r i a l s  and t r ib u la t io n s  o f  th e  cap ta in -genera l Dorn Jorge de
Almeida from h is  appointment in  Goa in  e a rly  1631 to  h is
(26)
reconquest o f  most o f  h i*  Kotte in  1632* The author o f  th i s
sk e tch , de Almeida* s own b ro th er Francisco de Almeida^ seeks
to  show th e  cap ta in -g en ra l in  th e  b e s t p o ssib le  l ig h t  and
d escrib es  in  lu r id  d e ta i l  the  methods used to  cow the  S inhalese
in to  submission* This sketch  to g e th e r w ith a sh o rte r  account
obtained  from th e  B ib lio teca  Nayiofaal have formed the ch ie f
sources fo r  th e  account o f  the campaign o f 1632 in  th is  
(27) 
study*
The biography o f  Constantino de Sa de Noronha w ritte n  
by h is  son and h e ir  Joao Rodrigues de Sa de Menezes comes 
close to  th e  border l in e  between a biography and a chronicle*
I t  p u rp o rts  to  g ive th e  l i f e  s to ry  o f  de Sa and an account o f
(26)A$uda 51-V-36• ff* 75-108
(27) BNL FG.7640 f f .  17-18
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h is  ru le  in  Ceylon bu t inc ludes much background m ateria l*  As
th e  author had no f i r s t  hand knowledge o f Ceylon and composed
(28)
t h i s  work before he v is i te d  th e  East i t  seems k l ik e ly  th a t  
he depended a g re a t  d ea l on th e  ch ron ic les o f  Joao de Garros 
and Diogo do Couto fo r  genera l in form ation  and h is  fa th e r* s  
p r iv a te  papers and th e  rep o rts  o f  acquaintances fo r  th e  events 
in  16209s* Though f i l i a l  a f fa c tio n  and the  d e s ire  fo r  a 
rew ari fo r  h is  fa th e r* s  se rv ices  may have in fluenced  De Sa 
de Menezes to  tu rn  a b lin d  wye to  h is  f a th e r 's  shortcom ings, 
h is  p ib tu re  o f  Constantino de Sa as a k in d ly , t a c t f u l  man 
resp ec ted  by h is  su b o rd in a tes , i s  supported by independent 
evidence*
These th re e  ca teg o rie s  o f  m a te ria l when taken to g e th e r 
provide a f a i r l y  c le a r  p ic tu re  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  event* 
and m il i ta ry  campaigns in  Ceylon* Considerable in form ation  
can a lso  be c o lle c te d  on sources o f  revenue, the  system o f  
ad m in is tra tio n  and th e  m issionary e f f o r ts .  There are  however 
se v e ra l gaps to  be no ted . F i r s t ly ,  though th e  documents g ive 
a f a i r  p ic tu re  o f  th e  Portuguese ad m in istra tiv e  su p e rs tru c tu re
(28) D*W. Ferguson in  JCBRAS XI.427 claimed th a t  de Sa de Menezes 
wrote h is  book almost f i f t y  years a f te r  h is  f a th e r 's  death  
b u t evidence w ith in  th e  book i t s e l f  in d ic a te s  th a t  i t  i s  
l ik e ly  th a t  i t  was completed before 1640. (See pages 214*-215 
o f th e  Spanish e d itio n  where de Sa de Menezes re fe rs  to  h is  
frien d sh ip  w ith th e  conde de Linhares).Acknowledgements a re  due 
to  P ro fesso r C.R. Boxer fo r  drawing my a t te n tio n  to  th i s  p o in t .
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l i t t l e  in fo rm ation  i s  av a ilab le  as to  the  changes in  s ta tu s  and 
functions o f  th e  S inhalese and Tamil o f f ic ia l s  a t  th e  lower 
lev e ls*  Secondly, inform ation on th e  economic o rgan iza tion  
o f  Portuguese Ceylon i s  inadequate* The add itions to  Vaz F re ire 's  
tombo o r land  r e g is te r  have no t survived w ith th e  s in g le
(29)
exception o f  P inheiro  Ravasco#s tombo o f  th e  Two K orales, 1622* 
None o f  th e  tombos o f  Ja ffn a  are  ex tan t and thus the  economic 
l i f e  o f  both regions had to  be p ieced to g e th er by c o lle c tin g  
s t r a y  re fe ren ces from documents. F in a lly , though m a te ria l on 
C atho lic  m issionary  p o lic y  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to  f in d , p ra c t ic a l ly  
no p o s it iv e  evidence e x is ts  as to  th e  fa te  o f Buddhism and 
Hinduism in  K otte and Jaffna*
H is to rie s  and ch ron ic les
F r. Queyroz* s Temporal and S p ir i tu a l  conquest o f  Ceylon 
has provided th e  framework on which the  chapters on p o l i t i c a l  
h is to ry  in  th i s  study have been b u i l t j  Fr* Queyroz wrote 
jfriis work w ith  a purpose- th a t  o f in s p ir in g  th e  Portuguese to  
reconquer Ceylon -  and to  d riv e  homehis arguements he d id  
no t a t  tim es sc rup le  to  tw is t h is to r ic a l  facts*  But i t  i s  a 
t r ib u te  to  h is  s k i l l  in  a ss im ila tin g  evidence th a t  an examination 
o f contemporary records leaves h is  n a rra tiv e  (though b e re f t o f  
the m iracles he d escribes) more o r le s s  in tac t*  Queyroz• s
study however i f  uneven in  depth and treatm ent* The whole
(29) T ransla ted  in to  English by F r. S .G .Perera.
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(30)
period  1612-1618 i s  dism issed in  two pages. The p o l i t i c a l
developments o f  th e  nex t twelve years are  described  in  a
hundred pages w hile th e  period  1630-1638 rece ives a
com paratively scan ty  th i r t y  pages.
d efic ien cy
This last/btzfjacngc however, can be p a r t i a l ly  compensated 
fo r  by u s in g  F r. Manoel de Assumppao• s account o f  the 
f in a l  oas&agn o f  Constaino de Sa and the  siege o f  Colombo
(31)
th a t  fo llow ed .F r. Assumpcab o r Manoal Borges da Costa as he
was christened^ en tered  the  A ugustinian order a t  th e  age o f
n ineteen  o r  tw enty in  I6l3» He a rriv ed  in  Ceylon in  1620
and soon a f t e r  became the  f i r s t  v ic a r  a t the  Augustinian
m ission a t  Rambukkana. He worked a t  Bentota in  1628 and was
ev en tu a lly  appointed p r io r  o f  the convent o f  Colombo on 1 December
1628. Soon a f te r  completing h is  work he l e f t  th e  is la n d  never
(32)
to  re tu rn  again .H is account^ o f  the  events o f  the  period  
August -  December 1630 can be checked w ith  two o th e r contemporary 
documents -  an account o f the  exp ed itio n  to  Uva as narra ted
(30)Pages a re  given o f  the  p rin ted  English t r a n s la t io n . A ll 
a v a ila b le  inform ation  &n Fr. Queyroz has been published in  
the  in tro d u c tio n  ta  th i s  t r a n s la t io n .
(31) Racapilacab breve das guerras da i lh a  de Ceilao e da Rebeliam 
dos Levant ados, morte do g e ra l Constantino de Sa de Noronha
e perda de todo a rra y a l co ou tras cousas q succeder£b.
(32) Pom P e te r  -  S tudies in  Ceylon church h is to ry  122-123;
Rego H .4 0 5 ; TT.Ms da L iv ra r ia  f f . 2h£
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by a s o ld ie r  who took p a r t  and an account o f the  siege  o f
(33)
Colombo* The two o th e r seventeenth century Portuguese w rite rs  
F a r ia  de Souza and Joab R ibeiro  have both been ex ten siv e ly  
used* F a r ia  Souza stands ou t as the  onl)r seventeenth  cen tury
A (3^)
to  c r i t i c i s e  de Sa fo r  imprudence in  h is  l a s t  campaign* 
R ibeiro  i s  u se fu l because h is  eighteen years o f  experience 
in  th e  is la n d  enables him to  r iv a l  Robert Knox as a f i r s t
(35)
hand source? o f  inform ation  on Ceylon* R ibeiro #s f ig u re s  
o f  armies and p r ic e s  however should be tre a te d  w ith caution* 
The study  which has emerged from these  sources i s  in  
a sense a study  in  Portuguese co lo n ia l h isto ry*  I t  i s  a lso  
a chapter in  th e  h is to ry  o f  Ceylon and w ith  th i s  in  mind 
d e sp ite  th e  d e f ic ie n c ie s  o f  the sources an e f fo r ts  had been 
made to  look  a t  th e  p o in t o f  view o f the  S inhalese and Tamil 
su b jec t as w ell as th a t  o f the  Portuguese conqueror*
(33) These two accounts have been published and tr a n s la te d  
by Fr* S .G .P erera in  The expedition  to  Uva made in  1630,
They w i l l  h encefo rth  be re fe rre d  to  as Jornada and Jornada- Lomba 
respec tive ly*
(3*0 The re fe ren ces  to  F aria  de Souza in  th is  work are  to  th e  
Portuguese t r a n s la t io n  by M.V.Garcia Santos P areira*  There i s  
an abrfged English t r a n s la t io n  by Captain John Stevens e n t i t le d  
The Portuguese Asia* London, 1695# but i t  leaves o u t some o f  th e  
m a te ria l used in  th i s  study*
(35) Robert Knox An h is to r ic a l  r e la t io n  o f Ceylon* The page 
references to  R ibeiro  are  from the  1909 ed itio n  o f  P .E .P ie r is fs 
t r a n s la t io n .
P a r t I I -  The Portuguese in  Ceylon (1505-1616)
In  1505, when th e  Portuguese f i r s t  v is i te d  Ceylon the
is la n d  was d iv ided  in to  th ree  major p o l i t i c a l  u n its  and a
number o f  l e s s e r  p r in c ip a l i t i e s .  The f i r s t  Portuguese
(2)
con tac ts  were w ith  the  kingdom o f K otte which a t  th is  time 
covered th e  whole o f  th e  populous and f e r t i l e  south-w estern 
lowlands* K otte  had pn the previous century excercised 
e f fe c t iv e  su z e ra in ty  over the  r e s t  o f  th e  is la n d  but s ince  
the days o f  Parakramabahu VI (1415-1467) i t s  ru le r  had been 
g radually  lo o s in g  co n tro l over various p a r ts  o f th e  is la n d . 
N evertheless even in  the  e a rly  s ix teen th  century i t  remained 
the  s tro n g e s t kingdom in  Ceylon and the k ing  o f Kotte 
s t i l l  claim ed to  be the  overlord  o f  the whole is la n d .
The K otte economy was b a s ic a lly  one o f subsistence
(1) Except where otherw ise s ta te d  th e  sources fo r th is  sec tio n  
o f th e  in tro d u c to ry  chapter are  F r. S .G .Perera -  A h is to ry
o f Ceylon fo r  schools. (1505-1796). F r. Fernao de Queyroz -
The tem poral and s p i r i tu a l  conquest o f Ceylon, and T.Abeyasinghe-
Portuguese ru le  in  Ceylon. 1594-1012.
(2 ) In  the  h is to ry  o f Ceylon kingdoms are  u su a lly  known 
a f te r  t h e i r  c a p i ta ls .  K otte th e re fo re  w ill be g en e ra lly  
used to  in d ic a te  th e  kingdom o f which the  c i ty  o f K otte 
was th e  c a p i ta l .  The so le  exception in  the  period  under 
survey i s  th e  kingdom o f Ja ffn a  whose c a p ita l  remained 
a t  N allu r u n t i l  1621.
27
a g ric u ltu re *  However th e re  was a lim ite d  ex te rn a l trad e  
i n  few v a lu ab le  commodities -  cinnamon, precious s to n es , 
a recan u t and elephants -  handled a t  the  p o rts  o f Puttajam , 
K a lp itiy a , Colombo, Negombo, Beruwala, G alle and Weligama*
This tra d e  was la rg e ly  in  th e  hands o f a small Muslim 
community concentrated  in  th e  p o rt towns o f K otte , and o f  
th e  o th e r kingdoms o f Ceylon*
The c e n tra l highlands o f Ceylon were under th e  ru le  
o f a  se p a ra te  monarch. Sometime a f te r  the a r r iv a l  o f  th e  
Portuguese th e  c a p ita l  o f  th i s  kingdom on the  h i l l s  was 
tra n s fe r re d  from Gampola to  th e  more c e n tra lly  s i tu a te d  
Senkadagala o r Kandy. Throughout the  s ix teen th  and e a r ly  
seventeen th  cen tu rie s  th e  prim ary p o l i t i c a l  ob jec tive^  o f 
the  k ing  o f  Kandy was to  secure h is  independence from the  
ru le r  o f  K o tte . Kandy, p ro tec ted  by geographical 
fa c to rs  such as i t s  mountainous te r r a in ,  fo re s t t r a c t s  
and r iv e r s ,  was a country d i f f i c u l t  to  keep under sub jugation . 
On th e  o th e r  hand, as i t  was le s s  populous and poorer 
than K o tte , th e  k ing  o f Kandy had o ften  to  seek a fo re ign  
a llia n c e  o r th e  a id  o f  reb e ls  w ith in  K otte to  m aintain  
h is  p o s it io n . Kandyan fo re ig n  trad e  was even more lim ite d  
than  th a t  o f K o tte , though elephants and arecanut were 
exported through the  e a s t coast p o rts  o f Trincomalee, 
B a ttic a lo a  and K o ttiy a r, and a lso  by way o f K otte and Ja ffn a .
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The kingdom o f  Ja ffn a  was in  many ways d is t in c t  
from th e  two o th e r  major kingdoms o f  th e  is la n d . I t  was 
peopled by Tam ils, a race d is t in c t  in  language and cultufce 
from th e  S inhalese  who in h ab ited  K otte and Kandy* Moreover 
th e  people o f  J a f fh a  were Hindus w hile th e  S inhalese o f
i
th e  south  were adherents o f Buddhism. The p o s itio n  o f Ja ffn a  
in  the 'n o rth ern  ex trem ity  o f th e  is la n d  made i t  a l in k  
( and sometimes a b u ffe r) between the  two S inhalese s ta te s  
in  the  south  and th e  powers o f south In d ia . Ja ffn a  i t s e l f  
had sp e c ia l t i e s  o f  c u ltu re  and commerce w ith the  south 
Indian empire o f  V ijayanagara and i t s  successor s ta te s  
o f Tanjore and Madura, bu t since i t  was also  exposed to  
a tta c k s  from them d ire c te d  a t  the  a c q u is itio n  o f the 
lu c ra tiv e  p e a r l  f ish e ry  o f f  Mannar, independence fo r Ja ffn a  
meant warding o f f  th re a ts  from across the  Palk s t r a i t s  
as w ell as from th e  sou th . Ja ffn a  too was based on a subsistence 
economy bu t th e  r e la t iv e  i n f e r t i l i t y  o f the s o i l  in  th i s  
area had stim u la ted  c r a f ts  such as th e  production of c lo th .
L esser p r in c ip a l i t ie s  extended from the w estern 
co a s ta l reg ion  between Mannar and Puttlam  across n o th -c e n tra l 
Ceylon and then  southwards along the  easte rn  seaboard up 
to  the  boundaries o f  K otte a t  the  Wal&we ganga. These p r in c ip a l i t ie s  
o ften  o f  no more than  a few doxen square m iles in  ex ten t, 
were ru led  by p e t ty  c h ie f ta in s  c a lle d  the Vanniyars. During
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t-he s ix te e n th  cen tury  most o f th e  Vanniyars o f  th e  ea s te rn  
co a s t came under th e  overlo rdsh ip  o f Kandy while those  in  
n o r th -c e n tra l  Ceylon y ie ld ed  a lleg ian ce  to  e i th e r  Ja ffn a  
o r  Kandy, as circum stances d ic ta te d .
The P ortuguese, as t h e i r  envoy explained to  th e  king 
o f  K otte on th e i r  f i r s t  v i s i t ,  came to  the  E ast mainly to  
tra d e . Having e s ta b lish e d  th e i r  headquarters a t  Goa in  
1510$ th ey  se ized  s t r a te g ic  p o s itio n s  l ik e  Malacca, Ormuz 
and Sokotra in  th e  Ind ian  ocean and attem pted to  exclude 
th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  r iv a ls  -  the  Muslims -  from the  trad e  
in  sp ices  and c lo th . However in  K otte fo r  a dozen years 
a f t e r  1505 th e  Portuguese trad ed  on equal terms w ith the  
Muslims who had h i th e r to  monopolized the  ex te rn a l trad e  
o f th e  kin>gdom. I t  was a f te r  they  had b u i l t  a f o r t  in  
Colombo in  1518 th a t  they  secured a more favourable p o s itio n  
by means o f a t r e a ty  o f  a l l ia n c e  w ith the  k ing  o f K otte .
K otte i t s e l f  was weakened by a p a r t i t io n  o f th e  
kingdom in  1521. This was th e  r e s u l t  o f a re v o lt  o f  the  
th ree  sons o f  V ijayabahu, ag a in s t th e i r  own fa th e r ,  the  
king o f K o tte . The th re e  p rin ces who feared  th a t  th e i r  
fa th e r  was p lann ing  to  d is in h e r i t  them, had him k i l l e d  
and d iv ided  th e  kingdom amongst them selves. The e ld e s t, 
Bhuvanekabahu, ru led  most o f  th e  kingdom o f K otte from the
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c a p i ta l  w hile the  o th e r two, Madduma Bandara and Mayadunne
were a llo c a te d  sm all p o rtio n s  o f  t e r i t o r y  around Rayigagia
and Sitawaka.
Kayadunne who had played a lead ing  p a r t  in  the
events o f  1521 was by no means content w ith  h is  p o s itio n .
Bhuvanekabahu fo r  h is  p a r t ,  while he lacked the  a b i l i ty
w.
to  oppose h is  b ro th e r , sh<j£ed no in c lin a tio n  to  give him 
g re a te r  reco g n itio n . To counter the  am bitions o f  Mayadunne 
he began in c re a s in g ly  to  id e n t ify  h im self w ith th e  Portuguese
(3)in te r e s t  and began to  r e ly  on th e i r  a s s is ta n c e . The 
Portuguese ^ e re  q u ite  w illin g  to  supply th i s  fo r  they  
knew th a t  m il i ta ry  p ro tec tio n  was the  f i r s t  s tep  to  
p o l i t i c a l  dominance over th e  valuab le  domains o f  K otte . 
Mayadunne thereupon tu rned  fo r  a ss is ta n ce  to  th e  well-known 
enemy o f th e  Portuguese on the  Malabar co a s t, th e  zamorift 
o f C a licu t.
The f i r s t  attem pt o f  Mayadunne to  gain  supreme power 
in  K otte occured in  1526. In  th is  and o ther attem pts duripg  
th e  next tw enty f iv e  years Bhuvanekabahu was saved only 
by the  a r r iv a l  o f  a Portuguese expeditionary  fo rce  from 
Goa. His dependence on th e  Portuguese became even more
(3) As by ex p e llin g  th e i r  commercial r iv a ls ,  the  Muslims.
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complete when he sought to  exclude Mayadunne from the  
s u c c e s s io n ^ ln  favour o f h is  own grandson Bharmapala. 
Bhuvanekabahu h im self seem to  have re a l is e d  th e  weakness 
o f  h is  p o s it io n  as a c l ie n t  o f th e  Portuguese and th i s  was 
probably  why he never agreed to  the complete d e s tru c tio n  
o f  h is  b ro ther*s power, o r to  give up Buddhism, the  f a i th  
o f  h is  peop le, to  a c c e p t^ f^ C h r is t ia n ity . On the  o ther hand 
th e  l im ita t io n s  o f  h is  power are  apparent from the  f a c t  
th a t  he had to  appeal to  the  king o f Portugal to  o rder the  
Portuguese and th e  converted C hristians in  h is  own kingdom 
to  obey th e  laws o f  the  l a n d i^
Even th i s  lim ite d  power in  time became irksome
(6)to  the  Portuguese who had Bhuvanekabahu assass in a ted , and 
th en  drove out h is  powerful son-in-law  Vidiya Bandara who 
had shown open h o s t i l i t y  towards both C h r is t ia n ity  and th e
(*0 The normal ru le  o f succession in  K otte was from b ro th e r 
to  b ro th e r and then  to  the  e ld e s t son o f the  e ld e s t b ro th e r . 
Exceptional cases o f  son succeeding in s te ad  o f b ro th e r are 
sometimes found, bu t grandsons c le a r ly  had a weaker 
claim  than  b ro th e rs .
(5) Fr. G.Schurhammer and E.A.Voretzch -  Ceylon zur z e i t  
des konigs Bhuvenekabahu und Franz Xaviers -  1539-1552.
I .  107-121; R ibeiro£ 27-28.
(6) P .E .P ie r is  and M .A ,H .Fitzler -  Ceylon and P o rtu g a l. I ,  
12-13. 257-260. 282-285; Ra.javaliya (ed. by B.Gunesekera) 
79.81
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Portuguese. The young p rince  Dharmapala who was proclaim ed
k in g  by th e  Portuguese on h is  g ra n d fa th e r 's  death in  15J1
was induced to  accept C h r is t ia n ity  s ix  years l a t e r  and thej^ forty vm
took upon them selves the  ta sk  o f reducing h is  kingdom to
obedience.
This proved to  be no easy ta sk . Mayadunne claimed
to  be th e  t r u e  h e ir  o f Bhuvanekabahu and posed as th e
champion o f  th e  S inhalese and o f Buddhism ag a in st fo re ig n
and C h ris tia n  in f lu e n c es . This fa c to r  as w ell as th e  law less
behaviour o f  th e  Portuguese induced many o f the  lead in g
men o f K o tte  to  take h is  h ide . F riend ly  re la tio n s  between
Bhuvanekabahu and Ja ffn a  f a c i l i t a t e d  the flow o f south
Ind ian  m ercenaries to  Ceylon. Furthermore th e  m il i ta ry  
vvowess
powers o f  Mayadunne's son, R ajasinha enabled him to  confine 
the  Portuguese to  a sm all co asta l area around Colombo. Attempts 
to  cap ture Colombo i t s e l f  however were fo ile d  by th e  tim ely  
a r r iv a l  o f  a id  to  th e  beseiged from In d ia .
N evertheless fo r fo r ty  years from 1^50» th e  ru le r s  
o f Sitawaka confined Portuguese power, ex^ercised in  the  
name o f Dharmapala^ to  the  environs o f  Colombo. The m issionary 
a c t iv i ty  o f  th e  Franciscansjfcas lik ew ise  confined to  the  
same a rea . However, though the  co a s ta l v illa g e s  o f  K otte 
which had g iven  th e i r  a lleg ian ce  to  Mayadunne su ffe red
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h e a v ily  from Portuguese r a id s ,th e  S inhalese in h a b ita n ts
o f th e  lowlands seem to  have continued trad e  r e la t io n s
w ith th e  Portuguese except during  th e  two g reat\^seiges ' o f
(7)
Colombo in  1579 and 1587-88*
The power o f  Sitawaka now a t  i t s  z en ith , was also  
s ig n a liz ed  by th e  conquest o f Kandy* Since 1521 th e  ru le rs  
o f Kandy had been l e f t  undisturbed w hile Mayadunne and 
Bhuvanekabahu were engaged in  a s tru g g le  fo r  supremacy.
One o f thera^J ayaweera Bandara by name^being anxious to  gain  
sovereign s ta tu s  had asked fo r  Portuguese a id  in  th e  15^0*s* 
The Portuguese were q u ite  w illin g  to  g ran t such a s s is ta n c e , 
d e sp ite  t h e i r  promises to  defend th e  realms and r ig h ts  o f  
Bhuvanekabahu, b u t u n fo rtu n a te ly  fo r  the  Kandyan k ing , th i s  
a s s is ta n ce  was forthcom ing only  a t  a time when Bhuvanekabahu 
and Mayadunne had tem porarily  u n ited  and th e  f i r s t  b id  
fo r  independedce ended in  f a i lu r e .
When R ajasinha succeeded to  the throne o f  Sitawaka 
in  1581 he found th a t  K araliyadde Bandara, Jayaweera Bandara's 
successor^ no t only  had a force o f Portuguese s o ld ie rs  to  
a id  him b u t had a l l ie d  h im self w ith th e  Portuguese and 
had given h is  daughter in  m arriage to  Dharmapala* This
(7) DR.IV, 239-243
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convinced R ajasinha th a t  the  conquest o f Kandy was necessary 
to  safeguard h is  own flank while a ttac k in g  Colombo• Some 
o f  the  Kandyan c h ie fs , a lien a ted  by Karaliyadde Bandara's 
pro-Portuguese p o lic y  also  gave valuab le  a id  to  Rajasinha 
in  h is  campaign* Finding h is  supporters too few and h is  
Portuguese contingent too small to  o f fe r  much re s is ta n c e , 
K araliyadde Bandara f le d  to  T rincoaalee, where he died*
His ch ild ren  b ap tised  as Dora F ilip e , DoraJoao and Dona Catherina 
re sp e c tiv e ly  were l a t e r  taken w ith a Portuguese e sco rt to  
M annar^
In  the  period  up to  1590, while the  Portuguese were 
fo ile d  in  th e i r  am bitions in  K otte and Kandy due to  the 
power o f  Sitawaka, in  Ja ffn a  they  were a t  bay by a succession
A
o f ru le r s  who c le a r ly  saw th a t  i t  was in  th e i r  in te r e s t  
to  r e s i s t  Portuguese encroachment. The b e s t known amongst 
them S an k ili (1519-1561) pursued a co n s is ten t an ti-Portuguese 
and an ti-C a th o lic  p o licy . He knew th a t  the  h e ir  o f  the  
former k ing  whom he had deposed had gained frien d s  among 
the  Portuguese. He also  quick ly  re a lis e d  th a t  the  C h ris tian  
converts o f the  F ishery  Coast would acknowledge no temporal 
sovereign o th er than the  king o f Portugal.Thus to  him the 
Portuguese represen ted  the  enemy from w ithout and C h r is tia n ity
(8) P .da Trinidade -  Conquista e s p ir i tu a l  do O rien te . I I I .  65-68.
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subversion  from w ith in . This was why he aided  Mayadunne
a g a in s t th e  Portuguese and l a t e r  o ffe re d  refuge and
a s s is ta n c e  to  V idiya Bandara. The Portuguese m il i ta ry  e f f o r ts
(9)a g a in s t S a n k ili  had l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  Even th e  e la b o ra te ly
prepared  ex p ed itio n  o f 1560 which was le d  by th e  V iceroy
Don C onstantino de Braganya h im self was ev e n tu a lly  fo rced
to  s a i l  away w ithout deth ron ing  him. B raganca 's exped ition
however achieved one im portant g a in . The is la n d  o f  Mannar
was se ized  and a f o r t  was b u i l t  on i t .  A number o f  C h ris tian s
( 10)
from th e  F ishery  Coast were s e t t l e d  in  th e  is la n d  which
h en cefo rth  became a base fo r  in tr ig u e s  ag a in s t h o s t i le
monarchs in  Ja ffn a  and a source o f support to  th o se  who
favoured th e  Portuguese. However, even when in  th e  1560*s
the  cap ta in  o f  Mannar ev en tu a lly  found h im se lf ab le  to  p lay
the  king-maker in  Ja ffn a  i t  was no t long  befo re  th e  new
r u le r  found h im self ob liged  to  oppose th e  Portuguese to
p ro te c t  h is  own in te r e s t s  and to  m ain ta in  th e  lo y a l ty  o f
h is  Hindu su b je c ts . For in stan ce  P e riy a p u lle  Chegarajasekaram
in s ta l l e d  in  1570 a ttack ed  Mannar w ith  a id  o f  fo rces  from
T anjoreJ11^
_ _ _
v ' F r. S .G .Perera holds th a t  in  15^3 Martim Affonso de Souza 
fo rced  S an k ili to  promise t r ib u te  b u t th e  v ery  nex t year S a n k ili
k i l l e d  a l l  C h ris tian s  in  Mannar who re fu sed  to  g ive  up th e i r
f a i t h .  The Portuguese were unable to  make him rev e rse  th i s  
p o lic y  d e sp ite  another exped ition  in  15^5*
(10) The T iru n av e li coast o f  south In d ia  between Cape Camorin 
and th e  is la n d  o f Rameswaram.
(11) V riddhag irison  * The Nayak o f  T anjore. 78.
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E ighty f iv e  years a f te r  th e i r  f i r s t  v i s i t  to  Ceylon,
the  Portuguese s t i l l  had l i t t l e  re a l  power in  Ceylon* They
and t h e i r  C h ris tian  converts were confined to  the  areas
surrounding the fo r ts  o f  Colombo and Mannar* Even these
fo r ts  were freq u en tly  beseiged by th e  kings o f  Sitawaka 
( 12)
and Ja ffn a  who acted in  concert ag a in s t th e  fo re ign  danger* 
Portuguese e f fo r ts  to  s e t  up puppet ru le r s  who would be 
amenable to  th e i r  wishes had so fa r  fa iled*  Correspondingly 
the  m issionary  a c t iv i ty  and th e  so c ia l impact o f C h r is t ia n ity  
was reduced to  a minimum*
During th e  next few y ears , however, a s e r ie s  o f  
s t r ik in g  v ic to r ie s  enabled the  Portuguese to  become th e  
ru le rs  o f  K otte and th e  dominant power in  Ceylon* This 
sudden re v e rsa l o f fortune was to  a la rg e  ex ten t a r e s u l t  
o f th e  d ec lin e  of the  power o f Sitawaka. R ajasinha#s 
exactions, e sp ec ia lly  those dufcing h is  p rep ara tio n s fo r 
h is  l a s t  se ige o f Colombo, a lien a ted  many* His conversion 
to  Hinduism and the favours he gran ted  to  Hindus could not 
have endeared him to  those who had turned  to  h is  fa th e r  
as a defender o f Buddhism. Moreover h is  ru th le s s  e lim in a tio n  
o f a ll  p o te n tia l reb e ls  ensured th a t  th e re  would be no
(12) Mannar fo r in stance  was attacked  f iv e  tim es in  t h i r t y  one 
years (Queyroz 418-4195 V riddagirison  78)
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strong  successor a t  h is  death .
A lte r  h is  f a i lu re  to  capture Colombo in  1588, R ajasinha 
faced re v o lts  in  h is  own dominions. The Portuguese p ro f ite d  
by th ese  d istu rbances to  capture some o f th e  lands o f 
K otte . Furthermore they  sen t a fo rce  to  th e  h i l l  country 
under Konnappu Bandara enthrone Don F il ip e , son o f  
K araliyadde Bandara, as the  new o f k ing  o f  Kandy, Konnappu Bandara 
jo in in g  hands w ith the  reb e llio u s  Kandyan n o b i l i ty  defea ted  
Rajasinha* s forces a t  Ganetenna and then  su c c e ss fu lly  
defended Balane Pass ag a in st R ajasinha h im self. Hatoing 
f a i le d  in  h is  f in a l  attem pt to  recover Kandy R ajasinha r e t i r e d  
towards Sitawaka in  1593 and d ied  on th e  way. A fte r h is  
death  d issensions w ith in  Sitawaka enabled th e  Portuguese 
to  gain  th e  support o f  a la rg e  se c tio n  o f th e  S inhalese 
army le d  by Manamperuma M ohotta li*^  and w ith h is  a id  
Sitawaka i t s e l f  was captured and th e  whole o f  south-w estern  
Ceylon reduced to  obedience.
In  Ja ffn a  too the  Portuguese gained ground. The King 
P u v ira ja  Pandaram P a ra ra ja s in g h am ^ ^ ad  a lready  launched
(13) Son o f  V irasundera Bandara who had helped R ajasinha to  
se ize  Kandy, V irasundera Bandara was l a t e r  k i l l e d  by R ajasinha 
on susp icion  o f treach ery  and h is  son f le d  to  th e  Portuguese.
(1*0 Manamperuma M ohottala was a south Ind ian  r e c r u i t  to  Rajasinha*s 
army. His o r ig in a l name was A ritthakeevendu Perumal. A fter 
Rajasinha*s death he won a skirm ish ag a in st th e  Portuguese and 
tak in g  th e  name o f J ayaweera Bandara, made an attem pt to  gain  
k ingship  fo r  h im self, before destroy ing  th e  Portuguese.
(15) The successor o f P eriyapu lle  Chegarajasekaram.
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an unsuccessfu l a ttac k  ag a in s t Mannar. R ea lis in g  th e  need
fo r  a naval power to  cut o f f  Portuguese sea-borne a id
he appealed to  the  K u n ja lis , th e  adm irals o f  th e  zamorin
of C a licu t to  a id  him. This proved to  be h is  undoing, fo r
in  wake o f  th e  C a licu t f l e e t  came the  Portuguese f l e e t
o f Andre Furtado de Mendoza which had been e sp e c ia lly
organised to  pu t an end to  K unjali arinfar ra id s  on Portuguese
sh ip s . De Mendonpa no t only destroyed th e  f l e e t  bu t having
re lie v e d  Mannar invaded Ja ffh a . The k ipg  o f  Jaffna was
Kc
defeated  and k i l l e d  to g e th e r w ith h is  son and^commander-
in -c h ie f  o f  th e  Ja ffh a  fo rces . Ethirmanne Sin^ham, son o f
P eriy ap u lle  whom the  Portuguese had s e t  up in  1570 and son-
in -law  o f P u v ira ja  Pandaram was then placed on th e  th rone .
The new king agreed to  accept the  king o f Portugal as
( 16)
sovereign and to  pay t r ib u te .
In  Kandy however the i n i t i a l  Portuguese success 
was soon followed by a hum ilia ting  rev e rse . The S inhalese 
fo rces o f Don F ilip e  having proved themselves w ell ab le to
(l6)C.R.B©xer -  Andre Furtado de Mandonca. 1538-l6 l0 ./ l3 -1 7 /  
A.Botelho de Souza -  Subsidios para  a h is to r ia  m il i ta r  
m aritim a da In d ia . 1.32
EM. Add. Mss. 28432.f .l2 4 v  ; B M L .F S .W .f .^ ; 3NL. 
Illum inados 139*f . 82
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defend Kandy, th e  Portuguese contingent re tu rned  to  Mannar
leav ing  a sm all g a rriso n  a t  Gannoruwa. Konnappu Bandara
however was not s a t i s f ie d  w ith h is  p o s it io n  as commander-j4
in -c h ie f ,  and made use o f the  growing unpopu larity  o f
th e  Franciscan m issionaries and th e  Portuguese to  form a
group lo y a l to  himself* Thus when th e  k ing  Don F ilip e  died
suddenjy^konnappu Bandara se ized  th e  opportun ity  to  r i s e
him
ag a in st Don F i l i p e ^  in fa n t son and to  expel/and the  
Portuguese from the highland kingdom* Konnappu Bandara 
h im self renouncedC hristian ity  and tak in g  the  name o f
i
Vimaladharmasuriya proclaim ed h im self r u le r  o f Kandy.
In  an e f f o r t  to  avenge th i s  d e fea t and re s to re  
Portuguese power in  K otte th e  v iceroy  a t  Goa nominated 
Pero Lopez de Souza to  lead  an expedition  to  Kandy.
De Souza a rriv ed  w ith a la rg e  fo rce  o f Portuguese from
Goa and prepared to  invade Kandy, and to  enthrone
Dona C atherina #r(Kusuraasana Devii the  so le  su rv iv ing  ch ild
of Karaliyadde Bandara. De Souza was aided by th e  former
Sitawaka coramander-in-chief, Jayaweera Bandara and many o f
the  lead ers  o f  Kandy who were glad  to  see th e i r  ro y al fam ily
back on th e  th ro n e , A fte r only s l ig h t ly  re s is ta n c e  Dona Catherina
$17) The Portuguese suspected th a t  Konnappu Bandara 
was responsib le  fo r  th e  death o f  Dom F ilip e# There i s  
however no d e f in i te  evidence to  prove th i s .
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was in s ta l le d  as queen in  Kandy and Viraaladharmasuriya was 
d riven  off*
From h is  ra th e r  desperate  p o s itio n  Vimaladharmasuriya 
e x tr ic a te d  h im self by ex p lo itin g  th e  p o l i t i c a l  weaknesses 
o f  th e  Portuguese. Since th e  tim e o f K araliyadde Bandara, 
i f  not e a r l i e r ,  a la rg e  sec tio n  o f the  n o b il i ty  had been 
m is tru s tfu l o f  Portuguese in te rfe re n c e . Vimaladharmasuriya 
o b lig in g ly  c irc u la te d  rumours th a t  th e  heavily-guarded 
p rin cess  was to  marry a Portuguese who would then  be th e  
a c tu a l r u le r .
F urther the  Portuguese wished to  avoid a r e p e t i t io n  
o f what had happened in  the  previous expedition  to  Kandy.
They en te rta in ed  susp icions o f  th e  am bitions o f  Jayaweera 
Bandara. Viraaladharmasuriya, knowing th i s ,  con trived  to  
l e t  a message from him to  the  S inhalese commander f a l l  in to
n
th e  hands o f  the  Portuguese. The r e s u lta n t  execution o f 
Jayaweera Bandara le d  to  th e  d e se rtio n  o f th e  S inhalese 
troops and the  d e fea t o f  de Souza. The capture o f Kusumasana 
Devi by Vimaladharmasuriya which followed was perhaps an even 
more im portant r e s u l t  o f  de Souza*s exped ition , fo r  th e  
Kandyan monarchy promptly m arried h er was thereby  provided 
w ith the  b e s t o f  claims to  be th e  le g itim a te  sovereign 
o f the  h i^ ila n d s . When K otte passed in to  Portuguese hands
4 1
a t  the  death  o f King Dharmapala w ithout is s u e , Vimaladharmasuriya 
as th e  so le  su rv iv ing  S inhalese monarch was considered 
even by many o f the  people o f K otte as th e i r  p ro tec to r*
H itherto  the  Potguoe o sought to  e s ta b lis h  th e i r  
in flu en ce  in  Ceylon by the  support o r in s t a l l a t io n  o f c l ie n t  
r u le r s ,  f i r s t  in  K otte and then  in  Ja ffn a  and Kandy* There 
i s  l i t t l e  evidence o f  a change o f  p o licy  from th a t  pursued 
in  K otte from the  e a rly  years o f Bhuvanekabahu1 s re ign  
u n t i l  the  d efea t o f Pero Lopes de Souza. Andre Furtado de Hendonya 
having defeated  the  opposing fo rces in  Ja ffn a  d id  not mnnex 
the  kingdom* He merely s e t  up a t r ib u ta ry  r u le r  who, i t  
was expected would remain lo y a l to  the  Portuguese* S im ila rly  
th e  two expeditions to  Kandy in  th e  ea rly  1590*s both aimed 
a t  e s ta b lish in g  S inhalese ru le r s  under Portuguese pro tection*
The document by which Xing Dharmapala o f K otte in  1580 
bequeathed h is  kingdom to  the  king o f Portugal in  case he 
d ied  w ithout issu e  seems on th e  face o f i t  to  t e l l  ag a in st 
th i s  p ro p o sitio n . However in  1580 when Dharmapala*s near 
r e la t iv e s  were a l l  in  th e  opposite  camp th i s  was the  only 
p o ss ib le  so lu tio n . The Portuguese had nothing to  lo se  
by m aintain ing  a figurehead ru ler*  I t  was merely th a t  a t  
th i s  time they  could not f in d  a successor to  Dharmapala.
Under Don Jeronimo de Azevedo (159^1612), Portuguese 
p o lic y  changed from one o f favouring ©£ the estab lishm ent o f
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p ro te c to ra te s  to  a i^ dc p o lic y  o f d ire c t  conquest* Some o f  th e  
fa c to rs  which in fluenced  th i s  change were developments 
w ith in  Ceylon* The p o l i t i c a l  events of the  e a r ly  1590 #s 
seemed to  in d ic a te  to  th e  Portuguese th a t  th e  conquest o f  
th e  whole is la n d  was w ell w ith in  th e i r  reach* The rap id  
co llapse  o f  th e  kingdom o f Sitawaka not only removed a 
major o b stac le  to  Portuguese expansion but enabled them to  
se ize  most o f th e  lands o f K otte and supplement t h e i r  own 
fo rces by la rg e  numbers o f  S inhalese m ilitiam en. In  th i s  
changed context those who favoured conquest gained a valuab le  
advocate in  Azevedo who by determined and v igouring  measures 
soon brought a l l  K otte to  hee t Moreover in  the case o f  Kandy 
the  Portuguese ran out o f  claim ants to  s e t  up on the  throne^ 
w hile the  experience o f Ja ffn a  showed th a t  v assa l ru le r s  
d id  not always remain amenable to  Portuguese w ishes.
VJhile Azevedo in  Ceylon urged d ir e c t  conquest, 
developments elsewhere in  the  East convinced th e  king o f 
P ortugal th a t  th is  was indeed the  b e s t p o licy . The Deccan 
campaign o f  Akbar between 1593 and 1600 awoke th e  fe a r  o f a 
Mughul th r e a t  to  Portuguese In d ia . In  the event o f  a Mughul 
conquest o f  th e  Deccan su lta n te s  i t  was considered th a t  
Ceylon would provide a valuab le base from which p o ss ib le  
lo sse s  in  In d ia  might be recovered. More im portant was the  
a r r iv a l  o f the  Dutch in  th e  East in  1595» The e a r ly  Dutch
43
expeditions followed the  Portuguese rou te along the  easte rn  
coast o f  A frica  and then sa ile d  across th e  Ind ian  Ocean to  
the E ast In d ie s . T heir f le e ts  in  the  f i r s t  twenty years 
th e re fo re  sa ile d  ju s t  south o f  Ceylon. Ceylon thus acquired 
a s t r a te g ic  value i t  had not had in  the  e a r l i e r  period  and 
the  Portuguese re a l is e d  th a t  the  ex istence  o f an unsubjugated 
kingdom occupying a long s tr e tc h  o f coast waa an open in v i ta t io n  
to  the  Dutch.
While p o l i t i c a l  events d ic ta te d  a w arlike p o licy , 
economic inducements too p u lled  th e i r  weight in  the  same 
d ire c tio n . The con tro l o f Ceylon would have secured a p le n t i f u l  
supply o f cinnamon, arecanu t, p ea rls  and precious stones as 
well as a monopoly o f  the  supply o f cinnamon. Moreover the 
clim ate o f the  is la n d  was thought extrem ely su ita b le  fo r  
fo s te r in g  a Portuguese colony. Advocates o f  the  conquest o f 
Kandy could p o in t to  economic rewards as w ell as p o l i t i c a l  
n ec e ss ity  e sp e c ia lly  as the  e lim in a tio n  of in land  f ro n tie r s  was 
expected to  r e s u l t  in  reduced defence c o s ts j^ ih e r e  thus
(18) T,Abeyasinghe ( I 89) estim ates th a t  costs would have been 
reduced by over ten  thoudand x e ra fin s  a year. This was o^fcourse 
in  tim e o f  war. But in  tim e o f peace the  saving could not 
have been much le s s  as Portuguese troops remained on a 
war fo o tin g  even from l621to 1628. However ag a in st th is  
must be s e t  th e  expenses o f  g a rriso n in g  Kandy,thou^a th is  
might conceivably have been financed by Kandyan revenues.
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seemed a v a r ie ty  o f good reasons why Don Jeronimo de Azevedo
should have pursued a p o licy  of d ir e c t  conquest o f  Kandy,
To meet th i s  new and more determined Portuguese
th re a t  Vimaladharmasuriya had only th e  resources o f th e
kingdom o f Kandy, though th i s  also  included some con tro l
over the  Vanniyars o f  the  easte rn  coast* His lands however
were poorer and more sp a rse ly  populated than th e  f e r t i l e
south-w estern p la in s  which were now under Portuguese control*
I t  i s  thus no su rp rise  th a t  he was forced on th e  defensive
fo r  most o f  h is  re ig n .
Vimaladharmasuriya however had two sources o f s tren g th .
(19)F ir s t ly  the  people o f  Kandy remained lo y a l to  h i£ , and
those of th e  low country, e sp ec ia lly  a f te r  the  death o f
King Dharmapala in  1597* regarded him as t h e i r  law ful sovereign.
(20)
This fa c to r  aided by th e  harsh  measures o f  Azevedo enabled 
him to  d iv e r t  the  Portuguese a ttack  by encouragement o f  
re v o lts  in  the  low lands. The Portuguese were thus occupied 
w ith the  successive re v o lts  o f Akaragama Appuhamy,
E d ir i l le  Rala, Simao Correa, Manoel Gomez, Kangara A ratchi
(19) Vimaladhramasuriya’s patronage o f  Buddhism was a fa c to r  
which ensured th i s  lo y a lty . P.M.P.Abeyasinghe -  Udarata V i t t i . l40 .
(20) A l e t t e r  o f th e  camara o f Colombo to  th e  v iceroy  dated
21 November 1617 describes how Azevedo ordered th e  massacre of 
every l iv in g  person from th e  youngest ch ild  to  th e  o ld e s t 
in h a b ita n t in  A ttan ag alla , fo r  the  k i l l in g  o f a Portuguese 
so ld ie r  in  the v il la g e .
AHU. Caixa V. 2 1 . l l . l 6 l7
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and Kuruwita R ala^*^
Secondly Vimaladharmasuriya had access to  supp lies o f
men, m unitions and p rov isions from abroad. F ortunate ly  fo r
the  Portuguese h is  n eg o tia tio n s  a f te r  1602 fo r  Dutch
ass is tan ce  bore no fru ity  bu t th e  lack  o f Portuguese power
in  the  e a s t coast enabled the  Muslim tra d e rs  to  supply
Kandy w ith  much of what she needed, c h ie f ly  through the
( 22)p o rts  o f  Trincomalee, K o ttiy a r and B a ttic a lo a . Soon 
a f te r  1594 m oreover,Jaffna had become an im portant rou te 
o f aupply.
Ethirimanne Sinham, th e  k ing  s e t  up by in  Ja ffh a  by
Andre Furtado de Mendonpa in  1591 was fo r  a time lo y a l to
the  Portuguese. By 1595 however the  Portuguese had found
(23)reasons to  suspect h is  lo y a lty ;  -"H is change in  a t t i tu d e
was perhaps due to  a d e s ire  to  gain  g re a te r  r e a l  power and
perhaps also  due to  i r r i t a t i o n  w ith the  overbearing a t t i tu d e
(24)
o f the Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  and the  demands o f the  C atholic 
p r ie s tif^ W h a te v e r  th e  cause, th e re  seems to  be l i t t l e  doubt 
th a t  he aided Kandy in  p ro c u r in g  of e s s e n tia l  supplies(26)
A
(21) Kuruwita Rala was a lso  known as Antonio B are tto . He l a t e r  
f led  to  Kandy and gained high o ff ic e  under Vimaladharamasuriya and 
became the  ru le r  o f Uva and commander o f  th e  army under Senerat.
(22) Puttlam  was a lso  a source o f supply but not between 1601 and
1603 and a f te r  1612.
(23) A P0.III.504; P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon-The Portuguese era  ,11. 118,
(24) P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon- The Portuguese e ra . I I .  119*
(25) P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon- The Portuguese e ra . I I .  150-152.
(26) P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon- The Portuguese, ££a, I I .  119-120.
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By l6 i4  the Portuguese k ing  had sen t d e f in i te  in s tru c tio n s  
to  depose him and only  th e  lack  o f means prevented th e
(27)cap ta in -g en era l in  Ceylon from carry in g  out th i s  order* 
However Ethirimanne Sinhara, naver dared to  come out openly 
e i th e r  ag a in s t th e  Portuguese o r ag a in s t C h r is t ia n i ty !^ ^  
The t r ib u te  was paid  regu larly*  In  f a c t  he was even forced  
to  allow  th e  co n s tru c tio n  o f a number o f  churches in  
the  is lan d s  near Jaffna* These churches a lso  served as 
d efen sib le  p o s itio n s  round which were gathered  a number o f  
Tamil converts* The g ran t o f  perm ission to  b u ild  a church
(27) P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon-The Portuguese era* I I .  119-120.
D R .II.308,402; A.Bocarro 0 Decada X III da h is to r ia  da I n d ia .277 
0(28) P .da T rinidade (111,20^-206) mentions an exped ition  
le d  by Manoel B arreto da S ilv a , cap ta in  o f Mannar, who 
w ith th ree  hundred Portuguese and seven hundred C h ris tian s  
o f Mannar s a ile d  to  Ja ffn a  to  fo rce  th e  k ing  to  p ro h ib it  
trad e  w ith Kandy. The exped ition  f a i le d  in  i t s  purpose 
fo r  the  k ing  stood firm  and B arreto had to  r e s t  content 
w ith a promise^ o f  continued re lig io u s  freedom fo r  
C h ris tian s  in  J a ffh a . The C h ris tian s  o f  Ja ffn a  apparen tly
s e t  l i t t l e  s to re  by th i s  undertaking  fo r  a m a jo rity  o f 
o f them, about e ig h t hundred in  number m igrated to  th e  is la n d  
o f Tanadiva o r Kayts which became a C h ris tian  stronghold .
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a t  U rkavaltu ra i fo r  in stan ce  le d  to  the lo s s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
co n tro l over th e  is la n d . The g ran t o f the revenues o f the
(29)
is la n d  o f  Tanadiva to  th e  church also  le d  to  the  same r e s u l t .  
These developments w hile they  provided a b asis  o f support 
fo r  any Portuguese in te rv e n tio n , in e v ita b ly  roused h o s t i l i t y  
among th e  Ja ffn a  Hindu n o b il i ty .
During the  twenty th ree  years a f te r  159^ the  main 
in te r e s t  o f th e  Portuguese la y  in  the  m aintainance o f  th e i r  
hold on K otte and in  th e  subjugation  o f Kandy, In  the  f i r s t  
e igh teen  years o f  th i s  period  they  were le d  by Don Jeronimo 
de Azevedo.Azevedo l e f t  h is  mark on Ceylon in  more ways than 
one. In  th e  re lig io u s  f i e ld  the  monopoly o f th e  Franciscans 
was broken f i r s t  by the  J e s u its  and then  by th e  Augustinians 
and Dominicans w ith h is  ac tiv e  encouragement, so th a t  th e  
t o t a l  m issionary e f f o r t  could be enlarged. I t  was he who 
e s tab lish e d  the  Portuguese headquarters a t  Malwana, an in lan d  
c a p ita l .
In  m atters o f c i v i l  ad m in is tra tio n  Azevedo d id  not 
seek to  innovate . In  h is  tim es K otte was governed la rg e ly  
through th e  t r a d i t io n a l  S inhalese ad m in is tra tiv e  o rg an iza tio n . 
Thus K otte was, as o f  o ld^divided in to  d isavas or provinces
fa
(29) P .da T rin id y  I I I . 205
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and k o ra les or d i s t r i c t s .  F urther subd iv isions were rep resen ted
(30)by p a ttu s  and v i l la g e s .  Each o f  th e  four d isavas o f  K otte 
was ru led  by an o f f i c i a l  a lso  termed d isava who had 
ad m in is tra tiv e , m il i ta ry  and ju d ic ia l  powers. The k o ra les  
were in  charge o f ko ra le  vidanes who w b b © in  ttum aided by
(31)
a tu k o ra le s . m ohottalas and kanakapulles and headmen. Apart
from th is  t e r i t o r i a l  o rg an iza tio n  th e re  a lso  e x is ted  baddas
which were o rgan iza tions (o fte n  o f ca s te  groups) fo r  purposes
(32)of revenue and se rv ice  to  th e  s ta te .  The S inhalese  armed 
fo rces too remained organised under th e i r  own m udaliyars 
o r commanders and a ra tc h is  o r cap ta in s . As in  th e  days o f 
K otte they  remained an un tra ined  m i l i t i a .  N evertheless, though 
th e  S inhalese ad m in is tra tiv e  framework was re ta in e d , th e  
in c reas in g  s u b s t i tu tio n  o f Portuguese fo r  S inhalese o f f ic ia l s  
and Portuguese ignorance o f S inhalese custom upon which 
th e  ad m in istra tio n  was based d id  lead  to  change which bore
r f
h eav ily  upon th e  su b jec t S inha lese .
I t  was however in  th e  m il i ta ry  sphere th a t  Azevedo
(30) M atara, Sabaragamuwa,Four and Seven K orales. These d iv is io n s  
had ex is ted  before th e  tim e o f Azevedo. P .d a  T rin idads I I I .  8-9*
(31) These c h ie f ly  a s s is te d  th e  k o ra le  vidane in  keeping 
records o f land  and revenue.
(32) For example th e  cinnamon department o r th e  mahabadda 
which included iiost of^Bhaleas o r cinnamon p e e le rs .
/ --------------
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excelled  and i t  was to  th i s  th a t  he devoted most o f  h is  
time and energy. He was an uncompromising opponent o f 
Kandy, p a r t ic u la r ly  o f Vimaladharmasuriya. He had howeve^r 
to  f i r s t  p ac ify  the  lands o f  K otte th a t  had r is e n  in  
re v o lt  on th e  news of the  d e fea t o f  de Souza. By 1603 th is  
ta sk  was completed and a number o f  f o r ts  and stockades had 
been constructed  both to  prevent re b e llio n  w ith in  Portuguese 
te r i to r y  and to  ward o f f  Kandyan a tta c k s . In  January 1603 
Azevedo le d  h is  troops ag a in s t th e  fo r ts  guarding the 
mountain approaches to  Kandy, took them and found h is  way 
to  &xndyvthe  c a p ita l .
Azevedo*s attem pt to  invade and conquer Kandy in  one 
d ec isiv e  campaigpi f a i le d  however due to  the  re v o lt  o f th e  
la sc a r in a . who formed the  bulk o f  h is  fo rc e s . The tough 
campaign th a t  follow ed, the re v o lts  in  Bcaoibt^ c K otte i t s e l f  
and the in c reas in g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f th e  Portuguese in  the  
East c rea ted  by the  coming o f  the  Dutch and English, 
apparen tly  convinced Azevedo o f the  need to  weaken h is  
enemy before fu r th e r  attem pts a t  conquest. Thus he began 
a p o licy  o f  d e s tru c tiv e  ra id s  on Kandy. Twice a y ea r, norm ally 
a t  harvest tim e, a l ig h t ly  armed and h ig h ly  mobile group 
o f Portuguese and la s c a r in s  entered  Kandyan t e r i t o r y  and 
la id  the  lands w aste. This p o lic y  was re in fo rced  by a blockade 
o f Kandyan trad e  enforced by a f l e e t  o f l ig h t  v esse ls
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which cru ised  o f f  the  ea s te rn  coast o f  Ceylon. This p o licy
was pursued w ith considerable success fo r  the  next decade.
I t  was nevertheless only a m akeshift attem pt to  keep Kandy
weak t i l l  the  Portuguese had gained s u f f ic ie n t  s trn g th  fo r
a f in a l  d ec is iv e  campaign.
The change to  a defensive p o lic y  by the  Portuguese
coincided w ith a change o f r u le r  in  Kandy. The death  o f
Vimaladharmasuriya in  l60k le d  to  a c r i s i s  in  Kandy. His
(33)
only son R ajju ru  Maha Adhasin was s t i l l  a ch ild  and the
queen Kusumasana devi prove to  be too weak to  ru le  over
th e  Kandyan n o b il i ty . Vimaladharraasuriya h im self had t r ie d  
to  secure an undisturbed succession  by appoin ting  h is  cousin 
Senerat to  th e  key p o s itio n  o f com mander-in-chiefi^ Senerat
(33)The Ctfulavamsa and some versions o f  th e  Ra.1avaliya hold
th a t  Kusumasana devi had a t  l e a s t  th re e  sons by Vimaladharmasuriya.
(BII.Add.Mss.22012, EM.or. 2702, H4.or.5307, BM.or.8219,
Ra.javaliya. 98, CKulavamsa. 11,233) N evertheless Portuguese 
sources supported by o th e r versions o f  Ra.javali.ya appear 
to prove th a t  Kumarasinha and V ijayapala as w ell as 
Maha Astana were sons o f  S enerat. (Biker I .  205-207, II*
Assentos I .  573, C A L R .III.^-50 ; 3C L R .ser.III. 155-293,
D iario  de conde de L inhares.66 ; Ajuda 5 1 -V III-^O .ff.2 l6 ,
220v) This leaves us w ith th e  conclusion th a t  R ajju ru  Kaha 
Adhasin was Vimaladharmasuriya*s so le  son.
(3^) There i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  Senerat was en tru s ted  w ith 
th e  p ro tec tio n  o f  Kusumasada devi and th e  p rince  by 
Vimaladharmasuriya ( Ra.javaliya 100, Jornada 3^» Queyroz 606, 
Handarampurapuvata stanza 177?) MWUMfatotf )
but i t  i s  doubtfu l whether Vimaladharmasuriya wished him to  
be h is  successor as a sse rted  by Queyroz and some S inhalese 
a u th o r i t ie s ,  (eg. P.M.P.Abeyasinghe, 132-139)
soon found th a t  o th e r p rin ce s , c h ie f ly  Mayadunne o f  Uva 
and Vidiya Bandara o f the  Seven and Four Korales wished 
to  marry Kusumasana devi and become k ing . He promptly 
fo re s ta l le d  them and marrying Kusumasana devi h im self 
was acclaimed k ing  a f te r  a perio d  o f tu rm oil l a s t in g  sev era l 
months
The displw regard ing  the  Succession in  K'w&fce enabled
Azevedo to  regain  co n tro l over much o f K otte . The s ig n ifican ce
o f  the death o f  Vimaladharmasuriya and accession  o f Senerat
has however been exaggerated. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  Senerat had
(36)
a t  one time been a bhikkhu and was very much le s s  w arlike 
than  h is  cousin. He had had fo r years experience in  lead in g  
tro o p ^ ^ ln d  had proved a s tu te  enough to  overcome h is  r iv a ls  
in  1604. Moreover he had the a s s is ta n ce  o f two o f  th e  reb e ls  
who had r is e n  ag a in st Azevedo in  1603 -  Kuruwita Rala and 
Kangara A ratch i. He d id  face more opposition  w ith in  Kandy 
than  Vimaladharmasuriya, bu t th e  r e a l  dec line  in  S en era t9 s
(35) The a lle g a tio n  i s  made by Queyroz (606-609) th a t  Senerat 
pu t to  death  th ree  hundred Portuguese p riso n ers  in c lu d in g  s ix ty  
b lin d  men a f te r  they  had aided him to  become k ing . A contemporary 
Portuguese document (Ajuda 51-V-3^f*101 a re p o rt on In d ia  1605) 
gives th e  same s to ry  but pu ts the  number o f  Portuguese k i l l e d
a t  two hundred. S e n e ra t 's  ch a rac te r and h is  trea tm en t o f 
captured Portuguese on o th er Occasions makes th is  re p o rt improbable 
un less the  Portuguese opposed h is  succession .
(36) A Buddhist monk.
(37) Jornada 3^; Baldeaeus 37» In  f a c t  an o ld  S inhalese 
poem published in  P.M .P.Abeyasinghe's U d a ra ta v itti 132-133 
even suggest th a t  he was chosen as Vimaladharmasuriya*s 
successor due to  h is  m il i ta ry  s k i l l .
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p o s it io n , p o p u la rity  and a u th o rity  occured only a f te r  1612
During th e  p erio d  1604^1612 th e  Kandyans were in  no 
p o s it io n  to  attem pt to  expel th e  Portuguese. The l a t t e r  
were lik ew ise  too weak to  make another attem pt on th e  
sc a le  o f l603« On th e  whole however th e  Portuguese re ta in ed  
th e  m il i ta ry  i n i t i a t i v e .  They were r e la t iv e ly  fre e  from 
re v o lts  in  K o tte^fo r constan t r is in g s  and harsh  r e p r is a ls  
had exhausted and cowed th e  lowland^ S inhalese . The Portuguese 
array was thus f re e  to  launch p e rio d ic  p u n itiv e  ra id s  on 
Kandyan te r i t o r y .  These ra id s  aimed a t  undermining th e  
economic b a s is  o f Kandyan power -  th e  v illa g e  se ttle m en t.
The system atic  d ev asta tio n  o f v illa g e s  and crops d id  make 
th e  Kandyans r e t i r e  fu r th e r  and fu r th e r  in to  th e  fo re s te d  
areas ra th e r  than  r is k  c a p tiv i ty  o r death  in  Portuguese
hands. ev e rth e le ss  Kandy surv ived , fo r  th e  p au c ity  o f 
trao p s lim ite d  the  e ffec tiv en e ss  o f  th e  Portuguese ra id s .
(38) Senerat was suspected o f  being  resp o n sib le  fo r  th e  death  
o f  Vimaladharmasuriya*s son. (Jornada 34, Baldaeus 58, 
Queyroz 610, Biker 1 .78) The mode o f  k i l l i n g  i s  given
only by Baldaeus and th e  R ajava liya . The former a s s e r ts  
th a t  th e  p rince  was poisoned and th e  l a t t e r  th a t  he was 
drowned. Kusumasana d ev i, h e r s e lf  m arried Senerat ag a in s t 
h er w ishes. (Baldaeus 42, Jornada 34)
(39) Filraoteca LM. 12 19/1-2. Dr. T.Abeyasinghe blames the  
i l l s  th a t  b e f e l l  Kandy on the  personal incompetence o f 
S enerat. T at a t  t h i s  tim e the  Kandyan fo rces were le d  by 
Kuruwita R ala, an opponent ju s t ly  feared  by the  Portuguese.
w ith  th e  death  o f R a jju ru  Maha Adhasin and Kusumasana dev i.(38)
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Moreover d esp ite  the  o f f ic ia l  embargo % ^ tra d e  Kandy 
and e f fo r ts  to  deprive her o f e s s e n tia l  goods, the  lu re  
o f  high p ro f i t s  from trad e  in  Kandyan pepper and g inger, 
e lephants, iv o ry  and arecanut proved to  be too strong  fo r 
some Portuguese as w ell as Muslim tra d e rs . Thus in  Ceylon 
as in  contemporary Europe, p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  s tru g g les  
d id  not involve the  cessa tio n  o f economic re la t io n s .
Azevedo l e f t  Ceylon in  December 1612 to  take up
the  post o f v iceroy  o f In d ia . As v iceroy  he sen t d e ta ile d
in s tru c tio n s  to  h is  successors to  guide them in to  the  adm in istra tion
o f K otte as w ell as in  the  conduct^ of th e  war ag a in st 
(40)Kandy; 'Consequently fo r  four years a f te r  h is  departure 
Portuguese p o licy  in  Ceylon remained e s s e n tia l ly  th a t  o f  
Azevedo.
The most im portant development in  K otte during these  
years was the making o f a tombo o r a r e g is te r  o f lands 
and revenues by Antao Vaz F re ire , an o f f i c i a l  sen t from 
Lisbon fo r  th is  ta sk . F re ire  who occupied the  p o st o f 
vedor da fazenda or c o n tro lle r  o f  revenue was not the  f i r s t  
Portuguese to  record th e  sources o f royal revenue, fo r  th is  
had been done in  1599 by Jorge Frolim de Almeida. However
(40) AHU Caixa 23.4.1614; Bocarro 275-276; AHU Caixa 5. 9.10.1615
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F reire*s work, in  ad d itio n  to  being in  much g re a te r  d e a ta i l
than th a t  o f de Almeida also  included a r e g is te r  o f a l l
the lan d s. The fo ra l  or r e g is te r  o f  revenue prepared by
F re ire  c e r ta in ly  achieved one o f i t s  o b je c tiv e s , the
in c rease  o f revenue fo r  while the ac tu a l revenue in  the
(42)
days o f  Azevedo d id  no t exceed 30,000 x e ra f in s , Antao Vaz 
F reire*s estim ate was as high as 73*740 x e ra f in s . F reire*s 
achievement must have come as welcome news to  the  king o f 
Portugal who was no doubt aware th a t  in  Azevedo*s day 
the Ceylon budget had an annual d e f ic i t  o f 25,000 x e ra fin s . 
In  the years th a t  followed th6 revenue assessed  according 
to  the new re g is te r s  proved to  be th e  f in a n c ia l b as is  
o f Portuguese power in  Ceylon. For the  time being however 
the conversion o f a l l  customary dues and g i f t s  in to  
compulsory payments d id  not endear Portuguese ru le  to  the  
S inhalese peasan try .
But i f  the  years a f te r  1612 were years o f  hope 
fo r  the Portuguese, fo r  Senerat they  were years o f tro u b le .
(41) TT.Manuscritos do convento da Gra$a , tomo 6D.pg. 325-411.
(42) AHU Codice 222 f .l7 2 v ; B althazar Marinho, th e  escrivao 
da fazenda o r sec rea ta ry  o f the  tre a su ry  estim ated the 
revenue to  be 15*000 x era fin s  a y ear, ap a rt from some 
customary dues and th e  revenue from elephan ts. A x e ra fin  
was a coin worth about 300 r e is  in  v a lu e .In  th e  seventeenth 
century  i t  was equal to  a pardao.
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A fter the death o f  Kusumasana devi who had le g itim ise d  h is
ru le , as i t  were, h is  p o s itio n  in  Kandy became so insecure
th a t  he forced her e ld e s t daughter to  marry him to  preserve
(43)h is  le g a l claims to  th e  th rone. For a time he hoped fo r
fo re ign  a s s is ta n c e . The honours and high p o s itio n  he
bestowed on H arcellus de Boschouwer, the  Dutch envoy in
was an index
K andy(I6 l2 -l6 l5 )/as much of h is  need fo r Dutch a id  as o f
h is  personal regard fo r  Boschouwer. D espite Bmschouwer's
rep re se n ta tiv es’ however^his superio rs  in  Kasulipatam and
Batavia were not keen on f ig h tin g  Senerat*s b a t t le s  and
(44)
no aid  m a te ria lized . Meanwhile a f te r  a b r ie f  re s p ite  in
(43) Baldaeus 80-81 ; Biker 1 .224; S .G .Perera- H is to r ic a l 
sketches. 152 ; DR 11.^02.
Vimaladharmasuriya and Kusumasana devi had two daughters -  
Soriya Adhasin and Hantana Adhasin. The e ld e r , Soriya me 
Kaarisdkssjoi m arried Senerat in  1613 and became h is  ch ie f  
queen. They had one daughter Lancadhasin o r Hamiadhasin 
before the  queen died in  l6 l? .  From then on her s i s t e r  
Hantana Adhasin became h is  ch ie f  queen. Hamiadhasin was 
l a t e r  m arried to  Maha Astana, Kusumasana devi*s th i rd  son 
by Senerat.
(44) CLR 3 s e r . I . 26-27; 216-219; 330332; 415-418 ; P ie r is  -  
The Portuguese era I .  418-429; Baldaeus 82; Rayachaudhuri- 
Jan company in  Coromandel l605-1690. 86.
Boschouwer l e f t  Ceylon on 9 May 1515 to  t r y  to  convince 
h is  superio rs  o f the  divantage o f g iv ing  m il i ta ry  a id  
to  Senerat in  re tu rn  fo r  a trad e  monopoly and o th e r r ig h ts .  
He was even tually  sen t to  Holland to  p resen t h is  proposals 
before the  XVII.
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the time o f Azevedo*s successor Don Francisco de Menezes Roxo
( I 6 l2 - l6 l4 ) | P o rtu g u ese  a ttack s  became even more frequen t
(46)
in  the  time o f Manoel Mascarenhas Homem (l6 l4w l6 l6 ) , As 
v iceroy  Azevedo kepfc Ceylon adequately supplied  w ith men 
and munitions to  continue th e  p ressu re  ag a in s t Kandyi^?) ^he
(45) Don Francisco de lienezes Roxo was the  son o f Diogo de Menezes, 
count o f  S ricey ra . He came to  Ceylon in  1596 and served as a cap ta in  
of a company o f  Portuguese s o ld ie rs .  L a te r he became th e  cap ta in  o f 
a galleon  and was the  captain-m ajor o f  th e  annual f l e e t  sen t to  
Ceylon. In  th e  l a s t  days o f  Azevedo's cap ta in -g en era lsh ip  he was 
the  captain-m ajor o f  th e  f l e e t .  Like Azevedo, de Menezes had no 
qualms about d iv e rtin g  royal revenues to  h is  own use, bu t he had 
n e ith e r  the  a b i l i ty  not the m il i ta ry  s k i l l  th a t  Azevedo possessed.
In  h is  terra o f e ighteen  months (December 1612- May l6 l4 ) he made 
only one ra id  on Kandyan te r i to r y .
F.de Souza VI. 14^15; Baldaeus 65; 77-815 Bocarro 45-47;
DR IV .26,206; TT.LM .l6.f.754; Simancas SP.1473.f . 278 ; AliU Caixa 6,
2.11.1618
(46) Homem had served in  Malacca before h is  appointment as 
cap ta in -g en era l o f Ceylon. Bocarro gives two dates o f  h is  a r r iv a l
in  Ceylon -  May l6l4(B ocarro 278) and November l6 l4  (Bocarro 405,410).
Contemporary documents in  the  AHU in d ic a te  th a t  the  former i s  the
co rrec t d a te . Homem seems td  have been equally  e f fe c tiv e  in  war and
in te rn a l  ad m in is tra tio n  and was removed from o f f ic e  only
because Don Nuno Alvares P e re ira , the  king*s nominee fo r
th e  p o st a rriv ed  in  Goa in  1615. Homem served t i l l  the
a r r iv a l  o f P e re ira  in  February l6 l6 .
Bocarro 272-279, 405-411; AHU Caixa 3, 30.6.1613;
AHU Caixa 3. 2 2 .1 0 .l6 l5 ; F.de Souza V I.77-78; CLR 3 se r .I .5 0 7 -8 ; 
Baldaeus 81
(47) The Portuguese fo rces in  Ceylon in  th e  four years 
l 6 l3 -l 6 l 6 ranged between 500 and 700 s o ld ie rs .
Bocarro 405-iH0, 496-497; Filmoteca LM.12.76/3; LM .12.99/l/3j 
CLR 3 s e r .  1.507-508, 513; Ajuda 5 1 -V n l-4 0 .f .l7 2
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a r r iv a l  o f  a new cap ta in -g en era l Don Nuno Alvares P e re ira m
( 1616- 1618) on 28 February l6 l6  le d  to  a fu r th e r  in te n s if ic a t io n
o f Portuguese h o s t i l i t i e s .  P e re ira  h im self led  two expeditions
to  Kandy in  A pril and August o f  the same year.
Senerat and h is  genera l Kuruwita Rala, however were
by no means pow erless. Although they  seldom risk ed  ppen
b a t t le  they  co n stan tly  followed th e  Portuguese ra id in g
(fy9)p a r t ie s ,  c u ttin g  o f f  s tra g g le rs  and s e t t in g  ambushes. Moreover 
the Portuguese did  not succeed in  conquering any s izeab le  
t r a c t  o f Kandyan t e r i t o r y  and Senerat remained strong  enough  
to  punish feudatory  ch ie fs  who contemplated jo in in g  the
Portuguese. ev e rtn e less  when P e re ira  a rr iv ed  in  1616 tfee general
s i tu a tio n  in  Ceylon was one o f hope fo r the  Portuguese. The
te be
Kandyan k ing  seemed becoming weaker year by year while K otteA
(48) P e re ira , b ro th e r o f  th e  count o f Feyra was the  person 
chosen by th e  king in  February 1613 to  succeed Azevedo
in  Ceylon. He l e f t  Lisbon in  l6 l4  in  the  ship  •Remedies* 
which a rriv ed  in  Goa only  in  May the  follow ing y ea r. He 
s e t  out fo r  Ceylon in  October 1615 but was forced
to  put T:o Cochim due to  bad weather and remained th e re  
t i l l  February l6 l6 . Though a man o f  mediocre ta le n ts  he 
was am bitious. In  th e  i620*s on h is  re tu rn  to  Goa a f te r  
serv ing  in  Mo9ambique he came to  be regarded as the  • Ceylon 
expert* in  th e  viceroy*s council
Bocarro 480-481; DR V.37-38, 42,45; AHU codice 501 .f.6v ;
Filmoteca LM. 12.76/3; R ibeiro -  Registo da casa da In d ia . 440-441.
(49) F.de Souza V I.78 ; Bocarro 407,*J09
(50) Baldaeus 60-64; Mandarampurapuvata. stanzas 182-187.
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seemed more firm ly  in  the  grasp o f the  Portuguese than ever 
befo re . The m issionary work o f the  Franciscans progressed 
s te a d ily  in  Ja ffn a  and they  and o th er order were ac tiv e  
in  K otte .
59
CHAPTER I I
A lthough/ when Don Nuno Alvares P e re ira  took up
/
/
th e  cap ta in -g en era lsh ip  o f  Ceylon in  e a r ly  l6 l6 , th e  p o s it io n
o f th e  Portuguese seemed most s a t i s f a c to ry /  w ith th e  lands o f
K otte q u ie t and in c re a s in g ly  productive and th e  enemy in
Kandy forced  back on the  defensive by th e  p u n itiv e  ra id s
and an economic blockade, w ith in  a year a l l  was to  be in  tu rm o il,
peace in  K otte sh a tte re d  by major re b e llio n s  and even more
unexpected, S enerat from Kandy seeking a p o s it iv e  a ll ia n c e
w ith th e  Portuguese ag a in s t the re b e ls .
The o rig in s  o f th is  ra d ic a l change in  th e  p o l i t i c a l
s i tu a t io n  a re  to  be found in  two r e v o lts ,  unco-ordinated
movements o f  th e  type so o ften  seen in  th e  e a r ly  years o f
Azevedo*s regim e, which drew upon widespread i f  l a te n t  d isc o n ten t.
The f i r s t  r i s in g  occured in  Sabaragamuwa in  September l6 l6
and F elipe  de O liv e ira , d isava o f th e  Seven K orales had to  be
sen t th e re  to  re s to re  order w ith a fo rce  o f  a hundred and
( 1)tw enty Portuguese aided by a la s c a r in  con tingen t. While. O liv e ira  
was occupied in  th e  South a second and tax more form idable
(1) A.Bocarro 497-8
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re b e llio n  broke out in  December 1616 in  th e  Seven Korales
(3)
under a man who ca lled  h im self N ikap itiya  Bandara.
The success o f  N ikap itiya  who in  th e  abs^ence o f  
de O liv e ira , became m aster o f  th e  ea s te rn  h a lf  o f th e  Seven 
K orales w ith in  a few weeks, was th e  s ig n a l fo r  Kandyan in te rven tion*
For th e  f i r s t  time since  h is  accession  Senerat saw a chance o f 
ca rry ing  the  war in to  Portuguese te r i to ry *  Kangara A ra tch i,a
(4)
former reb e l le a d e r  who had considerab le support in  th e  Seven K orales 
le d  two thousand well-armed Kandyan m ilitiam en to  re in fo rc e
(2) The exact date  o f  the  commencement o f  th e  second re b e llio n  
i s  not c e r ta in . A l e t t e r  o f th e  camara o f Colombo to  th e  king 
o f Portugal in  l6 l8  s ta te s  th a t  i t  began on 7 December bu t th e  
Annual Report o f  th e  J e s u i ts  in  1617 records th a t  two o f  th e i r  
number were k i l l e d  on th e  6 December. According to  Bocarro 
th e  re b e llio n  had begun a t  l e a s t  by 5 December.
(3) The r e a l  N ikap itiya  Bandara was a p rince  o f  Sitawaka who
was proclaim ed k ing  on th e  death  o f R ajasinha in  1592 and captured 
by the  Portuguese soon a f t e r .  He was l a t e r  educated a t  Colombo 
and Coimbra and d ied  in  l 6 l l  a t  Coimbra. The reb e l was a p re ten d er, 
son o f a measurer o f  g ra in  and a p r ie s te s s  o f  th e  Raigam K orale,
He was educated by F r. Manoel de T rinidade and m arried th e  daughter 
o f  Pulasinha A ratchi o f  Waskaduwa, P o tu p itiy a . He served the  
Portuguese in  various c a p a c itie s  ra f te r^ 1616)and gained the valued *
posts  o f vidang of Chaleas and Palanguin ~Bearer o f th e  cap ta in - 
general in  th e  time o f  Menezes and Homem. While a t  Malwana he 
le a rn t  much about th e  Sitawaka royal fam ily from la d ie s  o f  th e  
Sitawaka court who resid ed  a t  Walgama. His ca ree r however was 
sharp ly  in te rru p te d  and he seems to  have been dism issed from 
h is  p o s ts . Bocarro suggests th a t  th e  reason fo r  h is  d isg race was 
th e  abandonment o f h is  w ife and consequent d isp u tes  w ith the  
c le rgy . In  1615 he accompanied Antonio B atalha who was tak in g  
some elephants to  Ja ffn a  and d issappeared in to  th e  jung les o f  
Nuwarakalawiya whence he emerged an year l a t e r .
A.Bocarro 497; DR 1.10 .106; CLR 3 s e r . I I  530; F.de Souza VI 92;
DR I I .  230.239; W.L.A.Don P e te r-  S tudies in  Ceylon church h is to ry  113»
(4) T.Abeyasinghe 50; Bocarro 493 id e n t i f ie s  him as Gancara Rache.
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N ikapitiya*s peasan t array in  th e  north  while Kuruwita R ala, 
governor o f  Uva descended w ith h is  fo rces on h is  homeland
(5)the  Two Korales where he could always re ly  on f in d in g  support.
The Portuguese were thus confronted w ith a ttac k s  on
two fro n ts  by S inhalese fo rces which in  both cases amounted to
sev era l thousand men. To meet these  th e  Portuguese had some
seven hundred reg u la r Portuguese troops who could be re in fo rced
by detachments o f casados and topazes. ^ T h e  tim ely  a r r iv a l  o f
a f l e e t  from Malacca in  December l6 l6  placed an ex tra  fo rce  o f
a hundred Portuguese and th e i r  fo llow ers a t  th e  d isp o sa l o f th e
cap ta in -g en era l. ^ A  p roportion  o f these  fo rces was o^&ourse
occupied in  g a rriso n  duty but a t  the  outbreak o f th e  re v o lt
the cap ta in -genera l P e re ira  c e r ta in ly  possessed a Portuguese
fo rce  tw ice as s tro n g  as th a t  a t  the  d isp o sa l o f Azevedo in  the
(8)
l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  h is  regime in  Ceylon.
The key to  the p o s itio n  however was held  by the  la s c a r in  
fo rces . I f  they  deserted  th e  Portuguese fo rces would have l i t t l e  
option  but to  withdraw from most o f  th e  Seven K orales and 
Sabaragamuwa. As i t  was, many o f them did d e s e r t to  jo in  the
(5) A.Bocarro 498.508; F.de Souza V I.92
(6 ) Casados are  m arried Portuguese s e t t l e r s .  Topazes ’Dark skinned
or h a lf -c a s te  claim ants o f Portuguese descen t and C h ris tian  p ro fe ss io n 9 
according to  H.Yuli and A .L .B urnell -Hobson-Jobson
(7) This f l e e t  o f  e ig h t v esse ls  continued on i t s  way to  Goa in
January 1617 leav in g  many o f the  so ld ie rs  behind. A. Bocarro 496-7.
685; F.de Souza V I.91; CALR 11.131; Film oteca LM .12/99/l/3 
Filmoteca LM.12 76/3
( 8 ) T.Abeysinghe 64
le a d e r  they  believed  to  be th e  grandson o f R ajasinhe o f  Sitawaka,
but Dom Constantino, a converted p rin ce  o f th e  K otte dynasty
( 10)
who commanded th e  la s c a r in  fo rces was able to  keep th e  m ajo rity  
lo y a l.
The f i r s t  use made o f th e se  fo rces by th e  cap ta in - 
genera l was ag a in st N ikap itiya  whose success in  th e  Seven K orales 
continued th re a tn in g ly . Portuguese reinforcem ents were pushed 
up th e  K elani Ganga to  th e  forward base a t  Menikkadawara w ith 
ordersManoel Cezar who commanded th e  Portuguese j&EXX forces 
th e re  to  pu t a speedy end to  th e  r is in g .  Cezar marched northwards 
w ith a fo rce  o f two hundred and twenty Portuguese and a thoudand 
S inhalese la s c a r in s  and was met by N ikapitiya*s fo rces about 
four thousand s tro n g  who had crossed th e  Maha Oya in to  the  
Four K orales. The two armies met on a s t r tc h  o f  le v e l ground
(ui
a t  Gandolaha on 18 December l6 l6 .  D espite th e  d e se rtio n  o f h a l f  
o f  Cezar*s la s c a r in s  N ikap itiya  was forced back in to  the  Seven 
K orales a f te r  a hard fought b a t t l e .  This d ea rly  earned v ic to ry  
proved to  be o f l i t t l e  use to  th e  Portuguese however, fo r  when 
Manoel Cezar advanced in to  the  Seven K orales he found h im self 
in  a h o s t i le  lan d . No in te ll ig e n c e  o f th e  reb e ls  could be had 
and th e  Portuguese fo rces were harassed by th e  g u e r i l la  t a c t i c s
(9) CALR I I .  1305 A.Bocarro 499.504
(10) A.Bocarro 498
(11) A.Bocarro 498 saya th a t  Gandolaha was lo ca ted  on th e  r iv e r  
Loao. The s i t e  was p iobably  lo ca ted  somewhere in  th e  p re sen t 
Gandolaha Pattuwa. I t  was ev id en tly  a p iece  o f s t r a te g ic  value 
as P .da T rin id ad e (III  118) mentions th a t  th e  Portuguese had a 
g a rriso n  a t  Gandolaha (Gandole) in  1632.
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o f N ikapitiya*s men. His fo rce  was soon reduced to  e ig h ty  Portuguese 
and a handful o f  la s c a r in s . Indeed i t  was only the  a r r iv a l  o f 
de O liv e ira  from th e  Two Korales w ith a hundred and twenty 
Portuguese and e ig h t hundred la s c a r in s  th a t  saved Cezar from 
a n n ih ila tio n . Even these  jo in t  fo rces were p laced in  danger 
when de O liv e ira ’s la s c a r in s  absconded one n ig h t w ith a l l  th e i r  
arms and a t  th i s  stage th e  two commanders decided to  abandon the  
s tru g g le  fo r  the  Seven K orales, r e t r e a t  twenty m iles sou theast 
to  A ttanagalla  and th e re  f o r t i f y  them selves.
N ikap itiya  once more took th e  o ffen siv e , moving in to  the  
w estern reaches o f  th e  Seven Korales and ra id in g  on occasion
stronghold o f  the d isava  o f Sabaragarauwa, by a strategem  and
turned to  the  Matara d isa v a^ p a r tic u la r ly  th e  r ic h  Raigam K orale.
fo r  both N ikap itiya  and Kandy th a t  a ^Diplomatic Revolution* 
occurred in  Ceylon. Senerat who had so f a r  le d  th e  Kandyans in
(12) A.Bocarro 499-506; F.de Souza V I,92-96; AHU In d ia  caixa 5* 
21.11.16175 CALR 11.130-131; Ajuda 51-VIII-40 f.230v
(13) Located a t  o r near the  modern town o f  Ratnapura. In  1616 
the  f o r t  was garrisoned  by s ix ty  Portuguese under i t s  cap ta in  
Manoel Matoso and the la s c a r in s  o f Sabaragarauwa under d isava 
Estavao da F aria .
(14) A.Bocarro 508, 685; F.de Souza VI. 98
Relieved b f  th e  p ressu re  on th e  cen tre  o f  h is  power,
to  w ith in  a few m iles o f  Colombo ese successes emboldened
Kuruwita Ra&a o p era tin g  in  th e  south in  th e  Two K orales. He
(13)attacked  and captured th e  f o r t  o f  Sabaragarauwa, th e  main
(i*o
I t  was a t  th i s  time when th in g s were going so w ell
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war ag a in st the  Portuguese suddenly turned to  h is  e rs tw h ile  
enemies fo r  frien d sh ip  and a l l ia n c e . Kuruwita R ala, the  genera l 
who had served the  Kandyan kings so lo y a lly  since  1603 not 
only  turned ag a in st h is  m aster and ra ise d  a re v o lt  in  the 
h i l l  country i t s e l f  bu t also  in v ite d  a r iv a l  p rin ce  o f  th e  Sitawaka 
dynasty to  assume th e  throne o f Kandy. T.Abeyasinghe in  h is  
Portuguese ru le  in  Ceylon seeks to  explain  th i s  phenomena 
by s ta t in g  th a t  th e  re v o lt  in  K otte f . . .  became a s tru g g le  ag a in st 
th e  fo re ig n er in  the  low country and a re v o lt ag an is t incompetant 
monarchy in  th e  country on the  h i l l s .  The two power th rea tened  
by th e  re v o lt  th e re fo re  drew to g e th e r and th e  f i r s t  Kandyan- 
Portuguese t r e a ty  o f l 6l?  was the  r e s u l t . • ^ ^ T h e  Luso-Kandyan 
en ten te was no doubt a product o f  common in te r e s t  bu t th e  above 
explanation i s  a re v e rsa l o f  the  o rder o f  even ts , fo r  the  re v o lt  
ag a in st Senerat was a r e s u l t  and no t the cause o f the  Kandyan
( 16}a llia n c e  w ith the  Portuguese.
The tru e  explanation  o f th is  unusual sequence o f 
events must be sought fo r  in  the  ch a rac te r and aims o f th re e  
o f  th e  main p ro tag o n is ts  -  N ikap itiya  Bandara, Senerat and 
Kuruwita R ala. The tragedy  o f N ikap itiya  was th a t  in  claim ing 
to  be th e  grandson o f  R ajasinha, he also  in h e r ite d  a l l  o f  the  
Rajasinha legend. E lated  by the  success o f  h is  f i r s t  campaign
(15) T.Abeyasin^ae, 68
(16) Queyroz 710; P .da  Trinidade I I I . 78
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he began to  th ink  o f th e  ru le r  o f  Kandy as a v assa l and
demanded from him one o f the  daughters o f  Kusumasana Devi as 
(17)w ife. Senerat had so fa r  thought o f  h im self as N ikapitiya*s 
patron  and p ro te c to r . On re c e ip t o f  th i s  message he sw if tly  
re a lis e d  th a t  h is  protege' could become a dangerous r iv a l .  He 
th e re fo re  im m ediately withdrew th e  contingent he had sen t to  
a id  N ikap itiya  and in s tru c te d  Kuruwita Rala to  withdraw from 
h is  campaign. Furthermore, he began to  make e f fo r ts  to  reach 
an understanding w ith the Portuguese.
The cause o f th e  r i f t  between Senerat and Kuruwita Rala 
la y  in  th is  d ec is io n . Senerat*s prim ary in te r e s t  was to  safeguard 
h is  own dynasty and p ro te c t h is  own p o s it io n . For th i s  hw was 
w illin g  to  s a c r if ic e  a l l  hopes of^ ex p e llin g  th e  Portuguese 
from the is la n d . Bom and bred in  Kandy he was content to  ru le  
in  h is  kingdom i f  l e f t  unmolested by the Portuguese. In  th i s  
re sp ec t he was a tru e  successor o f  Vimaladharmasuriya. The 
Sitawaka dynasty had no t r a d i t io n  o f frien d sh ip  w ith th a t  o f 
Kandy, and N ikapitiya* s p re te n tio n s  alarmed him a l l  the  more 
as he had achieved in  a few weeks what Senerat had f a i le d  to  
do in  years o f  f ig h tin g  -  he had forced th e  Portuguese to  g ive 
up most o f  th e  Seven and Four K orales and had placed  them on 
the  defensive in  K otte . Thus, tolB e king th e  prudent course 
seemed to  be to  a l ly  h im self w ith  the  hard-pressed  Portuguese
(17) A.Bocarro 506; F.de Souza V I.96
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ag a in st the more dangerous N ikap itiya .
Kuruwita Rala viewed th e  c o n f l ic t  from an e n t i r e ly
d if fe re n t  p o in t o f  view. As a n a tiv e  o f  K otte he could no t regard
the fa te  o f  th e  people o f  the  lowlands w ith th e  same in d iffe re n ce
as Senerat. To him the Portuguese were always the  main enemy
and he no doubt considered th a t  th e  d iffe ren ces  between Senerfet
and N ikap itiya  could be so rted  ou t a f te r  the Portuguese had been
expelled  from the  is la n d . Already h is  own homeland, th e  Two Korales
was in  h is  hands. Kuruwita Rala th e re fo re  refused  to  tu rn  h is
back on the  most favourable opportun ity  to  l ib e r a te  K otte th a t
he had ever known. Thus when Senerat p e rs is te d  in  h is  p o lic y
o f seeking peace w ith  the  Portuguese Kuruwita Rala rev o lted
ag a in st him and soon became m aster o f much o f  southern Ceylon
in c lud ing  B a ttic a lo a , W ellassa, Panama, Uva and p a r t  o f
Sabaragamuwa and M a ta ra .^  In  a sense Kuruwita Rala ra th e r
than Senerat was th e  tru e  S inhalese p a t r io t  fo r  i t  was he who 
placed
pa&eed n a tio n a l above dynastic  in te r e s t s .
There i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  S e n e ra t;lik e  the  Portuguese^
(19)had formed an exaggerated opinion o f  th e  s tre n g th  o f N ik ap itiy a , 
b u t fo r  some tim e he fa ile d  to  convince the  Portuguese o f  h is  
d e s ire  fo r peace. The messenger &e sen t to  Balana to  ask fo r
(18) K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 14^19; CLR 3 s e r . I .  151
(19) N ikapitiya* s base and source o f s tre n g th  was the  Seven Korales 
which had su ffe red  much d ev asta tio n  in  the  tim e o f Azevedo. Apart 
from the  two thousand men he could ra is e  in  th i s  area  many la sc a r in s  
who d eserted  the  Portuguese fo rces o f  th e  Four Korales and
Matara jo ined  him.
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an e sc o rt fo r  h is  ambassador was p u t to  death  by th e  g a rr iso n . 
Senerat however d id  not lo se  hope. He next sen t Domingos Rodrigues 
and B althazar R ib e iro 9 two o f  th e  Portuguese captured a t  
Sabaragamuwa to  convey h is  w ishes. F in a lly  as even th i s  wouldy
not convince Manoel Falcao, th e  cap ta in  o f  th e  f o r t  he brought 
a l l  th e  fo rces he could spare and l a id  s ieg e  to  th e  f o r t .
A fter some re s is ta n c e  th e  Portuguese who had no hope o f  r e l i e f  
surrendered . I t  was only  then  th a t  Senerat succeeded in  convincing 
Falc&o th a t  h is  d e s ire  fo r  peace and an a l l ia n c e  was genuine. 
However due to  th ese  delays i t  was only  on 15 March 1617 th a t  
two o f h is  envoys reached Malwana to  o f fe r  a t r e a ty  o f peace
(20)
to  th e  cap ta in -g en e ra l. Even th en , though P e re ira  was p leased  
to  gain  an a l ly  a t  such a d i f f i c u l t  tim e^Senerat was asked to  
re le a se  some Portuguese p riso n e rs  and to  send envoys o f  g re a te r  
standing  as an ea rn est o f good f a i th .  I t  was only  when th ese  
fu r th e r  envoys w ith  an e sco rt o f  a  hundred la s c a r in s  to g e th e r 
w ith t h i r t y  o f  th e  Portuguese held  cap tive  in  Kandy a rriv ed  
a t  Malwana on 6 May 1617 th a t  a l l  doubts about Senerat*s 
in te n tio n s  were s e t  a t  r e s t .  The question  was how th e  Portuguese 
should re a c t  to  th e  Kandyan o f f e r .
Azevedo *s p o lic y  had been one o f  uncomprmising 
h o s t i l i t y  to  Kandy and though d ir e c t  a s s a u lt  had to  be abandoned
(20) F.de Souza VI. 99-100; CALR 11.135*131; A.Bocarro 509-510; 
CRL. 3 s e r . I I .  530-533
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i n  f a v o u r  o f  c o n t a i n m e n t  a n d  a  w e a r i n g  d o w n  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  
a b s o r p t i o n  o f  K a n d y  r e m a i n e d  t h e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l .  O n e  a r g u e m e n t  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h i s  p o l i c y  h a d  a l w a y s  b e e n  t h e  n e e d  t o  d e n y  t o  
P o r t u g a l * s  E u r o p e a n  r i v a l s  i n  t h e  E a s t  a n y  t r a d e ,  o r  m i l i t a r y  
a l l i a n c e  i n  C e y l o n .  I n  e a r l y  y e a r s  w h i l e  t h e  D u t c h  a n d  t h e  
E n g l i s h  w e r e  s e e k i n g  t o  a v o i d  a  f u l l  s c a l e  c l a s h  w i t h  e s t a b l i s h e d  
P o r t u g u e s e  c e n t r e s  o f  p o w e r  a n d  i n s t e a d  w e r e  p u s h i n g  t h e i r  
t r a d e  i n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  a r c h e p e l a g o ,  t h e  C o r o m e n d e l  c o a s t  a n d  
B e n g a l ^  i t  s e e m e d  a  j u s t i f i a b l e  p o l i c y  t o  d e v o t e  P o r t u g u e s e  
e n e r g y  t o  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  i n  C e y l o n  b y  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  K a n d y .
B u t  a s  D u t c h  a n d  E n g l i s h  p r e s s u r e  i n t e n s i f i e d  a n d  t h e i r  n e e d  t o  
b r e a k  i n t o  t h e  • c o u n t r y *  o r  p o r t  t o  p o r t  t r a d e  o f  A s i a  d r o v e  
t h e m  w e s t w a r d s ,  t h e  r i g h t  c o u r s e  f o r  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  C e y l o n  
b e c a m e  l e s s  c l e a r .  C o m p l e t e  m a s t e r y  o f  t h e  i s l a n d  w a s  m o r e  
d e s i r a b l e  t h a n  e v e r ,  b u t  w h e t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  c o u l d  p r o p e r l y  b e  
s p a r e d  f o r  a  w a r  o n  K a n d y  w h e n  s o  m a n y  o t h e r  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  
E s t a d o  d a  I n d i a j i  w e r e  t h r e a t e n e d  s e e m e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d o u b t f u l .
I n  t h e  s e c o n d  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  d o u b t  g r e w  a s  
t h e  E n g l i s h  b y  t h e i r  n a v a l  v i c t o r i e s  i n  G u j e r a t  b r o k e  i n t o  t h e  
t r a d e  w i t h  M u g h u l  I n d i a ,  t h e  D u t c h  c o n s o l i d a t e d  t h e i r  h o l d  o n  
t h e  C o r o m a n d e l  c l o t h  t r a d e  a n d  a s  b o t h  E u r o p e a n  a n d  A c h i n e s e  
a t t a c k  p u t  M a l a c c a  i n  p e r i l .  W i t h  t h e  f a i l u r e  i n  l 6 l 6  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  
p l a n s  f o r  a  c o u n t e r - b l o w  i n  I n d o n e s i a  b y  a  j o i n t  P o r t u g u e s e -  
S p a n i s h  P h i l i p p i n e  n a v a l  e x p e d i t i o n  d o u b t  t u r n e d  t o  c e r t a i n t y ;  
t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  v i c t o r y  i n  C e y l o n  m u s t  b e  s e t  a s i d e .  I n  E u r o p e
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t h e  k i n g  i n s t r u c t e d  t h e  n e w  v i c e r o y  Dom J o a o  C o u t i n h o ,  C o n d e
d e  R e d o n d o  t o  ' d i s s i m u l a t e *  w i t h  t h e  k i n g s  o f  C e y l o n  a n d  t o
c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  o p p o s i n g  t h e  E u r o p e a n  e n e m i e s .  T h e  n e w s  o f  t h e
r e v o l t  i n  C e y l o n  m a d e  e v e n  Dom J e r o n i m o  d e  A z e v e d o  s e r v i n g
a s  v i c e r o y  i n  I n d i a  a d m i t  t h a t  t h e  p e a c e  p r o p o s a l s  f r o m  K a n d y
m u s t  b e  a c c e p t e d *
M e a n w h i l e  i n  C e y l o n  e v e n t s  b o t h  i n  K o t t e  a n d  K a n d y
w e r e  d r a w i n g  S e n e r a t  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  e v e n  c l o s e r
( 22)
t o g e t h e r ,  f o r  a f t e r  c o n s u l t i n g  t h o s e  w h o  s u p p o r t e d  h i m  
K u r u w i t a  R a l a  d e c i d e d  t o  i n v i t e  M a y a d u n n e  o f  D e n a w a k a ,  d e s c e n d a n t
(23)o f  h i s  n a m e s a k e  w h o  f o u n d e d  t h e  k in g d o m  o f  S i t a w a k a ,  t o  r e t u r n  
f r o m  T a n j o r e  a n d  a c c e p t  t h e  t i t l e  o f  k i n g  o f  C e y l o n *  T h e  e x a c t  
r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  I n v i t a t i o n  i s  u n k n o w n ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  K u r u w i t a  R a l a  s u s p e c t e d  N i k a p i t i y a  t o  b e  a n  
i m p o s t e r *  I t  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  w a s  a n  a c t  t o  s a f e g u a r d  
h i s  o w n  p o s i t i o n *  H a v i n g  r e n o u n c e d  h i s  h i s  a l l e g i a n c e  t o  
S e n e r a t ,  h e  h a d  t o  p r o v i d e  h i s  f o l l o w e r s  w i t h  a n o t h e r  k i n g .
H e  h i m s e l f  w a s  i n h i b i t e d  f r o m  a s s u m i n g  t h e  t i t l e  d u e  t o
(21) H.W.Livermore, edit-wr Portugal and B raz il 227; Botelho de 
Souza I I I . ?
(22) The c h ie f  among th ese  were Kangara A ratchi and Vellappu 
A ratch i..T he l a t t e r  had reb e lled  in  the  Hewagam Korale in  the  
days o f Azevedo and had since been in  Kandyan service* 
T.Abeyasinghe 64; Jornada 10,35; BM.Add.Mss.19866; H4.0r.2012; 
EM.Or.2702; Ajuda 5 1 -V III-^ ).f .2 2 0 v ; Ra,1avaliya 99
(23) Biker 1.224; CLR 3 se r.1 .151
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h is  ca s te ; Thus he needed a figure-head  p rin ce  who would be 
amenable to  h is  co n tro l. N ikapitiya*s recen t conduct hard ly  
recommended him fo r th is  p o s t. Mayadunne on th e  o th e r hand 
was an id e a l  candidate , fo r  even N ikap itiya  could h ard ly  
d ispu te  th e  claims o f th i s  well-known p rin ce . On Mayadunne*s 
a r r iv a l  th e  two claim ants agreed to  a compromise. N ikap itiya
(25)was to  be k ing  o f K otte and Mayadunne^king to  Kandy.
During th e  f i r s t  s ix  months o f  1617 Mayadunne,
Kuruwita Rala and N ikapitiya more than  held  th e i r  own. N ikap itiya  
on 12 January 1617 t r i e d  and f a i le d  a t  K ale liy a  to  d e fea t the  
Portuguese in  open b a ttle#  But K ale liya  l ik e  Gandolaha proved 
to  be a P y rrh ic  v ic to ry  fo r  th e  Portuguese. N ikap itiya re a l is e d  
th a t  w ithout the  tra in e d  troops o f Kandy, h is  ill-a rm ed  le v ie s  
had l i t t l e  chance o f winning p itched  b a t t le s .  He th e re fo re  
began follow ing Kuruwita Rala*s p o licy  o f avoiding b a t t l e ,  
harassin g  the  Portuguese fo rces on the  move and a tta c k in g  
is o la te d  Portuguese o u tp o sts . The cap ta in -genera l P e re ira  was 
unable to  form ulate an e f fe c tiv e  p lan  o f m il i ta ry  ac tio n  ag a in st 
th e  re b e ls . This may have been p a r t ly  due to  th e  lack  o f 
tro o p s . In  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  1617 Portuguese fo rces were a t  no 
tim e stro n g  enough to  launch an o ffen siv e  ag a in s t both N ikap itiya  
and the  fo rces o f Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala a t  th e  same tim e.
(zb) Kuruwita Rala was o f th e  Karawa caste  which was not held  
in  high esteem in  Ceylon in  the  seventeenth  century . (Queyroa 591,
F.de Souza VI. 785 T.Abeyasinghe 6k; Jornada 355 A.Bocarro 508;
Ajuda 51-IV -32 .f.l6v) This was not enough to  bar him from high 
o f f ic e ,  fo r  Senerat made him ru le r  o f  Uva. To assume th e  t i t l e  o f  
k ing  was another m atter and Kuruwita Rala was shrwwed enough to  r e a l is e  
th a t  th is  was no time to  r is k  disputes over lo y a l t ie s .
(25) LM. 12 .f . 454 (26) Ajuda 51-V III-40. f . 230v; A.Bocarro 507-508
F.de Souza V I.97
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This enabled the reb e ls  to  launch d iv e rsio n ary  a tta c k s  on
the  dep leted  Portuguese forces in  one se c to r  w hile th e  main
Portuguese forced was f ig h tin g  in  the  o th e r. Thus the
apparen tly  su ccessfu l campaign o f Manoel Cezar ag a in st N ikap itiya
in  January 1617 had to  be h a lted  due to  Kuruwita*s o ffensive
ag a in st the  Raigam Korale fo llow ing h is  capture o f Sabaragamuwa
f o r t ^ ^ i m i l a r l y  an a ttack  on Kuruwita Rala in  February o f  th e
same year could not be pursued p a r t ly  due to  renewed a c t iv i ty
by N ikap itiya . N evertheless i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d isag ree  w ith
F aria  de Souza*s c r i t ic is m  th a t  th e  Portuguese fo rces could
(28)
have achieved more had they  been b e t te r  u ti l iz e d *  P e re ira  l e t  
th e  reb e ls  d ic ta te  th e  campaign, sw itching h is  main forces 
ag a in st the  one o r th e  o th e r according to  th e  success they  
tem porarily  achieved. Throughout th is  period  th e re fo re  the  
Portuguese fo rces achieved l i t t l e  save d ev asta tio n  o f  land  
which only tended to  a t t r a c t  more support fo r  th e i r  enemies.
Their co n tro l o f K otte remained lim ite d  to  th e  K elani V alley
(29)and th e  c o a s tlin e  from Negombo to  Matara.
By June however th e  s i tu a t io n  began to  favour th e  
Portuguese once more. The reb e ls  received  no new accessions 
o f  s tre n g th . The Portuguese on th e  o th e r hand received a flow
(27) A.Bocarro 507-508;68^685
(28) F.de Souza V I.130
(29) A.Bocarro 686-690, 703-711? CALR 11.132; F.de Souza VI.130
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o f men and supp lies which began to  a l t e r  th e  balance o f power* 
In  e a r ly  February the  China f l e e t  on i t s  way to  Goa ca lle d  
a t  Colombo and besides prov id ing  a much needed supply o f money 
l e f t  a number o f th e  four hundred Portuguese s a i lo r s , so ld ie rs  
and merchants who were on board to  serve in  th e  defence o f
the  is la n d . en favourable winds s e t  in  in  March,a stream  
o f reinforcem ents poured in  from Goa. F ir s t  to  a r r iv e  was 
Lourenco P ire s  de Carvalho w ith a fo rce  o f  s ix ty  o r seventy
Pedro Alvares Cabral who le d  a fo rce  o f a hundred and f i f t y
Portuguese. Another fo rce o f  e ig h ty  men was sen t from Goa to  
G alle in  A pril to  ensure th a t  th e  cinnamon producing v illa g e s  
in  th e  southern regions o f  K otte remained under Portuguese
While th e  fo rces o f  th e  Portuguese were thus being 
b u i l t  up, the  a id  in  men and supp lies  which th e  reb e ls  had 
expected from Ja ffn a  was la rg e ly  denied because o f a p o l i t i c a l  
upheaval in  th a t  kingdom. The death  o f  Bthirmanne Sinham a t  
th e  end o f 1615 had been followed by th e  in s t a l l a t io n  o f  h is
(30) P e re ira  obtained about seven thousand x e ra fin s  in  money from 
s ta te  and p r iv a te  funds on board th e  f l e e t .  TT.Corpo Chronologico 
P a r t I,Maco ll6 .D oc.101; TT.LM .13.f.l23; TT.Corpo Chronologico
P a r t I.Maco 116. Doc. 87
(31) CALR I I . f .1 3 2 ;  F.de Souza VI.130; A.Bocarro 702-703
(32) Simancas S P .l4 6 8 .f .l8 2 v
(33) A.Bocarro 693
(31)men and a consignment o f r ic e .  He was soon followed by
(32)
co n tro l
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Z u id e r  the regency o f A rasakesari,th re e  year old son 
Ethirraanne • s b ro th e r . This arrangement was confirmed by the
v iceroy  in  May i 6l 6 bu t before h is  l e t t e r  could reach Ja ffn a
a r iv a l  fa c tio n  headed by S a n k i l i^ a  nephew o f Ethirmanne Sinham
had se ized  power and p u t to  death  a l l  the  p rin ces  o f  th e  blood
save th e  h e ir  and S ank ili* s own b ro th e r-in -law , Luku Kumaran.
P eriy ap u lle  A ra tch i, one o f  th e  ch ie f  supportes o f  ttrasak esari* A
was also  pu t to  death . His son Sinna M ig ap illa i A ratch i thereupon
f le d  to  the  Portuguese w ith  two p rin cesses  and requested  support
(36)to  oust S a n k ili . S an k ili h im self a lso  ajbjblied fo r c o n f irm a tio n  
o f  h is  p o s it io n  as Regent. The Portuguese were thus placed 
in  a s tro n g  p o s itio n  fo r  in  re tu rn  fo r  reco g n itio n  as regen t 
they  forced S an k ili not only to  re fu se  a id  and a s s is ta n c e  to  
N ikap itiya  but also  to  c lose  th e  f ro n tie r s  ag a in s t him and deny 
him a r e g u g e ^ ^ in c e  the  reb e ls  had a lso  l o s t  any hope o f a id
(34) The age o f  th e  p rince  s ta te d  above i s  th a t  given in  Queyroz 463.
P .da T rinidade says th e  p rin ce  was seven o r eigfrt years o l d . ( I I I . 207)
(35) Queyroz 463 c a l ls  S an k ili *a p e r fe c t heathen and a t r a i to r*
b u t evidence from th e  work o f P .da Trinidade ( I I I  189) in d ic a te s  th a t  
he was by no means a n ti-C h r is t ia n  throughout. While s t i l l  a nobleman 
he granted th e  v illa g e s  o f  V is iv i l  and I la v r  to  F r. Pedro Betaneor.
(36) Sinna M ig ap illa i A ratchi was b ap tised  under the  name o f D .Luis.
He re tu rned  to  Ja ffn a  when the Portuguese recognised S an k ili and 
l a t e r  led  a r is in g  ag a in s t him.
(37) V riddagirison  80; A.Bocarro 698-99; F.de Souza 132-133*216; 
Queyroz 463-467; P .da T rinidade 111.207-8
The p e r s is ta n t  Portuguese charges th a t  S an k ili aided both Kuruwita Rala 
and N ikap itiya may throw some doubt as to  how fa r  S an k ili kept to  
h is  promises bu t th e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  S an k ili d id  not jo in  
N ikapitiya and Kuruwita Rala in  an attem pt to  g e t r id  o f  Portuguese 
overlordsh ip  as a sse r ted  by Alfredo Botelho de Souza. His p o s itio n  
in  Ja ffn a  i t s e l f  a t  th i s  time was too dependent on Portuguese support 
fo r  th i s .  N evertheless i t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  he followed Ethirraanne 
Sinham*s p o lic y  o f allow ing con tacts between the  S inhalese and south 
In d ia  through th e  t r a d i t io n a l  rou tes across Ja ffn a .
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from Senerat who was busy n eg o tia tin g  an a l lia n c e  w ith th e  
Portuguese, th e i r  p o s it io n  became in c re a s in g ly  d esp era te . The 
m ajo rity  o f so ld ie rs  in  th e i r  armies were peasan t r e c r u i t s ,  
armed only w ith swords, bows and spears who could not be 
expected to  be absent from theifc v il la g e  f ie ld s  fo r  long.
Promises o f lavisfe g ran ts  o f  land  might b rin g  them up fo r 
a w hile but th e  immefdiate need to  sow o r h arv es t the  fam ily 
f ie ld s  soon overshadowed a l l  hopes o f  fu tu re  g a in . Moreover 
though Kuruwita Rala could draw on h is  base in  Uva fo r  supp lies  
and new recru its^  fo r  h is  long tenure  o f power in  th a t  province 
had won him lo y a lty  th e re , N ikap itiya  had not th e  same f a c i l i t i e s  
in  th e  Seven Korales and h is  supp lies  and r e c ru i ts  were forthcoming 
only w hile he was a ttended  by success in  the  f i e ld .
These fa c to rs  exp lain  why the  campaign o f  Luis Gomes 
P in to  and Dom Constantino ag a in s t N ikap itiya  in  May-July 1617 
was such a success. N ikapitiya,who was forced to  withdraw 
northwards, escaped th e  Portuguese only because o f  the  im perfect 
con tro l th a t  Senerat had over the  Vanniyars o f  Nuwarakalawiya.
From Ju ly  l 6 l 7 N ikap itiya  ceased to  be a fo rce  to  be reckoned w ith . 
Though he made a f in a l  in cu rs io n  in to  Portuguese t e r i t o r y  in
(38) Evidence in  A.Bocarro (499*707) and in  contemporary J e s u i t  
letters(CALR 11.130) in d ic a te  th a t  N ikapitiya*s army f lu c tu a te d  
in  number from about four thousand to  under one thousand men.
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September 1617, he found th e  people o f  th e  Seven Korales 
re lu c ta n t to  support him* He th e re fo re  speed ily  withdrew to  
th e  fo re s ts  o f n o r th -c e n tra l Ceylon and was never heard o f
. (39) again.
The re v o lt l e f t  i t s  mark on th e  Seven X orales. This
province had been a valuable source o f  revenue and had
provided th e  se a t fo r  one o f  the  sub-kings o f  K otte a t  the
end o f  th e  f i f te e n th  century . I t s  p ro sp e rity  however had
su ffe red  a check a f te r  th e  system atic  d ev asta tio n  o f the  area
by Azevedo in  h is  attem pt to  regain  co n tro l o f  i t  in  1596-1601
( H O )
and ggain in  1603-1612. A fter f iv e  years o f  r e la t iv e  peace
th e  Seven Korales once more became a ba ttleg round  in  1616-1617.
I t  i s  u n lik e ly  th a t  the Portuguese estim ate o f seven thousand
S inhalese k i l le d  and over a thousand cripp led  by in ju ry  in
(41)
war in  th e  e ig h t months o f  re v o lt  was an exaggeration .
In  th e  long  run th e  Portuguese them selves l o s t  by th e i r  own 
scorched e a rth  p o licy  fo r  by 1618 th e  Seven K orales which
had mustered four thousand la s c a r in s  in  the  tim e o f  R ajasinha
Ui (42)y«dlded le s s  than  h a lf  th a t  number.
(39) A.Bocarro 714
(40) T.Abeyasinghe 32
(41) AHU 501 .ff.63v ,287 . Eight years l a t e r  Francisco Barbosa 
de Andrade estim ated th a t  a t  l e a s t  two thousand la s c a r in s  
d ied in  the  re v o lt o f  N ikap itiya . (Ajuda 51-V III-40.f.220v)
The Portuguese lo s s  probable exceeded two hundred dead. On 
many occasions the  Portuguese k i l l e d  a l l  t h e i r  cap tives to  
i n s t i l l  t e r r o r  and to  subjugate the  lan d . (A.Bocarro f f . 686- 687)
(42) Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.266
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The peace t r e a ty  o f  1617 between the  k ing  o f  Kandy and 
the  Portuguese was in  many ways th e  most s ig n if ic a n t  r e s u l t
s o  c o m p l e t e  a  r e v e r s a l  o f  p a s t  p o l i c i e s  a s  t h e  t r e a t y  r e p r e s e n t e d  
w a s  n o t  e a s i l y  a c h i e v e d .  O v e r  t h r e e  m o n t h s  e l a p s e d  b e t w e e n  
t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  t h e  k i n g * s  a c c r e d i t e d  a m b a s s a d o r s  i n  M a lw a n a
arose from m atters o f  procedure, though th i s  d id  not include 
d elay  in  con tac ting  and g e ttin g  the  approval o f  the  v iceroy
a s  F a r i a  d e  S o u z a  w o u l d  h a v e  u s  b e l i e v e .  I n  f a c t  t h e  w h o l e  
p r o c e s s  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  s i d e  w a s  d o n e  b y  
t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  D o n  N u n o  A l v a r e s  P e r e i r a  h i m s e l f ,  t h o u g h  
h e  w a s  a l w a y s  c a r e f u l  t o  o b t a i n  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  s t e p s  h e  t o o k  
f r o m  a  c o u n c i l  h e  h a d  f o r m e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e .  T h i s  c o u n c i l  
n o r m a l l y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  h i m s e l f ,  t h e  v e d o r  
o r  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  o f  r e v e n u e ,  t h e  c a p t a i n  o f  C o l o m b o ,  t h e
(43) F r. S .G .Pere^ra has w ritte n  a number o f  a r t i c le s  (based 
mainly on J e s u i t  records) on th e  n eg o tia tio n s  fo r  the  peace 
t r e a ty  and gives a t r a n s la t io n  o f  th e  peace t r e a ty  i t s e l f .
CALR 11.132-35; CALH I I I . 49-52; OR 3 s e r . I I . 536-538; CLR 3 se r  
111.157-166) The t r e a ty  and some o f  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  which 
proceeded i t  are published  in  Portuguese in  Biker I.203-217*
A m anuscript a t  Evora CVI /  2-2 f f . 246-253 provides much th e  
same inform ation  as F r. P e re ira  g ives. I t  i s  a version  o f 
th e  proceedings in  Ceylon in  1617 au th en tica ted  by A.Bocarro 
in  1643. Another m anuscript copy o f  the  peace t r e a ty  i s  found 
in  TT.LM. 51 .f f . 364-369v.
(44) de Souza VI. 132
o f  the  a c tiv itie s fo f  N ikapitya. As might have been expected
a n d  the  e v e n t u a l
(44)
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heads o f  th e  four re lig io u s  o rd e rs , the  four d isavas ( i f  
a v a ila b le ) , th e  o f f i c ia l s  o f  the  camara o r m unicipal council 
o f  Colombo and a few sen io r Portuguese s o ld ie rs .  The council
(^5)held  i t s  meetings in  Colombo. The delay  arose c h ie f ly  from
th e  f a c t  th a t  the  Kandyan envoys were allowed l i t t l e  power
to  n e g o tia te . Often they  could m erely in d ic a te  th e  k in g 's
wishes to  the  cap ta in -g en era l and convey the  Portuguese
proposals to  the  k ing  and h is  adv isers  in  Kandy. Thus a f te r
th e  f i r s t  meeting o f  the  c a p ta in -g e n e ra l 's  council when i t
approved o f th e  d ec is io n  to  n eg o tia te  peace on 13 May 1617 ,
i t  met again on 27 Ju ly  1617 to  consider the  d r a f t  proposals
o f  th e  general and tw ice more in  the same month to  d iscuss
(46)amendments proposed by the k ing  o f Kandy.
The delay  was a lso  due to  th e  d iffe ren ces  between 
th e  two p a r t ie s  as to  th e  term s o f th e  t r e a ty .  Senerat was 
w illin g  to  pay t r ib u te  and re le a se  a l l  p riso n e rs  se ized  in  
war in  re tu rn  fo r  reco g n itio n  as k ing  o f Kandy and fo r  an 
a l l ia n c e  w ith th e  Portuguese. On th e  o th e r hand he d id  not 
agree com pletely to  th e  Portuguese proposals regard ing  th e  
amount o f t r ib u te ,  th e  d e lim ita tio n  o f  th e  f ro n t ie r ,  m issionary 
a c t iv i ty  in  Kandy, trea tm en t o f  refugees from Portuguese lands
>'> cr
- -  - - -  -  —  -
(45) CLR 3 s e r .  111.158,160,162; CLR 3 ser .II .5 3 3 ,5 3 6
Biker V ol.1.208,211,213; Evora CV l/2-2.ff.246v-247,249-249v,
250v,251v,253
(b6) On 18 and 30 o f Ju ly .
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And the question o f  the fotft o f  Balane.
S en era tfs conception o f  t r ib u te  proved to  be a token
g i f t  o ffe red  #to  do honour to  th e  k ing  o f  P ortugal fo r  th e
(47)king  o f P ortugal has no need o f  money bu t only honour. *
The Portuguese on th e  o th e r hand demanded a su b s ta n tia l  
t r ib u te ;  namely four elephants (each f iv e  cu b its  in  he igh t) 
to g e th er w ith one thousand amunas o f arecanut and two hundred
m
bahars o f  cinnamon. Eventually  Senerat*s o f fe r  o f  one elephant 
a year le d  to** compromise se ttlem en t o f  a t r ib u te  o f  two elephants 
a year being accepted by the  Portuguese on 18 Ju ly .
The d iffe ren ces  over Balane f o r t  were as wide. The 
Portuguese o r ig in a l ly  wanted the  f o r t  to  be r e b u i l t  by S enera t, 
stocked w ith p rov isions fo r  a  whole year and handed over to  
th e  Portuguese w ith a l l  th e  men, arms and ammunition captured 
th e re  in  February. Senerat was no t prepared to  concede th i s .
The f o r t  a t  Balane had been construc ted  by Azevedo fo r  th e  
express purpose o f  a tta c k in g  Kandy and one o f  Senerat*s c h ie f  
o b jec tiv es  since h is  accession  had been th e  d ism antling  o f
(47) CLR 3 s e r .  111.1555 CALR I I I  50
(48) The Portuguese proposals mentioned above are  those o f 
th e  d r a f t  t r e a ty  prepared by Don Nuno Alvares P e re ira  on
30 June 161? and approved by h is  council on 2 Ju ly  1617. The 
compromise se ttlem en t mentioned^unless o therw ise in d ic a ted  
were reached by 18 Ju ly . For th e  proposals o f  th e  Portuguese 
and th e  counter-proposals o f  th e  k ing  see , CLR 3 s e r .  I I .  536-5375 
CLR 3 s e r .  I I .  156-1575 Biker I .  205-208; CALR I I I .  49-52;
Evora CVl/ 2 -2 .ff.246-250v
bahar=a measure o f weight 400-500 lb s .  amuna= a measure o f 
capac ity . An amuna^o f  arecanut contained 24000-26000 n u ts .
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the  f o r t .  Thus he o ffe red  merely to  re s to re  a l l  men and 
weapons captured from th e  f o r t  and th e  Portuguese had to  r e s t  
con ten t w ith th i s .  On the  question  o f  th e  re tu rn  o f  th e  men 
captured a t  Sabaragamuwa, S enerat o ffe red  to  re tu rn  th e  
Portuguese who were in  h is  power bu t made i t  c le a r  th a t  th e i r  
weapons were w ith th e  men o f  the  area  who were now follow ers 
o f  Kuruwita Rala.
Then th e re  was the question  o f  th e  r e p a tr ia t io n  o f  
the  re b e ls . P e re ira  l ik e  a l l  th e  generals s ince  Azevedo, was 
concerned w ith the  depopulation o f  K otte and wanted Senerat 
to  send back a l l  those reb e ls  who had f le d  to  th e  h i l l  country. 
S enerat agreed on cond ition  th a t  the  cap ta in -g en era l would 
pardon them and re s to re  th e i r  lands to  them.
At th e  o u tse t th e  Portuguese also  in s is te d  th a t  a l l
Moors and Europeans should be excluded from any con tact w ith
Kandy. This was a clause which Kandy would have found d i f f i c u l t
to  honour £n p ra c t ic e , fo r  much o f  the  Kandyan tra d e  was
in  th e  hands o f  the Muslims. Senerat found an ingenious
way ou t h ere . O m itting a l l  s p e c if ic  mention o f n a t io n a l i t ie s
he proposed th a t  Kandy •would be a fr ie n d  o f  our frien d s  and
9)
an enemy o f our enemies.* v 7 This preserved Kandyan trad e  
ag a in s t in te rfe re n c e , fo r  Ind ian  Muslims supplied  many goods
(49) CALR I I I . 50; CLR 3 s e r .I I I .1 5 5 ;  Evora CVl/2-2f.248; 
3 ik e r  1.207
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to  K otte too and th e re fo re  could not be regarded as enemies 
o f  th e  Portuguese. The Portuguese fe a rs  o f  a Kandyan 
a l l ia n c e  w ith o th er European nations were a lso  assuaged 
by th i s  c lause .
The Portuguese proposals regard ing  the  propagation 
o f  C h r is t ia n i ty  a lso  ra ise d  problems. The cap ta in -genera l 
had s t ip u la te d  not only  th a t  Senerat should provide a
s i t e  f o r  a  c h u r c h  i n  K a n d y  b u t  t h e  h e  s h o u l d  f f a v o u r
(IQ) (51)
and help* th e  spread o f  C h r is t ia n ity . Senerat was a to le ra n t
k ing  fo r  he had allowed Franciscan f r i a r s  fre e  access to
Kusumasana devi and had even en tru sted  th e  education o f
h is  sons to  them. Yet he could not have f a i le d  to  r e a l i s e
t h a t  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  h i s  p e o p l e  w a s  t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t
d e p e n d e n t  o n  h i s  p a t r o n a g e  o f  B u d d h i s m .  T h i s  was p e r h a p s
why th e  eventual t r e a ty  m erely contained a c lause e s ta b lish in g
the  r ig h t  o f  Kandyans to  become C h ris tian s i f  they  chose
♦ -4 ( 5 2 )to  do so.
The cap ta in -g en era l in  h is  d ra f t  t r e a ty  o f  30 January
(50) CLR 3 s e r .  I I I .  538; Biker 1 . 206 ; CALR I I I . 50
(51) This demand should also  be viewed in  th e  con tex t o f  the  
Portuguese in to le ran ce  o f Buddhism and Hinduism in  t h e i r  t e r i t o r y .
(52) There i s  no reason to  be liev e  th a t  freedom of conscience 
d id  not e x is t  in  Kandy before t h i s .  The only  d i f f i c u l ty  
Senerat ra ise d  was in  the  case o f slaves who on conversion 
became f re e ,  since th i s  led  to  d isp u te  between th e i r  m asters 
and th e  p r ie s t s .  The Portuguese who doubtless had experience 
o f th e  d i f f i c u l ty  in  Kotte agreed to  exclude slaves from
th e  freedom to  accept C h r is t ia n ity . The f in a l  t r e a ty  also
s p e c if ic a l ly  granted  Senerat th e  r ig h t  to  name th e  Franciscan
f r i a r  in  Kandy. The ex ten t to  which Senerat ex^ercised  th i s  r ig h t
i a  unknown. He c e r ta in ly  d id  nominate th e  f i r s t  Fr. Jose de Hadre
de Deus. Other Franciscans who served in  Kandy in  th e  1620#s and 309s
inc lude Fr. Francisco Negrao, Fr. Bernado de Cruz and Fr. Pedro doe Anios. 
{P. da T rin idads III*  79 . 85)
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1617 requested th a t  one o f S en era tfs th re e  sons be handed 
over as a hostage, and as th e  p rinces were young th a t  four 
o f  th e  Kandyan nobles should a lso  be handed over to  th e  
Portuguese. This demand r e f le c ts  the  d i s t r u s t  th a t  the  
Portuguese had o f  Kandyan in te n tio n s  even a t  th i s  l a t e  
s tag e . Senerat p re d ic tab ly  refused  to  p a r t  w ith  one of 
h is  sons and pointed th a t  h is  royal word was more valuable 
than  two hundred hostages. However, to  calm Portuguese 
apprehensions he agreed to  th e  sending o f some nobles as 
hostages on cond ition  th a t  they  could take tu rn s  so th a t
(53)none heed be separated  from h is  fam ily fo r  long.
o n l y  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  b o u n d a r i e s  r e m a i n e d .  
O n c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e g a n  D o n  N u n o  A l v a r e s  P e r e i r a  h a d  s e n t  a  
d e l e g a t i o n  o f  f i v e  t r u s t e d  p e r s o n s  t o  K a n d y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
t h e  l i m i t s  o f  e a c h  k i n g d o m .  T h i s  d i d  n o t  p r o v e  d i f f i c u l t  a s  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  K o t t e  a n d  K a n d y  w e r e  w e l l  
k n o w n .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r o s e  f r o m  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  e f f o r t s  
t o  o b t a i n  s o m e  k i n i f  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  e a s t e r n  s e a b o a r d  o f
CeylonL he cap ta in -g en era l in  h is  o r ig in a l  p roposals
(53) Senerat h im self asked fo r  no hostage save the  Franciscan 
f r a i r  in  Kandy. This clause o f  th e  t r e a ty  on hostages does not 
appear to  habe been enforced a t  any tim e.
(54) The f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  Trincomalee and B a ttic a lo a , two 
p o rts  on th e  easte rn  seaboard o f Ceylon had been urged on th e  
cap ta in -g en era l o f  Ceylon from the  time o f Azevedo. (See, DR.IV.137; 
AHU.282.f .62; DR.II. 478; D R .III .202.397)
A ll th ese  issu es  having been s e t t le d  by 18 Ju ly
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a s k e d  t h e  k i n g  o f  K a n d y  t o  p r o m i s e  t o  a i d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
i n  b u i l d i n g  f o r t s  b n  t h e  s e a - c o a s t .  S e n e r a t  r e f u s e d  t o  
a g r e e  t o  t h i s  a s  s u c h  a  m e a s u r e  w o u l d  i s o l a t e  K a n d y  a n d  
p l a c e  K a n d y a n  t r a d e  a t  t h e  m e r c y  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .  T h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  t h e r e u p o n  l a i d  c l a i m  t o  B a t t i c a l o a .  S e n e r a t  
o n c e  m o r e  r e f u s e d  t o  g i v e  i n ,  d e s p i t e  a  P o r t u g u e s e  c o m p r o m i s e  
o f f e r  i n  e a r l y  A u g u s t  b y  w h i c h  B a t t i c a l o a  w a s  t o  b e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  K a n d y a n  t e r i t o r y  o n  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  S e n e r a t  w o u l d  a i d  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  t o  b u i l d  a  f o r t  t h e r e #  E v e n t u a l l y  i t  w a s  a g r e e d
t h a t  a l l  r i g h t s  o v e r  B a t t i c a l o a  b e l o n g e d  t o  S e n e r a t  a n d
v.- u  < ( 5 5 )h i s  h e i r s .
T h u s  t h e  d e l a y  i n  s i g n i n g  t h e  f o r m a l  t r e a t y  w a s  d u e  
p a r t l y  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  i t s e l f  a n d  p a r t l y  t o  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  p a r t i e s .  S e n e r a t  a p p e a r s  t o  
h a v e  h a d  a n  e d g e  o v e r  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  h e  
y i e l d e d  f a r  l e s s  o f t e n  t h a n  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  o n  p o i n t s  a t  
d i s p u t e .  I t  s h o u l d  h o w e v e r  b e  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  S e n e r a t  h a d
(56)
c o n c e d e d  m u c h  t o  m a k e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  c o m m e n c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
M o r e o v e r  S e n e r a t  u n l i k e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  w a s  c o m p e l l e d  t o  
s t a n d  f i r m  o n  s e v e r a l  i s s u e s .  T h e  v e r y  p o l i c y  o f  m a k i n g  
p e a c e  w i t h  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  h a d  r a i s e d  r e v o l t s  i n  h i s  d o m a i n s .
S e n e r a t  k n e w  o n l y  t o o  w e l l  t h a t  t o o  m a n y  c o n c e s s i o n s  m ig jh t
(55) E v o r a  C V I /  2 - 2  f f . 2 4 9 v - 2 5 0 v ;  B i k e r  1 . 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 }  CLR 3 s e r .  I I I .  
159-160
(56) H e  a g r e e d  t o  b e  a  v a s s a l  a n d  t o  r e l e a s e  s o m e  o f  t h e  
p r i s o n e r s - o f - w a r .
83
lo se  him h is  throne* On th e  o th e r the  Portuguese cap ta in - 
genera l feared a fu r th e r  d e te r io ra tio n  o f th e  m il i ta ry  
s i tu a t io n  due to  fre sh  re v o lts  and a lso  feared  Dutch 
in te rv e n tio n , e sp e c ia lly  a f e t r  rumours o f  th e  s ig h tin g  o f
(57)
th ree  Dutch ships o f f  B atticaloa*  N evertheless, F aria  de Souza's 
charge th a t  Senerat a t  f i r s t  o ffe red  favourable terras and then 
changed them a f te r  th e  d e fea t o f  N ikap itiya  i s  re fu ted  by 
contemporary documents. S e n e ra t 's  ob jec tions to  th e  o r ig in a l 
Portuguese proposals and the  acceptance o f th e  eventual 
compromise so lu tio n s  by th e  Portuguese (except in  the  case
(58)
o f B a ttica lo a) a l l  came before the  f in a l  d e fea t o f  N ikap itiya .
The t r e a ty  was u ltim a te ly  signed by the  cap ta in - 
general on 17 August l6 l?  and by th e  king seven days la te r*
The trebly was then  sen t to  Goa fo r  th e  v ic e ro y 's  approval 
and f in a l ly  to  Lisbon fo r  confirm ation by the  k ing . The 
Luso-Kandyan a llia n c e  however brought no immetfdiate peace 
to  Ceylon fo r  th e  sw ift Portuguese success ag a in s t N ikap itiya  
was not repeated  ag a in st Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne*
The a b i l i t y  o f  Kuruwita Rala to  r e s i s t  the  combined 
power o f  Senerat and the  Portuguese was p a r t ly  due to  h is  
s k i l l  and experience in  war and p a r t ly  due to  the  ex ten t
(57) The new disava o f  th e  Seven K orales Luis T eixe ira  de Macedo 
a lso  warned o f another r i s in g  being planned w ith th e  a id  o f the  
king o f Ja ffh a  in  th e  Seven K orales. Evora C V l/2-2.ff.250v-251v; 
B iker 1.212-213; CLR 3 se r . I I I .  161-162
(58) F.de Souza VI. 132 appears to  confute^ th e  terras proposed by 
the  cap ta in -genera l w ith those o ffe red  by S enera t. Bocarro 
709-710 gives th e  o r ig in a l  proposals o f th e  Portuguese as the  
ac tu a l conten ts o f th e  t r e a ty .
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o f h is  resources. Throughout l 6 l 7 and most o f  l6 l8  Kuruwita Rala 
commanded much o f the  d isavas o f  Sabaragamuwa and K atara 
as w ell as the southern h a lf  o f th e  Kandyan kingdom. The 
fo rces he could r a is e  in  these  areas were su p e rio r to  ^any
(59)th a t  Senerat could muster in  number and as w ell as in  armament.
That was why Kuruwita Rala could ra id  Kandy and d rive
(60)
Senerat out o f h is  own c a p i ta l .  In  K otte , when confronted by 
th e  b e t te r  armed Portuguese forces Kuruwita Rala always 
withdrew and used h is  su p e rio r m ob ility  and b e t te r  inform ation 
se rv ice  to  su rp rise  is o la te d  bodies o f la s c a r in  a u x i l i a r i e s  
serv ing  the  Portuguese o r to  a ttack  r e la t iv e ly  undefended 
se ttlem en ts . Thus by th e  end o f  1617 Kuruwita Rala^not merely 
avoided d e fea t and kep t co n tro l over the  areas he subjugated 
but he had forced the Portuguese to  abandon the  newly r e b u i l t
(61)
f o r t  a t  S a b a r a g a m u w a ,  h a d  r a i d e d  B e r u w a l a ,  h a d  a t t a c k e d  tw o
detachments o f  la s c a r in s  and had even persuaded some more o f
( 62)
the  la sc a r in s  o f Matara to  d e se rt to  him.
The success o f  Kuruwita Rala however owed much to  a
(59)Most o f th e  foundry workers who had served the  Portuguese had 
jo ined  Kuruwita Rala, p a r t ly  as a p ro te s t  ag a in st th e i r  increased  
burdens under Portuguese ru le . (T. Abeyasinghe 83 ; TT.colieciofrde 
S .V icente. l iv r o  19. doc. 276) The k ing  o f  Kandy a t  th i s  time 
could h ard ly  ra is e  th re e  thousand men. ( JCBRAS XXXVII.75)
(60) K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 20-26
(61) Sabaragamuwa had been re-cap tu red  and r e - f o r t i f i e d  )&?y the  
Portuguese in  March-April l6 l?  in  an attem pt to  reg a in  co n tro l 
over the  d i s t r i c t .
(62) Bocarro does not mention a s in g le  m il i ta ry  v ic to ry  ag a in st 
Kuruwita Rala during th e  l a s t  s ix  months o f 1617* Thus the mention o f 
a v ic to ry  in  which twelve a ra tch is . and e ig h t mud&ljprs o f
Kuruwita Rala were k i l l e d ,  in  a p e t i t io n  o f a Portuguese so ld ie r  
should be tre a te d  w ith some cau tion . (Bocarro 711-713; AHU 501*f *287.
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**
fa c to r  ou tside  h is  control*  misgovernment in  K otte i t s e l f .
P e re ir a ’s m ediocrity  as a so ld ie r  had been p a r t i a l ly
d isg u ised  by th e  fo r tu ito u s  t r e a ty  o f peace w ith Kandy.His
work as an ad m in is tra to r had no such saving g race . Here
h is  p r in c ip a l f a u l ts  la y  in  h is  in a b i l i t y  to  d is c ip lin e
to  reward
h is  subordinates and an u rg e /lo y a l supporters a t  th e  expense 
of o th e rs . The former lim ite d  the e ffe c tiv n ess  o f  h is  
fo rces in  war, while th e  l a t t e r  earned him the  enemity o f  the  
camara o f Colombo, the  stronghold  o f Portuguese s e t t l e r  
i n t e r s t s .  The problem o f  d is c ip lin e  arose p a r t ly  from the  
fa c t  th e  Portuguese fid a lg o  o r nobleman could be punished 
ohly by the  v iceroy  and th e  High Court (Relacao)o f Goa fo r  
any crime he committed. The cap ta in -g en era l had only th e  power 
to  o rder h is  a r r e s t .  The a r r e s t  i t s e l f  would have to  be done 
by th e  ouvidor o r judge who would then send the  accused to  
Goa fo r  t r i a l .  P e re ira  however took no steps ag a in st th e  ch ie f  
o ffenders who happened to  be two o f h is  nephews. ouvidor
(63) Queyroz 622; JCBRAS X I.4955 TT.Corpo chronologico p a r t . I  
maco 116 doc. 87 ; AHU Caixa V .21.11.161?; AHU Caixa V I.2 .1 1 .l6 l8  
The two nephews o f th e  general Manoel Cezar and Don Francisco P e r ^ a  
became well-known fo r  t h e i r  law less and high-handed a c ts .
P e re ira  kidnapped a young Portuguese g i r l  and kept her in  
h is  house fo r  one and a h a l f  months. Cezar d id  not sc rup le  
to  use fo rce  ag a in st o f f ic ia l s  o f  th e  camara and even ag a in st 
p r ie s t s .  The camara in  a l e t t e r  dated  21 November 1617 
complained to  the  k ing  as follow s • queixasse mais e s ta  
povo e cidade dos criados do g e ra l acu tila rem  e mataram m 
homes e cometerV a d u lte r io s  porque se matar£o molheres cazados 
e entrarem  em cazas de viuvas honradas e fazerem m^as forcasT ’
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Francisco Gomes dos Santos d isp layed no wish to  a l ie n a te  
th e  cap ta in -g en era l, h is  su p erio r in  rank^by proceeding 
ag a in s t h is  fa v o u rite s . A fte r a time th e re fo re  even the  
outward forms o f ju s t ic e  ceased to  be observed and genera l 
and subordinates a lik e  d isp layed  no sc rup les about making 
money a t  the  expense o f  thercc royal tre a su ry . The consequent 
oppres^on o f the  S inhalese only tended to  in c rease  support 
fo r  Kuruwita Rala.
Moreover P e r e i r a 's  ac tio n s in  th i s  period  were a lso  
governed by a susp icion  o f a l l  S inhalese le a d e rs . At one 
stage he even suspected th a t  Don Constantino Barreto might 
lead  a new re b e llio n  in  M atara^^& istrustfu ljL  o f the  S inhalese 
and d is l ik e d  by the  Portuguese P e re ira  grew in c re a s in g ly  
in e f fe c tiv e  as a g en e ra l. This i s  why th e  a r r iv a l  o f  a 
competent cap ta in -genera l in  th e  person o f Constantino de Sa
(65)de Noronha in  September l6 l8  became such a s ig n if ic a n t  event*
The re v o lt  o f N ik ap itiy a , th e  peace w ith  Kandy and the 
appointment de Sa asp cap ta in -g en era l were th ree  key events
(64) DR V.239; Botelho de Souza I I I . 57
( 65) The need fo r  a successor to  P e re ira  d id  no t a r is e  out o f  
any doubts in  Lisbon as to  h is  a b i l i ty .  On th e  co n tra ry  the  k ing  
had decided in  March 1617 th a t  he was b e s t f i t t e d  by experience 
and stand ing  to  take up th e  cap ta in -g en era lsh ip  o f  Mo9ambique. 
(DR V.37-38,45)
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in  a period  ■which saw the  end o f th e  Azevedo era  in  Portuguese 
Ceylon. The f i r s t  c le a r ly  showed the  Portuguese th a t  they  
had by no means won th e  lo y a lty  o f  th e  S inhalese in h a b ita n ts  
o f  K otte even a f te r  two decades o f  ru le . The second gave 
them -  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e since they  claimed K otte in  th e i r  
own r ig h t  -  a chance to  reorganize th e  ad m in istra tio n  o f 
th e  kingdom, provide fo r  i t s  defence and to  t r y  to  win over 
th e  people, w ithout the  d is t r a c t io n  o f a war ag a in s t Kandy.
The th ird  gave th e  Portuguese in  Ceylon, a g if te d  le ad e r  fo r  
the  ta sk s  th a t  la y  ahead.
Constantino de Sa de Noronha was undoubtedly a n a tu ra l 
le a d e r  o f  men. As F r. Fernao de Queyroz p u t i t  *his g a l la n t  
d isp o s itio n  and manly frame and s ta tu r e ,  t a l l  and robust along 
w ith g re a t s tre n g th , firm ness and p e r fe c t h e a lth  won him 
resp e c t.*  (66)De Sa came from a fam ily w ith a t r a d i t io n  o f 
se rv ice  overseas. His own fa th e r ,  Martim Lourenco de Sa de Menezes 
had served as th e  warden o f  Ceuta. Brought up in  Belem, the  
se ttlem en t along th e  r iv e r  Tagus from which almost a l l  the  
famous Portuguese exp lorers s e t  s a i l ,  he was from e a r ly  days 
exposed to  the  lu r e  o f th e  Portuguese overseas empire. However 
de Sa*s departu re  to  th e  East was not a product o f h is  yearning 
fo r  adventure. I t  was an event prompted by economic n ec e ss ity .
He had in h e r i te d  l i t t l e .  His m arriage in  1607 to  Dona Luiza da S ilv a
(66) Queyroz 780
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de Medonya was merely a union between two impoverished noble
households. De Sa th e re fo re  had to  recourse to  the  only
occupation thought honourable to  th e  Portuguese fida lgo  o f
the  seventeenth century  -  a ca ree r in  the  armed se rv ic e s . He
served in  the navy fo r  a year and then fo r  two and a h a l f
years more in  the north  A frican f o r t  o f MazaglCo. These years
o f se rv ice  however brought him l i t t l e  fo rtune  w hile the  b i r th
o f f iv e  ch ild ren  to  h is  wife c e r ta in ly  increased  the  economic
(67)p ressu re  on him.
De Sa l e f t  Lisbon fo r  th e  East in  1614. Four years 
l a t e r  he had es tab lish ed  a rep u ta tio n  fo r h im self as a le a d e r  
o f men and occupied the im portant p o s itio n  o f  th e  captain-m ajor 
o f the  F lee t o f  Cape Camorin ( I6 l7 - l6 l8 ) .  In  h is  r i s e  he was 
undoubtedly a s s is te d  by h is  kinsmen bu t h is  ex p lo its  had a lready  
won him so much reco g n itio n  th a t  when on 8 October 1618 the  
new v iceroy , Don Joao Coutinho, Conde de Redondo summoned 
a meeting o f h is  council to  choose a new cap ta in -g en era l 
fo r  Ceylon ( u n t i l  th e  king made a fre sh  appointment) de Sa
( 67) De Sa*s fiv e  ch ild ren  included two daughters -  Dona Joana 
and Dona F rancisca. His e ld e s t son was Joao Rodriguez de 
3a de Iienezes. For fu r th e r  d e ta i l s  o f de Sa*s fam ily and 
personal l i f e  see -  JC3RAS XI. **80-494; Bocarro 325, 446, 
469,645-648; AHU.501 ff .l6 7 ;3 5 0 ; Simancas SP.1505 ff .1 0 .4 4 ; 
C.R.Boxer- Commentaries o f Ruy F re ire  da Andrede 3155 
TT.Livros do ordem do C hristo  XXI ff.35»58v "
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was th e  unanimous choice.
De Sa l e f t  Goa on 15 October o f th e  same year w ith
a sm all fo rce o f twenty seven men. A month l a t e r  he a rr iv ed  
(69)a t  Colombo. His f i r s t  ta sk  was th e  re -o rg an iza tio n  o f the  
armed fo rces , fo r  Portuguese power in  the is la n d  in  the  
l a s t  an a ly sis  depended on the  arm£. He moved cau tio u s ly  a t  
f i r s t  consu ltin g  the  d isavas and the  Portuguese cap ta ins o f
(68) Queyroz759-760 holds th a t  Constantino de Sa d id  no t seek 
to  en rich  h im self when he was captain-feeneral o f  Ceylon.
De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI 566-567) a lso  makes th is  con ten tion  
p o in tin g  out th a t  he spent eigh teen  thousand x e ra fin s  o f  h is  
own money in  works o f  f o r t i f i c a t io n  w hile re fu s in g  huge b rib es  
o ffe red  by th e  king o f Kandy. Contemporary documents however 
in d ic a te  th a t  de Sadid not neg lec t o p p o rtu n itie s  to  make money. 
Although h is  s a la ry  was fix ed  a t  four thousand xerafins a year 
th e  Bishop o f Cochim in  1619 ca lcu la ted  h is  annual income 
to  be twenty thousand x era fin s  . (AHU 33*f*j(2l). Staztoqi 
His mansion a t  Rossapana near Malwana was kep t in  such 
s ty le  th a t  th e  king ordered an in v e s tig a tio n  be made as 
to  whether such luxury  was in  accordance w ith royal in s tru c t io n s .  
(TT.LM .15.f.l6; TT.Ms. da Convento da Graca to m o .3 F .ff .4 l, 
46.30J; BNL.caixa 199.doc.78; TT.LM.13 .f . 243) In s tead  o f 
p ro h ib itin g  p r iv a te  trad e  among Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  in  
Ceylon as h is  son claimed he d id  (JCBRAS X I.539-40) de Sa 
h im self ca rried  on a b a r te r  tra d e  w ith the Kandyans supplying 
c lo th  and s a l t  in  exchange fo r  arexanut and e lephan ts.
(Evora CXVl/2-3. ff.67 -67v ; Ajuda 51-VIII-40 f .221 ;
BNL, Pombalina 490.f .  196) Such p ra c t ic e  however was common 
among Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  in  In d ia .
( 69) DR.V. 242; TT.Ms.da L iv . l699 .f.247
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the e s ta n c ia s . He appointed F ilip e  de O liv e ira  as cap ta in -
major o f  the Portuguese fo rces and en tru sted  him w ith th e
regrouping o f th e  s ix  hundred Portuguese so ld ie rs  av a ilab le
fo r  duty* The d isavas were requested  to  muster th e  la s c a r in
forces* To counter Kuruwita R ala#s ex c e llen t system o f
o b ta in ing  news o f th e  movements o f  Portuguese tro o p s , de Sa
es tab lish ed  an espionage corps o f h is  own* F in a lly , he
exchanged envoys w ith Kandy recognising  th a t  peace w ith Kandy
(71)was e s s e n tia l  to  secure the  d e fea t o f th e  re b e l fo rc e s .
the advice o f  more experienced Portuguese e r i d i m  captains 
to  co n s tru c t a stockade a t  Sabaragamuwa, on th e  s i t e  e f  
the  s i x te enth oontury  o tty  o€ Sitawaka. The stockade was to  
ac t as a base fo r  th e  campaign planned ag a in s t Mayadunne 
and Kuruwita Rala. De Sa determined to  avoid any r is k  o f  a 
re v o lt  in  the subjugated areas w hile he was away in  the  Two 
K orales. Thus s iz eab le  g a rriso n s  were l e f t  in  a l l  Portuguese
of two companies o f Portuguese so ld ie rs  aided by a force 
o f la s c a r in s . A thousand S inhalese under Luis Cabral de F aria  
guarded the  Four Korales* The defensive deployment o f  these
(70) About t h i r t y  so ld ie rs  formed one e s tan c ia  o r company.
(71) Queyroz 623; K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 65-70; JCBRAS XI*
^ 9 5 -^ 6 , 498, 500; Botelho de Souza I I I .  59 re ly in g  on a s in g le  
document s ta te s  th a t  Senerat made a new peace w ith  de Sa 
g iv ing  up B a ttica lo a  to  th e  Portuguese.
(72) Colombo, Malwana, Menikkadawara and G alle . (K ustantinu Hatana 
stanzas 83- 87)
Having completed h is  p rep ara tio n s  de Sa reso lved , on
new stockade a t  Sabaragamuwa was l e f t  in  charge
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fo rces l e f t  de Sa w ith l i t t l e  more than  th re e  hundred
so ld ie rs  to  spare . With th is  fo rce  and a detachment o f
la s c a r in s  he s e t  out in  l a t e  l6 l8  to  e lim inate  th e  power
(73)o f Mayadunne and Kuruwita R ala.
genera l and h is  well-armed troops in  open b a t t l e  r e t i r e d  to  
th e i r  mountain stronghold o f Meddegaraa, ju s t  in s id e  th e  
borders o f Kandy. The d is tan ce  from Sabaragamuwa f o r t  to  
Meddegama as th e  crow f l i e s  was h ard ly  twenty m iles. To make 
i t  on foo t however was no easy p ro p o s itio n . The sh o r te s t
rou te  la y  along the  v a lle y  o f  Bambarabotuwa Oya. kuruw ita Rala 
had however made considerab le defensive p rep ara tio n s along th e  
v a lley  which being th ic k ly  fo re s ted  and re p le te  w ith  r iv u le ts  
was th e  id e a l scene fo r  g u e r r i l la  w arfare . De Sa had no wish 
to  r is k  h is  fo rces in  a f ro n ta l  a t ta c k , bu t being  determined
avoiding th e  d i f f i c u l t  country th a t  p ro tec ted  th e  reb e l 
stronghold and advanced on Meddegaraa from th e  re a r  along 
th e  Waiawe Ganga. Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne promptly
The two reb e l le ad e rs  having no wish to  meet th e
(74)
made a wide detour to  th e  south , thus
(73) Queyroz 624; JCBRAS X I.500-503; F.de Souza VI. 185-186
(74) Across the  p resen t Meda Pattuwa Korale o f  th e  province 
o f Sabaragamuwa.
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r e t i r e d  fu r th e r  in land  hoping to  en tice  de Sa fu r th e r  but 
de Sa decided to  re tu rn  to  Sabaragamuwa p a r t ly  owing to  an 
outbreak o f sm all-pox among th e  la s c a r in s .  Hampered by many 
sick  so ld ie rs  de Sa decided to  tak e  a sh o r te r  rou te  on the  
re tu rn  journey, though he once more avoided th e  rou te  along 
th e  Bambarabotuwa Oya bu t Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne r e a l iz in g  
th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  the  Portuguese were soon on th e i r  h e e ls .
For over tw enty-five  m iles from Imbulpe to  L e llo p itiy a  they  
pursued the Portuguese, c u ttin g  o f f  s tra g g le rs  and doing 
a l l  th ey  could to  impede th e i r  march. At len g th  a t  L e llo p itiy a , 
w ith in  four m iles o f the  Portuguese f o r t  o f  Sabaragamuwa, 
th e  cap ta in -genera l decided to  co u n te r-a ttac k . He feigned 
to  r e t i r e  in  d iso rd e r and la id  an ambush. The S inhalese , 
e la te d  by th e i r  success rushed in to  the  tra p  and were routed 
by th e  Portuguese fo rces .
The encounter a t  L e llo p itiy a  had been h a iled  as a
g re a t v ic to ry  fo r  de Sa by both S inhalese and Portuguese
w rite rs  o f th e  seventeenth century . The g re a te s t  S inhalese
(76)
poet o f  the  age, Alagiyawanna, wrote a poem K ustantinu Hatana 
(o r the  b a t t le  o f  Constantino) d ep ic tin g  i t  as a g rea t trium ph.
(75) K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 97-180; Queyroz 625; JCBRAS XI. 
504-505; F.de Souza VI. 186
(76) Baptised as Don Jeronimo Alagiyawanna in  the  time o f 
Azevedo.
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De Sa de Menezes and Queyroz claim  th a t  e ig h t thousand 
S inhalese were k i l le d  in  the  s tru g g le  w ithout the lo s s  o f 
a s in g le  Portuguese and th a t  Kangara A ratch i, a renowned 
S inhalese rebel le ad e r  was captured# Queyroz moreover s ta te s  
th a t  fo u rty  mudaliyars o f th e  reb e ls  were k i l l e d  in  b a t t l e .  
Alagiyawanna m aintained th a t  t h i r t y  two m udaliyars were
(77)captured and mentions the  names o f four o f them.
Of the  th ree  w rite rs  only Alagiyawanna was a
contemporary re s id e n t in  Ceylon a t  the tim e o f the  b a t t l e .
However h is  poem i s  obviously an e u lo g is tic  account o f the
a c t iv i t ie s  o f  the  general and allowance must be made fo r
p o e tic  l ic e n c e . Alagiyawanna moreover was a C h ris tian  convert
and had been in  Portuguese se rv ice  fo r  many y ea rs . De Sa de
Menezes when he wrote h is  hzagraqsigc f a th e r1 s biography
would have been in fluenced  not merely by f i l i a l  a ffe c tio n
bu t also  by the  expecta tion  o f m a te ria l reward fo r  h is
f a th e r1s se rv ic e s . Moreover, when he composed h is  work over
twenty years ftad elapsed since the  b a t t le  o f  L e llo p itiy a .
y e t
De Sa de Menezes had n o t /v is i te d  the  E ast. Of these  w rite rs  
th e re fo re , only Queyroz can be expected to  take  a reasonable 
detached view. But Queyroz does not seem to  have r e l ie d  on 
contemporary documents. His account o f  th e  b a t t l e  i s  taken
(77) K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 180; JCBRAS X I.505; Queyroz 6251 
F.de Souza claim s th a t  t h i r t y  f iv e  m udaliyars were 
captured.
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from de Sa de Menezes f s Rebellion de Ceylan* and a 
c e r t i f i c a te  o f  Francisco Barbosa da Andrade dated 3 June 
163*. W >
In te rn a l evidence in  these  th ree  accounts and th e i r  
comparison w ith th a t  o f  F aria  de Souza suggests th a t  the  
Portuguese v ic to ry  has been considerab ly  exaggerated. Even 
on th e  face o f i t  the  estim ate o f  S inhalese lo sse s  given 
in  Queyroz and de Sa de Menezes i s  suspected in  viww o f 
the  low casu a lty  f ig u re  quoted fo r  th e  Portuguese. F a ria  de 
Souza claims th a t  the  fo rce  trapped numbered only f iv e  
hundred men. A contemporary J e s u i t  re p o rt sca le s  down the  
b a t t le  s t i l l  fu r th e r  by a s s e r tin g  th a t  only t h i r t y  th ree  
o f th e  enemy were k i l l e d  during the  whole campaign. The 
account o f th e  capture o f  Kangara A ratchi given by de Sa de 
Menezes and repeated  by Queyroz i s  open to  doubt, e sp e c ia lly  
as Alagiyawanna f a i l s  mention him among th e  le ad e rs  se ized .
Queyroz h im self g ives another account o f how Kangara A ratchi
. . (79)was captured .
The events fo llow ing L e llo p itiy a  moreover support 
th e  view th a t  i t  was m erely a minor ambush. The Portuguese 
army continued to  r e t r e a t  towards Sabaragamuwa even a f te r
(78) Jornada 9
(79) Queyroz 729* K ustantinu Hatana stanzas 177
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the  encounter. The only ta n g ib le  r e s u l t  was th e re fo re  the
(80)sa fe  re tu rn  o f the  Portuguese fo rce . In  f a c t  the  months
which followed the  b a t t le  saw an extension o f th e  area  under
reb e l con tro l and continued a ttack s  by Mayadunne on the  lands
the
o f K o tte . But fo r  th i s /c h ie f  reason probably la y  in
im portant developments in  J a ffn a .
The ru le r  o f  Ja ffn a  had faced an unenviable ta sk  since
1591* Hw was pledged to  favour C h r is t ia n ity  and oppose a l l
enemies o f the  Portuguese. On th e  o th e r hand he had to  c o n c ilia te
the  mass o f h is  sub jec ts who remained Hindu in  f a i th .  The
r u l e r 's  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were increased  by the  r i s e  in  power o f
the  n o b il i ty  during the l a s t  h a l f  o f  th e  s ix te e n th  century .
The n o b il i ty  however feere by no means u n ited  and w hile some o f
them were involved in  trad e  re la t io n s  w ith Kandy and south
In d ia , o thers who were converted to  C h r is t ia n ity  looked to
the  Portuguese fo r  advancement. The whole s i tu a t io n  was
complicated by the a t t i tu d e  o f  th e  m issionary p r ie s t s  some
o f whom l ik e  Fr. Pedro Betancor, re ly in g  on th e  support o f
(81)
th e  Portuguese in  Mannar, behaved in  an arrogan t fash ion .
S an k ili who had been confirmed governor by the  Portuguese 
in  1617 was by no means f i t t e d  to  dea l w ith  th e  d e l ic a te
(80) Queyroz 627; JCBRAS XI. 565. 508
(81) Queyroz 665-666
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s i tu a t io n . He was as Queyroz described  him fproud, am bitious
(and weak.1 His d i f f i c u l t i e s  were fu r th e r  aggravated by h is
unpopularity . Many in  Ja ffn a  resen ted  th e  k i l l in g  o f some
o f th e  p rinces o f the  royal fam ily in  th e  coup by which he
came in to  power. Hw also  l o s t  popular esteem by h is  open
asso c ia tio n  w ith a woman dancer. The susp icion  th a t  S an k ili
intended to  do away with the  h e ir  and make h is  own son-in-law
king added g re a t ly  to  the u n re s t in  the country. P ro f i t in g  by
the general d isco n ten t two C h ris tian  mudaliyars Do» Pedro and
Dor* Luis w ith the  support o f  th e  Portuguese casados re s id e n t
in  Ja ffn a  ra ise d  a re v o lt  ag a in st S an k ili and drove him to
Kayts in  August-Septembeb 1618. S an k ili im m efdiately applied
to  the  cap tain  o f Mannar fo r  help ag a in st the  re b e ls . The
acap ta in  who provided a refuge fo r  S an k ili in^Franciscan  
monastery proved unw illing  to  give S an k ili m il i ta ry  a s s is ta n ce  
ag a in s t a r is in g  le d  by th e  Portuguese and the  C h ris tian s .
S an k ili th e re fo re  turned to  th e  Nayaka o f TanJJore fo r  he lp .
The powerful Ragunatha Nayak/l (1600-163*0 was only  too glad 
to  a id  a neighbouring Hindu ru le r  ag a in s t what he thought 
to  be a C h ris tian  re v o lt supported by th e  Portuguese. A force 
o f f iv e  thousand men was sen t from Tanjore under Varuna K u la ttan . 
Meanwhile the  e f fo r ts  o f  th e  reb e ls  to  provide an a lte rn a tiv e  
to  S an k ili by in v it in g  th e  nephew o f P a ra ra j asingham who 
was l iv in g  in  Rameswaran met w ith l i t t l e  success and the
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re b e llio n  was sw if tly  crushed;
The subsequent p o licy  o f S an k ili was determ ined by
h is  own weakness in  Jaffna* Henceforth h is  power re s te d
la rg e ly  on a con tingen t o f troops from Tanjore. This fo rce
remained under the  command o f Varuna K ulattan  who stayed
(83)
in  Ja ffn a  and received  high honours. Being dependant on 
a fo re ign  c o n t in g e n t to  m aintain power in  h is  own kingdom 
S an k ili could n e ith e r  hope to  take e f fe c t iv e  ac tio n  ag a in st 
those who reb e lled  ag a in s t him nor break w ith th e  Portuguese.
Thus the  casados and p r ie s t s  who d id  no t fo rg ive  him fo r  
h is  a l lia n c e  w ith Tanjore were allowed to  remain unmolested 
though they formed a p o te n t ia l  f i f t h  column. These were not 
slow to  p o in t out to  th e  cap ta in  o f  Mannar th a t  S an k ili had 
v io la te d  h is  agreement w ith th e  Portuguese by b ring ing  
Vadugai troops in to  the  c o u n t r y ^ ^ a n k i l i  seemed to  have 
hoped th a t  th e  Portuguese would ignore th is  infringem ent 
in  th e  same way as they  had to le ra te d  Bthirmanne Sin^ham, s 
p o lic y  o f a id ing  Kandy.
Portuguese p o lic y  towards Ja ffn a  during  th i s  period  
was sim ple. Ever s ince  the news had reached Lisbon th a t  
Ja ffn a  was a rou te o f  supply to  the  Kandyan enemy, the  king
(82) V riddagirison  76-77, 80-81, 91; DR.Vj!.1955
A s s e n t o s  1.11-13; Q u e y r o z  467-468; P .da  T r i n i d a d e  I I I . 208-209
(83) Queyroz 631* Varuna K ulata o r Varuna K ulattan  i s  the  name 
given in  Queyroz 463. F.de Souza VI. 214 c a l ls  him
Chem Nayak, the  k ing  o f the ca reas .
(84) ®uejns&&^6S6.|Vadugai £&& B a g a d a s  as th e  Portuguese o f th e  
seventeenth cen tury  termed them were Telugu speaking 
people o f th e  Madura a rea .
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of P ortuga l had requested  th a t  Ja ffn a  be conquered and
incorporated  in to  th e  Portuguese estado da India^ ^Ihe v iceroy
Azevedo (I6 l2 - l6 l7 )  however had found th a t  the  execution o f
th is  o rder required  troops which he could not spare* Thus
though he passed on th e  k in g ’s o rders to  Ceylon he also
m aintained normal re la tio n s  w ith Ja ffn a  and ex^ercised the
r ig h t  o f the  suzerain  in  confirm ing the  regencies o f
A rasakesari and S ankili^  Ihe new v iceroy  Don Joao Coutinho
a t  f i r s t  held  th a t  Azevedo's l e t t e r  o f appointment to  S an k ili
(87)
precluded the  Portuguese from any h o s t i l i t i e s  ag a in st him*
By th e  end o f August l 6l 8 he had changed h is  min^ and had 
accepted the  wisdom o f conquering Ja ffn a  as soon as forces 
were a v a ila b le . By th e  end o f th a t  month rep o rts  from the  
cap ta in  o f Mannar, the  Cominissioner o f the Franciscans and 
the  ouvidor or crown judge o f Mannar had convinced the  
v iceroy  and h is  council th a t  th e  time was r ip e  fo r  the 
conquest o f Jaffna* In s tru c tio n s  were th e re fo re  sen t to  
Francisco de Miranda Henriques, captain-m ajor o f th e  Malabar 
f l e e t  to  accomplish th i s  task^ b e f o r e  Henriques could a r r iv e  
in  Ja ffh a , another exped ition  had been sentifrom K otte ag a in s t
(85) DR I I .  465; TT.LM. 13 .f . 115
(86) F.de Souza VT.216; A.Bocarro 699; Queyroz 466; 
V riddagirison  80
(87) TT.cprpo chronolo^ico p a r t . I .  maco ll6 .d o c . 87
(88) DR I I .  195; Assentos I .  11-13
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S an k ili by Constantino de Sa.
De S a 's  expedition  was not aimed a t  overthrowing S an k ili
to  gain  possession o f Ja ffh a  as was th e  v icero y 1 s bu t was
\
ra th e r  preven tive in  in te n t .  I t ' s  m il i ta ry  o b jec tiv e  was
to  check any movement o f  south Ind ian  m ercenaries through Ja ffn a
in to  reb e l-h e ld  t e r i t o r y  and to  dea l w ith rumoured attem pts
by S an k ili to  win over Senerat to  renewed o pposition , in
a llia n c e  w ith Mayadunne^against the  Portuguese. De Sa also
apparen tly  placed some weight on the  s to ry  th a t  S an k ili hdd
sought a id  from the Dutch a t  P u l ic a t f ^ ^ u r th e r  in  March 1619
the cap ta in -genera l received  news from Mannar th a t  one
(90)
Pedro Rodrigues, a cousin o f the  l a s t  K unjali adm iral o f 
C alicu t had appeared o f f  Ja ffh a  w ith f iv e  armed v e s se ls ,
(89) Assentos I .  52.59
(90) Born in  157$, he was taken p riso n e r in  1591 by Andre Furtado 
de Mendoncja in  h is  v ic to ry  over th e  K unjali f l e e t .  He became a 
C h ris tian  and was henceforth  c a lle d  Don Pedro Rodrigues. Soon 
a f te r  he m arried a Portuguese orphan bu t was s t i l l  no t
granted  complete l ib e r ty .  One n ig h t he escaped w ith h is  
fam ily and g a th erin g  a band o f M alabari fo llow ers 
began a ttack in g  Portuguese sh ipping .
100
p r e s u m a b l y  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  S a n k i l i  a n d  w a s  p l u n d e r i n g  a l l
P o r t u g u e s e  s h i p p i n g .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  a n d
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  p o s i t i o n  i n  J a f f n a  d e  S a ’ s
e x p e d i t i o n  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  p r o m p t  p a y m e n t  o f
(91)
t r i b u t e  w h i c h  w a s  i n  a r r e a r s  a n d  t o  p u t  a n  e n d  t o  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i o n  o f  J a f f n a  e l e p h a n t  s a l e s  w i t h  t h o s e  m a d e  b y  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e .  T h e  e x p o r t  o f  e l e p h a n t ^ r o m  K o t t e  f o r m e d  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e  f o r  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .  T h e s e  e l e p h a n t s
(91) Q u ey ro z^ li s ta te s  th a t  S an k ili owed the  Portuguese 
tr ib u te  fo r  t h i r t y  y ea rs . This i s  u n lik e ly  as th e  question  
o f t r ib u te  d id  no t a r is e  when S an k ili asked fo r  xgx±ia± 
aid  ag a in s t th e  two C h ris tian  m udaliyars who rev o lted  
ag a in s t him in  August-September 1618. The regimento o f 
Constantino de Sa given to  F ilip e  de O liv e ira teq u ire s  
the  l a t t e r  to  c o l le c t  ’money o f th e  e lep h an ts^ ’ I t  i s  known 
th a t  according to  the  t r e a ty  o f 1591 th e  k ing  o f Ja ffn a  
was forced to  pay annually  ten  elephants o r th i r te e n  
thousand fanams a y ear. I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  d istu rbances 
o f  1618 made S an k ili f a l l  behind in  h is  payment o f t r ib u te  
bu t in  th a t  case th e  t r ib u te  would have been owing only 
fo r  l6 l8 - i6 l9 . Another p o ss ib le  explanation  o f  th i s  demand 
fo r  the  ’d inhe iro  dos elefantes* i s  th a t  i t  may r e f e r  to  
th e  elephants sen t to  Ja ffn a  fo r  sa le  in  1615 by th e  then 
cap ta in -genera l Kano e l Mascarenhas Homem and the  vedor 
Antao Vaz F re ire . Due to  th e  v ice ro y ’s p ro h ib itio n  on the  
sa le  o f  elephants th a t  y ea r, these  animals were l e f t  unsold 
in  the  care o f  th e  k ing  o f J a ffn a . In  any case th i s  issu e  
gained even g re a te r  importance due to  th e  shortage o f  funds 
among th e  Portuguese as de Sa explained in  h is  o rders to  
O liv e ira ’th e re  i s  no money to  pay the  s o ld ie r s , nor fo r  th e i r  
food allowance, nor to  buy r ic e  fo r  the  w inter save th a t  
obtained from (the  sa le  of) e le p h a n ts .’
A s s e n t o s  1.55-56,59; R e g i m e n t o s  d o s  f o r t a l e z a s  d a  I n d i a .  
( e d i t e d  by P . S . S . P i s s u b l e n c a r )  359-36o.
1 0 1
were u su a lly  tran sp o rted  overland to  Mannar o r Ja ffn a  fo r
sale* Here they  had to  face com petition from elephants so ld
by the  ru le r  o f Ja ffn a  himself* The move in to  Ja ffn a  would
not only secure the  co n tro l o f  the  tra d in g  ground bu t also
give th e  Portuguese g re a te r  co n tro l over th e  s e l l in g  price*
Of the  various reasons fo r  ac tio n  th e  fe a r  th a t  S an k ili ,
w ith the  a id  o f  th e  Dutch and o f Don Pedro*s f l e e t  might
a ttack  Mannar and thus endanger th e  Portuguese p o s itio n  in
Ceylon was doubtless th e  s tro n g es t and th e  most urgent* This 
de
explains why Jo* d id  no t r e s t  con ten t w ith th e  appealing to
Goa fo r a id . Despite th e  presence o f reb e ls  in  K otte i t s e l f ,
he prepared a strong  exped itionary  fo rce  o f  about two hundred
(92)
and th i r t y  Portuguese and th ree  thousand la sca rin s*  This 
fo rce  was sen t to  Mannar in  two detachm ents. The f i r s t  co n s is tin g  
o f about a hundred Portuguese w ith  many la s c a r in s  s a ile d  
from Colombo in  two g a l l io t s  under Joao da S ilv a  and Joao 
Madeira and s ix  boats under V ito rio  de A b re u ^ ^ h e  second 
le d  by F il ip e  de O liv e ira  consisted  o f a hundred and t h i r t y  
Portuguese and the  r e s t  o f  th e  la s c a r in s * This fo rce 
marched overland across the  Seven K orales to  Pooneryn#
(92) BM.Add. Ms. 9853.f . 158; F.de Souza VI.189; Queyroz 629
(93) Assentos I .  44-45, 554 F*de Souza VI. 187-188; Queyroz 6£$; 
JCBRAS XI. 507; K.Nambiar- The K unjalis* adm irals o f  Calicut* 
142-143
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T h e  tw o  f o r c e s  w e r e  t o  s a f e g u a r d  M a n n a r ,  d e f e a t  t h e  M a l a b a r
f o r c e  o f  D o n  P e d r o  a n d  o b t a i n  i m m e d i a t e  p a y m e n t  o f  a r r e a r s
£ k b  o f  t r i b u t e  f r o m  J a f f h a .  I f  S a n k i l i  r e f u s e d  t o  p a y
t r i b u t e  o r  w a s  p r o v e d  t o  h a v e  h a d  t r e a s o n a b l e  d e a l i n g s  w i t h
(94)
D o n  P e d r o ,  O l i v e i r a  w a s  e m p o w e r e d  t o  c o n q u e r  t h e  k in g d o m *
T h e  s e a b o r n e  f o r c e  r e a c h e d  M a n n a r  f i r s t .  T h e  c a p t a i n  
o f  M a n n a r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  f l e e t  w i t h  t w e l v e  s m a l l  c r a f t ?  
o f  h i s  ow n* W i s h i n g  t o  g a i n  a l l  t h e  c r e d i t  f o r  t h e  e x p u l s i o n  
o f  t h e  M a l a b a r  f o r c e s  h e  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h i s  c o m b i n e d  s q u a d r o n  
s h o u l d  a t t a c k  D o n  P e d r o  w i t h o u t  w a i t i n g  f o r  F i l i p e  d e  O l i v e i r a .  
H o w e v e r  t h e  i n c o m p e t a n t  h a n d l i n g  o f  t h e  a t t a c k  r e s u l t e d  i n  
t h e  l o s s  o f  t w e l v e  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n  b o a t s  a n d  o v e r  t h r e e  
h u n d r e d  .m e n * T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  t h e r e u p o n  r e t i r e d  t o  J a f f n a .  A* 
O l i v e i r a  m e a n w h i l e  a r r i v e d  a t  P o o n e r y n  a f t e r  a n  e x h a u s t i n g  
m a r c h  a c r o s s  t h e  a r i d  l a n d s  s e p a r a t i n g  K o t t e  f r o m  t h e  n o r t h e r n  
k i n g d o m ^ ^ r o m  P o o n e r y n  h e  s e n t  a  m e s s a g e  t o  S a n k i l i  a s k i n g  
f o r  a  f e r r y - b o a t  t o  c r o s s  t h e  l a g o o n  t o  t h e  J a f f n a  p e n i n s u l a .  
S a n k i l i  c o m p l i e d .  T h e  c a s a d o s  o f  J a f f n a  a l s o  s e n t  a  v e s s e l  
t o  h e l p  i n  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  b u t  t h e  c r o s s i n g  t o o k  e i g h t  d a y s  t o
(96)
c o m p l e t e .  A f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  c a p t a i n  o f  M a n n a r ,  
O l i v e i r a  d e c i d e d  t o  a p p e a l  f o r  n a v a l  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  N e g a p a t a m
(94) A s s e n t o s  I .  53-54,59; F . d e  S o u z a  V I.189; Q u e y r o z  629 
( 9 5 A t 0 1 i v e i r a #s  m a r c h  w a s  s l o w  d u e  t o  s i c k n e s s  a n o t a c t e d  
o n  t h e  w a y .  A s s e n t o s  1 .54; Q u e y r o z  629
(96) Q u e y r o z  629s F . d e  S o u z a  VI. 187-188; A s s e n t o s  1.55
T h e  l a g o o n  c r o s s i n g  w a s  f o u r  m i l e s  w i d e  a n d  t h e  b o a t s  c o u l d
t a k e  o n l y  a  f e w  a t  a  t i m e . ) $ 0 1 i v e i r a  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  d a t e d
8 .6 . l6 l9  l a t e r  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t  S a n k i l i  i m p e d e d  t h e  c r o s s i n g  b v  s c a r i n g  a w a y  t h e  s a i l o r s  w h o  w o u l d  h a v e  h e l p e d  t o  m a n  t h e  b o a t s .
1 0 3
as he d id  not f e e l  th a t  th e  two g a l l io ts  alone could s a fe ly
a ttac k  the  f l e e t  o f  Don\ Pedro, On news o f Portuguese
p repara tions however, Don\Pedro thought i t / t o  s a i l  away 
*, (97)
and thus one o fA0 1 iv e ira* s problems d isappeared ,
S ank ili* s conduct during  th e  whole o f  Dow Pedro
episode had been impeccable* He had not only re fra in ed
from a lly in g ^ ^ t!^  th i s  powerful enemy o f th e  Portuguese
but had even given valuab le  a s s is ta n c e  to  th e  Portuguese
themselves* To th e  Portuguese f l e e t  defeated  by th e  M alabaris,
Ja ffn a  was made av a ila b le  as a p o r t o f refuge , while th e  
At
advancing.O liveira was furn ished  w ith f e r ry  boats to  cross 
th e  lagoon* His conduct th e re fo re  suggests th a t  S an k ili
(98)
s t i l l  viewed th e  Portuguese as h is  a l l i e s  and p ro tec to rs*
)c01iveira*s conduct during  th e  next few days undeceived 
him JeO liveira demanded th e  immediate payment o f th e  t r ib u te  
and th e  surrender o f  th e  commander o f  S ank ili* s south 
Ind ian  mercenary tro o p s . Compliance w ith th e  second demand 
would have meant th e  c r ip p lin g  o f S a n k i l i 's  power. He 
th e re fo re  declined  to  give up Varuna K ulattan  and poin ted  
out th a t  some o f  th e  t r ib u te  demanded had a lread y  been paid*
(97) Queyroz 630; Assentos 1*55
(98 ) I f  S an k ili had been contem plating an an ti-P ortuguese 
a llia n c e  he would sca rce ly  have missed th e  chance to  a ttac k  
O liveira*s Portuguese forces w hile th e  S inhalese la s c a r in s  
were s t i l l  in  Pooneryn*
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S a n k i l i  h o w e v e r  w a s  a w a r e  o f  h i s  o w n  p o s i t i o n *  T h e  t o t a l
f o r c e  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l  d i d  n o t  e x c e e d  f o u r  t h o u s a n d  m e n .
AtH e t h e r e f o r e  c h o s e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a n d  r e q u e s t e d ^ O l i v e i r a
VtytV'
t o  w i t h d r a w  t o  P o o n e r y n  f e r  a n  i m m e d i a t e  p a y m e n t  o f
f i v e  t h o u s a n d  p a r d a o s  a n d  t h e  p a y m e n t  o f  s i m i l a r  su m
w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  t h r e e  m o n t h s .  H e  a l s o  o f f e r e d  t o  s e n d
b a c k  h i s  V a d u g a i  t r o o p s  t o  s o u t h  I n d i a ? 60 1 i v e i r a  a c c e p t e d
A
t h e  f i r s t  p a y m e n t  a s  h e  w a s  s h o r t  o f  m o n e y  t o  b u t j  p r o v i s i o n s
f o r  t h e  t r o o p s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d ^  o f  m o v i n g  h i s  t r o o p s  a c r o s s
*
t h e  l a g o o n  h e  a d v a n c e d  t o  V a n n a r p a n n a i .  T h i s  l e d  t o  a  
c l a s h  b e t w e e n  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  l a s c a r i n s  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
f o r c e  a n d  t h e  J a f f h a  a r m y .  T h e  e n s u i n g  b a t t l e  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h e  t o t a l  d e f e a t  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  a f t e r  i t  h a d  g a i n e d  
s o m e  e a r l y  s u c c e s s .  O n  t h i s  n e w s  S a n k i l i  a n d  h i s  f a m i l y  
f l e d  i n  a  b o a t  t o w a r d s  t h e  s o u t h  I n d i a n  c o a s t  b u t  w e r e  
b l o w n  b a c k  t o  P o i n t  P e d r o .  I n  h i s  s e c o n d  a t t e m p t  t o  f l e e  
J a f f h a  i n  a  l a r g e r  b o a t  h e  w a s  o v e r t a k e n  a n d  c a p t u r e d  
b y  h i s  P o r t u g u e s e  p u r s u e r s ,  ^ ^ a i m n a  K u l a t t a n  h a d  b e t t e r  
f o r t u n e  a n d  e s c a p e d  t o  T a n j o r e .
i ^ O l i v e i r a  o c c u p i e d  t h e  c a p i t a l  N a l l u r ,  a n d  
e s t a b l i s h e d  h i s  h e a d q u a r t e r s  a t  t h e  g r e a t  H i n d u  t e m p l e  
t h e r e .  A p a r t  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  f o r c e  w a s  l e f t  a t  t h e
(99) A s s e n t o s  I .  55-57; Q u e y r o z  6 3 1 ;  F . d e  S o u z a  V I .  1 8 8 - 1 9 0  
P . d a  T r i n i d a d e  I I I .  2 1 - = 2 1 2
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Franciscan church in  Ja ffh a  under Francisco P e re ira  Velho.
&
With the capture o f S a n k ili , a l l  re s is tan c e  ceased* O liv e ira
thereupon annexed th e  kingdom to  the  Portuguese empire
Ae
in  the  name o f the  king* As th e  land appeared q u ie t^O liv e ira  
sen t Antonio da Motta Galvao w ith one hundred Portuguese 
and most o f  th e  la s c a r in s  back to  K otte as he knew the  
general was in  need o f troops*^^l!)a Motta was a lso  in s tru c te d  
to  e sco rt S an k ili to  Colombo from where he was sen t to  
Goa fo r  t r i a l ^ ^ ^
The ease o f  th e  Portuguese conquest o f  Ja ffn a  
co n tra s ts  w ith th e i r  f a i lu re  to  conquer Kandy. The reasons 
fo r  th is  could be seen p a r t ly  in  the  d if fe r in g  lo ca tio n ^  
and s iz e , population  and r a c ia l  composition o f th e  two 
kingdoms. Kandy s itu a te d  in  th e  c e n tra l regions o f  Ceylon 
was fa r  more d i f f i c u l t  o f access than Ja ffn a , whose c a p ita l  
was le s s  than a day’s march from the  sea . The Kandyan 
kingdom moreover, being la rg e r  in  s iz e  and rugged afforded 
the  defeated  monarch many p laces o f refuge. In  f a c t  in  
Ceylon h is to ry  Kandy has t r a d i t io n a l ly  being th e  ’home o f 
th e  lo s t  causes’ and the  northeityplains o f  Ceylon ’the
(100) Queyroz 631; BPI.9353*^*158; Assentos 1.50-51
(101) S ank ili was t r i e d  in  the  Relacao o r High Court o f 
Goa fo r treaso n  and found g u il ty . He became a C h ris tian  
before he was executed. The two nephews o f  S an k ili were sen t 
w ith him to  Colombo fo r  as^O liveira  p u t i t  • todo o q 
c h e ira r  a p rin c ip e  he bom e s ta r  longe daqui. •
TT.LN. 15 .f . 62; Film oteca Reis Vizinhos 37/1-2
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f i r s t  p rey  o f the invader. * Furthermore the  ru le r  o f Kandy
ap art from h is  a b i l i ty  to  r e ly  on a la rg e r  popu lation
could always hope as a l a s t  re s o r t  to  subvert th e  fellow -
S inhalese la s c a r in  so ld ie rs  o f th e  Portuguese. In  Ja ffn a
on the  o th e r hand the Portuguese could use the  S inhalese
( 102)
la s c a r in s  w ith confidence ag a in s t the Tamil popu la tion . 
Another major reason fo r Portuguese success seems to  have 
been a lack  o f Tamil lead ersh ip  and u n ity  in  Ja ffn a .
S an k ili as a le ad e r  compares unfavourably w ith any o f 
the  Kandyan kings who fought th e  Portuguese. He lacked 
the  fo re s ig h t to  envisage the  eventual c lash  between h is  
lo y a l t ie s  to  the  Portuguese and those to  Tanjore. Finally^ 
note should be taken o f the growth o f a pro-Portuguese 
C h ris tian  m inority  w ith in  J a ffn a . The C h ris tian s  had been 
s trong  enough to  make S an k ili seek a id  from Tanjore.
During and a f te r  th e  conquest they  provided a source o f 
s tre n g th  in  Ja ffn a  th a t  the Portuguese never possessed 
in  Kandy.
The conquest o f Ja ffn a  meant a g re a t accession  o f 
s tren g th  to  the  Portuguese in  In d ia  as w ell as in  Ceylon. 
With Ja ffn a  in  th e i r  hands th e  Portuguese communications
(102) The o r ig in a l  invasion  force contained th re e  asonctosd 
thousand S inhalese la s c a r in s . one thousand f iv e  hundred 
S inhalese coo lies and only two hundred and t h i r t y  Portuguese 
s o ld ie rs .
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between the  Malabar and th e  Coromandel coasts became much
sa fe r  and the  Dutch se ttlem en t a t  P u lic a t began to  look
(103)
even more iso la ted *  The flow o f south Ind ian  m ercenaries 
to  Ceylon was checked to  some degree* The lands o f  Ja ffn a  
i t s e l f  though not as r ic h  as those o f  K otte became a 
u se fu l means o f rewarding the  se rv ices  o f  Portuguese so ld iers*  
The possession  o f Ja ffn a  moreover enabled th e  Portuguese 
to  gain  a g re a te r  measure o f  co n tro l over they^upply o f
OV9^
elephants from the Vanni and the  p e a rl f ish e ry  o f f  Mannar.
I t  took som^4ime however before the  Portuguese
hold in  Ja ffn a  became a secure one. The danger to  Portuguese
ru le  in  the  area was tw ofold. F i r s t ly  th e re  was a r isk
o f a r e v o lt ,  by the  an ti-P ortuguese Tamil element in
Ja ffn a . Secondly th e re  was th e  th r e a t  o f invasion  by the
forces o f  Raghunathayf Nayak o f  Tanjore. During the  period
June 1619 to  February 1621 th e  Portuguese had to  faee the
opposition  o f both these  elem ents. The Portuguese forces 
in  Ja ffn ain  th is: feerxiHd ranged between one hundred and one hundred 
and f i f t y  soldados p lus some twenty casados and about a
( 10^)
thousand S inhalese la s c a r in s .  This fo rce was sometimes
(103)The Dutch had s e t  up a fac to ry  a t  P u lic a t  in  1610. The 
Portuguese destroyed i t  in  1612 and the  Dutch promptly replaced  
i t  w ith a f o r t  in  th e  fo llow ing y ear. The attem pt o f th e  
Portuguese to  se ize  th e  f o r t  in  1615 fa i le d  bu t since th a t  time 
i t s  d e s tru c tio n  had remained a cherished o b je c tiv e . The Dutch 
wished to  m aintain th e i r  hold on P u lic a t  rose from the d e s ire  
to  gain a supply o f Coromandel c lo th  w ith which they  traded
in  the East In d ie s .
(104) Ajuda 50-7-51 .f . 163; Reimers 56 ; P .da T rinidade I I I . 215
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hard pressed  by Tamil armies o f up to  f iv e  thousand men 
but the  Portuguese had th ree  g re a t advantages; the  support 
o f the  C h ris tian  Tamils o f  J a ffn a , the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f 
o b ta in in g  reinforcem ents from K otte and th e  inform ation 
regard ing  Tanjore p rep ara tio n s provided by th e  Portuguese 
a t  Negapatam. These fa c to rs  enabled them ev en tu a lly  to  
wear down the Hindu Tamils o f  Ja ffn a  and th e  Kayak o f 
Tanjore.
The f i r s t  r e a l  challenge to  Portuguese a u th o rity  
came in  March 1620. By th e  end o f 1619 DomLuis, who had 
h ith e r to  been one o f th e  foremost supported  o f the  Portuguese 
in  Ja ffn a  was d is i l lu s io n e d  by th e  ro le  assigned to  him 
in  th e  Portuguese regime. He th e re fo re  f le d  to  Tanjore 
tak in g  w ith him two Tamil p rin cesses  who had been in  h is  
charge since  l 6l 6 . In  Tanjore he appealed to  Raghunathajf 
fo r  a id  to  expel the  Portuguese and to  enthrone th e  only 
member o f the  Ja ffn a  royal fam ily o u ts id e  Portuguese co n tro l, 
th e  p rin ce  o f Rameswaram. Raghunatha/i was only too w illin g  
to  se ize  a chance to  r e - e s ta b l is h  the  p o s it io n  he had enjoyed 
in  Ja ffn a  while Varuna K ulattan  commanded S ank ili* s 
Vadugai tro o p s. He prom ptly organized a new expedition  
to  Ja ffn a . The p rince o f  Rameswaram reassu red  by Raghunatha#*s 
a s s is ta n ce  organized h is  array to  take possession  o f
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Ja ffn a . The a r r iv a l  o f  the  f i r s t  Sttfcsk sh ip  in  th e  East 
w ith th e  new o f fu r th e r  fo rces to  follow  gave Down Luis
( 106)
and th e  p rin ce  hopes o f  a new a l ly  ag a in st the  Portuguese.
The force organized by th e  Nayak was th e  f i r s t  to  
land . I t  was only a thousand stro n g  bu t DomLuis who commanded 
i t  counted on the  support o f the  Hindus o f  J a ffn a . He was 
not d isappoin ted  fo r  from the  time th e  invading fo rce  landed 
a t  Talairaannar in  March 1620 i t  grew d a lly  in  s iz e  and s tren g th , id- 
O liv e ira  was fo r once caught unprepared. The bulk o f h is  
forces had been sen t back to  Kotte J^O liveira  decided to  
make a stand a t  h is  headquarters a t  th e  Hindu temple a t  
N allur w ith about t h i r t y  Portuguese and a force o f  S inhalese 
a u x i l ia r ie s .  In  th e  se ttlem en t o f  Ja ffn a  Francisco Velho 
organized th e  defence o f  the  w ell b u i l t  F ranciscan church
(105) Queyroz 634 holds th a t  th e  attem pt o f  th e  p rin ce  o f 
Rameswaram to  expel th e  Portuguese was d is t in c t  from and 
p r io r  to  the  f i r s t  attem pt made by Don L u is . However evidence 
in  P .da Trinidade I I I .  21^-216 and F.de Souza V I.212-214 
make i t  c le a r  th a t  th e  m udaliyar Mas Maminhas,who in v ite d  
the p rin ce  to  Ja ffn a  was none o th e r than  Dun Luis
h im self. What P .da T rinidade 111.214^-218 and F.de Souza
V I.212-214 d ep ic t as one g rea t as one g re a t attem pt
by Varuna K ulattan , th e  p rin ce  o f Rameswaram and
Don Luis to  se ize  co n tro l o f  J a f fn a , Queyroz 633-638 p resen ts
as th ree  sep ara te  a ttem p ts. Contemporary documents support
the T rin idade-F .de Souza v ers io n . (TT.LM.15 f f . 59*67*190,
193; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I .  48/2-3 /
(106) P .da Trinidade I I I .  217-218. See pages 1*1 fc oh 
the f i r s t  Danish exped ition  to  th e  E ast.
of Nossa Senhora dos M ilagres w ith th e  a id  o f tw enty casados
and a number o f  Tamil C hristians.A  fu r th e r  detachment o f
Portuguese was d e ta ile d  to  defend K ayts. The combined Tamil
and Vadugai force which now amounted to  over th ree  thousand
men attacked  both the  church a t  Ja ffn a  and th e  pagoda a t
N allur. For almost a month the  Portuguese were thus
confined to  these g a rr iso n  p o s ts .
I t  was sea-power which saved th e  meagre Portuguese
forces in  Ja ffh a . This enabled a supply o f m unitions sen t
by the casados o f Negapatara to  reach Ja ffn a  sa fe ly . As
im portant was the  sa fe  a r r iv a l  o f  a fo rce  o f two hundred
Sinhalese under Antonio da Motta Galvao by sea . This fo rce
(probably sen t to  re lie v e  a p a r t  o f the  S inhalese detachment
on g arriso n  duty in  Ja ffh a ) proved to  be o f immense use .
Moreover command o f th e  sea enabled th e  Portuguese to  send
a request fo r  a id  to  Constantino de Sa who promptly sen t a
re lie v in g  force o f one hundred and twenty Portuguese and
Sloe thousand f iv e  hundred S inhalese la s c a r in s  under
Luis T eixe ira  de Macedo by land  and a f l e e t  o f s ix  v esse ls
e
under Andre Coelho by sea . The c ru jd , ru th le s s  measures o f
(107)de Macedo cowed th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f Ja ffn a  w hile the
(107) P .da Trinidade I I I .  216 and F.de Souza V I.215 accuse 
de Macedo o f c ru e lty  -  th a t  he cu t ch ild ren  in  two, severed 
b rea s ts  o f women and cu t open th e  abdomen o f women and 
pushed th e i r  babies in s id e . These accusations seem confirmed 
by contemporary documents. CALK I I I . 25
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in h ab itan ts  o f Ja ffn a  while th e  combined r e l i e f  fo rces
defeated  Do»» Luis and forced him to  f le e  to  T anjore, leav in g
h is  own fam ily in  Portuguese hands.
Meanwhile th e  p rince  o f Rameswaram unaware o f  the
a
d e fea t o f h is  a l l i e s  had landed a t  lELaur w ith contingent o f
r
one thousand f ig h tin g  men. At th i s  stage the  C h ris tian
de
Tamils o f Ja ffh a  gave news o f th e  new invasion  to /O liv e ira ,
who being determined to  check th e  re v o lt  before i t  could
spread sen t de Macedo w ith a s tro n g  fo rce  ag a in st the  p rin ce .
The p rince  was defeated  and captured a few m iles north  o f
N allur and the  land  re tu rned  to  obedience once more. De Macedo
and de Motta thereupon re tu rned  to  K otte w ith th e i r  troops
( 108)and the  cap tive p rince  was sen t w ith them to  Colombo.
The f a i lu re  o f  h is  f i r s t  attem pt by no means discouraged
Don L uis. On h is  re tu rn  to  Tanjore he appealed once more/
to  Raghunathai/. Raghunathayf thereupon prepared a second and
stronger expeditionary  fo rce . The new e n te rp ris e  was pu t
under the  o v e ra ll command o f Varuna K u la ttan , a v e teran
(109)o f the  Ja ffn a  campaign o f I6 l8 - l6 l9 .
The Portuguese a t  Negapatam kep t de O liv e ira  informed
(108) AHU 5 0 1 .f.l8 5 v ; AFiU Caixa XXII.4 .8 .1654; P .da Trinidade 
I I I .  214-216; F.de Souza VI.212-213; Queyroz 635-638;
Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I .  45/ 5 , 45-46/5-1, W l - 2 ,  48/2-3
(109) P .da Trinidade I I I . 219 s ta te s  thfct the  command o f th e  e n te rp ris e  
was given to  Cheni (Chem Nayak) th e  c h ie f  o f  the  Tanjore n o b il i ty  
while the  general o f the  expeditionary  force was Bom agolate
(Varuna K u la ttan ). However evidence in  F.de Souza VI. 214 and 
Queyroz 468 show th a t  Chem Nayak, k ing o f th e  Careas and Varuna
K ulattan  were the  same person. Contemporary l e t t e r s  r e f e r  to  only 
one le a d e r  -  the  king o f th e  Careas.
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o f th ese  developments. He in  tu rn  reported  the  m atter to
de Sa. De S a 's  problem was th a t  w ith  th e  continuing re v o lt
in  K otte he could not a ffo rd  permanently to  leave fo rces 
to
strong  enough/defend Ja ffn a  w ithout a s s is ta n c e . Nor was
the Portuguese command*! o f  the  sea complete enough to
prevent the  land ing  o f h o s t i le  fo rces from Tanjore. The
b e s t de Sa could do was to  promise speedy a ss is tan ce  in
case o f  a tta c k . De O liv e ira  meanwhile d id  no t s ta y  id le .  On
the f i f te e n th  o f August 1620 he began to  b u ild  a sm all f o r t
with two bulwarks , surrounding the Franciscan church in
Ja ffn a . The Portuguese forces a t  N allu r were withdrawn to
th is  f o r t .  In  November the  casados o f Negapatam sen t
munitions to  Ja ffn a  w ith a warning th a t  invasion  was imminent.
Eventually  on 5 December two thousand men from Tanjofce landed
a t  Tondaimannar. Once more the  Hindus o f Ja ffh a  jo ined
the invaders.
De O liv e ira  advanced to  meet the  invading fo rc es , 
a
The r e s u l t  was a drwn b a t t le  a t  N allu r. As th e  Tamil forces*
proved stro n g er than  expected de O liv e ira  r e t i r e d  to  Ja ffn a  
to  aw ait reinforcem ents. The Tamils in  th e i r  tu rn  sen t 
requests  fo r  fu r th e r  fo rces from Tanjore. F ortunately  fo r 
de O liv e ira  the  Portuguese r e l i e f  fo rce  under Antonio da Motta 
Galvao a rriv ed  f i r s t .  This fo rce  o f n in e ty  Portuguese and 
a thousand S inhalese la s c a r in s  a rr iv ed  on 14 January 1621.
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De O liv e ira  a ttacked  the  enemy encampments a t  N allu r soon
a f te r  and defeated  the  Tamils a f te r  heavy flg frting . However
i t  neede a fu r th e r  b a t t le  a t  Kopay in  e a rly  February 1621
before th e  invasion  fo rce was com pletely destroyed and i t s
( 110) 
commander k illed *
The challenge to  Portuguese ru le  however was not
y e t over, fo r th e  Nayak o f Tanjore despatched a fre sh  force
prepared in  response to  Vanina K ulattan*s c a l l  fo r  a id  in
December 1620* By the  time these  fo rces a rr iv ed  however
de O liv e ira  was in  co n tro l o f  most o f  J a ffn a . The new force
was ambushed a t  A chcl^eli by da Motta on 11 Februaru 1621
before i t  could gain  any support in  Ja ffn a . The Tanjore dead
included the new governor o f  Ja ffh a  sen t by th e  Nayak. With
th is  d efea t ended th e  second and f in a l  attem pt o f  Raghunathajl
to  conquer Ja ffn a . For the  next s ix  years th e re fo re  peace
returned  to  J a ffn a . These years were used by de O liv e ira
( H I )
to  b u ild  up and conso lida te  Portuguese power in  the  kingdom.
I t  w ill  be re c a lle d  th a t  when de Sa sen t h is  f i r s t  
expedition  to  Ja ffn a  in  1619, he was a lso  s t i l l  engaged in  
th e  stru g g le  in  K otte ag a in st both Mayadunne and Kuruwita R ala.
(110)P.da T rinidade I I I .  219-221; F.de Souza VI. 214; 
Queyroz 638- 6**!; TT.LM. 1 5 .f f . 59.190.193
(111) Queyroz 642-645; P .da T rinidade I I I .  221-223; 
F.de Souza V I.215
These l a t t e r  n a tu ra lly  p r o f i t e d  by th e  d iv e rs io n  o f 
Portuguese a t te n t io n . Kuruwita Rala promptly advanced 
in to  th e  Seven K orales w hile Hayadunne t r i e d  to  e s ta b lish  
h im self in  th e  Two K orales. To meet th i s  new challenge 
de Sa h im self le d  a s tro n g  Portuguese fo rce  to  th e  Seven 
K orales and forced Kuruwita Rala to  r e t i r e  to  Uva, w hile 
d isava Don Constantino defeated  Mayadunne. The main fo rces
T (1of th e  re b e ls  were qu ick ly  d riven  out o f Portuguese te rr ito ry .
However, the  d e fea t o f  Mayadunne and Kuruwita Rala 
did not re s to re  peace in  K otte . I t  m erely changed the  
nature o f  th e  c o n f l ic t .  Small bands o f S inhalese g u e r i l la s  
basing  themselves on fo re s ted  areas impeded Portuguese 
co n tro l o f  near-by v i l la g e s .  As each group numbered only 
about a hundred men th e i r  e lim ina tion  proved a d i f f i c u l t  
ta sk . Therefore fo r  most o f 1619 a la rg e  p o rtio n  o f the 
Seven K orales remained fre e  o f  Portuguese co n tro l. The 
Portuguese ta sk  was made even more d i f f i c u l t  by a new 
r is in g  le d  by mudaliyar Ekanayake in  M atara. Mayadunne and 
Kuruwita Rala too had th e i r  own problems fo r  they  had to  
ca rry  on another campaign ag a in st Senerat in  Kandy.
By th e  end o f  i6 l9  w ith the  re tu rn  o f a p a r t  o f  
th e  exped itionary  fo rce  sen t to  Ja ffh a  and the  a r r iv a l  o f
(112) Queyroz 627; JC3RAS XI.510; BM.Add.Hs.9853-f.158
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reinforcem ents from Goa th e  Portuguese were able to  take
Don?
the  offensive* D isava/Constantino o f Matara a ttacked  and
s e t  f i r e  to  Mayadunne *s mountain c a p ita l  a t  Maddegama Nuwara.
M ilita ry  cooperation w ith Senerat a lso  continued* On one
occasion d isava Dor* Constantino le d  a hundred Portuguese
and over one thousand la s c a r in s  up to  Alutnuwara and jo in in g
(113)w ith Senerat*s fo rces p en e tra ted  so u th -east to  Panawa*
In  another expedition  d isava Dom Constantino captured Kangara
(114)A ratchi who was executed fo r  treaso n  in  Colombo*
In  March 1620 w ith th e  weakning o f the  Portuguese
forces on the departu re  o f Luis T eixe ira  fo r  J a ffh a , Mayadunne
appeared once more in  the  Seven K orales. De Sa,w ith  h is
captain-m ajor Constantino de Sa de Miranda and the  disava
o f the  Four Korales Francisco B rito  de Almeida, forced
Mayadunne to  r e t i r e  from Talam pitiya bu t was unable to
dislodge him from Moratanne u n t i l  T eixe ira  re tu rn  from Ja ffn a .
With the  re tu rn  o f T e ix e ira , de Sa began a determined campaign
(115)
to  elim inate th e  power o f  Kuruwita Rala and Mayadunne.
Action ag a in s t th e  reb e ls  was made more u rgen t by 
a change in  a t t i tu d e  on the  p a r t  o f S enerat. For S enerat, 
as fo r  the Portuguese, th e  peace o f l6 l?  was a ra th e r
(11^1 Assentos I .  50-515 EM.Add. Md. 9853 ff.l57v-1585 
AHU aixa XXII. 4 .8.1654
(114) Queyroz 729
(115) Queyroz 730; Ajuda 51-V III-40. f . 22?v
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u n sa tis fa c to ry  compromise, agreed on to  gain tim e to  dea l
w i t h  a  m o r e  d a n g e r o u s  e n e m y .  S e n e r a t 1 s  m a i n  e n e m y  N i k a p i t i y a
h a d  l o s t  a l l  p o w e r  b y  n o w *  The P o r t u g u e s e  c o n q u e s t  o f
Ja ffn a  in  l 6l f  and the d e fe a t o f Mayadunne in  the  same
year roused Senerat*s fe a rs  o f the  Portuguese once again.
By th is  time he had also  received  news th a t  European aid
was on i t s  way to  him. So e a rly  1620 he made an inform al
truce  w ith Mayadunne. Mayadunne was to  become the k ing  o f
a (116)K otte while Senerat remained m aster o f Kandy.
The f l e e t  Senerat based h is  hopes upon was the  f i r s t  
Danish squadron to  come to  th e  e a s t . Boschouwer, having 
fa ile d  to  convince the d ire c to r  o f  th e  Dutch V.O.C. o f  the 
advantages to  be gained in  a id ing  S enera t, had procecled 
to  Denmark. There in  March l 6l 8 he made a t r e a ty  w ith 
King SflDExjbotfci C hristian  IV and h is  newly formed Danish 
East In d ia  Company. Consequently in  August l 6 l 8 the  *0eresundf 
under Roelant Crape se t out fo r  Ceylon, followed in  
December o f  the  same year by four more v esse ls  under the 
commander Ove Giedde. The a r r iv a l  o f  Crape in  Ceylon a t 
the  end o f 1619 provided Senerat w ith th e  f i r s t  in k lin g  
o f what had happened. The main f l e e t  under Giedde sigh ted
$116) Q u e y r o z  730; JCBRAS XXXVII. 62. 73-77
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(117)
Ceylon in  May 1620•
T h e  p r o j e c t e d  K a n d y a n - D a n i s h  a l l i a n c e  w a s  b e s e t  w i t h  
p r o b l e m s  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  s t a r t .  B o s c h o u w e r  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a k e  
s u r e  o f  D a n i s h  a s s i s t a n c e  h a d  n o t  o n l y  e x a g g e r a t e d  t h e  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  S e n e r a t ,  b u t  h a d  e v e n  u s e d  f o r g e d  c r e d e n t i a l s  
t o  m a k e  p r o m i s e s  h e  w a s  n o t  e m p o w e r e d  t o  d o .  T h u s  G i e d d e  
a r r i v e d  i n  1620 e x p e c t i n g  a n  i m m e d i a t e  p a y m e n t  o f  n i n e t y  
f i v e  t h o u s a n d  d o l l a r s  a s  S e n e r a t * s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e x p e n s e s
C e y l o n  m a d e  m a t t e r s  w o r s e ,  f o r  G i e d d e  w a s  n o  d i p l o m a t s  
M o r e o v e r  b y  t h e  t i m e  G i e d d e  a r r i v e d  i n  C e y l o n  S e n e r a t  w a s  
o f f i c i a l l y  a t  p e a c e  w i t h  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a n d  t h e  c a u t i o u s  
m o n a r c h  w i s h e d  f o r  t a n g i b l e  p r o o f  t h a t  t h e  D a n e s  w e r e  
a c t u a l l y  w i l l i n g  a n d  a b l e  t o  d r i v e  a w a y  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
o u t  o f  C e y l o n  b e f o r e  h e  a b a n d o n e d  t h e  t r e a t y  w h i c h  h a d  c o s t  
h i m  s o  m u c h  t o  g a i n .
T h e  e v e n t u a l  f a i l u r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  K a n d y a n - D a n i s h  
4
a l l i a n c e  a s  yf w o r k i n g  c o n c e r n  h o w e v e r  w a s  n o t  d u e  e i t h e r  
t o  t h e  d e c e i t  o f  B o s c h o u w e r  o r  t o  S e n e r a t * s  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  
g o  t o  w a r ,  f o r  S e n e r a t  e v e n t u a l l y  a c c e p t e d  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  p a y  t h e  s u m  d e m a n d e d  a n d  s i g n e d  a  n e w  t r e a t y  o f  a l l i a n c e
d e a t h  o f  B o s c h o u w e r  o n  t h e  w a y  t o
(117) T T .L M . 1 2 .f .5 ; JC B A A S X X X V II . 51-62; V r i d d a g a r i s o n  96-97
(118) T T .L M . 1 2 .f .6 5 ; V r i d d a g a r i s o n  96-97; JC B R A SpC X X V II. 51-62
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w ith Denmark on 21 August l62of ^ h e  re a l  cause o f f a i lu re
la y  in  th e  weakness of the  Danish flw et and th e  d iffe ren ces
in  th e  ob jec tiv es  o f  the  two p a r t ie s ,
Giedde had s e t  out w ith a fo rce  of th ree  fcioucarL
( 120)
so ld ie rs  from Denmark on 29 December l 6 l 8 . One and a h a lf  
years l a t e r  th is  number had been reduced by death  and d e se rtio n , 
while many o f the surv ivors were s ic k , Senerat would no 
doubt hatifcalso heard th a t  Roelant Crape had been forced 
to  abandon ship  by a Portuguese f l e e t  under Andre Coelho, 
and had taken refuge in  Tanjore, These fa c to rs  explain  why 
Senerat a t  f i r s t  suggested th a t  th e  Danes a l ly  themselves
(121)
with Mayadunne who was a lready  a t  war w ith the  Portuguese,
Even a f te r  Senerat had agreed to  a formal t r e a ty  of 
a l l ia n c e , d iffe ren ces in  aims between the  two p a r t ie s  
prevented e ffe c tiv e  cooperation , Senerat was in te re s te d  in  
fo re s ta l l in g  the Portuguese by b u ild in g  a f o r t  a t  Trincomalee, 
and o ffered  a id  fo r the  ta sk  to  the  Danes, Giedde on th e  
o th e r hand was more in te re s te d  in  procuring  a cargo fo r 
h is  ship and l e f t  fo r  th e  Coromandel coast two weeks a f te r  
the  t r e a ty  was signed. D espite th e  sending o f  a body of
(119) JCBRAS XXXVII. 63
(120) J.H .Schlegei g ives the  date  as 25 August 1620 but 
Ove Giedde*s d ia ry  proves o therw ise, JCBRAS XXXVII. 80-86
(121) JC B R A S XXXVII. 62 ,63 ,66,7^,77; B H L . FG. 7160 f .9 7 ; 
Queyroz 731; T T .L M . 12.f.5{  T T .L M . 15. f .  67; Film oteca, Reis 
Vizinhos I .  22/2
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s ix ty  men by Senerat to  help in  the  co n s tru c tio n  work, the
Danes who had occupied the  Hindu temple a t  Trincomalee
and made i t  th e i r  headquarters remained in a c tiv e  and
even tually  evacuated i t*  Senerat th e re fo re  decided to  give
up h is  p lans ag a in s t the Portuguese un less th e  Danes a rriv ed
( 122)
w ith a much la rg e r  fo rce .
Meanwhile de Sa*s new campaign ag a in st Mayadunne
had gained s t r ik in g  success. By June 1620 the  reb e l le ad e rs
were once more expelled from Portuguese t e r i t o r y .  Mayadunne
him self was so h o tly  pursued th a t  he was forced to  take
temporary refuge aboard a Danish sh ip  a t  K o ttiy a r on 
(123)
2 Ju ly  1620. About a month l a t e r  h is  c h ie f  general
Kuruwita Rala was su rp rised  and k i l le d  a t  Panawa by d isava
(124)
Don Costantino o f M atara. The death  o f  Kuruwita Rala marieed
the  end o f e f fe c tiv e  opposition  to  th e  Portuguese in  the
low lan d s. Mayadunne having f a i le d  to  gain  Danish support
fo r  h is  f in a l  b id  in  March 1621 l e f t  Ceylon soon a f te r
(123) T T .M s s .  Liv. 1699.f ♦ 2<S); T T .L M . 18. f .  **4; JCBRAS XXXVII.77-79
(122) JCBRAS XXXVII.68-70,86-87; T T .L M . 1 5 . f .^ 5  T T .L M . I 8 .f . l3 5  
(12**) De Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS X I.510) g ives another version  o f 
th e  death o f  Kuruwita Rala. Queyroz (626) seems to  accept t h i s .
However th e  version  given above i s  a lso  p resen t in  Queyroz (731)
and i s  supported by contemporary J e s u i t  l e t t e r s  (CALR.II.26,29)»
the  d ia ry  o f  Ove Giedde (JCBRAS. XXXVII.78) and F r. Manoel de
Assumpcao^ work (TT.ras.de L iv . 1699* 2**7) The only document
which may lend support to  de Sa de Menezes*s versio n  i s /  a l e t t e r
from the v iceroy  to  th e  king dated 6 February 1620 which s ta te s
th a t  de Sa ' matou hum alevantado nosso que para  e l le  se f o i .  caoitao-mor
e cabaca da mor p a r te  da sua gen te. * (DR .V.262) This ofcourse
ra^ 25e/T T .!S l.K! % ^ m ; Ar^ S .  XXXVII. 8?
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Thus from about 1620 u n t i l  the g re a t r i s in g  o f 1630 
K otte enjoyed a period  o f  r e la t iv e  t r a n q u i l i ty .
For Kandy to o , th e  ea rly  1620*s were a period  o f 
peace. Up to  1627 th e  le g a l basis  o f  re la tio n sh ip  between 
Kandy^ and th e  Portuguese remained th e  t r e a ty  o f l6l?« 
Though th e  re la tio n sh ip  was not always a co rd ia l one, 
no open c o n f lic t  developed during  th i s  p erio d . Peace 
however sh o rtliv e d  was welcome to  Kandy a f te r  t h i r t y  f iv e  
years o f war. Senerat used i t  to  conso lida te  h is  hold on 
th e  kingdom. He toured  h is  lan d s, encouraged s e t t l e r s  from 
abroad to  co lon ise abandoned and u n cu ltiv a ted  land  and 
was a c tiv e  in  the  re p a ir  of tanks and cana ls , th e  m ain-stay 
o f r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n ^ ^  Senerat a lso  t r i e d  to  make p rov ision  
fo r  a peacefu l succession . As e a rly  as 1621 th e  kingdom was 
divided in to  th re e  p r in c ip a l i t ie s ,  Uva, Mat a le  and Kandy 
and these  a llo ca ted  to  th e  th ree  p r in c e s . ^Ihe p rinces 
remained w ith  Senerat even a f te r  th i s  as they  were s t i l l  
minors bu t by 1625 Kumarasinha was e x e rc is in g  personal 
ru le  over Uva and was th e  commander o f th e  fo rces o f
(126) Mandaram pura puwata. stanzas 198-201
(127) TT.colleaabde Sao V icente, l iv r o  19.doc.110; 
Biker I .  22^; Parangi hatana. stanzas Gt-7/.
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(128)th a t  reg ion . With peace, K an^prospered and trad e  increased
(129)not only w ith th e  Portuguese bu t a lso  w ith Ind ian  merchants.
A fte r the  l a s t  o f the  invaders from Tanjore had 
been d ispersed  in  1621 Ja ffn a  enjoyed a period  o f peace 
which la s te d  t i l l  1628. For most o f th is  time Ja ffh a  
was dominated by the commanding fig u re  o f F ilip e  de O liv e ira .
He was responsib le  fo r  the  o rgan iza tion  o f the adm in istra tion  
o f the newly conquered kingdom in  accordance w ith in s tru c tio n s  
sen t from G o a i^ ^ H is  encouragement o f the  m issionaries was 
one of the  p r in c ip a l reasons fo r  th e i r  success in  Ja ffn a .
(128)Ajuda 51-VIII**JO.ff.220v,222v. Kumarasinha was only twenty 
years o f age a t th is  tim e. Contemporary evidence co n trad ic ts  th e  
a s se r tio n  o f  P ie r is  (11.173) th a t  the  p a r t i t io n  o f Kandy
occured in  1628. I t  i s  p o ss ib le  however th a t  Maha Astana, the  
youngest son was s e t  up as th e  p rince  o f Kandy only a t  
th a t  d a te , fo r  th is  would be in  keeping w ith evidence in  
the  Cyulayamsa. The mode o f a llo c a tio n  in  the  th ree  
p r in c ip a l i t ie s  may have been by l o t  as suggested in  the  
Cflulavamsa. I I .  231 and Knox 53* but Knox's s to ry  th a t  
Senerat c r a f t i l y  made sure th a t  Kandy would go to  Maha Astana 
i s  more dubious e sp e c ia lly  as Uva which f e l l  as Kumarasinha's 
share was probably the s tro n g es t o f the  th ree  p r in c ip a l i t i e s .
The p ra c tic e  of d iv id in g  the kingdom among th e  sons o f the 
king was no t new. I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  even in  1630 Maha Astana 
had no precedence over the  o th e r two p rin ce s .
(129) Ajuda 51-VIII-iK). f f .  2l6v, 219* 222, 223, 225
(130) Assentos I .  50. The a s se r tio n  o f Queyroz 728 and of 
de Sa de Menezes(JCBRAS XI. 516-517) th a t  de Sa v iy ite d  
Ja ffn a  and reorganized i t s  ad m in is tra tio n  during  h is  
f i r s t  term  o f  o ff ic e  i s  in accu ra te .
122
^O liveira was a lso  responsib le  fo r  th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  Jaffna*s
c a p ita l  from th e  anc ien t c i ty  o f  N allu r to  the  Portuguese
(131)
se ttlem en t a t  Patanam or Ja ffn a  in  1621. Ja ffn a  being a
p o rt could be more e a s i ly  defended and re in fo rced  by aea
w hile the  maintenance o f th e  Portuguese headquarters a t
N allur n e c e ss ita ted  th e  d iv is io n  o f  Portuguese fo rces
to  p ro te c t the  township and to  secure communications. The
d iv is io n  o f  a lim ite d  force in  a newly conquered land  had
proved to  be unwise, O liv e ira , supported by de Sa, even
suggested th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  th e  Portuguese headquarters to
the  is la n d  o f  Kayts ^ “^ h i s  suggestion , made in  1624,
r e f le c ts  th e  in s e c u r ity  f e l t  by the  Portuguese even fiv e
years a f te r  the conquest. The v iceroy  agreed th a t  a f o r t
be constructed  on th e  is la n d  bu t re fe r re d  the  dec ision  on
(133)the  tr a n s fe r  o f the c a p ita l  to  Lisbon, Eventually  however
i t  was re a liz e d  th a t  the  is la n d  o f Kayts being ten  m iles
in  len g th  would be as d i f f i c u l t  to  defend as a f o r t  on the
mainland* Moreover the  cadado s e t t l e r  community in  Ja ffn a
town seemed q u ite  con ten t th e re . Thus even a f te r  Miguel P e re ira
(13^)
b u i l t  a f o r t  a t  Kayts Ja ffh a  remained the  c a p ita l  o f  th e
(131) The reasons fo r  th e  abandonment o f  N allur seem cu rio u sly  akin 
to  those which led  to  the  abandonment o f  K otte in  15&5* P .E .P ie r is  
(Ceylon I I ,  137)in c o rre c tly  assume th a t  Queyroz*s statem ent 642
*P h ilip s  de O liveyra moved to  N allu r on 2nd o f February and ordered 
the la rg e  pagoda to  be razed* means th a tjfa liv e ira  tra n s fe re d  h is  
headquarters to  N allur on 2 February 1621, In  f a c t  the  temple a t  
N allur had been h is  headquarters since th e  conquest up to  August- 
September 1620 when he moved to  J a ffn a . Queyroz here r e f e r r in g  to  
an in c id e n t in  th e  campaign ag a in st the  fo rces o f  th e  Nayak o f T anjore>
(132) TT.LM. 19. f.40v (133) BNL. FG. 1932. f . 51
(134) Reimers, 56
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kingdom,The f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f Ja ffh a  i t s e l f  was begun in  
1624 but work progressed s lo w ly ^  The f o r t  was b u i l t  
around th e  s i t e  o f th e  o ld  F ranciscan church which fo r
many years had served as a stockade in  tim es o f c r i s i s ,
c)U/
The work done in  0 1 iv e ita* s  time however su ffe red  as a
r e s u l t  o f th e  g rea t tempest o f 162? and d esp ite  th e  e f fo r ts
d e
o f Lancarote de S e ix a s ,/O liv e ira 's  successor, work op the  
7 (136)
f o r t  was no t completed t i l l  1632, Though de O liv e ira 1s
term of o f f ic e  in  Ja ffh a  was a su ccessfu l one from the
Portuguese p o in t o f  view, i t  was one o f  hardship  fo r  th e
people o f  J a ffh a , The wars which raged u n t i l  1621 were
followed by an epidemic o f sm all-pox and a fev e r. Famine
(137)was a n a tu ra l r e s u l t ;  The making o f  the  tombo o f the  
lands of Ja ffn a  by Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara in  1623 
and i t s  completion and rev is io n  by de O liv e ira  h im self in  
162321627 re su lte d  in  th e  in c rease  o f  dues to  be paid  to  
th e  crown. The Portuguese gained la rg e  t r a c ts  o f lands 
confiscated  from the supporters o f S a n k ili , The Hindu Tamils 
o f course found l i f e  more d i f f i c u l t  than  th e i r  C h ris tian  
coun terparts fo r  a l l  o f f ic e s  were reserved  fo r th e  favoured
. ( 139)converts.
(135) T T ^ l le a d jd e  St, Viconte, l iv ro  19. doc.2; TT.LM. 15 .f . 20; l6 . f .5 6 l
(136) Queyroz^647-48; Baldaeud, 86
(137) The wars re su lte d  in  over s ix  thousand dea ths. (Jornada 35)
Queyroz 646-647
(138) Queyroz 646; AHU, Caixa2. 246; AHU.caix^fX. 20.11.1626
(139) Queyroz 645-646, 629
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With th e  re tu rn  o f peace de Sa was able to  pay g re a te r  
a t te n tio n  to  the  problems o f ex te rn a l defence* This aspect 
had been badly  neglected  by Azevedo who being convinced 
th a t  the  conquest o f Kandy alone would b rin g  se c u r ity  to  
the  Portuguese w ith in  Ceylon had spent most o f  h is  
eighteen years in  th e  is la n d  in  an attem pt to  wear down 
Kandyan resis tance*  When Azevedo l e f t  Ceylon in  1612 th e  
only Portuguese f o r t  in  the  is la n d  capable o f o ffe rin g  
worthwhile re s is ta n c e  to  an a ttac k  by a well-armed European 
force was th a t  of Colombo, bu t even in  th e  f o r t  the  w alls
(140)
were in  need o f repair*  As viceroy, Azevedo doubtless 
passed on the  k in g 's  o rders to  f o r t i f y  Colombo to  h is  
successors- Doft)Francisco de Menezes and Manoel Mascarenhas 
Homem- fo r  they  r e b u i l t  the w alls o f  Colombo f o r t  on
(JAl)
the  laddward side* N evertheless th e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t
the  po licy  d ire c tiv e s  from Azevedo compelled the  captain-*
( 1^2)
generals in  Ceylon to  consider Kandy as the  prime enemy*
(1^0) The k ing  had urged the  streng then ing  o f th e  Colombo f o r t  
in  l605» 1607, 1608 and tw ice in  1610- bu t l i t t l e  was done t i l l  
1613* A re p o rt on Ceylon about th i s  time s ta te s  th a t  ' Colombo 
nao tern muros e os que tin h a  todos ftst.an ohao abertos que 
entram os gados por e l le s  e hao ha_ b a lt^artes ' ( DR*II*85)
(141) AHU. Caixa IV. 18.12.1616. FOmoteca Li-I. IS . 86/1;
TT.LM. 13 .f . 147
(142) Bocarro 273-278; AHU.Caixa I I I .  2 3 .4 .l6 l4 ; AHU.Caixa IV. 
9.10.1615 The comprehensive regjmento se n t by Azevedo to
de Menezes and Homem re f le c t^  th is  p o lic y . A g re a te r  p a r t  of 
these reglmentos i s  devoted to  the  Kandyan war while the 
f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f f o r ts  i s  not even mentioned*
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By th e  1620*s however the Dutch and English were
too powerful in  the East to  be s a fe ly  ignored. The English
challenge to  the  Portuguese command of the  trad e  o f the
Arabian Sea and the  P ersian  Gulf had led  to  sev era l encounters
£
in  which th e  Portuguese could claim no sucess. The Dutch 
under the ab le  lead ersh ip  o f Jan P ieterzoon  Coen were by 
now firm ly  es tab lish ed  in  th e  Indonesian Archipelago and 
were th re a tn in g  the Portuguese strongholds o f Malacca and 
Macao as w ell as th e i r  Far E astern  trade* The Luso-Spanish 
a llia n c e  in  th e  East In d ies  had f a i le d  to  check the  Dutch 
advance and a lready  rumours o f an impending Anglo-Dutch
( 143)
a llia n c e  ag a in st the  Portuguese had appeared in  the  East*
De Sa who had served as captain-m ajor o f  the  f l e e t  o f
Cape Camorin fo r about two years knew these  dangers as w ell
/
as any o th e r man* That was perhaps why he began work on 
fo r t i fy in g  the  co as ta l p o rts  o f K otte even before the  
reb e llio n  in  h is  lands was over*
The f i r s t  p o r t he turned to  was Galle* Next to  
Trincomalee, G alle possessed the  b e s t n a tu ra l harbour in  
Ceylon* I t s  p o s itio n  on the  south-w est coast o f  the  is la n d
(143) Film oteca, Reis Vizinhos I* 52/3 /4 ; Botelho de Souza, 
I I I .  99-100; The Cambridge H isto ry  o f In d ia  , V. 32,78-83*
The agreement was a c tu a lly  concluded in  Ju ly  1619* D efin ite  
news regard ing  the  conclusion o f the  pac t a rr iv ed  in  
th e  East in  e a rly  1620*
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taken in  conjunction w ith the winds and ocean cu rren ts  which 
p rev a iled  gave i t s  possessor a command over th e  sea rou tes 
from Arabia to  Malacca and from the  west to  th e  ea s t coast 
o f  India* The f i r s t  proposal to  f o r t i f y  G alle had been 
made even befo re  th e  death o f Rajasinhja o f Sitawaka • By 
1597 the Portuguese had constructed  a sm all f o r t  on a 
h illo ck  a sh o rt d is tan ce  from the  harbour* The king r e a l is in g  
the  s t r a te g ic  value o f G alle rep ea ted ly  urged thesdc
(l44)streng then ing  o f  th e  f o r t  in  the  e a rly  seventeenth  century; /
(1^5)In  1619 de Sa began to  give h is  a t te n tio n  to  the  task*
The e x is tin g  f o r t  had been b u i l t  o f  mud and re in fo rced  
by wooden palisades*  Intended p rim arily  as a base ag a in st 
the  re b e llio u s  S inhalese , I t  had been neg lected  when the  
ad jo in ing  lands were subjugated and p a c if ie d . The f o r t ,  
moreover, though lo ca ted  on elevated  ground was so placed 
th a t  i t s  guns d id  no t command th e  entrance to  th e  harbour*
As Antonio M artins, a Portuguese fida lgo  remarked in  
1613-1614, th e  f o r t  o f G alle would have fa l le n  to  any s in g le  
enemy ship  th a t  dared to  a ttack  i t*
D e S a  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  f o r t  e v e n  i f  
s t r e n g t h e n e d ,  w o u l d  b e  o f  l i t t l e  u s e  a g a i n s t  E u r o p e a n
(144) D R*I* 8,58,60-61,387-338; D R .V . 138
(145) Q u e y r o z  627; D e  Sa d e  M e n e z e s  5115 T T . C o l l e c A a p d e  
S . V i c e n t e f  l i v r o  19*doc*271 y
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enemies. He knew th a t  the  value o f a f o r t  in  G alle in  th e  
context o f  th e  AngLo-Dutch th r e a t  to  the  Portuguese depended 
p a r t ly  on whether Portuguese v esse ls  could safelyjride a t  
anchor under the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  guns o f th e  f o r t .  He 
th e re fo re  proposed th e  dem olition  o f th e  e x is tin g  s tru c tu re  
and the  b u ild in g  o f an e n t i r e ly  new f o r t  on th e  promontory 
on the  w estern s id e  o f  th e  harbour.
De Sa reasoned th a t  the rocky coast o f th e  promontory 
i t s e l f  was s u f f ic ie n t  p ro tec tio n  on the  side  fac ing  the  
sea. The s id e  fac ing  th e  bay was to  be guarded by a w all 
o f beams and e a rth . On th e  southernmost p o in t o f  th e  
promontory de Sa planned to  b u ild  a b as tio n  to  command the  
entrance to  th e  harbour. Another b as tio n  a t  th e  quayside 
was to  p ro te c t the  anchorage. The landward defence o f  th e  
f o r t  was to  be secured by b u ild in g  a w all across th e  promontory 
a t  i t s  isthm us.
The i n i t i a l  s tages o f the co n stru c tio n  o f th e  new f o r t  
was supervised by Fernao Pinhao, cap ta in  o f  G alle , 1620-1623. 
F inancia l d i f f i c u l t i e s  slowed co n struc tion  work which was 
however continued w ithout in te rv a l  t i l l  162^ >
De Sa however re a l is e d  th a t  the  defence o f  Ceylon should 
be considered as a whole and th a t  the  co asta l defences in
(146) Queyroz 828; R ibeiro  129; TT.LM. 2 1 .f .l3 9 ; TT.LM.24.f.458
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K otte i t s e l f  would no t su ff ic e  w hile th e  whole o f  the
ea ste rn  coast remained unprotected* De Sa’s predecessors
hadArepeated  orders to  f o r t i f y  th e  two im portant p o r ts  on
the ea s te rn  coast -  Trincomalee and B a ttic a lo a , bu t had
fa ile d  to  take any a c t io n l ^ ^ f i t h  the  conquest o f J a ffn a ,
the  maintenance o f th ese  proposed fo r ts  became a much e a s ie r
p ro p o sitio n , fo r  Trincomalee and B a ttic a lo a  when cu t o f f
from K otte by monsoon winds were accesib le  from Ja ffn a  and
v ice  v e rsa . The peace t r e a ty  o f  1617 however p laced both
xthese  p o rts  in  the  t e r i to r y  o f th e  k ing  o f Kandy. De SaA
was no t d e te rred  by th i s .  He ev id en tly  considered th a t  the 
king o f Kandy was too weak to  break w ith  th e  Portuguese 
while contending w ith a re v o lt in  h is  own lands and he 
decided to  proceed w ith thfe co n stru c tio n  o f th e  two f o r t s .  
However th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  faced by the Portuguese in  o th e r 
p a r ts  o f Asia as w ell as th e  death o f  th e  v iceroy  
DomJoao Coutinho, Conde de Redondo prevented the  sending 
o f s u f f ic ie n t  money and a r t i l l e r y  fo r  th e  purpose and the
(14?) DR.II. 465,478; D R .III.397,399; DR.V.260-264; 
TT.LM. 7 . f . l ;  AH0.33.f.20; TT.LM.15.f.20; AHU.282.f.62
The f i r s t  o rder to  f o r t i f y  Trincomalee was made as ea rly  
as 1602. The f i r s t  req u est fo r  a f o r t  a t  B a ttica lo a  was 
in  1613# Don Huno Alvares P e re ira  however d id  t r y  to
ob ta in  th e  possession  o f B a ttic a lo a  in  th e  n eg o tia tio n s 
fo r  peace in  1617. Seo—above page •
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(148)
p ro je c t had to  be postponed.
S inhalese
De Sa also  t r i e d  to  win the  favour o f  th e /in h a b ita n ts  
o f K otte . He re a l is e d  th a t  th e i r  a ss is ta n ce  was inva luab le  
in  the prevention  and suppression o f re b e llio n s  in  K otte 
as w ell as in  the war ag a in st Kandy. De Sa believed  th a t  
kin£ and ju s t  trea tm en t would reco n c ile  th e  S inhalese to  
Portuguese ru le . He th e re fo re  t r ie d  to  ensure ju s t ic e  fo r  
a l l .  De Sa a lso  encouraged a renewal o f m issionary a c t iv i ty  
in  the  areas which had been under reb e l c o n tro l, fo r  
conversion to  C h r is t ia n ity  was one o f the  means o f ensuring 
lo y a lt ie s  to  the Portuguese.
By 1621 de Sa had secured peace w ith in  K otte. Ja ffn a  
was by now firm ly  in  the grasp o f de O liv e ira . The peace 
with Kandy was m aintained, though much o f the goodwill th a t  
had ex is ted  between th e  two s id es  had disappeared w ith the 
d efea t o f the  re b e ls . The Danish th re a t  was proving to  be 
an empty one. Perhaps most im p o rtan t,th e  Portuguese possessions 
were fo r  the  f i r s t  time begirdng to  pay th e i r  way and were 
soon to  be a valuable source o f  income.
De Sa’s a c t iv i t i e s  were however suddenly cu t sh o rt 
when in  February 1621 the new Portuguese governor o f In d ia  
Fernao de Alba/querque decided to  r e c a l l  him to  Goa and
(1^8) TT.LM. 12 .f . 505 DR.V.263; F ilraoteca, Reis Vizinhos 
52/3-4. Se o chapter I l T--?age b€»low»
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(149)to  appoint h is  own son Jorge de Albttgpquerque as cap ta in - 
general o f  the  island* Jorge de A lbuquerque a lready  held 
the  post o f  the  cap tain  o f Colombo. His fa th e r  po in ted  out 
to  the king th a t  A lbuquerque was w illin g  to  serve as 
both cap ta in  o f Colombo and cap ta in -g en era l o f Ceylon fo r 
only the  sa la ry  o f the  former p o st!  * ^^av in g  money fo r the 
royal tre a su ry  was by no means the  tru e  motive o f the  fa th e r  
and the  son, fo r  w ith h is  l e t t e r  o f appointment Fernao de 
A lbuquerque also  gave h is  son a decree by which f i f t y  fcahars 
o f cinnamon could be so ld  by him to  h is  own p r o f i t  d esp ite
(151)reg u la tio n s enforcing a royal monopoly o f the  product.
Queyroz lay s  the  blame fo r  the  appointment on the  fa th e r
who i t  i s  sa id  could not bear to  see th e  son o f  th e  governor
(152)
o f Ind ia  subordinate to  anyone but h im self. However^
Fernao de A lbuquerque had ru led  th e  Portuguese in  the  
East fo r  over a year before he made th is  appointment. Three 
months before he re c a lle d  de Sa he wrote to  th e  k ing  s ta t in g
(149) Jorge de A lbuquerque had m arried Dona Isa b e l de Souza, the  
daughter o f Pero Lopea de Souza who died in  Kandy in  1594.
(150) TT.LM. 1 5 .f .6 7 ; TT.LM. l 6 . f .  45; TT.KMx Micellaneuus 
Mss.da Convento da Graca, 2E. 557
(151) TT.LM. 2 1 .f . 277; TT.LM.18 .f . 247
(152) Queyroz 732
th a t  he had decided not to  change th e  cap ta in -g en era l 
in  C ey lo n i^^O b v io u sly  i t  was the  personal appeal o f h is
son who v is i te d  Goa in  e a rly  1621 which caused him to
( i  zk) 
change h is  mind; ^
Jorge de Albfcjpquerque l e f t  Goa on th e  10 February 
1621 w ith Gomez da S ilv a  da Cunha who had been appointed 
as th e  new captain-m ajor o f  the f ie ld .  A rriv ing  in  Ceylon 
w ith one hundred and f i f t y  men on 12 March he took over
f r o m  d e  S a  a n d  r u l e d  P o r t u g u e s e  C e y l o n  f o r  j u s t  o v e r  t w o  y e a r s .
D e A l b t q r q u e r q u e  c o n t i n u e d  d e  S a * s  p o l i c y  o f  
f o r t i f y i n g  t h e  p o r t s  o f  K o t t e .  T h e  w o r k  o n  t h e  f o r t  a t  
G a l l e  w a s  c o n t i n u e d  a n d  c o m p l e t e d  i n  h i s  t i m e .  A l b u q u e r q u e  
a l s o  b u i l t  a  q u a d r a n g u l a r  f o r t  w i t h  t w o  b a s t i o n s  d e f e n d e d  
b y  t h r e e  p i e c e s  o f  a r t i l l e r y  a t  K a l u t a r a ,  t w e n t y  s e v e n
m i l e s  s o u t h  o f  C o lo r a b  n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s  h o w e v e r  h i s  
r u l e  w a s  a  c o m p l e t e  f a i l u r e .  H e  d e s t r o y e d  w h a t  l i t t l e
(153) TT.LM. 15 .f . ^
(15*0 This o f  course does no t absolve Fernao de A lbuquerque.
I t  merely explains the  reason fo r  h is  ac tio n . Lan^arobe de Seixas 
who was serv ing  as the  vedor o f Ceylon a t  th is  tim e claimed 
in  a l e t t e r  to  the  king dated 29 November 1621 th a t  the  
appointment o f Jorge de Albfcjpquerque was made ag a in s t the  
advice o f  th e  viceroy*s c o u n c illo rs , (AHU. 35*f»24)but 
de Seixas was a h o s t i le  c r i t i c  and no confirm atory evidence 
i s  a v a ila b le .
(155) Queyroz 73^5 TT.Mss.da l i v r a r i a  l699*f«247v; AHU. 
caixa XVII. 9.5.16^5
(156) TT.LM. 18 .t .# A ;  R ibeiro  35; Reimers 56 ; JCBRAS X I.526}
I t  was b u i l t  on the  ru in s  of an e a r l i e r  f o r t  b u i l t  by
Azevedo in  the 1590*s.Ten casados were s e t t le d  in  nearby v i l la g e s .
(155)
1 3 2 -
good w il l  de Sa*s c o n c il l ia to ry  measures had gained among 
the  S inhalese . This was c h ie f ly  due to  h is  a rb i ta ry  a r r e s t  
p f  a prominent S inhalese le a d e r , Naide Appu. Naide Appu, or 
Manoel Mascarenhas Homem as he was ca lle d  a f te r  h is  conversion 
to  C h r is t ia n ity  had served the  Portuguese lo y a lly  fo r  many 
years and had am assei a considerable fo rtu n e . Under de Sa 
he had served as th e  ch ie f  of th e  la s c a r in s  o f th e  Seven 
K orales. De Albfcrquerque had Naide Appu seized  and confiscated  
a l l  h is  p roperty  and expelled  him from th e  is la n d  on the 
charge th a t  lie had p lo tte d  to  re b e l . On th e  way to  Goa by 
ship Naide Appu was thrown overboard and drowned.
De A lbuquerque moreover could not r e i i s t  making 
use o f h is  p o s itio n  to  en rich  h im self. In  f a c t  i t  was w idely 
rumoured th a t  Naide Appu died because o f h is  w ealth ra th e r  
than because o f any treach ery . De A lbuquerque c e r ta in ly  
used h is  p o s it io n  to  secure from h is  fa th e r  the  g ran t o f  
an is la n d  o f f  Ja ffn a  d e sp ite  a royal d ire c tiv e  th a t  lands 
in  Ja ffn a  should be given only to  those who a c tu a lly  served 
th e re£ 158lL a lso  ob tained  th e  revenues o f  sev e ra l v il la g e s  
in  K otte i t s e l f .  The c h ie f  sources o f  h is  unauthorised 
income however were arecanut and cinnamon. He bought both
(157) P .E .P e ir is ,  Ceylon. I I .1 6 7 ; JCBRAS XL. 526; Queyroz 733; 
TT.LM. 18, f f .  44.171.219; TT.LM .19.ff.17,23; TT.LM.2 3 .f . 435
(158) AHU.Caixa V III.2 6 .1 .1 6 2 5 .; TT.LM. 17 .f f . 23.57
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these  products a t  low p rice s  and made considerable p ro fits*
De A lbuquerque’s tendencies to  reward only those
whom he favoured led  to  d isco n ten t among both so ld ie rs  and
s e t t l e r s .  The so ld ie rs  rose in  mutiny ag a in st h±zs th e i r
captain-m ajor Gomez da S ilva  da Cunha and s e t  up a council
o f twelve to  rep resen t th e i r  grievances to  the  g en era l.
Eventually  de A lbuquerque was forced to  give way and
appoint a new captain-m ajor fo r  the  army. The casados of
the  camara o f Colombo complained to  the  king mainly o f the
(160)
misuse o f  royal funds by the  g en era l.
While th e  genera l f e l l  in to  d isfavour among S inhalese and 
Portuguese a l ik e , th e  work o f ad m in is tra tio n  was thrown in to  
confusion by disagreem ents between the  cap ta in -g en era l, the 
vedor and th e  ouvidor.The lack  o f ab le government was re f le c te d
in  th e  e lec tio n s  to  th e  m iserico rd ia  which re su lte d  in  open
( 161)
f ig h tin g  and the  death  o f a s o ld ie r .
(159) TT• LM. 18 .f f .243-244, lk?; TT.LM.21 .f . 277 ^
(160) Queyroz 75^1 TT.LM.18 .f f . 239-2^05 P .da T rin ida*T II. 129
( 161) TT.LM. 15. f .  191; TT.LM. 18 .f . 2^0; B ib lio teca  ft* de 
Sociedade de G eografia, Rest ante D.Ma<yo 4 .doc. 52
An unsigned contemporary document (TT.LM. 18. f . 71)suggests th a t  
many o f Jorge de A lbuquerque’s tro u b les  might have a r ise n  
from opposition  to  him by th e  vedor, Lan9a ro te  de Seixas 
who was a fr ie n d  and kinsman o f Constantino de Sa. De Seixas 
apparen tly  had considerable in fluence  both in  the  array and 
among th e  casados o f Colombo.De Seixas was c e r ta in ly  no 
frien d  o f  Jorge de Albtqpauerque. On 20 November 1621 he 
wrote to  the  k ing  making many s p e c if ic  charges o f  corrup tion  
ag a in st th e  new general (AiTu.35-fT.2k.24v) but no conclusive 
evidence can be found to  connect de Seixas w ith the mutiny 
in  the army and the  p ro te s ts  o f the  camara o f Colombo.
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E arly  in  1623 however, Jorge de Alb&jrquerque received
news of the a r r iv a l  o f th e  new v iceroy  Don Francisco da Gama
w ith orders to  r e in s ta te  Constantino de Sa in  C e y lo n ^ ^ ln
A p ril, before de Sa could re tu rn  to  Ceylon de A lb^ juerque
commandeered a v esse l which had come to  Ceylon to  take some
cinnamon to  the  P ersian  Gulf and took h is  fam ily in  i t  to  
 ^ (163) (164)
Goa* De Sa s e t  out from Goa fo r  Ceylon in  the  same month.
The s ign ifance  o f the  ru le  o f Jorge de A lbuquerque
l i e s  in  what he fa i le d  to  achieve. Having the  s tro n g e s t t i e s
o f personal re la tio n sh ip  w ith the Portuguese governor in  Goa
he was much b e t te r  placed than de Sa to  ob ta in  the  resources
necessary to  execute royal o rd ers . He chose however to  use
h is  period  o f  o f f ic e  fo r  the  p u rs u it  o f persohal ga in . The
Kandyan monarch thus received  a fu r th e r  period  o f  time to
re -e s ta b lis h  h is  a u th o rity  over h is  kingdom, and to  regain  the
confidence o f  h is  people. De A lbuquerque * s ta c t l e s s  measures
moreover made deep inroads in  th e  support among S inhalese c h ie f ta in s
which de Sa had b u i l t  up during h is  f i r s t  period  o f  o f f ic e .
(162) The k ing  had never agreed to tth e  appointment o f  Jorge de 
A lbuquerque, and he even ordered an in q u iry  to  be held  as to  
why de Sa was dism issed.
£±£2* TT.LM. l6 .f„4 5 ; TT.LM. 18 .f f . 233,326; TT.Collecttfrde S.V icente 19. 
doc. 3^0
(163) In c id e n ta lly  th is  deprived Ruy F re ire  de Andrade o f much needed 
funds which would have been gained by the  sa le  o f  th i s  cinnamon.
(164) De Sa a f te r  he l e f t  Ceylon had resided  in  Goa u n t i l  appointed 
commander o f th e  squadron sen t to  re lie v e  Ormuz. De Sa d isp layed  
l i t t l e  eagerness to  reach Ormuz in  time and h is  f l e e t  was too l a t e  
to  save th e  f o r t .  On h is  re tu rn  to  Goa h is  conduct o f  the  expedition  
was in v e s tig a te d  by the  Relacao where de Sa was c leared  o f a l l  
re s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r  the  lo s s .
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CHAPTER I I I
F ro m  M a y  1623 t o  A u g u s t  1630 t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  t e r i t o r i e s  
i n  C e y l o n  w e r e  g o v e r n e d  b y  C o n s t a n t i n O  d e  S a  d e  N o r o n h a .  U n t i l
1628 d e  S a  g o v e r n e d  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  p e a c e ,  b u t  e v e n ^ t h e s e  y e a r s
w a r  n e v e r  a p p e a r e d  f a r  o f f *  W i t h  t h e  E s t a d o  d a  I n d i a  h a r d  
p r e s s e d  b y  E u r o p e a n  a n d  l o c a l  e n e m i e s  i n  m a n y  s e c t o r s  f r o m  
E a s t  A f r i c a  t o  C h i n a ,  p e a c e  i n  C e y l o n  i f  i t  c o u l d  b e  c o m b i n e d  
w i t h  s e c u r i t y  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  d e s i r a b l e  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e *  F r o m  
t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  K a n d y  t o o ,  a s  t h e  w e a k e r  o f  t h e  tw o
p r o t a g o n i s t s ,  p e a c e  w a s  m u c h  t o  b e  s o u g h t  a f t e r .  S e n e r a t  a f t e r
1 6 2 1  w a s  r e a d y  t o  p o s t p o n e ,  i f  n o t  g i v e  u p  c o m p l e t e l y ,  h i s  
p l a n s  f o r  a  f r e s h  w a r  a g a i n s t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e ,  f o r  h e  r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  K a n d y  n e e d e d  a  s p e l l  o f  p e a c e  t o  r e c o v e r  f r o m  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  f o r e i g n  i n v a s i o n  a n d  c i v i l  w a r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a l t h o u g h  d e t e r m i n e d  
t o  r e s i s t  a n y  f u r t h e r  d i m i n u t i o n  o f  h i s  p o w e r ,  S e n e r a t  w a s  
p r e p a r e d  t o  a c q u i e s c e  i n  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  P o r t u g u e s e  p o w e r  i n  
C e y l o n  w h i c h  h a d  o c c u r e d  b e t w e e n  1617 a n d  1621.
T o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
K a n d y  p r e s e n t e d  a  t h r e e f o l d  t h r e a t  t o  t h e i r  s e c u r i t y .  F i r s t l y , i t  
i n c r e a s e d  t h e  r i s k  o f  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  C e y l o n .  A k i n g d o m  
o u t s i d e  P o r t u g u e s e  c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  C e y l o n  w a s  a n  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  
f o r  o t h e r  E u r o p e a n  n a t i o n s  t o  t r y  t h e i r  f o r t u n e s  i n  t h e  i s l a n d .  
S e c o n d l y ,  a  s t r o n g  K a n d y a n  m o n a r c h  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  e x p l o i t  a n y  
P o r t u g u e s e  w e a k n e s s  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p e l  t h e m  f r o m  t h e  i s l a n d *  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  s u p p o r t  f r o m  o r  a t  l e a s t  a  r e f u g e  i n
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t h e  h i l l - c o u n t r y  c o u l d  i n  m a n y  w a y s  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  
i n d u c e m e n t  f o r  l o w - c o u n t r y  S i n h a l e s e  t o  r e b e l .  C o n s e q u e n t  P o r t u g u e s e  
h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  K a n d y  h o w e v e r  o n l y  s e r v e d  t o  a r o u s e  K a n d y a n  
s u s p i c i o n s  a s  t o  P o r t u g u e s e  o b j e c t i v e s .
T h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  p o l i c y  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
o v e r s e a s  e m p i r e  w a s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  E u r o p e .  I n  
t h e o r y  a l l  i m p o r t a n t  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  h a d  t o  h a v e  t h e  a p p r o v a l  
o f  t h e  k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l .  A t  t h i s  t i m e  h o w e v e r  a s  t h e  S p a n i s h  
a n d  P o r t u g u e s e  c r o w n s  w e r e  u n i t e d  a n d  t h e  k i n g  u s u a l l y  r e s i d e d  
i n  S p a i n ,  P o r t u g a l  i t s e l f  w a s  g o v e r n e d  e i t h e r  b y  a  v i c e r o y  
o r  b y  a  b o a r d  o f  t h r e e  g o v e r n o r s ^  T o  a v o i d  t h e  d e l a y  i n h e r e n t  
i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e  w a s  
d e v i s e d .  A l l  n o r m a l  a n d  r o u t i n e  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  P o r t u g u e s e  
p o l i c y  r e l a t i n g  t o  h e r  o v e r s e a s  e m p i r e  w e r e  m a d e  i n  L i s b o n  
b y  a  b o d y  k n o w n  a s  t h e  c o n s e l h o  d a  f a z e n d a  w h i c h  w o r k e d  i n  c l o s e  
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a n d  o f t e n  i n c l u d e d  t h e  v i c e r o y  o f  P o r t u g a l .
W h e n e v e r  a  m a t t e r  o f  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c ^ k a d  t o  b e  d e c i d e d  i t  w a s  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  c o n s e l h o  d a  f a z e n d a  a n d  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
s e n t  u p  i n  a  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  c o n s e l h o  d e  P o r t u g a l . T h i s  l a t t e r  b o d y  
a p p a r e n t l y  m o v e d  w i t h  t h e  k i n g  t o  k e e p  i n  c l o s e  t o u c h  w i t h
( l )  A l i s t  o f  t h e s e  v i c e r o y s  a n d  g o v e r n o r s  i s  f o u n d  i n  
J o a o  P e d r o  R i b e i r o * s  D i s s e r t a c o e s  c h r o n o l o g i c a s  e  c r i t i c a s  s o b r e  
a  h i s t o r i a  e  j u r i s p r u d e n c i a  ^  e c c l e s i a s t i c a  e  c i v i l  d e  P o r t u g a l  I I ,  
195-199.
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him and d e a l t  w ith a l l  im portant m atters regard ing  P ortugal
and her empires C o-ordination in  p o licy  m atters between these  
two bodies was achieved by means o f  ro u tin e  correspondence 
conducted between th e  conselho de P ortugal on b eh a lf  o f  the  k ing  
and th e  conselho da fazenda* The same o b jec tiv e  was fu rth e red  
by th e Aappointment o f  an in f lu e n t ia l  and tru s te d  co u n c illo r to  
both co u n c ils . For in stance  the  prominent Spanish nobleman^Uve 
Duque de V ila  Hermoza, conde de Ficalho was both p re s id e n t o f  
the conselho de Portugal and a member o f  th e  conselho da fazenda
The v iceroy  o f In d ia  was th e o re t ic a l ly  a subordinate 
o f f ic ia l  who was expected to  execute orders issued  by the  conselho 
da fazenda on beh a lf o f th e  k ing . However i t  o ften  happened 
th a t  th e  v iceroy  appointed was a man o f some stand ing  and h is  
opinions were th e re fo re  g en e ra lly  respected  and taken  in to  
co nsidera tion . In  a c tu a l f a c t  no im portant p o licy  dec isio n  
was taken in  Europe w ithout consu lting  th e  v iceroy . Moreover, 
very o ften  only th e  broad o u tlin e s  o f  p o licy  were in d ica ted  
and th e  v iceroy  was allowed to  determine th e  d e ta i l s  o f  i t s  
execution. The slow communications between Lisbon and Goa -  
the re tu rn  voyage took almost two years -  were a fa c to r  which
(2) The Duque de V ila  Hermoza d e a lt  w ith some o f  the  correspondence
from the  conselho da fazenda to  th e  k ing  fo r s ix teen  y ears ,
1618-163^, The Duque was o ften  in  Lisbon during  th e  months January
to  March when the conselho da fazenda d e a lt  w ith correspondence to
be sen t to  the  East in  th e  annual f l e e t .  During th e  g re a te r  p a r t  o f
the. year however he apparen tly  liv e d  w ith the  court in  Madrid, 




added to  th e  independence o f th e  v iceroy . However th e  conselho 
da fazenda once i t  decided on a p o licy , sen t p e r s is te n t  orders 
fo r i t s  execution u n t i l  d e f in i te  news a rriv ed  th a t  th i s  was 
done, thus reducing the  v icero y ’s powers to  those of delay . The 
viceroy in  h is  tu rn  was aided by an advisory council. He had 
the  power to  overru le  h is  council but th e  proceedings o f th e  
council in d ic a te  th a t  th e  v iceroy  o ften  l is te n e d  to  th e  advice 
o ffered  and sometimes even bowed to  the  dec ision  o f th e  m ajo rity
(3)
when he was opposed to  i t .
The o th er person who could be expected to  have some 
in fluence in  p o licy  form ulation fo r  Ceylon was th e  man on the  
spot -  th e  cap ta in -genera l h im self. He had the  r ig h t  to  correspond 
d ir e c t ly  w ith  th e  k ing , which in  e f fe c t meant w ith the  conselho 
da fazenda.He was however thought o f  p rim arily  as an o f f ic e r  xvho 
would execute p o licy  dec isions already  made, though he might 
o f fe r  some u se fu l suggestions. The conselho da fazenda, moreover, 
had access to  o ther sources o f  f irs th a n d  in form ation , fo r  both 
the vedor da fazenda o r c o n tro lle r  o f revenue and the  camara 
or municipal council o f  Colombo had the  r ig h t  to  eorrespond 
d ir e c t ly  w ith Lisbon. Apart from th ese  reg u la r  channels the  
conselho da fazenda also  received  sp e c ia l rep o rts  from in d iv id u a ls . 
The bishop o f Cochim fo r  example sen t d e ta ile d  inform ation and
(3) C.R.Boxer -  A glimpse o f th e  Goan archives (B u lle tin  of the  
School o f O rien ta l and A frican S tu d ies , XIV,320)
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s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  a c t i o n ,  o n  p r a c t i c a l l y  e v e r y  c o n c e i v a b l e  t o p i c  
o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  w a s
p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  t o  m a k e  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  f e l t  b y  
t h e  d e t e r m i n e d  a d v o c a c y  o f  a  c e r t a i n  c o t i r s e  o f  p o l i c y ,  t h o u g h  
t h e  p r o x i m i t y  o f  h i s  i m m e d i a t e  s u p e r i o r ,  t h e  v i c e r o y ,  a t  G o a  
g r e a t l y  r e d u c e d  h i s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
w a s  g e n e r a l l y  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  L i s b o n  b y  t h e  c o n s e l h o  d a  f a z e n d a  
i n  t h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  k i n g  p r i m a r i l y  o n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
v i c e r o y  i n  G o a  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  i n  C e y l o n .  F o r  t h e  
s a k e  o f  c o n v e n i e n c e  s u c h  d e c i s i o n s  s h a l l  h e n e c e f o r t h  b e  r e f e r e d  
t o  a s  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  k i n g .
Though the weight exerted  by each o f these  councils and 
in d iv id u a ls  in  the policy-m aking machine v aried  from issu e  to  
issue  and period  to  p erio d , the conten t o f the  p o lic y  i t s e l f  
was to  a g rea t ex ten t a re f le c t io n  o f the Portuguese p o l i t i c a l ,  
m ilita ry  and economic p o s itio n  in  Europe as w ell as Asia.The 
resumption o f  the war w ith the  Dutch a t  the end o f the twelve 
year tru ce  in  1621 imposed a considerab le burden on Portuguese 
resources. The Dutch a ttac k s  on the valuable Portuguese colonies 
o f Bahia and Angola and the consequent s tru g g le  fo r  th e  reconquest 
of these  areas absorbed much o f the  Portuguese war e f fo r t  in
mi‘h u s  i t  c a n  b e  b r o a d l y  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  P o r t u g u e s e  p o l i c y
(if) TT.LM.16 .f f . 106,108-109
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(5)the 1620fs .  In  the Ind ian  ocean the s i tu a t io n  was not much
b e tte r#  The Anglo-Dutch accord signed in  Europe in  June 1619
had provided fo r  c lose co-operation , p o l i t i c a l  and economic,
between these  two powers in  Asia. And though th e  expectations
of the  p aren t companies in  Europe were never matched by the
ac tu a l co-operation  between th e i r  o f f ic ia l s  in  the  E ast, the
years which followed were marked by considerable Anglo-Dutch
successes ag a in s t the  Portuguese. In  1622 an a l l ie d  f l e e t
attacked the Portuguese squadron b ring ing  out th e  v iceroy  Dorn
Francisco da Gama, conde de V idiguera, o f f  Mozambique and
destroyed th ree  o f the four galleons in  the  Portuguese f l e e t .
The v ic to rio u s  Anglo-Dutch f l e e t  l a t e r  blockaded Goa fo r  four
months between December 1622 and March 1623 to  prevent the  departure
of the  annual Portuguese f l e e t  to  Lisbon. In  1622 came also  the
Dutch a ttack  on Macao and the  se izu re  o f  Ormuz by a P ersian
force supported by an English f l e e t .  This l a s t  event was a
tremendous psychological blow to  th e  Portuguese and th e i r  main
e f fo r ts  in  the  East during the  next few years were d irec ted
to regain ing  command o f  the P ersian  Gulf and the  re s to ra t io n
(6)
of th e i r  p re s tig e .
These fac to rs  n a tu ra lly  led  to  a r e s t r ic t io n  on the  
amount o f  Portuguese resources in  men, arms and equipment th a t
(5) H.W. Live m ore -  H isto ry  o f P o rtu g a l. 277
(6) The Cambridge H isto ry  o f In d ia  V, 83-8h
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could  be d iv e r te d  to  Ceylon, The v ic e ro y  a t  Goa as th e  head o f
a hard  p re s se d  and f a r  f lu n g  em pire had to  a l lo c a te  to  each a cco rd in g  
i t s
to  Exssh needs and in  com parison w ith  o th e r s  th o se  o f  C eylon/ 
d id  n o t look  p re s s in g .  T his ex p la in ed  why th e  f ig u re  o f  6 ig h t 
hundred so ldados i n  th e  f i e l d ,  a t ta in e d  in  th e  e a r ly  y e a rs  o f
_ .mu « r r P/
Azevedo’s regim e was n o t reached  again  in  Ceylon t i l l  th e  i s la n d  ^
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  w h a t  w a s  t o  b e  d o n e  w i t h  t h e  l i t t l e  t h a t  
c o u l d  b e  s p a r e d  f o r  C e y l o n  w a s  a  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  g a v e  r i s e  t o  
c o n t r o v e r s y  b o t h  w i t h i n  a n d  o u t s i d e  C e y l o n ,  A f t e r  1 6 1 7 ,  tw o  
a l t e r n a t i v e  u s e s  a p p e a r e d  p o s s i b l e .  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  c o u l d  
e i t h e r  p r e s e r v e  p e a c e  w i t h  K a n d y  a n d  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  t h e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p o r t s  o f  t h e  i s l a n d  t o  p r e v e n t  a n y  o t h e r  E u r o p e a n  f r o m  
g e t t i n g  a  f o o t h o l d  o r  r e n e w  t h e  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  K a n d y  i n  t h e  
h o p e  o f  c o n q u e r i n g '  t h e  k i n g d o m ,  t h u s  r e n d e r i n g  s e c u r e  t h e i r  
h o l d  o n  t h e  i s l a n d .  B o t h  p o l i c i e s  a i m e d  a t  o b j e c t i v e s  d e s i r a b l e  
f r o m  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  T h e y  w e r e  v i e w e d  a s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
s i m p l y  b e c a u s e ,  w i t h  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a t  h a n d ,  at b e s t  o n l y  o n e  o f  
t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  c o u l d  b e  a i m e d  a t .
H o w e v e r , a s  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  f o u n d  o u t  i n  t h e  l 6 2 0 * s  t h e s e  
tw o  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  n o t  t r u e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  T h e  t r e a t y  o f  1 6 1 7  h a d  
g r a n t e d  t h e  k i n g  o f  K a n d y  t h e  w h o l e  o f  t h e  e a s t e r n  s e a b o a r d  o f  
C e y l o n  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p o r t s  o f  T r i n c o m a l e e  a n d  - j a t t i c a l o a .  T h u s
( 7 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  4 3
w a s  i n  d a n g e r  o f  b e i n g  c o m p l e t e l y  l o s t  i n  1 6 3 0 - 1 6 3 1
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a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  f o r t i f y  a l l  t h e  f o r t s  o f  t h e  i s l a n d  w a s  l i k e l y  
t o  i n v o l v e  a  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  K a n d y a n  k i n g d o m .  S i m i l a r l y  
a n y  f u r t h e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  s u b j u g a t e  K a n d y  c o u l d  w e l l  l e a d  S e n e r a t  
t o  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  D u t c h  f o r  a i d  b y  w a y  o f  t h e  e a s t  c o a s t .
T h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  L i s b o n  d i d  n o t  r e a l i s e  t h i s  p r o b l e m  
f o r  t h e  l e t t e r s  o f  t h e  k i n g  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  i n  b o t h  1 6 1 9  a n d  
1 6 2 0  c o n t a i n e d  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  b o t h  T r i n c o m a l e e  a n d  B a t t i c a l o a  
b e  f o r t i f i e d , ^ w h i l e  a n o t h e r  d a t e d  2 6  M a r c h  1 6 2 0  i n s t r u c t e d  t h e
( 9 )v i c e r o y  t o  c o n f i r m  t h e  t r e a t y  o f  1 6 1 7 *  H o w e v e r  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
g o v e r n o r  o f  I n d i a ,  F e r n a o  d e  A l b t y r q u e r q u e  w h o  h a d  e a r l i e r  
s e r v e d  a s  t h e  c a p t a i n  o f  C o lo m b o  w a s  u n d e r  n o  s u c h  d e l u s i o n .
H h e n  h e  r e c e i v e d  t h e s e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  h e  a t  o n c e  r e p l i e d  o n  
2 0  F e b r u a r y  1 6 2 1  t h a t  t h e  p e a c e  t r e a t y  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a n d e d  o v e r  
t o  K a n d y  t h e  l a n d s  o f  B a t t i c a l o a  w h e r e  t h e  k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l  h a d
( 10)
a s k e d  f o r  a  f o r t  t o  b e  b u i l t .  C o n f r o n t e d  b y  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s
o f  c o n f i r m i n g  t h e  p e a c e  t r e a t y  o f  1 6 1 7  o r  o f  c o n s t r u c t i n g  f o r t s
w e da t  T r i n c o m a l e e  a n d  B a t t i c a l o a  w i t h  t h e  r i s k  o f  r e n e ^  c o n f l i c t s ^  
t h e  k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l  u n h e s i t a t i n g l y  c h o s e  t h e  l a t t e r .  A l e t t e r  
o f  t h e  k i n g 1 t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  d a t e d  8  F e b r u a r y  1 6 2 2  d e c r e e d  t h a t  
p e a c e  b e  m a d e  o n l y  o n  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  B a t t i c a l o a  b e  l e f t  i n
(11)P o r t u g u e s e  h a n d s .  W h e n  Dora F r a n c i s c o  d a  G a m a , c o n d e  d e  v i d i g u e r a ,  
d e  A l b t t a r q u e r q u e ’ s  s u c c e s s o r  a s  v i c e r o y ,  p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  t h e
( 8 )  D a  V , 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 ;  T T . L M . l 6 . f . 5 6 1
( 9 )  T T .L M .1 3 . f . 1 3 3
( 1 0 )  T T .L M .1 5 . f . 2 1
( 1 1 )  T T .L M . l 6 . f . 7 9
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f o l l o v r i n g  y e a r  t h a t  e v e n  T r i n c o m a l e e  w a s  i n  K a n d y a n  t e r i t o r y
( 12)
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p e a c e ,  t h e  k i n g  r e j o i n e d  t h a t  p. s u c h  a  t r e a t y
( 1 3 )
s o  h a r m f u l  t o  h i s  i n t e r e s t s ^  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n f i r m e d  a t  a l l .
T h e  k i n g * s  d e c i s i o n  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  s t r u g g l e  w i t h  K a n d y  
i n v o l v e d  a  c h a n g e  f r o m  t h e  p o l i c y  l a i d  d o w n  i n  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
o f  i 6 l 7  t o  t h e  o u t g o i n g  v i c e r o y  Dorn J o a o  C o u t i n h o ,  c o n d e  d e  
R e d o n d o ,  T h r e e  r e a s o n s  s e e m  t o  h a v e  b e e n  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h i s .
B y  1 6 2 2  t h e  k i n g  h a d  r e c e i v e d  n e w s  t h a t  t h e  r e b e l l i o n s  i n  
P o r t u g u e s e  t e r i t o r y  w e r e  a l m o s t  e x t i n g u i s h e d .  T h u s  i t  c o u l d  b e  
s a f e l y  p r e s u m e d  t h a t  r e n e w e d  w a r  w i t h  K a n d y  w o u l d  n o t  p l a c e  t o o
CL
g r e a t ^  b u r d e n  o n  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  f o r c e s  i n  C e y l o n .  S e c o n d l y  b y  
t h i s  t i m e  n e w s  o f  t h e  c o n q u e s t  a n d  a n n e x a t i o n  o f  J a f f n a  h a d  a l s o  
b e e n  r e c e i v e d  i n  L i s b o n .  T h i s  a c c e s s i o n  o f  t e r i t o r y ,  t h e  f i r s t  
i n  C e y l o n  f o r  o v e r  t w e n t y  y e a r s ,  w o u l d  h a v e  o n c e  m o r e  r o u s e d  
h o p e s  o f  t h e  s u b j u g a t i o n  o f  K a n d y .  F i n a l l y ,  b y  1 6 2 2  l e t t e r s  
f r o m  t h e  v i c e r o y  h a d  i n f o r m e d  t h e  k i n g  t h a t  a  D a n i s h  f l e e t  h a d  
a r r i v e d  o f f  C e y l o n  i n  1 6 2 0  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  
k i n g  o f  K a n d y  t o  d r i v e  o u t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .  T h e s e  f a c t o r s  p r o m p t e d  
t h e  k i n g  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a  n e w  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n .  K a n d y  w a s  t o  b e  
h e n c e f o r t h  c o m p l e t e l y  i s o l a t e d  f r o m  f o r e i g n  c o n t a c t s .  T h i s  
p u r p o s e  w a s  t o  b e  a c h i e v e d  b y  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  f o r t s  r o u n d
( 1 2 )  T T .L M .1 7 . f . 8v
( 1 3 )  T T .L M .2 0 . f . l
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t h e  c o a s t  o f  C e y l o n  a t  T r i n c o m a l e e ,  B a t t i c a l o a ,  W e l i g a m a ,  G a l l e ,
K a l u t a r a ,  N e g o m b o  a n d  K a y t s .  A s  t h e  f o r t s  h a d  t o  b e  s t r o n g  e n o u g h
t o  r e s i s t  h o s t i l e  E u r o p e a n s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  a r m y
t h e  k i n g  a l s o  r e q u e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  v i c e r o y  s e n d  a  q u a l i f i e d
(1*0
e n g i n e e r  t o  a d v i s e  o n  t h e i r  c o n s t r u c t i o n .
H o w e v e r  t h e  k i n g ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  t e a r  u p  t h e  1 6 1 7  t r e a t y  
d i d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t  a s  t h e  n e w  v i c e r o y  Dom  F r a n c i c s o  
d a  G a m a , c o n d e  d e  V i d i g u e r a  e m b a r k e d  o n  a  p o l i c y  q£- v e n t u r e  o f  
h i s  o w n . A f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  C o n s t a n t i n e  d e  S a ,  t h e  
v i c e r o y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  s e i z u r e  o f  T r i n c o m a l e e  w e r e  d o n e  
w i t h  t a c t  a n d  s p e e d  n o  c o n f l i c t  n e e d  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s u l t .  T h e  
k i n g  o f  K a n d y ,  w e a k e n e d  b y  a  r e b e l l i o n  i n  h i s  o w n  d o m a i n s  w h i c h  
h a d  l a s t e d  f r o m  1 6 1 7  t o  1 6 2 0 ,  w a s  a s  y e t  i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  r e n e w  
w a r .  H e  w a s  k e e n  o n  a  p e r i o d  o f  p e a c e  t o  b r i n g  u p  h i s  t h r e e  s o n s ,  
t h e  e l d e s t  o f  w h o  w a s  h a r d l y  e i g h t e e n  y e a r s  o f  a g e .  M o r e o v e r  
h a v i n g  r e f u s e d  t h e  o f f e r  o f  D a n i s h  a i d  i n  1 6 2 0 - 1 6 2 1  h e  k n e w  t h i f c  
h e  m i g h t  w e l l  b e  w i t h o u t  a l l i e s  i n  a  n e w  w a r  a g a i n s t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .
I n  v i e w  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s ,  t h e  v i c e r o y  o r d e r e d  d e  S a  t o  
p r o c e e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  T r i n c o m a l e e  a n d  s t a r t  w o r k  o n  b u i l d i n g  a  
f o r t  t h e r l . ^ A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  h e  d e s p a t c h e d  a  F r a n c i s c a n  ,
F a t h e r  E l e v J e r i o  d e  S a n t i a g o  t o  K a n d y  t o  e x p l a i n  t o  S e n e r a t  t h a t
( 1 4 )  T T .L M .1 6 . f . 1 5 6
( 1 5 )  T T . L M . I 6 . f . l 6 v j  n . L M . 1 7 . f . 6 6 j  T T .L M . 1 9 . f . 6 v ;  
T T . C o l l e c c a o  d e  S . V i c e n t e  X I X . D o c . 1 5 ^
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th is  was merely an attem pt to  f o r e s ta l l  the  enemies o f the
(16)
Portuguese who had planned to  se ize  Trincomalee fo r  them selves.
De Sa s e t  out from Goa in  th e  f i r s t  week o f A pril 1623
w ith four g a l l io t s  and two pinnaces, to g e th e r w ith men, munitions
(17)
and e ig h t p ieces o f  a r t i l l e r y .  He was also  accompanied by Francisco
Pinto  Pimenta who was w ell versed in  m atters regarding  
( 18)
f o r t i f ic a t io n s .  De Sa had been delayed in  Goa p a r t ly  by the
Anglo-Dutch blockade o f the p o r t which la s te d  t i l l  19 March
and p a r t ly  by th e  in q u iry  in to  the  conduct o f  the  expedition
led  by him fo r  the  r e l i e f  o f Ormuzf Consequently he met w ith
adverse winds and was forced to  put in to  Tuticofcim. Thence he
crossed over to  Ja ffn a  on 16 May 1623. A fter spending a few
weeks regrouping h is  fo rces and tak in g  in  some fre sh  supp lies
and la s c a r in  troops from Ja f fh a  de Sa s a ile d  fo r  Trincomalee
. (20)
which he reached in  Ju ly  1623.
The p o rt and the  area  surrounding Trincomalee bay was 
under the  ru le  o f  th e  vanniyar o f  Trincomalee and K o ttiy a r who 
was a t r ib u ta ry  o f th e  king o f Kandy. This ru le r  seems to  have
( 16) Quetroz 6985 P .da T rinidade, I I I , 79
(17) TT.fvvp anoflft Aa s . X I X . D o c . 1 5 4 ;  TT.Mss.da Convento da 
Gra^a-, tomo 2E .pg.557-558; TT.LM.19.f.6v
(18) Pimenta had come to  the  East w ith  Antonio P in to  da Fonseca, 
the m il i ta ry  engineer sen t by P h ilip  I I  o f Portugal (and I I I  o f 
Spain) to  s treng then  th e  Portuguese fo r t i f ic a t io n s  o f  the  E ast.
TT.LM.1 7 .f . 88v; TT.LM.16.f . l 6v; TT.LM.2 2 .f .84
(19) TT.LM.17 .f .4 v ; TT.Colleccao de S.V icente j IX.Doc.271
(20) TT.Mss da L iv .l699 f f . 248,260; I t  i s  p o ssib le  th a t  th e  reference 
in  Queyroz 696 to  a v i s i t  by de Sa to  Ja ffn a  in  which he reorganized 
the ad m in istra tio n  o f th e  area may w ell r e f e r  to  th i s  s ta y . Queyroz 
however seems to  have been confused on th i s  su b jec t as he l a t e r  makes 
out (Queyroz 757) th a t  no cap ta in -genera l had s e t  fo o t in  Ja ffn a
up to  1627.
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o f f e r e d  n o  r e s i s t a n c e .  T h e  r u l e r  o f  K a n d y ,  S e n e r a t  w a s  b y
n o  m e a n s  d e c e i v e d  b y  P o r t u g u e s e  p r o f e s s i o n s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  b u t
b e i n g  u n p r e p a r e d  f o r  w a r  c o n t e n t e d  h i m s e l f  w i t h  p r o t e s t s  t o
t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  a n d  t h e  c a m a r a  o f  C o lo m b o  r e m i n d i n g  t h e m
, (21)
o f  t h e  p e a c e  t r e a t y  o f  1 6 1 7 »
T h e  s p o t  c h o s e n  f o r  t h e  f o r t  a t  T r i n c o m a l i e  w a s  t h e  s i t e
o f  t h e  f a m o u s  K o n e s a r  t e m p l e .  T h i s  t e m p l e  h a d  b e e n  o n e  o f  t h e
m o s t  k n o w n  a n d  m o s t  f r e q u e n t e d  H i n d u  t e m p l e s  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n
i n  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  a n d  h a d  m a d e  T r i n c o m a l e e  a  p i l g r i m
a s  w e l l  a s  a  t r a d e  c e n t r e .  I t  h a d  b e e n  b u i l t  o n  t h e  i s t h m u s
( 22)
o f  a  p r o m o n o t o r y  w h i c h  p r o t e c t e d  T r i n c o m a l e e  h a r b o u r .  T h e  
D a n e s  r e c o g n i s i n g  i t s  n a t u r a l  s t r e n g t h  h a d  e n t r e n c h e d  t h e m s e l v e s  
i n  i t  i n  1 6 2 0 .  H o w e v e r  t h e y  h a d  l e f t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
m o r e  o r  l e s s  i n t a c t  e v e n  w h e n  t h e y  f i n a l l y  e v a c u a t e d  i t  i n  
l 6 Z & l e  S a  w a s  n o t  c o n t e n t  w i t h  s u c h  a  m a k e s h i f t  s t r o n g h o l d .
H e p r o c e e d e d  t o  d e m o l i s h  t h e  o l d  t e m p l e  b u l i d i n g  a n d  t o  u s e  
t h e  m a t e r i a l  f o r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  t r i a n g u l a r  f o r t  w i t h  
t h r e e  b a s t i o n s .  T h e  e i g h t  p i e c e s  o f  a r t i l l e r y  b r o u g h t  f r o m  G o a  
w e r e  s u p p l e m e n t e d  b y  t h e  s a l v a g e  o f  e l e v e n  g u n s  f r o m  t h e  D a n i s h  
s h i p  'C o p e n h a g e n *  w h i c h  h a d  s u n k  o f f  K o t t i y a r  i n  1 6 2 0 .  O f  t h e  
t h r e e  b a s t i o n s  t h e  s o u t h e r n m o s t ,  S a n t a  C r u z  w a s  b u i l t  o n  t h e
( 2 1 )  T T . M s . d e  L i v .  l 6 9 9 . f . 2 4 8 ;  B a l d a e u s  8 6 ;  T T .L M .1 7 . f . 8 8 v  
A j u d a  5 1 - V I I I - 4 Q • f . 2 2 2
( 2 2 )  JC B R A 3 XXX 3 ^ 2 ;  Q u e y r o z  2 3 6
( 23) T T . M s . d a  L i v .  1 6 9 9 .  f .  2 4 8
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s i t e  of the  h ig h est bu ild ings o f the  former temple* I t  was
provided w ith s ix  of the la rg e s t  guns to  defend the  harbour.
-w est
From th is  key bastion  one w all ran northwards fo r about f i f t y
paces across the isthmus to  the  b as tio n  o f S .Iago , c u ttin g  o f f
the proraonotory from the mainland. Another w all extended northwards
from Santa Cruz fo r one hundred paces and term inated in  the sea
a t  the b as tio n  o f 3 .Antonio. The s tr e tc h  betwwen S.Iago and
3 .Antonio was d i f f i c u l t  o f access from w ithout, due to  th e  rocky
nature o f th e  coast but the  Portuguese b u i l t  a w all on the  topmost
rocks to  elim inate  a l l  danger o f  a ttack  from the narrow sea beach.
The township was e s tab lish ed  on the  promonotory and was thus
(24)
cut o f f  from th e  mainland by the  f o r t .  The f o r t  was a s trong
one though (as the  Dutch discovered la te r )  a h illo c k  to  the
south of i t  enabled a tta c k e rs  to  exchange f i r e  w ith th e  b as tio n
(25)o f Santa Cruz on almost equal teems.
The b u ild in g  o f the  f o r t  n ecess ia ted  the  tra n sp o r t o f  
stone and lim e from Ja ffh a  and o th e r p a r ts  o f the  coast to  the  
top o f the rock, llluch o f  the  labour fo rce  used fo r th is  work 
appears to  have been brought from Ja ffh a . In  fa c t  the  a s s is ta n ce
o f de O liv e ira , the  captain-m ajor o f  Ja ffn a , in  the  p ro c u r in g
(24) A.P.O. (New ed .) Tomo IV .V ol.2 .P art 1.412; JCBEAS X.124 
Reimers 57; R ibeiro 130; Plihmoteca. P lan tas  Rola, I I I .
(25) JCBRAS X.125
(26 ) AHU Caixa 26. 31*l*l664
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of supplies o f food and m unitions as w ell as a la s c a r in  contingent
months o f  work had placed the  f o r t  in  a f a i r ly  d efen sib le  
p o s itio n , de Sa departed fo r  K otte leav in g  Francisco P in to  Pimenta 
as cap tain  o f Trincomalee w ith a force o f e igh ty  Portuguese
and a hundred la sc a r in s  to  defend the fo r  _ De Sa ev iden tly  
considered i t  too dangerous to  leave K otte longer w ithout a 
cap ta in -genera l. Further delay would have made s a i l in g  even 
more d i f f i c u l t /  due to  th e  onset o f the  north-w est monsoon. 
He s e t o f f  from Trincomalee in  a pinnace and reached Colombo
in  October 1623#
Pimenta went ahead w ith the  co n stru c tio n  o f th e  f o r t  
but met w ith sev era l d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In  th e  f i r s t  p lace the  resources 
l e f t  were f a r  sm aller than those de Sa had enjoyed. The 
com paratively la rg e  f l e e t  o f  four g a l l io ts  and two pinnaces 
had been a llo ca ted  to  de Sa*s expedition  only because i t  was 
considered th a t  the g a l l io ts  could proceed in  e a rly  162^ to
(27) AHU 5 0 i.f .3 6 ; TT.LM. 22. f.ll**$ Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.228  
TT.LM. 19 .f . ^ v ;  A.Botelho de Souza I I I . 328
(28) The estim ate given above i s  th a t  o f Queyroz 737* Other
estim ates are as follow s -  la s c a r in s .
De S a it  M 529- e igh ty  Portuguese and f in e  hundred fenCT * 
A.Botelho de Souza -  s ix ty  Portuguese and one hundred and 
f i f t y  la s c a r in s . In  January 1624- th e  v iceroy  Sac fcksx wrot® to  the  
king th a t  th e  force expected to  be l e f t  in  Trincomalee was seventy 
Portuguese and one hundred and f i f t y  la s c a r in s .These fig u res  
ofcourse do not include the labour fo rce  brought from Ja ffn a  
fo r  co n stru c tio n  work.
(29) TT.SM.Ms. da L iv . 1699.f . 248




j o i n  t h e  C o r o m a n d e l  f l e e t  l e d  b y  D i o g o  d e  M e l l o  d e  C a s t r o ,  
a n d  t h i s  t h e  g a l l i o t s  p r o c e e d e d  t o  d o .  T h u s  P i m e n t a  w a s  
r e d u c e d  t o  t h e  m a n p o w e r  o f  t h e  g a r r i s o n  a n d  s u c h  a i d  a s  h a d  
a r r i v e d  f r o m  J a f f n a .  S e c o n d l y ,  S e n e r a t  r e a l i s i n g  t h e  w e a k n e s s  
o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  f o r c e  a t  T r i n c o m a l e e  b e g a n  t o  t a k e  m e a s u r e s  
d e s i g n e d  t o  i m p e d e  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r t  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  
t o  d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .  L a t e  i n  l 6 2 * f ,  S i n h a l e s e  g u e r i l l a  
b a n d s  b e g a n  t o  r a i d  t h e  v i l l a g e s  a r o u n d  t h e  f o r t  w h i c h  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  h a d  a l s o  b r o u g h t  u n d e r  t h e i r  c o n t r o l .  T h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  
c e r t a i n l y  d i s c o n c e r t e d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  w h o  h a d  h o p e d  t o  o b t a i n  
m u c h  o f  t h e i r  s u p p l y  o f  r i c e  f r o m  n e i g h b o u r i n g  v i l l a g e s  l i k e
( 3 1 )
T a m b a l a g a m a .
D e S a  h a v i n g  h e a r e d  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  b y  P i m e n t a
d e c i d e d  i n  1 6 2 ^  t o  v e n t u r e  o n c e  m o r e  t o  T r i n c o m a l e e ,  t a k i n g
w i t h  h i m  a  f o r c e  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  s o m e  d e t a c h m e n t s
o f  S i n h a l e s e  l a s c a r i n s .  T h e  w h o l e  f o r c e  w a s  u n d e r  t h e  o v e r a l l
c o m m a n d  o f  t h e  n e w  c a p t a i n - m a j o r - o f - t h e - f i e l d  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  
( 3 2 )
S a  d e  M i r a n d a .  T h e  d i s a v a  o f  t h e  F o u r  K o r a l e s ,  F r a n c i s c o  d e  
B r i t ^ o  d e  A l m e i d a  a l s o  m a d e  r e a d y  t o  a c c o m p a n y  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l
( 3 0 ) T T . L M . 1 9 . f .  9
( 3 1 )  T T .M s s  d a  L i v . l 6 9 9 . f . 2 ^ 8 ;  A j u d a  5 1 - V I I I - * K ) . f . 2 2 8 v ;  
B a l d a e u s  855 F i l m o t e c a  L M .1 5 . 3 8 / 1 - 5
T h i s  i n c i d e n t a l l y  d i s p r o v e s  t h e  v i e w  a d v a n c e d  i n  Q u e y r o z  698 
a n d  R i b e i r o  2 2 1  t h a t  S e n e r a t  w a s  s o o t h e d  i n t o  a c q u i e s c e n c e  i n  
t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  s e i z u r e  o f  T r i n c o m a l e e .
(32) AHU 5 0 1 . f . 292; S i m a n c a s  S . P .  1 5 3 0 . f . 3 0
w i t h  t h e  m e n  f t f  h i s  p r o v i n c e .  S e n e r a t  f e a r i n g  d e  S a ' s  m o v e s  
a c t e d  t o  f o r e s t a l l  h i m .  K a n d y a n  a g e n t s  b e g a n  t o  f o m e n t  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  t h e  F o u r  K o r a l e s  i n  t h e  h o p e  t h a t  d e  S a  w o u l d  
b e  d e t e r r e d  f r o m  l e a v i n g  K o t t e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  f o r  S e n e r a t  
d e  S a  d e c i d e d  m e r e l y  t o  s e n d  b a c k  d e  A l m e i d a  t o  p a c i f y  t h e  
F o u r  K o r a l e s  a n d  h i m s e l f  c o n t i n u e d  o n  h i s  w a y  t o  T r i n c o m a l e e  
w h e r e  h e  s p e n t  a n o t h e r  f o u r  m o n t h s  c o m p l e t i n g  t h e  f o r t .  H e  a l s o  
s u p e r v i s e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  n e w  t o w n s h i p  w h e r e  s e v e r a l
(33)c a s a d o s  s e n t  f r o m  G o a  w e r e  s e t t l e d  a s  r e s i d e n t s .
D e S a  h a d  i n s t r u c t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  v i c e r o y  t o  s e e  t o  t h e  
s t i y i g t h e n i n g  o f  t h e  f o r t s  o f  K o t t e  i t s e l f ,  o n e s  T r i n c o m a l e e  w a s  
f o r t i f i e d .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  h i s  v i s i t  t o  G a l l e  i n  N o v e m b e r  1 6 2 3
(33) TT.LIi. 19.f»*Wv; Heimers 575 Filmoteca LM.20 .9 /10 /4-2 ;
.AHU Caixa 16 .an t. 18.1.164^
T h e  n o r m a l  g a r r i s o n  i n  T r i n c o m a l e e  w a s  a b o u t  s e v e n t y  f i v e  
P o r t u g u e s e .  D u r i n g  t h e  y e a r s  1 6 2 3 - 1 6 2 7  a b o u t  t h i r t y  c a s a d o s  
i t f e r e  s e t t l e d  i n  t h e  t o w n s h i p .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  s o l d a d o s  i n  t h e  
g a r r i s o n  w e r e  r e d u c e d  i n  n u m b e r  t o  t h i r t y  o r  f o u r t y  m e n . I t  i s  
n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  t h r e e  o f  t h e  b e s t  k n o w n  P o r t u g u e s e  w r i t e r s  o f  
t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  w h o  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
f o r t  a t  T r i n c o m a l e e  -  F e m a o  d e  Q u e y r o z ,  ( 7 3 ^ - 7 3 6 )  J o a o  R o d r i g u e z  
d e  S a  d e  G e n e z e s  ( 5 2 7 - 5 2 9 )  anc* J o a o  R i b e i r o  ( 2 2 1 )  a l l  m a i n t a i n  
t h a t  t h e  f o r t  w a s  b e g u n  i r n l y  i n  1 6 2 ^ .  T h e y  a l l  a s s u m e  t h a t  i n  
1 6 2 3  d e  S a  w e n t  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  G o a  t o  C o lo m b o  w h e r e  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  d e  S a  d e  I l e n e z e s  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  o p p o s e d  b y  h i s  ^  
c o u n c i l l o r s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p l a n  t o  f o r t i f y  T r i n c o m a l e e  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  a r e a  a r o u n d  w a s  t o o  p o o r  a n d  u n i n h a b i t e d  t o  
s u p p o r t  a  l a r g e  g a r r i s o n .  A u t h o r i t i e s  o n  C e y l o n  h i s t o r y  h a v e  
s o  f a r  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  t h e  v e r s i o n  g i v e n  b y  t h e s e  c h r i n o c l e r s .  
( e g . F r .  S . G . P e r e r a  -  A h i s t o r y  o f  C e y l o n  f o r  s c h o o l s , 8 3 ;  
P . S . P i e r i s  - C e y l o n  I I , 1 6 8 )  H o w e v e r  c o n t e m p o r a r y  d o c u m e n t s  c l e a r l y  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  tw o  s e p e r a t e  e x p e d i t i o n s  -  o n e  f r o m  
G o a  i n  1 6 2 3  a n d  o n e  f r o m  K o t t e  i n  1 6 2 ^ .
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soon a f te r  he a rr iv e d  from Trincomalee# The f o r ta l ic e  planned
by de Sa to  command G alle harbour had been completed by
Femao Pinhao, cap tain  o f  G alle in  tim e o f Jorge de Albe^querque.
The defense s tru c tu re  in  G alle however was f a r  from complete.
The w all in tended to  cu t o f f  th e  promon^tory (on which th e  
f o r ta l ic e  was b u i l t )  from th e  mainland was no t y e t complete, 
while th e  seaward b as tio n  o f  Santa Cruz, in tended to  command 
th e  entrance to  th e  bay, s t i l l  lacked th e  long range a r t i l l e r y  
necessary  fo r  th i s  ta s k . N evertheless de Sa considered th e  s i tu a t io n  
a t  G alle s u f f ic ie n t ly  s a t is f a c to ry  to  leave i t  alone u n t i l  more
( 3 5 )
urgent ta sk s  had been attended to .
Up to  th e  and o f  1624, de Sa followed th e  p o lic y  o u tlin ed
by th e  v iceroy . Peace was m aintained w ith Kandy, w hile th e  Portuguese
in  Ceylon endeavoured to  s tr^g th en  th e i r  p o s itio n  ag a in s ta
ex te rn a l a t ta c k . However a t  th e  end o f th i s  y ear de Sa requested
th e  v iceroy  fo r  perm ission to  resume open war ag a in s t Kandy.
In  support o f  h is  view he attached  a l e t t e r  from Joao Cardoso
da P ina, d isava  o f  M atara, an experienced Portuguese f id a lg p .
( 3 6 )g iv ing  th e  reasons fo r  advocating th is  course. As n e ith e r  l e t t e r  
survives i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  say w ith c e r ta in i ty  why de Sa 
became convinced th a t  open war was p re fe rab le  to  working under
( 3 * 0  T T . L M . i 8 . f . 4 4 , 5 7 ;  T T . L M . 2 f t . f . 4 5 8
( 3 5 )  T T . L M . 1 9 . f . M 8 , 4 0 v }  JC B R A S  X I , 5 3 7
( 3 6 )  B N L .F G ,1 9 8 2 . f . 5 9
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xth e  gu ise o f  peace. Apart from th e  S inhalese g u e r i l la  a ttack s
on the  v illa g e s  surrounding Trincomalee, sev e ra l p o ss ib le
reasons may be advanced by way o f  explanation . F i r s t ly  the
pretence o f  keeping the  peace made i t  im possible fo r  th e
cap ta in -genera l to  a c t ag a in s t the  tra d in g  a c t iv i t i e s  I f  th e
Indian  merchants a t  B a ttic a lo a . De Sa must have re a l is e d  th a t
an open p o r t a t  B a ttica lo a  gave Senerat unimpeded access to
fo re ign  powers in  h is  search fo r  a l l i e s .  War alone could check
th i s .  Secondly, about th i s  tim e came S en era t9s req u est fo r  th e
daughter o f  S a n k ili , the  l a t e  r u le r  o f  J a ffh a , as consort fo r
(37)h is  e ld e s t son. On Portuguese re je c tio n  o f  th i s  p lan  Senerat 
procured from Tanjore two o f  S a n k ili9s n ieces (who had been 
taken to  th a t  p r in c ip a l i ty  by D.Luis when he broke w ith  th e  
Portuguese) as consorts fo r  h is  two e ld e s t sons, Kumarasinghe
(0 Q \
and V ijayapala. These a c t iv i t i e s  probably roused de Sa9s 
fe a rs  regard ing  S en era t9s intentionsjtow ards la f f n a .  T h ird ly , 
i t  i s  apparent from th e  records o f  th e  d iscussions o f  th e  
v ice ro y 9 s council th a t  one o f  th e  reasons p u t forward by de Sa 
fo r  the  advocacy o f  war was th e  growing s tren g th  o f th e  
Kandyan k ing . During h is  f i r s t  term , de Sa had seen Senerat
(37) P«da T rinidade I I I . 233; Queyroz 692
(38) Biker 1 .22^; JCERAS H .5 1 7 t 529-539; CLR 3 se r.1 .1 5 2 ; 
3^ G; Per  e ra ■ An- exped i t i on -t o Uya*36 3 b
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a t  h is  weakest, when th e  r is in g s  w ith in  h is  kingdom had
confined h is  power to  th e  Kandy-Mat a le  reg ion . Now on h is
a r r iv a l  in  Ceylon a few years l a t e r  de Sa saw how u se fu l th e
pesiod o f  peace had been fo r  th e  Kandyan monarch. He th e re fo re
(39)
wished fo r  war to  a r r e s t  the  growth o f  Senerat*s power.
The v iee ro y -in -co u n c il was apparen tly  unimpressed by
the  arguments pu t forward by de Sa and da P in a . By th i s  tim e
he had found a staunch supporter fo r  h is  p o lic y  o f  peace w ith
Kandy w ith in  h is  own council in  Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira . 
a fovmev
P e re ira , th e /ca p ta in -g e n e ra l o f  Ceylon ( i 6 l 6-1618), had retu rned
from Mo9ambique to  take a se a t in  th e  v ice ro y ’s council in
1624. As th e  only member in  the  council w ith f i r s t  hand
experience o f  th e  is la n d , h is  views on Ceylon were l is te n e d
to  w ith re sp e c t. P e re ira  doubtless from conviction  bom  o f
h is  own experience in  Ceylon (which was perhaps re in fo rced  by
an urge to  defend h is  own handiwork -  th e  t r e a ty  o f  1617 ) held
th e  view th a t  th e  b e s t p o licy  fo r  the  Portuguese a t  th e  moment
(40)was to  p reserve peace w ith Kandy. I t  was th e re fo re  decided 
on 2 January 1625 to  re fu se  de Sa perm ission to  go to  war.
The v iceroy  however considered th a t  a m atte r as weighty 
as th i s  could no t be f in a l ly  reso lved  w ithout f a r th e r  evidence.
(39) BNL.PtJ. 1 9 8 2 .f.59
(40) Ajuda 5 1 -V III-4 0 .f .2 l6
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He th e re fo re  requested  th e  cap ta in -genera l to  summon twelve
men named by th e  v iceroy  and to  d iscuss w ith  them th e  question
o f how to  curb th e  growing power o f  Kandy and assu re  th e  s e c u r ity
(4 l)
o f th e  Portuguese possessions in  th e  island*  Undoubtedly one 
o f th e  aims o f th e  v iceroy  in  making th i s  req u est was to  
gauge what element o f  support ex is ted  w ith in  Ceylon fo r  h is  
p o licy  o f  peace. His l e t t e r  o f  7 Hanuary 1625 th e re fo re  contained 
e laborate  in s tru c tio n s  designed to  ensure th a t  th e se  twelve 
men would voice th e i r  views w ithout f e a r .  A fte r a f u l l  sca le  
d iscussion , each was to  go back to  h is  own house and pu t h is  
views in  w ritin g  and then hand over th i s  document to  th e  
vedor da fazenda who would se a l i t  and despatch i t  to  th e  
v iceroy . However, i f  the  v iceroy  hoped to  rece iv e  a vo te fo r 
peace he was a lso  open-minded in  h is  search fo r  in form ation , 
suggestions and opin ions. Thus each man was requested  to  
s ta te  no t only whether he was in  favour o f  war n r n o t, bu t i f  
in  favour o f  war, how many Portuguese s o ld ie rs ,  how much money 
and what supp lies would be necessary , o r i f  ag a in s t war, what 
o ther measures could be taken to  prevent Kandy from g e t t in g
(41) BNL.PGr.l982.f.59 The twelve nominated by th e  v iceroy  were 
Luis Gomes P in to , F ilip e  de O liv e ira , Domingos Carvalho Cao, 
Lan9arot£e de Seixas, Luis Cabral de F a ria , Francisco Barbosa 
de Andrade, Luis T eixe ira  de Macedo, Joao Roiz Homen, Diogo da 
Sousa da Cunha, JeronimA T aveira , Fr* Bernadino da Fonseca 
and the  vedor Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara.
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stronger* The twelve were a lso  enjoined to  g ive t h e i r  opinions 
as t a  where th e  Portuguese array should be based and what o th er
measures were necessary  to  ensure th e  s e c u r ity  o f  Portuguese
„ . (42)Ceylon*
The r e s u l t  o f  th i s  in q u iry  provided a dem onstration o f 
overwhelming support f o r  th e  cap ta in -g en era l9 s view th a t  war 
was th e  b e s t course o f  action* Of the  eleven Portuguese co n s ilted  
(th e  tw e lfth  F ilip e  de O liv e ira , se rv ing  in  Ja ffn a  was unable 
to  a ttend) nine u n h e s ita tin g ly  came ou t in  favour o f  open 
war, one was non-committal and only one opposed th e  immediate
(43)
d e c la ra tio n  o f  war* Apart from the  two arguments in  favour
of war mentioned above -  th a t  peace allowed Kandy to  con tact
the enemies o f  th e  Portuguese and th a t  i t  enabled th e  k ing  o f
Kandy to  grow s tro n g er d a i ly ,  fou r o th e r reasons were advanced
by those who wanted war* F i r s t ly ,  i t  was held  th a t  i t  was th e
ex istance o f Kandy th a t  made the  Portuguese hold on th e
lowlands in secu re , fo r  re b e llio n s  in  K otte owed much to  the
(44)encouragement given by Kandy* As Lan^arot^e de S eixas, the
former vedor o f  Ceylon argued, "^No man i s  sa fe  w ith  an enemy
(42) BNL.FG.1982.f*595 Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.223v ; De Sa de Menezes 
(JCBRAS XI*560,566) mentions t h i s 9meeting o f  c a p ta in s9 but 
rep resen ts  i t  as a council summoned by th e  cap ta in -g en era l to  
urge th e  v iceroy  to  ac tio n . This s to ry ;rep e a ted  in  P .E .P ie r is  9s 
Ceylon 11*173* needless to  say, i s  i n a c c u r a t e *
(43) Ajuda 5 1 -V III-5 0 .ff .216-230
(44) Ajuda 5 1 -V n i-4 0 .f f .216,217,225,227,227v
(45) Do Seixas had ju s t  re tu rned  to  Ceylon a f t e r  se rv ing  a year 
as th e  Provedor mor dos contos a t  Goa.
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( « )
in  h is  own h o u se .9 The war ag a in st Kandy was thus advocated 
as a p reven tive  measure. 9I f  we do not conquer Kandy9 wrote 
Luis T e ix e ira  de Macedo 9a l l  th e  Portuguese w ill  one day be
k i l le d  in  th e i r  s le e p .9 Secondly, i t  was held  th a t  th e  tim e 
was r ip e  to  s t r ik e .  The Portuguese now had an ab le  cap ta in -
general ,  a la s c a r ln  fo rce  in  Ceylon and s tro n g  fo rces  in  In  
T h ird ly , i t  was contended th a t  un less they  made th e  attem pt 
now, th e  Portuguese would soon be forced to  do so under le s s  
p ro p itio u s  circum stances fo r  th e  number o f  la s c a r in s  in  
Portuguese fo rces  was g radually  d im inish ing , fo r  many were
f le e in g  to  Kandy to  take se rv ice  under Senera . F in a lly , the  
a t te n tio n  was drawn to  th e  economic advantages which would r e s u l t  
from th e  conquest, in  g re a te r  revenue, customs dues and th e  
l i k e .  Luis T e ix e ira  de Macedo even argued th a t  i f  Kandy was 
seized  Ceylon could a f te r  h a lf  a dozen years provide money and
m a te ria l to  support o th e r wars in  th e  E ast.
The v icero y  o f  In d ia , Dorn Francisco da Gama remained 
unconvinced. The Portuguese in  In d ia  a t  th i s  tim e were engaged
(46) Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.225
(47) Ib id . f .2 l6 v
(48) I b i d . f . 216,225
(49) Ib id . f f .217,221,222,223,225
(50) I b i d . f . 216
( 4 7 )
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in  one co n te s t ag a in st th e  English fo r  th e  Mughal-Persian 
tra d e , and another ag a in s t th e  Dutch fo r  th e  sp ice  tra d e  in
(51)
the  East In d ies  • The v iceroy  d id  no t wish to  shoulder ad d itio n a l
commitments i f  he could i t .  Moreover Dom Nuno Alvares P e re iraA
in  the  v ic e ro y 's  council o ffe red  cogent reasons why he should
not go to  war w ith Kandy. P e re ira  po in ted  ou t th a t  th e re  was
no guarantee th a t  de Sa would succeed where o th e rs  had f a i le d  -
in  completing th e  conquest o f  Kandy. Moreover he held  th a t  war
normally involved a f a l l  in  revenue and a g re a t r i s e  in
expenditure. Thus Ceylon^ f a r  from financ ing  o th e r wars in  th e
East would need considerab le a id  fo r  a long  tim e to  come.
would
F in a lly  he po in ted  ou t th a t  c o n f l ic t  w ith Kandy/only encourage 
enemies o f  th e  Portuguese, whether Dutch, English o r  South Ind ian  
to  open up a new fro n t in  Ceylon and th i s  was something th e  
Portuguese could no t afforcl.^M oreover th e  k ing  o f P ortuga l 
meanwhile had agreed in  p r in c ip le  to  th e  v ic e ro y 's  advice to  
p reserve peace and had begun to  exchange f r ie n d ly  l e t t e r s  w ith
(53)
th e  k ing  o f  Kandy. The v ic e ro y 's  wider view o f  th e  Portuguese 
p o s itio n  in  A sia p rev a iled  and de Sa th e re fo re  had to  give up
(5*)
h is  aggressive plans fo r  th e  tim e being.
Since an attem pt to  conquer Kandy had been ru led  ou t
(51) Of course th e re  were English in  th e  E ast In d ies  and th e  Dutch
in  w estern In d ia . In  f a c t  th e  f i r s t  Dutch sh ip  to  leav e  In d ia  d i r e c t ly  
from Europe s a ile d  in  1624. But th e  co n test was g en e ra lly  in  the  
l in e s  in d ic a ted  above.
(52) AJuda 51-V III-40 .f.229
(53) Ajuda 5 l-IV -3 2 .f.5 v
(54) TT.LM. 23. f f • 53# 141
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de Sa had to  re tu rn  to  th e  second rou te  to  s e c u r ity  by way o f 
command o f  th e  l i t t o r a l*  During th e  next few years h is  main 
e f fo r ts  were d ire c te d  to  the  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  p o rts  and 
the  reo rg an isa tio n  o f  th e  adm in istra tion  o f  K otte . Moreover, 
in  162** th e  k ing  had tw ice requested  th e  v iceroy  to  send him 
plans o f a l l  th e  p o rts  in  th e  is la n d  and to  l e t  him know what 
o th e r f o r t i f ic a t io n s  were necessary  and what ac tio n  was being
taken to  d ea l w ith th ese  gaps in  Ceylon's defences. In  1625 
th e re fo re  de Sa tu rned  h is  a t te n tio n  to  Colombo f o r t .  This was 
e a s ily  th e  la rg e s t  f o r t  in  Portuguese Ceylon. I t  had been 
strong  enough to  w ithstand th e  a ttac k s  o f  th e  w arlike R ajasinha 
<S o f Sitawaka in  th e  1530 's  bu t had been neg lected  s in c e . Thus 
th e  s ix teen th  century ram parts connecting th e  stone bastio n s 
had been made o f  ta ip a  o r  mud and had co llapsed  in  many p la ce s . 
The camara o f  Colombo had requested th e  k ing  to  ensure th a t  
Colombo was adequately  defende& f^ and th e  a u th o r it ie s  in  L isbon, 
having recognised th e  ju s t ic e  o f  th is  demand, had sen t
(57)corresponding in s t r u c t io n s  to  th e  v iceroy  o f  In d ia . The problem 
was, as i t  always had been, one o f  finance. In  th e  tim e o f 
Mathias de A lbuquerque (1591-1597) the  k ing  had gran ted  the
(55)
(55) TT.LM .20.ff.l,39 
D R.I.182
D R.I.8, 58-61,182,332,388, DR.IV,138
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money re a l is e d  from the  sa le  o f  an annual voyage to  China
fo r th i s  work bu t none o f  the  24,300 x e ra fin s  re a l is e d  from
(58)
th is  s a le  was ever spent on Colombo* By 1613 however repeated
in s tru c tio n s  from home, th e  extension  o f English and Dutch
a c t iv i t ie s  in  th e  w estern seaboard o f  In d ia  and th e  worsened
s ta te  o f  th e  w alls o f  Colombo had forced Azevedo's successor
Dorn Francisco de Menezes, to  take action* He and h is  successor
M&noel Mascarenhas Homen r e b u i l t  th e  w alls on th e  landward s id e
(59)
fo r more than  h a lf  th e i r  c irc u it*  The lack  o f  funds however,
prevented th e  generals from using  stone* Thus once th e  b u ild in g
and re p a ir  work ceased as i t  d id  in  l6 l6  due to  th e  re v o lt  o f
N lkap itiya , th e  to r r e n t ia l  ra in s  o f  th e  south-w est monsoon
took th e i r  t o l l  and by 1618 th e  w alls had one again collapsed
(60)
in  many places*
De Sa however d id  not pay a t te n tio n  to  th e  problem
of re p a ir in g  th e  w alls on th e  landward s id e . He ev id en tly  considered
th e  p rospec ts o f  a landward a tta c k  ra th e r  remote* He concentrated  
on the defence o f the  harbour ag a in st a tta c k  by sea , which
had become more l ik e ly  due to  Dutch attepm ts to  cap ture th e
trad e  in  th e  Arabian sea in  th e  1620's* The headland which had
(58) TT.LM .15.ff.23,111; TT.LM.l6*f*552
(59) T T .m *13 .f.l47 ; AHU Caixa 4.18.12.1616; Film oteca LM.12.86/3; 
DR. 111*39^395
(60) AHU Caixa 6. 21.11.1618
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formed the  s i t e  fo r  th e  o r ig in a l  Portuguese f o r ta l ic e  a t  Colombo,
ca lled  th e  p o in t o f S*L©u®enpo was f o r t i f i e d  to  form a new
b as tio n  ca lle d  S.Cruz and provided w ith  eleven p ieces o f
(61)
a r t i l l e r y  to  defend th e  whole harbour* The casados o f  
Colombo gave th e  cap ta in  s u b s ta n tia l a id  in  th i s  p ro je c t 
which occupied most o f  1625*
The v iceroy  had a lso  in s tru c te d  de Sa to  f o r t i f y  
Puttalam . A stockade had been e s tab lish ed  th e re  in  th e  second 
decade o f  th e  seventeenth century  to  prevent th e  Kandyans from 
using th e  port* De Sa however was ag a in st th e  d isp e rs a l o f  
Portuguese so ld ie rs  a t  too many f o r t i f ie d  p o sts  and wrote bade 
to  th e  v iceroy  th a t  Puttalam  was s itu a te d  in  a barren^ area  
unfrequented by Europeans and he abandoned the  p ro j ec£*^De Sa 
could ju s t i f i a b ly  argue here th a t  although Puttalam  was undefended 
and although th e  f o r t  o f  Chilaw es tab lish ed  in  th e  tim e o f  
Azeveclo"^ad been abandoned, th e  f o r t  o f  Negomteo b u i l t  by 
Louren9o T eix e ira  de Macedo in  th e  15909s was adequate to  
defend th e  cinnamon r ic h  areas o f  th e  P i t ig a l ,  B eliga l and 
Alutkuru Korales* De Macedo who had been gaanted th e  captaincy 
o f Negombo fo r  l i f e  kep t th e  f o r t  in  r e p a ir  and m aintained a 
small la s c a r in  force fo r  i t s  defence from th e  revenues o f  th e
(61) Queyroz 7^0; JCBRAS XT. 537-538; Reimers 52
(62) Reimers 54; BM*Add.Ms*9853.f.l57v
(63) T«Aboyasinghe, 28
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p o r t and th e  v il la g e s  a ttached  to  i t .  Apart from th i s  fo rce  
th e re  were u su a lly  f i f te e n  o r twenty Portuguese so ld ie rs  
p lus another f iv e  o f f i c i a l s .  These were a s s is te d  in  tim es 
o f  war by h a lf-a-dozen  m arried s e t t l e r s  who liv e d  w ith in  easy 
reach o f  th e  f o r t ,  Negorobo f o r t  i t s e l f  was tr ia n g u la r  in  shape 
and sm all in  s iz e  w ith th ree  w e ll-b u il t  bulwarks -  Nossa Senhora 
da V ito r ia , E sp ir ito  Santo and and S.Louren9o -  fu rn ished  w ith 
a few sm all p ieces  o f  a r t i l l e r ^ ^
By 1625 th e re fo re  th e  co a s ta l b e l t  o f K otte was defended 
by the four f o r ts  o f  Negombo, Colombo, K alu tara  and G alle ,
In  th is  year a rr iv e d  a l e t t e r  from th e  k ing  to  th e  v iceroy  
requesting  th a t  an in q u iry  be made as to  whether Weligama, 
eighteen m iles south o f  G alle , should l l s o  be f o r t i f ie d !  ^ h i s  
in q u iry  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  a p e t i t io n  subm itted by one 
Diogo Vaz F re ire , a Portuguese fidal&o who had seen many years 
o f se rv ices  in  Ceylon, F re ire  po in ted  ou t th a t  a f o r t  a t  
Weligama would be o f g re a t use to  th e  Portuguese w ith in  Ceylon 
as w ell as in  t h e i r  c o n f l ic t  w ith th e  Dutch, The co n stru c tio n  
o f  a f o r t  th e re ,  he argued, would enable th e  Portuguese to  gain  
a g re a te r  hold over th e  southern p a r t  o f  th e  Matara d isav a . 
Furthermore he argued th a t  such a f o r t  would be o f immense
(6*0 Film oteca- P lana tas Rola I I I ;  TT.LM .31.ff,42-43; APO (new ed) 
Tomo IV ,V o l,2 ,P art I ,  369-370; R ibeiro  130; Reimers 53
( 65) TT.LM.20.f,365
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value to  Portuguese sh ipping . At th i s  tim e th e  Dutch were
a ttack in g  Portuguese sh ipping s a i l in g  to  Goa from th e  Far East
and Malacca a t  a p o in t ju s t  to  th e  south  o f  Ceylon, F re ire
poin ted  out th a t  a lo s s  o f  a sh ip  in  1619 and two more in  1620
could have been avoided had a f o r t  a t  Weligama enabled th e
Portuguese to  use Weligama bay as a refuge. F re ire  a lso
contended th a t  only th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f a l l  such bays and in le t s
could ev en tu a lly  enable th e  Portuguese to  co n tro l th e  trad e
o f the  is la n d  and ensure th e  conquest o f  the  Kandyan kingdom.
To c lin ch  th e  is s u e  he o ffe red  to  spend between eighteen  and
twenty thousand cruzados fo r  th e  f o r t  i f  given th e  d isava o f
Matara and l a t e r  th e  command o f  th e  la s c a r ln  troops o f th e
( 66)
is lan d  and a g ran t o f  Weligama fo r  l i f e *
The k ing  was obviously impressed w ith  th e  o f fe r ,  fo r ,
although he l e f t  th e  dec isio n  whether to  co n s tru c t th e  f o r t
to  the d is c re tio n  o f  th e  v icero y , he asked th a t  a hundred
C h ris tian s be s e t t le d  in  th e  v ic in i ty  o f  Weligama to  give
(6?)
added s tren g th  to  th e  p ro jec ted  stronghold . The v iceroy  and the  
cap ta in -genera l however were both opposed to  th e  scheme on th e  
grounds th a t  th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  G alle rendered th a t  o f 




F re ire  were excessive and th a t  th e  p o r t  and v illa g e s  o f
Weligama were a lready  granted  to  another who could no t be
d ispossessed  o f  i t  save in  a genera l re -a llo c a tio n  o f  lands
( 68)
and v illa g e s  in  Ceylon.
In  th e  period  1626-1627 de Sa continued th e  work o f  
s treng then ing  th e  defences o f Kotte* In  1626 he concentrated 
on the  two in land  cen tres o f Malwana and Menikkadawara* Malvana, 
the  residence o f  the  cap ta in -genera l since th e  tim e o f  Azevedo 
was provided w ith the  square shaped f o r t  named S. Helena. The 
g arriso n  requ ired  fo r  th i s  f o r t  had been estim ated as seventy
(68) BHL.TO. 1982. f f .  121v-122; TT.LM.22 .f f . 113v-li4 ; TT.LM.2 4 .f . 6v, 117 
From a l e t t e r  from th e  k ing  to  th e  v iceroy  dated  19 March 
1623 i t  would appear th a t  Gaspar de Mello de Sampayo held  
Weligama during  th is  p erio d . (TT.LM. 18 .f . 207) D espite th e  advice 
given by de Sa and th e  v iceroy  conde de V idiguerra ag a in st 
th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  Weligama in  1626, th e  k ing  continued to  
urge th a t  the  m atte r be in v e s tig a te d  fu r th e r . Action was delayed 
by the  outbreak o f  war ag a in st Kandy. Einv E ventually  in  1634 
th e  cap ta in -genera l o f  th e  day Dom Jorge de Almeida repo rted  
th a t  Weligama could be f o r t i f i e d  w ithout detrim ent to  th e  
in te r e s ts  o f  th e  C h ris tian  converts o f  th e  a rea . By t h i s  time 
the  v iceroy  conde de L inhares was a lso  in  favour o f  th e  p ro je c t .  
D efin ite  o rders to  f o r t i f y  Weligama issu ed  both  by th e  v iceroy  
and th e  k ing  in  1636 were no t c a rr ie d  out only due to  th e  
lack  o f funds.
Coimbra 459.f f . 250, 280; Film oteca LM.13A.4/2;A.Botelho de Souza 
H I , 436; TT.LM. 25. f .  118; TT.LM. 26. f .  86; TT.LM. 27. f .  130
TT.LM. 28. f .  128; TT.LM. 31 115; TT.LM. 36. f .  131;
TT.LM. 37* f .  83
165
so ld ie rs  though in  ac tu a l f a c t ,  very o fte n  th e  fo rce  l e f t  to
(69)
guard th e  f o r t  was much smaller*
The f o r t  b u i l t  a t  Menikkadawara was much la rg e r  in  scable*
I t  was in tended p a r t ly  as a base from which th e  Portuguese army
could be supplied  fo r  any o ffen siv e  o r defensive campaign
in  th e  Four K orales, p a r t ly  as a secure p lace o f  refuge to
which a Portuguese force could r e t i r e  a f t e r  a  t i r i n g  campaign*
(70)
C onstruction work on th e  f o r t  was s ta r te d  in  October 1626*
The f o r t  i t s e l f ,  named th e  f o r t  o f  Santa Fe was rec tan g u la r
w ith four b a s tio n s? ^ h a  w alls  and th e  breasjlrork were made o f
stone and m ortar and a wftll w ith in  th e  f o r t  secured th e  w ater
supply* The co n stru c tio n  o f  a moat was begun bu t l a t e r  abandoned*
In  th e  cen tre  o f  th e  f o r t  was th e  c i ta d e l c a lle d  Forte Cruz*
Work on th e  f o r t  was continued t i l l  about Hay 1628* For much
o f  th e  time th e  cap ta in -genera l h im self supervised th e  work bu t
dufcing h is  absence th e  ca p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld , Francisco de
(72)B rito  de Almeida was l e f t  in  charge*
One such period  o f  absence was due to  de Savs departu re  
in  1627 to  f in is h  th e  work on th e  f o r t  o f  G alle which had been
(69) Reimers 61; R ibeiro  130; De Sa de Menezes 566; Queyroz 45, 
751; TT.Ms *Liv* 1699• f  • 248v
(70) AHU.501.f*51v
(71) Called S .Iago , S*Boaventura, S .Jorge and S.Pedro* Reimers 62 
says th e re  were only th re e  bastions*
(72) Simancas 1530.f*130; TT.Ms.da L iv .i699*f.248v; AHU Caixa 16, 
an t. 18.1.1644; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655; P .E .P ie ri.s#s -Ceylon II*
173 a s se r tio n  th a t  th e  f o r t  o f  Menikkddawara was b u i l t  in  a
•few days* i s  an inaccuarcy derived  from Queyroz 751*
1 6 6
l e f t  incom plete in  1623* In  162? de Sa attended to  th e  ta sk  
o f  constructing the  defences o f  G alle on th e  landward side* The 
w all sep ara tin g  th e  se ttlem en t from the  mainland was 
strengthened by th ree  b a s tio n s , one a t  each end and th e  th i rd  
a t  th e  centre* These were provided w ith seven small p ieces o f
(73)a r t i l le ry *  Da S a 's  in te n tio n  to  streng then  the  defences w ith
(7*0
a moat was given up due to  lack  o f  funds*
The years o f  peace( 1623-1628) were thus used by de Sa 
to  streng then  the  Portuguese p o s itio n  in  Ceylon* He had been 
forbidden to  attem pt a so lu tio n  through a renewal o f  war 
w ith Kandy* But he had done what he could to  i s o la te  the  mountain 
kingdom and to  prevent any Kandyan con tact w ith th e  European 
enemies o f  the  Portuguese by h is  programme o f  co a s ta l fo r t i f ic a t io n *  
However he d id  not stop  th e re  fo r  he re a l is e d  th a t  th e re  could 
be a  th re a t  to  th e  Portuguese t e r i t o r i e s  in  Ceylon from within*
His construc tion  work a t  Malwana and Menikkadawara served
OuL
to  counter th re a ts  w ith in  th e  lowlands as w ell from Kandy* He
A
also  b u i l t  a gunpowder fa c to ry , designed to  tu rn  ou t about
(73) AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1644; AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.16555 $
Simancas^ SP. 1530*f*30; APO (new ed) Tomo IV *V ol.2.Part 1.406 
In c id e n ta lly  contemporary documents disprove th e  conten tion  
o$ de Sa de Menezes (De Sa de M* 537) th a t  de Sa, h is  fa th e r  
completed th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  G alle in  1625.
(7*0 Queyroz 62?
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one hundred and s ix ty  pounds o f  powder d a i ly . But most
im portant o f a l l ,  he sought to  ensure th e  lo y a lty  o f  th e
la sc a r in s  by the  establishm ent o f  two f o r t i f i e d  se ttlem en ts
fo r  them near Colombo. One o f  th ese  se ttlem en ts was a t
Peliyagoda w ith in  th re e  m iles o f  th e  Portuguese f o r t  o f
(76)Colombo. The o ther was probably lo ca ted  a t  M ulleriyawa, about
(77)s ix  m iles due west o f  Colombo* The p o licy  o f p u ttin g  th e
la sc a r in s  and th e i r  fam ilies  w ith in  f o r t i f i e d  se ttlem en ts
(78)
had been urged by th e  king as e a rly  as 1607* I t  was re a l is e d  
th a t  as long as the  fam ilies  o f  la s c a r in s  and th e i r  ch ie fs  
remained w ith in  f o r ts  in  Portuguese power, th e  S inhalese were 
u n lik e ly  to  d e s e r t .  However d esp ite  repeated  orders by th e
475) Queyroz (7 ^g2 ifspo rts  th a t  th e  s a l tp e t re  was ob tained 
from Madura. T h is ^ l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce  from th e  m il i ta ry  p o in t 
o f view as no p ro v is io n  was made fo r  th e  sto rag e  o f in g red ien ts  
e s s e n tia l  fo r  th e  making o f gunpowder, most o f wh&fch had to  
be purchased overseas. I t  may be noted th a t  in  th e  16^0*s 
R ibeiro observed a  gunpowder fa c to ry  on th e  same s i t e  as th a t  
e s tab lish ed  by de Sa. However he gives i t  a capac ity  (two q u in ta ls  
o r about th re e  hundred and fo r ty  pounds a day | double th a t  
mentioned by de Sa de Menezes. iX 538; R ibeiro  128)
(76) *Deste lu g a r de Matual para  onde. nasce o s o l ,  espaco da 
t i r o  de e s fe ra  es t?  a f«z Constantino de Say
sehdo g e ra l . p^ovoada da mulhareg dos araches la s c a r in s  e mais 
gente de guerra  e das se te  co ra les  p a ra  seguranca d e s ta  
conquista. * Paulo da Trinidade I I I .  136.
See also  Queyroz 715 and R. Boudens -  The C atholic church in  
Ceylon under Dutch ru le .  35*
(7 7 )T h is  was also  ca lle d  Tranqueira Grande -  th e  g re a t stockade.
(78) T.Abeyasinggie, 59*61
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k ing  no s tep s had been taken to  p u t th e  re  commendations in to  
e f fe c t  up to  l 62^ r^ T h e  prim ary o b stac le  to  th e  execution o f 
th i s  p o lic y  was th e  problem o f land  a lloca tion*  Such f o r t i f i e d
y
v il la g e  se ttlem en ts ad proposed, i f  they  were to  serve t h e i r
intended purpose, hac^to be lo ca ted  near a major Portuguese
f o r t ,  fo r  o therw ise in  tim e o f  war th e  con tro l o f  th ese
se ttlem en ts could be e a s ily  be lo s t*  The la s c a r in s  who were
paid  by g ran ts  would n a tu ra lly  have to  be a llo c a te d  land  near
th e i r  settlem ents* The d i f f i c u l ty  thus arose because a l l  lands
had already  been a llo ca te d  and much o f  th e  land near
Colombo was in  the  hands o f  the  Portuguese casados who were
(80)
re lu c ta n t to  give i t  up* However i t  soon became c le a r  th a t  
even i f  th e  la sc a rin s  ^favourably disposed towards th e  Portuguese 
they  had l i t t l e  choice i f  th e i r  fam ilies  were exposed to  
r e ta l ia t io n  by the  rebels* The Portuguese s e t t l e r s  o f  Colombo 
thereupon propounded th e i r  own so lu tio n  to  th e  problem* In  a 
l e t t e r  o f  th e  camara o f Colombo to  th e  king dated  20 November 
1615 they  proposed th a t  th e  casados be given th e  ta sk  o f  m aintaining 
th e  la sc a rin s* For every la s c a r in  m aintained th e  casado resp o n sib le  
was to  be granted  lands worth one hundred pardaos a year in
(79) TT.LM. 1 6 .ff.2i40, IOI5 DR.IV.if6-^7
(80) TT.LM.26 . f . 313
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revenue* The camara* th e  stronghold  o f  Portuguese s e t t l e r  
in te r e s t s ,  argued th a t  th i s  so lu tio n  would ensure th e  obedience 
o f  the  la s c a r in s  who would be thus be deprived o f  th e i r  le ad e rs  
and placed in  a p o s itio n  o f dependence upon th e  Portuguese* 
However th e  Portuguese governor o f  In d ia , Fernao de Alberquerque 
to  whom th e  suggestion was re fe red  , decided ag a in st i t  on th e  
grounds th a t  i t  was in tended to  serve th e  p r iv a te  in te r e s t s  
o f  the casados who would r e ta in  and even add to  t h e i r  lands 
as w ell as ob ta in  bands o f r e ta in e rs  who might be used in
personal q u a lie ls  as w ell as in  tim es i f  war*
By th e  l6209s th e  opinion o f  sen io r Portuguese so ld ie rs  
w ith in  Ceylon had swung s tro n g ly  in  favour o f  the  scheme fo r  
f o r t i f ie d  settlem ents* Of th e  eleven Portuguese who in  1625
f83)sen t s e c re t rep o rts  on Ceylon to  Goa a t  th e  v ice ro y 9s request 
f iv e  d e a lt  w ith th is  problem* A ll th ese  f iv e  were in  favour 
o f  th e  f o r t i f i e d  se ttlem en t scheme and th re e  o f  them s p e c if ic a l ly  
s ta te d  th a t  la sc a r in s  should be gran ted  lands near Colombo taken 
from th e  Portuguese who could be compensated w ith lands fu r th e r
a f i e l  . However i t  was apparent th a t  such a step  would meet
(81) AHU Caixa 6* 21.11*1618
(82) TT.LM.16.f . 561
(83) See abovefa^ t l££.
(Qk) These th re e  were Jeronimo T aveira , Francisco Barboda da 
Andrade and Luis Cabral da Faria* The o th e r two Luis Gomes P in to  
and Domingos Carvalho Camjif d id  no t dea l w ith th e  problem o f kvv 
how to  ob ta in  lands fo r  th e  la s c a r in s  thpugh th e  l a t t e r  remarked 
th a t  9 no accomodar d es ta  gente bem veio ha dever dificuldades/
respeifeoa..9 Luis Gomes P in to  advocated th e  establishm ent 
o f  such se ttlem en ts n ear G alle , Negombo as w ell as
Colombo but th e  o th er fou r advocated se ttlem en ts near Colombo 
only . Ajuda 51 -V H I-h0 .ff.217 ,2 l8v-219 , 220-22iv
(82)
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with b i t t e r  opposition  from th e  Portuguese s e t t l e r s  o f Colombo 
and charges o f favouritism  and d isc rim in a tio n  were sure t& 
a r is e  from those who l o s t  by th e  changes* De Sa foresaw th is*
As e a rly  as 1 December 1623 he proposed to  th e  k ing  th a t  a 
new tombo o r r e g is te r  o f lands be made* Once th i s  was done, 
a l l  v il la g e s  save those whose g ran ts  were confirmed by th e  king 
could be resumed and then  a llo ca ted  according to  royal in s tru c tio n s  
leav in g  s u f f ic ie n t  lands in  th e  neighbourhood o f  Colombo and 
along th e  s t r a te g ic  K e l  any v a lle y  fo r  se ttlem en t o f
o f
dependents i t  meant th e  rese ttlem en t o f  about te n  thousand men,
women and children* During de S a 's  tim e only a sm all f ra c tio n
o f  th i s  number were s e t t le d  in  th e  two f o r t i f i e d  se ttlem en ts 
(87)
s e t  up, mainly because th e  work on th e  new tombo and the
re d is tr ib u t io n  o f land  never go t under way* One e s s e n tia l  d iffe re n ce  
between th e  scheme urged by th e  k ing  and th a t  p u t in to  p ra c tic e  
by de Sa should be noted* The k ing had o r ig in a l ly  urged th a t  
th ese  f o r t i f i e d  se ttlem ents be p laces o f  residence no t only  fo r
(85) TT.Collecao de S.V icente 19. doc* 276
(86) Ajuda 51-V III-40.ff.217,220-221v
(87) In  Peliyagoda fo r  in s tan ce  on 23 November 1628 th e re  were 
only two hundred C h ris tian  converts* (P .da T rinidade 111,136)
(88) TT.LM.24*f*335
(86) » 
about two thousand la s c a r in s .  Taking in to  accouJb a l l  th e i r
(887
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th e  la sc a r in s  and th e i r  ch ie fs  bu t a lso  fo r  th e  Portuguese
(89)s e t t l e r s  and Ind ian  C h ris tian  c o lo n is ts .  A fter th e  r is in g s
o f 1616-1618 in  K otte the  a u th o r i t ie s  in  Goa apparen tly  l o s t
some o f  t h e i r  optimism about Portuguese s e t t l e r s  l iv in g  w ith
(90)se c u r ity  among th e  S inhalese , bu t th e re  i s  no evidence o f a 
change o f  p o licy  in  Lisbon regard ing  th e  f o r t i f i e d  towns*
De Sa had however no i l lu s io n s  regard ing  th e  s a lu ta ry  e f fe c ts  
o f  mixing Portuguese s e t t l e r s  w ith la s c a r in  forces*H is o b jec t 
was to  l e t  th e  S inhalese l iv e  in  th e i r  se ttlem en ts w ith  the  
minimun in te rfe ren c e  from th e  P o rtu g u esl* ^
De Sa and many o f h is  contem poraries both w ith in  Ceylon 
and in  Goa and Lisbon re a l is e d  th e  value o f  ensuring th e  lo y a lty  
o f th e  la sc a r in s  in  th e  event o f  any re b e llio n  o r  war* This 
accounts fo r  th e  e f fo r ts  made in  th e  1620's to  assure  economic 
as w ell as m il i ta ry  s e c u r ity  fo r  the  fam ilies  o f  th e  la sca rin s*  
H itherto  land  g ran ts  made to  those o th e r than Portuguese could 
be withdrawn a t  any time* In  th e  e a r ly  1620's  th i s  was changed 
when th e  king* on th e  recommendation o f  de Sa, decreed th a t
(89) T.Abeyasinghe 59-61
(90) In  a l e t t e r  dated 20 March 1620 th e  king in s tru c te d  th e  
v iceroy  to  consider th e  proposal th a t  a  w all o f  atone be b u i l t  
w ith in  the  mud w alls o f th e  f o r t  o f Colombo and th e  la s c a r in s  and 
th e i r  fam ilies  s e t t le d  in  th e  space between th e  walls* The Portuguese 
were to  re s id e  w ith in  th e  in n er walls*
(91) | Convinha he r e p e r t i r  se aquelle  I lh a  de Novo*dando aos 
natu raes quatro  co rlas  y iz inhas « rvi-daries s em m istu ra  dos
Portugueses* ' TT*LM*22*f*88
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(92)lands should be granted  to  n a tiv e  in h a b ita n ts  fo r  l i f e *
However, t h i s  measure d id  no t a f f e c t  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  cap ta in -
general and the  d isavas to  resume lands whose g ran ts  had not
been confirmed by th e  king* This explains why th e  v iceroy  had
to  ask th e  cap ta in -genera l in  January 1625 to  fo rb id  th e
(93)disavas to  se ize  lands from th e  S inhalese and th e  Tamils* The 
cap ta in -g en era l de Sa and th e  vedor Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara 
were both  convinced th a t  th e  concessions gran ted  to  th e  la s c a r in s  
d id  not go f a r  enough* Both held  the  view th a t  i f  th e  la s c a r in s  
were given se c u r ity  and assurances o f  th e  continued w ell-being  
o f  th e i r  fa m ilie s , they  were le s s  l ik e ly  to  revolt*  They 
doubtless r e a l is e d  th a t  th e  g ran ts  o f  lands fo r  l i f e  d id  not 
assure th e  S inhalese o r Tamil so ld ie r  th a t  h is  fam ily , eken i f  
i t  provided someone to  take h is  p lace a f te r  h is  death  would 
continue to  hold th e  lands he now held* They th e re fo re  recommended 
in  l a t e  1625 th a t  land  g ran ts  should be made to  th e  la s c a r in s  
e i th e r  fo r  a  period  o f  th re e  l iv e s  o r in  perpetu ity*  Such lands 
would re tu rn  to  royal hands only in  case o f  absence o f  a male 
to  perform the  m il i ta ry  se rv ice  a ttached  to  th e  grant* In  case 
o f  lack  o f ch ild ren  th e  la s c a r in  was e n t i t le d  to  nominate a
(92) Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.225
(93) Ib id . f.223v
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(94)
r e la t iv e  to  succeed him. This p o lic y , which envisaged th e  g ran t 
o f  lands to  th e  S inhalese and Tamils on equal terms w ith  th e  
Portuguese d id  no t f a i l  rouse opposition  among th e  s e t t l e r  
element in  Ceylon. Lancarote de S eixas, probably th e  w ea lth ie s t 
casado in  Ceyloh s p e c if ic a l ly  recommended to  th e  v iceroy  th a t  
in  no case should a land  g ran t be made to  a n a tiv e  fo r  more
(95)
than two l iv e s .  However th e  v ice ro y -in -co u n c il decided to
accept th e  jo in t  recommendations o f  th e  vedor and th e  cap ta in -
g en era l. I t  was decided a t  a council meeting on 26 January 1626
th a t  henceforth  a l l  land  g ran ts  to  n a tiv es  in  Ceylon ahould
be fo r  th re e  l iv e s .  Records were to  be kep t o f th e  exact area
granted and th e  revenue i t  was expected to  y e ild  to  th e  h o ld er.
Moreover, i t  was s p e c if ic a l ly  decreed th a t  n e i th e r  th e  d isavas
nor th e  cap ta in -g en era l h im self had th e  power to  resume th ese  
(96) 
g ran ts .
Apart from try in g  to  b e t te r  th e  genera l l o t  o f  th e  
la s c a r in s  de Sa t r i e d  to  win th e  lo y a lty  o f  th e i r  commanders 
by la v is h  patronage and by fo s te r in g  a fe e lin g  th a t  th ey  too 
played a u se fu l and v i t a l  ro le  in  th e  Portuguese regime in  Ceylon.
(94) BNL. FG .1983.ff.88-89; TT.LM.22.f.87v
(95) Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.225
(96) BHL.FG.1983.ff.88-89
The v ic e ro y 's  d ec isio n  on land  tenure  was probably in fluenced  
by th e  considera tion  th a t  longer tenure  might induce the  
la s c a r in s  to  agree to  pay q u it  re n ts  fo r  th e i r  lan d s . For a 
d iscu ssio n  o f th e  question  o f th e  payment o f  dues fo r  lands 
held  by la s c a r in s  see chapter VI.
17 4
Four S inhalese lead ers  gained de Safs favour and prospered
in  h is  tim e -  Mudaliyar Kulatunga Wickramasinghe o r Dorn Cosmo,
Amarakoon M antri o r Dom A leixo, Siyane Korale Banadara o r
Dom B althazar and K atto ta  M antri or Dom Theodosio Barret^?"^
(98)
Dom Cosmo and Dom B althazar as w ell as Dom Theodosio were
rep re sen ta tiv es  of:; o f th e  S inhalese n o b i l i ty .  Dom Cosmo was the
(99)
son of Weerasekera M udaliyar. a very  r ic h  S inhalese nobleman
who liv e d  a t  the  end o f th e  s ix te e n th  century . The son gained
favour among th e  Pcrtuguese fo r  h is  se rv ices  in  the  re v o lt  o f
N ikap itiya and was appointed head o f  th e  la s c a r in s  o f th e
Four K orales. This enabled Dom Cosmo to  b u ild  a la rg e  residence
fo r  h im self a t  Peliyagoda, w hile h is  e ld e s t son Dom Antonio
was m arried to  th e  daughter o f  Dom Manual , the  standard -
( 100)
b eare r o f  th e  cap ta in -g en era l. Dom B a lth a za r 's  power and
(97) The p re c ise  id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f th ese  four le ad e rs  was f i r s t  
made by P .E .P ie r is .  (R ibeiro 252-253) from whose work much o f 
th e  next paragraph i s  ex trac ted .
(98) Le Grand holds th a t  Dom Theodosio was a de Cendant o f  a 
Moor o f Cannanore who had commanded one o f four sh ips th a t  
brought a id  to  Rajasinha o f  Sitawaka. (Le Grand 88) A seventeenth  
century m anuscript however described  Dom Theodosio as ' Chingala
de nayao p a ren ts  dos reis d&qnaTlas re ln o s . 1 
TT.Ms .da  L iv . $31 .f . 1^5
(99) V irasequara -  P ie r is  renders th i s  as W ijayasekera. (R ibeiro  252, 
P . I .P ie r i s -  Ceylon. I I .  175)
(100) JCBRAS XI. 582
Le G rand's version  o f R ibeiro holds th a t  Dom Cosmo gave 
h is  daughter in  m arriage to  Dom Manual. (Le Grand, 88)
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in fluence was cen tred  in  th e  Siyane K orale, th e  area  o f  th e
Four K orales n e a re s t to  Colombo* He was connected to
( 101)
Dom Theodosiofs fam ily by t i e s  o f  marriage* Dom Theodosio,
th e  le a d e r  o f  th e  la sc a r in s  o f  Matara was probably th e  most
powerful amongst them* He was ^mada a mudaliyar by de Sa*
In  coS'fefl^s to  th e  o th e r th ree  Dom Aleixo rose from th e  ranks,
h is  s k i l l  in  war winning th e  patronage o f Luis Gomes P in to ,
an experienced Portuguese commander* Apart from th ese  four
lead ers  th e re  were a lso  S inhalese le ad e rs  o f  le s s e r  account
favoured by de Sa, no tab ly  Dom Simao, le a d e r  o f  th e  la s c a r in s
o f Sabaragamuwa and Rajapakse o r Dom Jeronimo who le d  th e
( 102)
la s c a r in s  o f  th e  Seven Korales*
The e f fo r ts  o f  de Sa to  reco n c ile  th e  S inhalese in  
Kotte to  Portuguese ru le  and to  win t h e i r  lo y a lty  even tually  
ended in  fa ilu re*  The reasons fo r  th i s  la y  p a r t ly  in  h is  
in a b i l i ty  to  ca rry  ou t th e  reforms he had advocated. The delay  
in  th e  making o f th e  second tombo f ru s tra te d  h is  p lans fo r  a 
more eq u itab le  r e -a llo c a tio n  o f  lands* Moreover d e sp ite  h is  
zea l fo r  ju s t ic e  de Sa could no t check a l l  those p e t ty  a c ts  o f  
oppression which aroused anger ag a in st th e  Portuguese so ld ie rs
(101) His uncle Amancota A ratch i m arried Dom Theodosiofs aunt* 
P .E .P ie r is  -  Ceylon* II*  176; Le Grand 88
(102) TT.Ms. da L iv. 1^99 f f . 276-277
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and s e t t l e r s .  However, S inhalese and la s c a r in s  d isco n ten t
s
w ith de S a 's  ru le  arose from ac ts  o f  coimniqfLon ra th e r  than
o f orami^Lon. De S a 's  ex tensive programme^f f o r t  co n stru c tio n
and th e  making o f  p a lisad e s  o f wood and ta ip a  around la s c a r in
se ttlem en ts involved a g re a t dea l o f  lab o u r, th e  major p a r t
o f  which f e l l  on th e  shoulders o f  th e  su b jec t S inhalese and 
(10*0
Tamils. Moreover de Sa, a devout C atho lic  h im self, looked
on conversion to  C h r is t ia n ity  as an index o f  lo y a lty  to  th e
Portuguese. The period  1623-1628 saw a g re a t extension in  church
b u ild in g  and m issionary a c t iv i ty .  This n a tu ra lly  le d  to
resentm ent in  th e  h ea rts  o f  those who believed  ikm and revered
(105)
th e  teachings o f Buddhism and Hinduism. While fo r  such 
reasons d isco n ten t grew among th e  rank and f i l e ,  resentm ent 
als<k found i$ s  way to  th e  S inhalese le a d e rs . De Sa, though 
he consulted  th e  S inhalese commanders in  m atters o f  im portance,
(106fc
never appointed a S inhalese to  th e  coveted p o st o f  d isava .
This p o st had been l a s t  held  by a S inhalese in  1620 when 
Dom Constantino, a S inhalese p rin ce  was d isava o f  Matara and
(104) Queyroz 1053; TT.LM.30.f.253S TT.LM.37.f.8&; Coimbra 459, 
f.360v
(104) Queyroz 1031
(105) TT.Ms da L iv . l699.f.3065 TT.LM.30.f.253; TT.LM.31.f.42v
(106) P .E .P ie ris  i s  in  e rro r  when he says (P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I .  
175) th a t  Dom Theodosio was th e  d isava o f  M atara. As he h im self 
s ta te s  a few l in e s  l a t e r  the  d isava was Joao Cardoso da P in a ,
a Portuguese.
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th i s  rank was what the  la s c a r in  le ad e rs  hoped to  o b ta in  when
(107)
they  ev en tu a lly  d eserted  to  Senerai#
The co lo n iza tio n  p o licy  o f  th e  Portuguese had been
devised in  th e  context o f  th e  u h ce rta ln  lo y a lty  o f  th e  la s c a r in s
in  th e  e a r ly  seventeenth  century# By th e  1620*3 th e  e a r l ie r
hopes o f  a t t r a c t in g  la rg e  numbers o f  Portuguese c o lo n is ts  by
means o f  land  g ran ts  had disappeared# Though sm all numbers o f
(108)
Portuguese c o lo n is ts  continued to  a r r iv e  th e  hopes o f  the  
king o f  P o rtu g a l now re s te d  in  the  planned m igration o f  Ind ian  
C hristians#  Three reasons la y  behind th e  k in g #s p o licy  o f
(107) I t  i s  by no means im plied th a t  the  S inhalese le ad e rs  
went over to  Senerat fo r  th e  sake o f a tn d a d  grtw dm aterial 
gains alone bu t i t  i s  c e r ta in  th a t  th ese  played an im portant 
p a r t  a t  l e a s t  i n  th e  case o f Dom Theodosio who re tu rned  to  th e  
Portuguese l a t e r  on a f te r  a disagreem ent w ith th e  Kandyan 
princes# (see  below pagets
(108) T.Abeyasinghe c o rre c tly  (62) p o in te  out th a t  th e  number 
o f Portuguese c o lo n is ts  was very small# However th e  estim ate
o f 350 Portuguese c iv i l ia n  males in  Colombo in  1634 (given
in  the  Arquivo Portuguese O rien ta l (nova ed) Tomo#IV*Vol#2. 
P a r t  1# 371) must no t be taken as in d ic a tiv e  o f  th i s  s i tu a t io n  
5m th e  l620*s# By 1634 s ix  years o f  war had caused a dec line
in  th e  number o f  Portuguese casados through death , d isease
and p o ss ib le  em igration, w hile th e  in f lu x  o f  s e t t l e r s  ceased 
almost completely# Though th e  estim ate  in  Reimers (52)
o f  fou r hundred casados w ith in  th e  f o r t  and th re e  hundred 
o u ts id e  may be somewhat too h igh , i t  i s  c e r ta in  th a t  th e  
casado/ popu la tion  in  Colombo in  1628 must have exceeded th a t  
o f lo 3 4 .  Apart from th e se , th e re  were in  Ceylon, one hundred 
and twenty s e t t l e r s  in  J a ffn a , twenty to  t h i r t y  in  Trincomalee 
and f i f t y  in  G a lle , te n  in  K alu tara  and sm all numbers in  o th e r 
co a s ta l towns#
(APQ#( new ed) Tomo IV# V o l.2 .P a rt i#37/-37f ; Reimers 52-60)
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advocating th e  se ttlem en t in  Ceylon o f  C h ris tian s  from Goa,
Sals e ta  and B&rdes as w ell as th e  Coromandel co ast. F i r s t ly ,
i t  was held  th a t  th ese  s e t t l e r s  could be used to  c u l t iv a te
th e  areas depopulated by war and m igration  o f  th e  in h a b ita n ts
to  Kandy. T his, i t  was considered would r e s u l t  in  increased
revenue and a supply o f  food s tu f f s  much o f  which was c u rren tly
imported from ab ro a^ ^ ^ S eco n d ly , i t  was thought th a t  th e
se ttlem en t o f  Paravar In h ab itan ts  o f  th e  so -c a lled  F ishery
coast o f  Coromandel would streng then  th e  Portuguese hold
( 110)over th e  p e a rl f ish e ry . F in a lly , i t  was considered th a t  these
m igrants would be more r e l ia b le  a l l i e s  than  th e  S inhalese
themselves and would be o f  g re a t use in  th e  conquest o f th e
( 111) 
is la n d .
The a t t i tu d e  o f  de Sa to  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f Ind ian  
co lo n is ts  g ives us some in d ic a tio n  o f  the  ex ten t o f  h is  t r u s t  
in  th e  S inhalese la s c a r in  fo rces he commanded. At th e  commencement 
o f h is  second te rn  he was f u l l  o f  confidence th a t  he could 
win la s c a r in  l o y a lty . Thus though he was in  favour o f  th e  p lan  
fo r  th e  se ttlem en t o f  C h ris tian s from th e  F ishery  coast he held
(109) TT.LM.25 . f . l 06 ; TT.LM.23.f.57; TT.LK.20.f.39; 
TT.LM.27.f.78; A.Botelho de Souza I I I ,  102
(110) The Parvar were fisherm en o f  th e  T innevelly  coast o f  
South In d ia .
( I l l )  A.Botelho de Souza, I I I . 102
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th a t  i t  would be o f b e n e f it  only  in  so f a r  as c u ltiv a tio n  o f
th e  land  and th e  o rgan iza tion  o f th e  p e a rl f ish e ry  was
concerned. As fo r  th e i r  m il i ta ry  value he commented th a t  *in
th is  re sp ec t your M ajesty has been given in accu ra te  inform ation
fo r  th is  conquest cannot be concluded w ithout th e  (help ogj th e
same n a tiv es  w ith whom i t  was begun, and a l l  o th e r forces are
o f  no use fo r  th is  ta sk  as has been shown in  th e  case o f  a id
in  th e  form o f  the  C h ris tian s  o f  S.Thome who were destroyed
( 112)
w ithout achieving an y th in g .# However th e  e f fo r ts  o f  th e  
v iceroy  and th e  cap ta in -g en era l le d  to  no r e s u l t  e i th e r  good o r 
bad, economic o r m il i ta ry , fo r  th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f  Goa, S a lse te  
and Bardes proved as re lu c ta n t to  leave th e i r  homeland as th e  
people o f  th e  F ishery  c o a s ^ ^
( 112) TT.LM .21,f.i47; TT.Colleccao de S .V icente XIX.Doc.276
*E n este  p a r t ic u la r  nao fo i  VHge bem informado porque e s ta  conquis ta  
n£o se ha de conc lu ir senao com os mesmos n a tu ra ls  com que s e 
p rin c ip io u  e toda a o u tra  gente para a conquista nao ha de nenhh 
e f f e i to  com j a  o tempo tem mostrado nos soccorros que a e l le  
v ie r'a t dos C hristaos de Sao Thome que sem fazerem nenhu e f f e i to  
acabaraoT1 TT.Colleccao de S.VicenteXIX.Doc.276 , Constantino de 
SaTto tEe k ing  1 . 12. 1623. fckl
(113) TT.LM. 30. f .  128
The only recorded in stan ce  when la rg e  number o f  Ind ian  C h ris tian s  
declared  themselves ready to  s e t t l e  in  Ceylon occured in  1631 
when famine cond itionahffected  most o f North In d ia . This occured 
a t  a tim e when th e  v ice ro y -in -co u n e il, re a c tin g  s tro n g ly  to  what 
th e  Portuguese considered to  be treach ery  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  
S inhalese , was in  favour o f  rep lac in g  th e  S inhalese in h a b ita n ts  
in  th e  lowlands no t only  by th e  Ind ian  C hritians bu t a lso  by 
Negroes from Mozambique. The p lan  to  send f iv e  hundred Negroes a 
year d ir e c t  from Mocambique was never pu t in to  e f f e c t .  However over 
one thousand one hundred Canarese^ and th ree  hundred Negroes were 
sen t from Goa to  Ceylon in  October l631.(Continued on nex t page - )
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During th e  period  o f peace de Sa a lso  tu rned  to  th e  
problem o f th e  Muslims in  Ceylon .Here again can be seen th e  
perpetual search  fo r  se c u r ity , both in te rn a l  and ex te rn a l 
th a t  th e  Portuguese were engaged . in  Ceylon* The Muslims in  
Ceylon were few in  number and c h ie f ly  engaged in  trad^ing* 
Unlike in  In d ia  where Moghul power was always a fa c to r  to  be 
reckoned w ith , th e  Muslims in  Ceylon p resen ted  no p o l i t i c a l  
th re a t  to  th e  Portuguese* The Muslims tent o f  course had been 
the t r a d i t io n a l  enemies o f  th e  Portuguese* However Portuguese 
o f f ic ia l s  in  Ceylon wer^as a ru le  not in c lin e d  to  a c t ag a in s t 
Muslims on re lig io u s  grounds alone* In  f a c t  in  the  l630*s 
Diogo de Mello de Castro advocated tra d e  w ith  the  Muslim Nawab 
o f Bengal in  p reference to  trad e  w ith  th e  Hindu Nayak o f  Madura 
on economic grounda. The view in  Europe however was norm ally 
a more dogmatic one* As h e re tic s  as w ell as r iv a ls  in  tra d e  th e  
Muslims were regarded as 9 enemies o f k ing  and God*9 When th e  
Portuguese a rr iv ed  in  Ceylon th ey  found th e  Muslims in  co n tro l 
of th e  lo c a l  in te r - v i l la g e  tra d e  and much o f th e  ex te rn a l tra d e  
o f th e  island* Bhuvanekabahu, k ing  o f K otte (1521-1551) knowing 
the  Portuguese h o s t i l i t y  towards th e  Muslims, expelled  them
(113) Contd.,
These men were expected to  s e t t l e  in  Ceylon,Many 
of th e  A fricans died* Others d eserted  to  Kandy* Of th e  Canarese 
many even tually  re tu rned  to  th e i r  former homes upon news 
o f improved conditions th e re .
(TT.L M*30.f*128; TT*LM*36*f*89; Assentos 1*360; a ls c - s ee 
below pago . )
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from h is  domains In  o rder to  o b ta in  Portuguese support
(11*0
ag a in st h is  b ro th er in  1526, bu t h a l f  a century  l a t e r ,  when
th e  r is in g  power o f Sitawaka had confined th e  Portuguese to
the  environs o f  Colombo, the  Portuguese re a l is e d  how u se fu l
th e  Muslims could be in  supplying th e i r  f o r t  a t  Colombo w ith
e s s e n tia l  requirements* Thus th e  ¥iceroy Dom Antao de Noronha
(1564-1568) passed a decree au th o ris in g  th e  Muslims f re e  en try
(115)in to  Portuguese fo r ts  in  Ceylon. Such a s i tu a t io n  involved
no problem as long as K otte remained under th e  nominal s u z e r a in ty
o f the  S inhalese King Dharmapala. But a f t e r  159** when th e
Portuguese claimed to  be th e  ru le rs  o f  K otte o f  th e i r  own
r ig h t  th e re  arose the  co n trad ic tio n  o f a C atholic  monarch
p ersecu ting  P ro te s ta n ts  w hile harbouring Muslims in  h is  own 
r
te iji to ry . This was re a l is e d  by Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de
Vidiguerjfa when serv ind  h is  f i r s t  term as v iceroy . (1597-1600)
He sen t word to  th e  cap ta in -genera l o f  th e  day o rdering  him
to  exp e l l  a l l  Muslims from K o tte . Azevedo, though probably
under p ressu re  from ^Sranciscans, acted  w ith cau tion . He re a l is e d
th a t  th e  Muslims o f K otte as s a i lo r s  and tra d e rs  were p lay ing
an im portant in  the  economy o f th e  reg ion . On th e  o th e r hand A
(114) F r. S ,G .Perera -  A h is to ry  o f Ceylon fo r  sc h o o ls /, th e  
Portuguese and Dutch p e rio d s . 22. This measure probably 
a ffec ted  only th e  fo re ig n  tr a d e rs .
(115) APO V I.10795 D R.III.258
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l ik e  most Portuguese o f h is  time he regarded the  Muslims as
foes o f  h is  country. Thus, w hile he convinced th e  v iceroy
th a t  expulsion was not p o l i t i c ,  i t s  probable r e s u l t  being
th e  f l ig h t  o f  Muslims to  Kandy and th e  streng then ing  o f th a t
kingdom^he took measures to  b rin g  them under su rv e illa n c e , A ll
Muslims a lready  re s id e n t in  K otte were ordered to  s e t t l e  in
c e r ta in  p o rts  and ca rry  on th e i r  tra d in g  and sea fa rin g
a c t iv i t ie s  from th e re . No more Muslims were allowed to  s e t t l e
in  K otte , However as he h im self adm itted l a t e r ,  Azevedo's
reg u la tio n s were o ften  broken by th e  v illag e -h o ld e rs  who no
f a - A j  ( 116)
doubt/these tra d e rs  u se fu l in  th e i r  dealings w ith th e  S inhalese ,
Soon a f te r  tak in g  up o f th e  p o s t o f  v iceroy  o f  In d ia  in  
1612 Azevedo sen t an o rder to  th e  cap ta in -genera l o f Ceylon 
o u tlin in g  th e  p o licy  to  be followed in  the  case o f  Muslims,
In  h is  a lv ara  o r  decree dated  22 A p ril 1613 he made an im portant 
d is t in c t io n  between th e  Muslims re s id e n t in  th e  country and 
those who had come from abroad merely fo r  th e  purpose o f tra d in g  
w ith th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f  K otte , Those Muslims who had liv e d  
in  Colombo since  th e  days o f R ajasinha o f Sitawaka were 
allowed to  l iv e  th e re  as they  had always done bu t newcomers were 
to  be perm itted  to  re s id e  in  th e  c i ty  only  t i l l  th e  change o f
(11$) Film oteca LM.12. 62/4-5
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(117)
the  monsoon enabled them to  s e t  sa il*  Notice was given to
a l l  those who had already  overstayed th e i r  l im it  to  leave
(113)
w ith in  a month on pain  o f  being sen t to  th e  g a lle y s . Foreign
Muslim tra d e rs  were s t i l l  presumably allowed to  remain fo r
longer periods in  p o rts  o th er thai^bolombo though forbidden
to  take  up permanent residence in  th e  island* Before long
th is  question  began to  rece ive  th e  a t te n tio n  o f th e  a u th o r it ie s
in  Lisbon. In  February 1615 th e  k ing  sen t two l e t t e r s  to  th e
Viceroy Azevedo on th i s  subject* I t  i s  apparent from th ese
l e t t e r s  th a t  th re e  main reasons had been advanced to  persuade
the king to  take  ac tio n  ag a in st th e  Muslims. F i r s t ly , i t  was
argued th a t  th e  to le ren ce  extended to  th e  Muslims was an
impediment to  conversion* Secondly, i t  was held  th a t  th e i r
presence encouraged re b e llio n  w ith in  Portuguese te r ito ry *
T hird ly , i t  was argued th a t  they  in  p a r t  con tribu ted  to  the
depopulation o f lands by buying o r rece iv in g  as payment o f
(119)
debts youths o f th e  land  and tak in g  them to  In d ia . On th ese
(117) * . . . nenhun mouro s e ia  mo rad ar na cidade de C o l o m b o ,  nam p o s s a  
e s ta r  n e l la  raais que de moncao e x c e p t o  o s  m o u r o s  natu raes e moradores 
na mesma cidade do tempo do Ra.1u que podm»£b n « n  a v i — * APO.VI.950 
The reasoning behind th i s  d is t in c t io n  was impeccable from th e  
Portuguese p o in t o f  view. Those who had liv e d  in  Colombo off  t h e i r
own v o lit io n  and su ffe red  during  th e  two g re a t se iges by R ajasinha 
could not hafre been h o s t i le  to  th e  Portuguese.
(118) APO.VI.950-951
(119) In  th e  seventeenth century  Ceylon, S inhalese could s e l l  themselves 
o r  th e i r  ch ild ren  *as slaves* to  pay a deb t. This * slavery* d if fe re d  
g re a t ly  from th e  Western version  in  th a t  a man re ta in e d  a l l  h is  r ig h ts  
(includ ing  th a t  o f  holding p roperty) during th e  period  o f  • s la v e ry , ' 
and d id  not lo se  h is  s ta tu s  which was determined by caste* This
p a r t ic u la r  charge ag a in s t th e  Muslims however seems unfounded and 
based on th e  im position  o f Western concepts o f  Asian p ra c t ic e .
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grounds th e  king decided th a t/o n ly  should th e re  be a t o t a l  ban
on th e  en try  o f  Muslims in to  Ceylon bu t th a t  even those 
already  re s id e n t should be expelled  from th e  island* Severe 
p e n a ltie s  were th rea tened  not only ag a in s t those who v io la te d  
th ese  o rders but a lso  even ag a in s t those  who merely aided and
Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira  was w ill in g  to  r is k  th e  d is ru p tio n
o f the  K otte economy which would r e s u l t  from th e  expulsion o f  
the
all/Muslims*The a u th o r it ie s  in  Lisbon th e re fo re  received  
l e t t e r s  exp lain ing  th e  disadvantages th i s  p o licy  would
e n ta i l  and th e  o bstac les th a t  la y  in  th e  path  o f  i t s  execution* 
This was perhaps why in  th e  in s tru c tio n s  o f  21 March 1617 th e  
k ing  om itted a l l  mention o f  th e  expulsion o f  th e  Muslims
and merely r e i te r a te d  h is  in s tru c tio n s  to  fo rb id  th e i r  en try
(122) (123)
to  Ceylon* However as both Manoel Godinho de E redia and
Dom Frey Sebastiao  de S*Pedro repo rted  in  1619» even th i s  o rder
was not enforc This may have been p a r t ly  due to  th e  re b e llio n s  
w ith in  K otte between 1616 and 1620 but i t  seems l ik e ly  th a t
(120) APO VI.10?9-1080; D R .H I.258j AHU 33*f.l9v
(121) Film oteca LM .12.85/86/5-i
( 1 2 2 )  DR I V . 1 3 9
(123) A w ell known Portuguese cartographer o f  th e  e a r ly  seventeenth  
century* See A.Cortesao and A .T eixeira  da Mota -  Portugallece 
monument a c a r to g ra f ia . Vol. VI. 258 . /U'skcvi,
(124) AHU Caixa 6. 1.2.1619; TT.LM .l6.f.239v
( 120)
abetted  such v io la tio n s .
However n e ith e r  th e  v iceroy  nor th e  cap ta in -g en era l,
( 121)
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many Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  ignored contraventions o f  th e
(125)
k in g ’s orders fo r  motives o f personal gain* N evertheless
th e re  jf seems l i t t l e  evidence o f  any g re a t in f lu x  o f Muslim
s t t t l e r s  to  Ceylon in  th e  e a rly  seventeenth  century* The reasons
fo r  th is  are  no t f a r  to  seek* Though th e  Muslims were o ften
able to  make much money as t r a d e r s ,  t a i lo r s  and butchers
th e r r  freedom w ith in  K otte was very lim ite d  indeed. Though they
were not forced to  accept C h r is t ia n ity  n e ith e r  were they  allowed
to  b u ild  mosques* Even in  a Muslim v il la g e  i t  was an exception
( 126)
to  have th e i r  own quazis o r  judges.
In  February 1620, the  Portuguese governor o f  In d ia ,
Fernao de Alberquerque made a recommendation th a t  compelled
th e  complete re-exam ination o f  the  is s u e . In  response to  a
ro u tin e  o rder by th e  king dated 26 February 1619 req u estin g
th a t  Muslims be forbidden to  en te r and s e t t l e  in  Ceylon he
argued th a t  th e  b e s t Portuguese p o licy  would be to  encourage
them to  s e t t l e  in  th e  is la n d  and to  t r e a t  them w ell. He emphasised
th e  se rv ice  they  rendered as s a i lo r s  and merchants and
(127)
s ta te d  th a t  from h is  experience in  Ceylon th e  Muslims were a
peacefu l community who would not a c t ag a in s t th e  Portuguese in
( 128) 
tim e o f war*
(125) The a u th o r it ie s  a t  Lisbon s tro n g ly  suspected as much. 
APO. VI. 1080; DR. 111.258
(126) Queyroz 7^®7^5
(127) He had served as the  cap ta in  o f  Colombo.
(128) TT.LM. 12. f f . 241-2^2
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On re c e ip t o f th i s  l e t t e r  Portuguese p o lic y  regard ing  
the  Muslims in  Ceylon was once more d iscussed  and f in a l ly  
decided upon. As f a r  as th e  o ld  Muslim re s id e n ts  o f  Colombo 
and th e  fo re ig n  Muslim tra d e rs  who came to  K otte were concerned 
Azevedofs p o licy  as embodied in  the  v icero y al decree o f  22 
A pril 1613 was reprom ulgated. The o ld  s e t t l e r s  were considered 
to  have proven th e i r  lo y a lty  by long periods o f  se rv ice  during*
th e  wars ag a in st Raj as inha . The merchants were allowed to
remain in  K otte only u n t i l  th e  change o f  th e  monsoon made i t
p o ssib le  fo r  them to  returns to  th e i r  homes abroad. As f a r
as a l l  o th e r Muslims o f  K otte were concerned i t  was decided
th a t  they  should be expelled  on the  pain  o f  dea th . However
due to  the  rep resen ta tio n s  o f  Femao de A lbuquerque i t  was
rea lised r 'tf ia t such a measure would le ad  to  h a rih ip  in  K o tte .»\
Therefore an exception was allowed fo r  a temporary period  
in  the  case o f  Muslim s a i lo r s  and i t  was l e f t  to  th e  d is c re tio n  
o f th e  v iceroy  as th  whether th e se  s a i lo r s  be included in  th e  
general expulsion o r be allowed to  l iv e  in  K otte u n t i l  expelled  
a t  some l a t e r  d a te . I f  i t  was decided to  l e t  th e  s a i lo r s  l iv e  
in  K otte fo r  any long tim e they  were to  be compelled to  l iv e  
in  four p o rts  chosen by th e  cap ta in -g en era l. The Portuguese 
o f f ic ia l s  in  Ceylon were also  ordered to  make a r e g is te r  o f
t 8 7
(129)
Muslims so th a t  th e i r  number and whereabouts would be know ni^. 
This o f  course represen ted  a re tu rn  to  th e  harsh p o lic y  o f  
expulsion*
These in s tru c tio n s  dated  10 December 1622 reached In d ia
when Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de V idiguer^a was serv ing
as v iceroy  fo r  h is  second term . They were followed by reminders
(130)
in  1623 and 1624. The cap ta in -genera l o f  Ceylon in  co n su lta tio n
w ith the  v iceroy  apparen tly  decided by e a rly  1626 th a t  the
time had come fo r  ac tio n . He th e re fo re  proclaimed a genera l
(131)
order ex p e llin g  the  Muslims. I t  may be assumed th a t  the  old
Muslims re s id e n ts  o f  Colombo were excluded from th is  decree.
The decree moreover involved no ban on Muslim tra d e rs . However
the  option given by th e  k ing , to  r e ta in  th e  Muslim s a i lo r s
i f  necessary does no t seem to  have been exerc ised .
Lack o f evidence makes i t  im possible to  estim ate th e
economic in p ac t o f th i s  expulsion o f  a p eace fu l, in d u strio u s
community. I t  involved th e  em igration o f  those who had liv e d
(132)
many generations in  se ttlem en ts such as Beruwala. Nor i s  i t  
c e r ta in  tfeeefc what p roportion  o f  th e  Muslims accepted conversion
(129) TT.LM .l6.f.548
(130) TT.LM.I8.f.221 ; TT.LM.23.f.45
(131) JCBRAS X I.543; Queyroz 745; Jornada 10
(132) P .E .P ie r is  - The Cefrlon l i t t o r a l . 41. A S inhalese m anuscript 
in  th e  B r i t is h  Museum L ibrary  e n t i t le d  (BM.or.6611,52) Rabel 
Vamanava seems to  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  Muslims were replaced
in  in te r - v i l la g e  trad e  in  K otte by th e  S inhalese .
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as a means o f  circumventing th e  o rder fo r  expulsion. I t  i s
known however th a t  a t  l e a s t  four thousand o f  them f le d  to  Kandy
where they  were w ell received  by Senerat and accomodated
in  the  f e r t i l e  lands around B& tticaloa where th e i r  decendents
(133)s t i l l  form a s ig n if ic a n t  p roportion  o f  the  popu lation .
question o f th e  Muslims appears to  have been le s s  r ig id  than 
th a t  in  Lisbon. Queyroz mentions the case o f  one Femao Duarte 
who thought them dangerous and p e titio n e d  de Sa to  make a l i s t  
o f them but even th i s  was to  ensure th a t  any s tran g e rs  were
expelled ra th e r  than to  oust th e  long  s e t t le d .  On the  o th e r hand
i t  i s  known th a t  people from G alle , Alutgama and Negombo p e tit io n e d  
de Sa d ec la rin g  th a t  Muslims enriched th e  area  and should not
be e^pelle  This f a c to r  probably explains why d esp ite  the
order fo r  expulsion some Muslims d id  remain in  Portuguese K otte .
I t  appears th a t  during  th e  period  1623-1628 w hile de Sa 
succeeded in  streng then ing  the  Portuguese m il i ta ry  p o s itio n  
by b u ild in g  a number o f  f o r ts  and stockades and keeping o rder
(133) Queyroz 745; JCBRAS.H. 543? TT.LM.24.f.4v
(134) Queyroz 744
(135) Queyroz 745
(136) P .da Trinidade I I I . 167
S.Arasaratnam- Dutch power in  Ceylon. 1638-1688, 204-205 
says th a t  in v e s tig a tio n  in  th e  1650's revealed  th a t  Muslims 
had been in  G alle fo r  generations and had v a lid  le g a l  t i t l e s  
to  th e  p roperty  they  held  th e re .





and d is c ip l in e  among th e  Portuguese s o ld ie r s , he had le s s  
success in  winning th e  confidence o f  th e  S inhalese in  Kotte*
His ac tio n  in  exp e llin g  th e  Muslims, though i t  won th e  favour 
o f h is  su p e rio rs  d id  l i t t l e  to  s tren g th  th e  Portuguese o r 
reco n c ile  th e  o th e r elements in  Ceylon to  Portuguese rule*
Moreover h is  d ispu tes w ith th e  vedor da fazenda* Ambrosio de
(137)
F re ita s  da Camara prevented th e  smooth running o f th e  adm inistration*
However by 1628 h is  ru le  appeared to  be having unprecedented
success. There was no sign  o f  la s c a r in  d isco n ten t and de Sa lr\<xdi
every confidence in  th e  S inhalese c h ie f ta in s  he had patronized*
The Portuguese m issionary e f f o r t  was more successfu l and Portuguese
Ceylon had enjoyed a longer period  o f peace than  ever b efo re .
The m aintainance o f  peace, however, owed l i t t l e  to
de Sa who from an e a rly  d ate  was o f the  opinion th a t  i t  was
b es t to  f ig h t  and destro y  th e  power o f  Kandy. The war fa c tio n
a
in  Ceylon alm ost succeeded in  p r e c ip i ta t in g /c o n f l ic t  w ith th e  
th e  highland kingdom over th e  death  o f  a  Portuguese ca lled  
Damiao Correa* Correa was k i l le d  w hile w ith in  Kandyan te r r i to ry *
I t  was contented th a t  th e  k i l l in g  o f  a Portuguese in  Kandy 
was an in s u l t  to  Portuguese p re s tig e  and an a c t o f  h o s t i l i t y  
by th e  Kandyans b u t, as Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira  po in ted  out
(137) See below pages
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in  Goa th a t  the  death  o f  Correa was ajresu lt o f  p r iv a te
provoked
venegence and not a h o s t i le  actjpBaakKi by th e  king o f  Kandy,
(138)
the  v iceroy refused  to  sanction  a war ag a in st Senerat.
D espite the  mutual susp icion  th a t  coloured Luso-Kandyan
a t t i tu d e s  in  th i s  period  normal tra d in g  r e la tio n s  continued
between th e  two powers. This p o lic y  d id  not lack  c r i t i c s .  Kandy
imported most o f  th e  s a l t  and c lo th  she needed and many
Portuguese were o f  th e  view th a t  an economic blockade was
the  b es t way o f  reducing Kandy. At one stage  th e  vedor Ambrosio
de F re ita s  da Camara advocated th e  establishm ent o f  a monopoly
(139)o f s a l t  mainly to  co n tro l the  supply to  Kandy. Perhaps th e
s tro n g es t proponent o f  th i s  p o licy  was Diogo Vaz F re ire , who
pu t forward h is  views in  a p e t i t io n  addressed to  th e  k ing  in
162^. \ftien F re ire  was appointed cap tain  o f  Trincomalee in  1625
he tid e d  to  pu t th is  p o lic y  in to  e f fe c t  by se iz in g  some v esse ls
(141)
o f the  king o f Kandy, but was apparen tly  re s tra in e d  by de Sa.
De Sa h im self was no advocate o f  th i s  p o lic y . He was, i t  i s  
tru e  in  a d i f f i c u l t  p o s it io n , as he had been in s tru c te d  by the
(138) Ajuda 51-V III-40. f .229v; BNL.FG 1982 .f.l22v
I t  i s  unknown th a t  Correa was doing in  Kandyan t e r r i to r y .  
Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira  held  th a t  he had k i l l e d  a Kandyan 




viceroy to  m aintain peace and a genera l tra d e  embargo would 
c e r ta in ly  have meant war. N evertheless, i t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  
de S a 's  opposition  to  economic w arfare was no t based so le ly  
on reasons o f s t a te ,  fo r  d e sp ite  a s se r tio n s  by h is  son and 
biographer Joao Rodrigues de Sa de Menezes th a t  de Sa stamped 
out p r iv a te  tra d e  among Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  in  Ceylon, contemporary 
documents show th a t  he and most o f  h is  d isavas were involved
in  tra d in g  re la tio n s  w ith the  Kandyans up to  the outbreak
(142) 
o f war.
During th e  period  1626-1628 the  main issu e  in  d isp u te  
as f a r  as Portuguese p o lic y  towards Kandy was concerned, was 
whether to  f o r t i f y  B a ttic a lo a  and i f  so, when to  do i t .
The view taken by the  conselho da fazenda in  P o rtuga l as 
re f le c te d  in  th e  l e t t e r s  o f  fche king to  th e  v iceroy  during  
th is  period  shows no change from e a r l ie r  a t t i tu d e s .  B a ttica lo a  
was to  be se ized  and f o r t i f i e d  even a t  th e  r is k  o f  war. In  
f a c t in s tru c tio n s  to  th i s  e f fe c t  became even more urgent 
than before fo r  i t  was rumoured th a t  th e  Dutch in tended to  se ize  
B a ttica lo a  and use i t  as a base to  a ttac k  th e  annual Portuguese 
China f l e e i l ^ T h e  cap ta in -g en era l Constantino de Sa was a lso
(142) JCBRAS.XI.539-540; Queyroz 740; TT.M da L iv .l6 9 9 .f .2 4 8 v  
Evora CXVI /2 -3; Ajuda 51-V III-40.ff.221,222v,223
(143) BNL.FG.1982.f.l4Q There was some b as is  fo r th i s  fe a r  fo r  in  
January 1625 th e  Dutch sen t f iv e  ships to  in te rc e p t Portuguese 
v esse ls  s a i l in g  from Macao and Malacca to  Goa. The Dutch sh ips were 
in s tru c te d  to  la y  in  w aiting  o f f  th e  p o in t o f G alle . (See De Vos*s 
tra n s la tio n s  o f  th e  Dagh R eg iste rs  o f Batavia in  JCBRAS. XXX.94)
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keen on th e  se izu re  o f  B a ttic a lo a , fo r  he considered th a t  i t  
would e i th e r  le ad  to  war which would enable him to  conquer 
Kandy or a t  lfeast would enable him to  deny Senerat th e  use 
o f  h is  l a s t  remaining major p o r t . The opposition  came from 
th e  v iceroy  conde de V idiguerra o r  ra th e r  from h is  council*
The v icero y 1 s opposition  stemmed from la rg e ly  from th e  
fe a r  o f  a renewed c o n f lic t  w ith  Kandy* He s ta te d  as much in  aaw
l e t t e r  to  th e  king on 15 January 1626* However as he could
(145)
no t r e je c t  royal in s tru c tio n s  o f f  hand, he sought to  give
good reasons why th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f B a ttica lo a  was no t
advisable* In  th is  he was ably  seconded by h is  co u n c illo rs
le d  by Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira . In  response to  th e  k in g fs
warning o f a Dutch p lan  to  se ize  B a ttica lo a  th ese  co u n c illo rs
re jo in ed  th a t  th is  was very u n lik e ly  as th e re  were a number
o f  u n fo r t if ie d  bays and ±e in le t s  in  Ceylon which would s u i t
(lh6)
th e  Dutch purpose much b e t te r .  In  f a c t ,  th e  v icero y ’s 
opposition  to  th e  f o r t i f i c a t io n  o f B a ttic a lo a  was le s s  
determined and le s s  r ig id  than  th a t  o f  h is  c o u n c illo rs . This 
was c le a r ly  shown by c e r ta in  developments in  I6 l6 - i6 l7 .
(lkk) TT.LM.22.f.84
(lh5) TT.LM .21.f.i37
(lh6) Film oteca LM .lh.119/1-3
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In  1626, follow ing th e i r  expulsions from Portuguese t e r r i to r y ,
the  Muslims o f  K otte f le d  to  Kandy* S enerat, who saw in  them a
re l ia b le  a l ly  ag a in st th e  Portuguese, s e t t le d  some four
thousand o f them in  th e  lands around B atticaloa*  This was in tended 
UTe
to  discourage^ Portuguese from making a  f o r t  in  th i s  area* The
immediate e f f e c t  however was ex ac tly  th e  opposite* De Sa sen t
a
word to  the  v iceroy  rousing  fea rs  of^Muslim tra d in g  cen tre
in  B a ttica lo a  developing ou tside  Portuguese control* This in
tu rn  prompted the  v iceroy  to  w rite  back to  th e  cap ta in -g en era l
in  September 1626 req u estin g  him to  prepare fo r  th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n
of B a ttica lo a  and prom ising s u b s ta n tia l a id  fo r  th e  p r o j e c i i ^
A few months l a t e r  th e  v iceroy  changed h is  mind and countermanded
h is  former in s tru c tio n s . The reason fo r  th is  was th e  in fluence
h is  c o u n c illo rs , p a r t ic u la r ly  Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira , exerted
on him* In  a c ru c ia l m eeting in  e a rly  February th ese  co u n c illo rs
persuaded th e  v iceroy  th a t  the  co n s tru c tio n  o f  a f o r t  a t  B a ttic a lo a
was inadv isab le  on two grounds -  f i r s t ,  th a t  B a ttica lo a  d id  nfct
have a harbour which allowed la rg e  ocean going v esse ls  Ksnxzfcbix 
(148)
to  en te r i t ,  and second th a t  a f l e e t  o f  s ix  l ig h t  v esse ls  opera ting
(147) rr.L M .24 .f.5s AHU Caixa 16.18.1.164*
De Sa #s personal em issary Francisco de B rito  da Almeida l e f t  
Ceylon on 8 June 1626. He however reached Goa only on 5 September 
1626, Having d iscussed  th e  question  o f m il i ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  w ith  
th e  v iceroy  he s e t  out &n 27 September and reached Ceylon w ith  
the  v ic e ro y 's  in s tru c tio n s  a t  th e  end o f October 1626*
(148) '** . B a ttica lo a  rifa hflhj* pay* naos nem navios 
grandes sendo a s s i  qui ha em C eilam o u tras  p a rte s  caoazes d isse u . . '
TT.LM .24,f.l
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from Trincomalee could co n tro l trad e  in  th i s  area  as e f fe c t iv e ly
as a f o r t  a t  a much sm aller co st and w ith much le s s  danger o f
a c o n f lic t  w ith  Kandy* This d ec is io n  taken by th e  v ice ro y -in -co u n c il
in  February 1627 was upheld once more when th e  question  came up
(1*9)
before th e  same body in  September 1627*
Dom Nuno Alvares P e re ira  however, had no t c leared  a l l
th e  doubt in  th e  viceroy*s mind, fo r a t  th e  end o f 1627 when
fre sh  in s tru c tio n s  to  f o r t i f y  B a ttica lo a  a rr iv ed  from Lisbon, the
conde de Vidiguerjfa decided to  in s t ru c t  th e  cap ta in -g en era l
(150)
to  prepare to  f o r t i f y  B atticaloa*  I f  th e  v iceroy  had been convinced 
th a t  the  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f  th i s  f o r t  was no t advisab le  he could 
a t  l e a s t  have postponed ac tio n  on th e  grounds th a t  th e  o b jec tio n  
to  th i s  course o f  ac tio n  contained in  h is  l e t t e r  o f  20 February
(151)
1627 had not y e t been considered by the  king*
(149) TT.LH.24*f*l; BNL.PG.1982.f*150
(150) N either th e  l e t t e r  o f  k ing  to  th e  v iceroy g iv ing  th i s  o rder 
nor th e  viceroy*s in s tru c tio n s  to  the  cap ta in -g en ra l have ngiiriflte 
survived* However both Queyroz (75$) and de Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS.XI.566) 
hold th a t  th e  cap ta in -g en era l was asked to  f o r t i f y  B a ttic a lo a
by th e  viceroy*
(151) I t  i s  in te re s t in g  to  note th a t  had he thus w aited, he (o r 
ra th e r  h is  successor) would have received two co n trad ic to ry  orders
on th is  quettion* One dated  20 March 1628 from the  conselho da fazenda 
in s tru c te d  th e  v iceroy  to  b u ild  a f o r t  as soon as possible* Another 
dated  10 A pril 1628 signed a t  Madrid and presumably from conselho de 
Portugal gave him perm ission to  abandon th e  p ro je c t .  N either 
l e t t e r  a rr iv ed  in  time to  a f fe c t  th e  developments in  Ceylon*
The re p e t i t io n  o f  both orders in  th e  follow ing year on 26 February 
and 24 January re sp e c tiv e ly  sheds some l ig h t  on th e  lack  o f 
co -ord ination  between th e  two councils in  th ese  years*
TT.LM* 2 5 .f f .126,1485 TT.LM.26. t t i  82 ,78)
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i
De Sa med ca re fu l p rep ara tio n  fo r  th e  long exirggtiiat 
awaited execution o f th e  p lan  to  se ize  B atticaloa*  As e a rly  
as March 1628 th ree  sh ips were sen t to  th e  ea s te rn  coast o f
Ceylon to  reconno itre  the  area  and streng then  th e  fo rce  a t
i
(153)
T rin c o m a le e .^  On 2 Ju ly  1628 de Sa h im self s e t  s a i l  fo r  Trincomalee
with over a hundred Portuguese and two thousand la sca rin s*
From Trincomalee he marched southwards along th e  coast towards
(154)
th e  B a ttica lo a  lagoon* There, on th e  is la n d  o f P u liy an tiv u ,
some th ree  m iles in s id e  th e  lagoon de Sa la id  th e  foundations
o f th e  B a ttica lo a  fo rt*
The Portuguese se izu re  o f  B a ttica lo a  re su lte d  in  th e
immediate outbreak o f  war w ith Kandy* Senerat was by now ready
fo r  war and was unw illing  to  see h is  l a s t  major p o r t l o s t  w ithout
s tru g g le . When de Sa a rriv ed  a t  P u liy an tiv u  in  Ju ly  1628 th e  k ing
sen t him a message asking him to  d e s is t  and de Sa made a c o n c il l ia to ry
(155)
but evasive re p ly . Senerat having re a l is e d  th a t  th e  Portuguese
(152) AHU Caixa 22. 4.8*1654
(153) TT.Ms.da L iv . 1699.f . 249
(154) FT. Manual de Assunqacao w ritin g  in  1630 (TT.Ms.da L iv . 1699.
f.249) says th a t  de Sa crossed th e  is la n d  to  reach B a ttica lo a  and
then pro ceded to  Trincomalee, but*Sh*3ourney by sea tojf Trincomalee 
and the  subsequent march overland to  B a ttica lo a  are  mentioned
by de Sa h im self in  a c e r t i f i c a te  dated 8 November 1628 granted
to  a so ld ie r  who accompanied him*
AHU Caixa*22* 4.8.1654
(155) Biker 11.48; BNL.FS.257.f . 27-28; CALR.IH.351? TT.Ms.da 
L iv. 1699.f . 260; JCBRAS E .5 6 ? 5 Queyroz 752
This i s  the  S inhalese version  as given in  a l e t t e r  o f  Senerat to  
the  v iceroy  dated 5 December 1632. De Sa de Menezes afad Queyroz 
on the  o th er hand m aintain th a t  Senerat was try in g  to  m aintain peace 
and even o ffe red  de Sa a b rib e  o f  e igh ty  thousand x e ra fin s  to  do so.
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were determined to  se ize  B a ttica lo a  decided on ac tio n , Wijayakoon 
(156)
Bandar a , a t ru s te d  commander o f  royal blood was sen t w ith two 
thousand men to  B a ttic a lo a  to  impede the  making o f  the  f o r t .
On news o f th i s  a ttac k  a Portuguese fo rce  under Ja c in to  Rebelo, 
d isava o f Sabaragamuwa and Domingos Carvalho Cao, d isava of  Matara 
s e t  out from K otte and marched overland towards B a ttic a lo a . The 
king o f  Kandy thereupon requested  h is  e ld e s t son Kumarasinha 
to  check the  Portuguese re lie v in g  fo rce  moving towards B a ttica lo a  
and p ro f i t in g  by th e  d iv is io n  o f th e  Portuguese fo rces h im self 
launched an a ttac k  on th e  Four K orales, U nfortunately  fo r  Senerat 
in  th ese  i n i t i a l  stages th e  fo rtunes o f war went ag a in s t him.
The two Portuguese d isavas making th e i r  way along the  so u th -eas te rn
co asta l p la in  proved to  be more than a match fo r  th e  fo rces
sen t ag a in st them by Kumarasinha, Even before th e i r  a r r iv a l
de Sa had a ttacked  and defeated  th e  troops under Wijayakoon Bandara,
F in a lly , Senerat*s o ffen siv e  in  th e  Four K orales was repulsed
by the  Portuguese army based a t  Menikkadawara le d  by th e  cap ta in -
( 157)
m a jo r-o f- th e -f ie ld , Diogo Mendes de B rito .
(156)He may have been Mudaliyar Wijayakoon o f  Tumpane o r 
Mudaliyar Wijayakoon o f  Walalgama. Both l a t e r  d is tin g u ish ed  
themselves a t  th e  b a t t l e  o f  Randeniwela in  1630. tR ib e iro  255) 
Queyroz (755) re fe rs  to  a W ijayapala who was a noble in  th e  
court who had been a t  th e  Sitawaka court in  th e  e a rly  1590*s .
(157) Jornada 4 -5 ; AHU Caixa 22. 4.3.1654; AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.1655 
AHU 501.f.379; Evora CV /2/7.f.70
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These successes enabled de Sa to  continue work a t  B a ttic a lo a , 
t i l l  e a rly  October* During th is  period  he b u i l t  one b as tio n  and 
ra ise d  the  w alls  a l l  round to  a h e ig h t o f  about th re e  feet*  Then 
he l e f t  fo r  K otte leav in g  Damico Botado a§ cap ta in  o f  th e  f o r t
o f Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca a t  Batticaloa*Botado was
£
a l l o t t e d  a  d e t a c h m e n t  o f  l a s c a r i n s ,  f i f t y  P o r t u g u e s e  a n d  t h i r t y  
t o p a z e s  t o  a i d  i n  d e f e n c e  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  w o r k *  D e  S a  h i m s e l f  
r e a c h e d  K o t t e  o n  1 2  O c t o b e r  1 6 2 ^ . ^
Work on B a ttica lo a  f o r t  continued fo r  th e  next two 
years d esp ite  continued war* As in  the  case o f Trincomalee, Ja ffn a  
proved to  be an invaluab le  source o f  supplies* The f o r t ,  when 
even tually  completed was a rec tan g u la r s tru c tu re  w ith th ree  
b a s tio n s . The main b a s tio n , th a t  o f  S*Cruz commands^the p o rt 
and was provided w ith s ix  p ieces o f  a r t i l l e r y  in c lu d in g  th re e  
la rg e  cannon. The o th e r two b as tio n s had th ree  p ieces erf
The f o r t  was undoubtedly badly s i te d .  As i t  had no supply 
o f water w ith in  th e  c i r c u i t  o f  th e  w alls stockades had to  b u i l t  
from th e  w alls to  th e  lagoon to  p ro te c t those who went to  fe tc h  
water* Access to  th e  sea could only be gained by s a i l in g  
fo r  th ree  m iles along a narrow channel* Moreover although de Sa
(158) TT*Ms da L iv. l699*f.249v
(159) Four o f  th e  twelve p ieces o f  a r t i l l e r y  provided fo r  B a ttica lo a  
were sen t from Goa fo r  th i s  purpose*
T T .L M , 2 7 *  f .  2 2
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planned to  s e t t l e  twenty o r t h i r t y  fa m ilie s  dn th e  is la n d , 
i t  soon became c lea r  th a t  the  channel sep a ra tin g  P u liy an tiv u  from 
the mainland was too narrow to  prevent th e  passage o f S inhalese 
from th e  mainland. Thus in  time o f  war th e  sa fe ty  o f  the
( 160)
s e t t l e r s  could no t be guaranteed o u ts id e  th e  w alls o f  th e  f o r t .
Although th e  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  th e  war could be la id  
squarely  on th e  shoulders o f  th e  Portuguese who provoked i t  by 
the  se izu re  o f B a ttic a lo a , in  1628 th ey  would have p re fe rre d  
Senerat not to  have opened h o s t i l i t i e s ,  fo r  t h e i r  p re-occupation  
w ith the  f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f B a ttica lo a  hampered them in  both 1628 
and 1629. Once war commenced, however, opinion both in  Ceylon and 
Goa hardened ag a in st a se ttlem en t w ith  Kandy and i t  was resolved 
by both cap ta in -genera l and v iceroy  th a t  th i s  opportun ity  should 
be used f in a l ly  to  subjugate Kandy* ^
The Portuguese fo rces in  Ceylon in  the  1620 *s amounted 
to  over seven hundred and f i f t y  so ld ie rs* ^  ^ f  th ese  however a 
la rg e  p roportion  were occupied in  g a rr iso n  duty . The defence o f
b.
(160)AHU Caixa 22. 4.8.165^} AHU Caixa 23.26.1.1656; Quayroz 1150-1151 
APO (new ed) Tomo IV. Vol. I I .  P a r t  I ,  408-4K>9» R ibeiro  130 .
The bad s i t in g  o f th e  f o r t  le d  to  many proposals in  th e  
1630 vs to  dism antle i t  and reb u ild  i t  on a b e t te r  s i t e .  N evertheless 
in  view o f th e  expenditure o f  fo r ty  thousand w erafins a lready  
incu rred  on th e  f o r t ,  i t  was decided to  leave th e  f o r t  as i t  
stood u n t i l  a la rg e  sum o f money became av a ilab le  fo r  th i s  purpose.
This e v e n tu a lity  never occured and th e  f o r t  as i t  stood f e l l  to  
th e  Dutch in  I 638 .
AHU Caixa 11. 7.12.1634; Filmoteca LM.14. 119/1-3; Film oteca LM.131. 
32/3-5* TT.LM.3 6 .f . 214; JRAS XXXI. 3685 Film oteca LM.13A. 34/1-4
(161) TT.LM.2 7 .f . 885 TT.Ms.da L in . 1115. f.48v
(162) Ajuda 51-V III-40•f .221
** * 4  S g rr-* "
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th e  kingdom o f  Ja ffn a  occupied a hundred and f i f t y  Portuguese
soldados w hile a fu r th e r  hundred men were t i e d  up in  th e  defence
(163)
o f the  fo r ts  o f  Trincomalee and B a ttic a lo a . The seven f o r ts  in
(164)
Kotte required  a t  l e a s t  another two hundred men. This l e f t  a mobile 
force o f only th re e  hundred men. However th e  cap ta in -g en era l 
could c a l l  on th e  se rv ices  o f  over th re e  hundred casados o r 
m arried Portuguese s e t t l e r s  and a s im ila r  number o f topazes or
(165)
men o f  mixed descen t. These men, though they  ra re ly  served in
th e  mobile army could be o f g rea t use to  f re e  Portuguese so ld ie rs
from g a rriso n  du ty . The Portuguese fo rces in  th e  army were
re in fo rced  by about four o r f iv e  thousand S inhalese la s c a t ta s
(166)
and a few hundred Tamils.
Throughout th e  l620 , s ,  de Sa by repeated  appeals fo r
( 167)
ass is tan ce  to  Goa t r i e d  to  in c rease  th e  number o f troops a v a ila b le .
From about 1626 both th e  v iceroy  and the  king began to  r e a l is e
( 168)
th a t  th e  danger o f war d id  e x is t  in  Ceylon. However due to  
th e  sm all number o f  men a v a ila b le , th e  need to  equip th e  high
(163) Reimers 56,57; See above page •
(164) Negombo, Colombo, K alu tara , G alle , Malwana, Menikkadawara 
and Sabaragamuwa.
(165) Soo above-page and T.Abeyasinghe 188.
(166) TT.Ms.da L iv. 1699*f*262-263; APO (nova ed) I I .  Tomo I I .
V ol.2. 416
(167) Film oteca LM.13A. 67/68/3-1; F.de Souza V I.293; Ajuda 51-V III-51, 
f .4 l  In  November 1627 de Sa made a sp e c ia l journey to  Mannar to
meet F re i Luis de B rito , then  bishop o f  Cochin who soon became 
Archbishop o f Goa and in  March 1628 v iceroy  o f  In d ia . In  h is  
d iscussions de Sa would no doubt have explained h is  views and 
o b jec tiv es  in  Ceylon.
(168) Ajuda 51-IV -32.f.5v; ENL.FG.1982.f.l22v
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seas f l e e t  o f Nuno Alvares Botelho and to  repea l th e  th r e a t  to  
Malacca from Achinese and Jh e  Dutch fo rces , l i t t l e  could be 
spared fo r Ceylon* S ta t i s t i c a l  d a ta  o f  th e  number o f  Portuguese 
troops sen t to  Ceylon in  th i s  period  i s  incomplete bu t i t  i s  
apparent from a comparison o f  th e  s tren g th  o f th e  Portuguese army 
in  1625-1626 w ith th a t  in  1630 th a t  the  lo sses  through death
(169)and departu re  were h ard ly  compensated fo r  by th e  new a rriv a ls*
However th e  Portuguese fo rces in  the  f i r s t  two years o f th e  war 
were f a r  s tro n g er than those which had su ccessfu lly  and sy stem a tica lly  
devasta ted  Kandy in  th e  decade preceding 1617* Not only was
(170)
the  numerical s tren g th  o f  th e  Portuguese element almost doubled, 
but the  rou tes through which Kandy had obtained a id  in  th e  e a r l ie r  
period  were to  a la rg e  ex ten t closed by th e  conquest o f  Ja ffn a  
and th e  se izu re  o f  th e  p o rts  o f Trincomalee and B atticaloa*
This alone would explain  th e  optimism o f th e  veterans o f th e  
Kandyan war, th a t  given a reinforcem ent o f  a fu r th e r  th re e  o r
( 171)
four hundred so ld ie rs  Kandy would be w ith in  th e i r  g rasp .
The war fa c tio n  in  Ceylon f a i le d  however to  make s u f f ic ie n t  
allowance fo r th ree  facto rs*  F i r s t ly ,  th e  e f fo r ts  o f  th e  Portuguese 
to  en c irc le  Kandy and cu t o f f  her con tacts w ith o th e r powers 
had re su lte d  in  a d isp e rs a l o f  th e i r  forces* In  th e  days o f
(169) Ajuda 51-V III-40 .f.221 ; Assentos 1*5255 Film oteca LM.19D.
23/4.5 Evora GR.Arm.V-Vi,1 4 -5 .f . 166; TT.LK.2?.f.222
(1?0) T. Abeyasinghs 64
(171) Ajuda 51-V III-4Q ff.2 l6v ,217,218,221,221v,222v,219,224,225v,226
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Azevedo i t  was th e  Portuguese opera tin g  from th e i r  main f o r t  in
Colombo, who had th e  advantage o f in te rn a l  l in e s  o f  communication*
In  1628 th is  advantage la y  w ith Kandy* Secondly, almost ten  years
o f peace had undone much o f the  damage wrought by the  Portuguese
in  th e  f i r s t  twenty years o f th e  seventeenth  century . The problem
o f depopulation in  Kandy had been solved to  a la rg e  ex ten t by
s e t t l in g  S inhalese and Muslim refugees from Portuguese t e r r i t o r y
in  abandoned lands* Small bands o f co lo n is ts  from South In d ia
as w ell as Bengal came in to  f i l l  what gaps were le f t*  Kandy was
(172)
once more a r e la t iv e ly  prosperous kingdom. F in a lly , th e  complete 
d efea t o f  h is  r iv a ls  and th e  achievement o f  Senerat in  securing  
peace fo r  h is  people had g radually  enabled Senerat to  win back 
the  a lleg ian ce  o f a l l  Kandyans.The low est p o in t o f h is  power 
and p re s tig e  had been reached in  1617-1618 when Senerat found 
h a lf  h is  kingdom in  re b e llio n  ag a in st him* From th a t  tim e onwards 
he had p a t ie n t ly  r e b u il t  th e  foundations o f h is  power* In  th e  
ea rly  1620's h is  two e ld e r sons had been appointed ru le r s  o f  the  
provinces o f Uva and Matale* In  1628, a t  th e  age o f s ix te e n , h is  
youngest son Maha Astana was acclaimed the p rin ce  o f  Kandy, th e  
l a s t  o f  th e  th re e  p r in c ip a l i t ie s  in to  which the  kingdom o f  Kandy 
was divided*
(172) Mandarampura Puvata* stanzas 179-209
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I t  i s  th e re fo re  no su rp rise  th a t  throughout l£28 i t
was Senerat who took th e  o ffen s iv e . A fte r th e  fa i lu re  o f  h is
attem pt to  check th e  f o r t i f i c a t io n  o f B a ttic a lo a  in  July£
September 1628, he re-o rgan ised  h is  fo rces and a ttack ed  th e
Portuguese in  th re e  fro n ts  -  B a ttic a lo a , Haffha and K otte ,
(173)
In  l a t e  1628, a S inhalese commander w ith  a s tro n g  fo rce  was 
sen t to  beseige B a ttica lo a  and impede a l l  co n stru c tio n  work.
This fo rce su ccessfu lly  cut o f f  th e  g a rr iso n  from a l l  
ou tside  con tact bu t th e  defenders continued to  r e s i s t  even 
a f te r  reinforcem ents le d  6y th e  k ing  o f  Kandy a rriv ed  to
(1741streng then  th e  beseig ing  fo rc e , Senerat*s expedition  was
A
aimed a t s h a tte r in g  th e  Portuguese hold on Ja ffn a , He re a lis e d
( 175)
th a t  th e  Portuguese p o s itio n  a t  Trincomalee and B a ttica lo a  
le s s
would be much/strong i f  the  base from which they  were supplied  -  
Ja ffha-cou ld  be subdued. Moreover through th e i r  m arriages
(173) 'V isiapu* was th e  name given to  him by th e  Portuguese,
(174) Evora CV/2-7.f,70
(175) I t  was a t r ib u te  to  th e  n a tu ra l s tren g th  o f  Trincomalee 
th a t  the  S inhalese d id  not attem pt to  cap ture i t  as they
did  B a ttic a lo a , The Portuguese sources do no t dpeak o f any 
armed c o n f lic t  a t  Trincomalee u n t i l  th e  l a t e r  s tag es o f  1630 
bu t i t  i s  c le a r  from th ese  sources as w ell as th e  S inhalese 
manuscript  Matale Maha Disava Kada^ira Pota th a t  a blockade 
was m aintained on Trincomalee f o r t  on th e  landward side  from 
1620 and th a t  the  f o r t  received  i t s  p rov isions from Ja ffn a , 
AHU 501.f . 379; AHU Caixa 22, 4 .8 .1654; BM.or 6606 (144)
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to  the  n ieces o f S a n k ili , the  two e ld e r sons o f  Senerat
had some s o r t  o f  claim to  th e  throne o f  Jaffna# Thus in
1628 Senerat despatched a sm all fo rce  to  rouse th e  Tamils o f
Ja ffn a  ag a in st th e i r  Portuguese ru le rs#  Ja ffn a  was r ip e  fo r
rebellion#  The years follow ing the  conquest had seen the
expropria tion  o f la rg e  amounts o f land  by th e  Portuguese#
The new tombo begun by Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara in  1624
and completed in  a rev ised  form by F ilip e  de O liv e ira  in
1626 had meant a considerable in c rease  in  taxes and dues#
The widespread d e s tru c tio n  o f Hindu temples in  the  days o f
de O liv e ira  had aroused g re a t resentm ent9 w hile the death
o f  de O liv e ira  in  1627 had removed from th e  scene the  man
most feared  by the  Tamils# Thus w ith th e  a r r iv a l  o f th e  S inhalese
forces th e re  was a genera l r i s in g  in  a l l  p a r ts  o f  Jaffna# Two
(176)
J e s u its  were k i l le d  on 16 September 1628# T hirteen  churches
(177)
erec ted  in  various p a r ts  o f  Ja ffn a  were destroyed# The Hindus 
in  th e i r  anger bu rn t a l l  th e  c ro sses , C h ris tian  symbols and 
sacred ornaments they  could la y  t h e i r  hands on# The fa c to r  of 
Trincomalee and a Portuguese ad igar ( o r headman) who could
(176) Fr# Bernadino da Isen a  (Pecci) and Fr. Mathew Fernadez# 
D#Ferroli - The J e s u i ts  in  Malabar at 1 .443-445: Boudens 535 
CALft I I I . 124.IV#97-99
(177) Siraancas SP .1523.f.5
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(178)
not reach the  sa fe ty  o f Ja ffh a  f o r t  in  time lo s t  t h e i r  liv es*  
The captain-m ajor o f  J a f fh a , Lanparote de Seixas who had a 
force o f  s ix ty  Portuguese s o ld ie r s ,  e igh ty  lo y a l la s c a r in s  
and many casados cau tio u sly  withdrew h is  fo rces w ith in  the  
f o r t  o f J a ffh a , which was promptly beseiged by th e  combined 
S inhalese and Tamil fo rc es . The seige la s te d  fo r  th ir te e n  
days during  which the  combined S inhalese and Tamil army, a 
l i t t l e  over a thousand strong  made one general a s s a u lt  on th e  
f o r t |  On th e  repu lse  o f th i s  a ttack  a f te r  a c o n f lic t  la s t in g  
the  whole day the  bese igers constructed  a stockade behind 
the  s h e lte r  o f  which they  f ire d  in to  the  f o r t .  By th i s  tim e 
de Seixas had re a l is e d  how ill-a rm ed  and i l l -o rg a n is e d  h is  
opponents were. He th e re fo re  suddenly a ttacked  th e  stockade 
and catching h is  opponents by su rp rise  com pletely defea ted  
them. The remnants o f  th e  S inhalese fo rces  and some o f  the 
Tamils f le d  from th e  p e n in s u l i J ^ S e n e r a t 's  attem pt to  
rouse the people o f  Kotte by sending fo rces to  th e  f ro n t ie r  
d i s t r i c t s  was even le s s  e f fe c tiv e  fo r  th e  Portuguese army 
fact lay dbg 3x 
$178) Evora C*V 2 /7 .f . 70
(179) CALR IV ,97. * n i .1 2 4 ;  AHU 501 .f.37v ; Evora C-V 2 /7 .1 .7 0
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led  by de Sa su ccessfu lly  defended th e  f ro n t ie r s .
With h is  fo rces meeting w ith rev erse  fo r  th e  second
time w ith in  a year, Senerat decided to  request a se ttlem en t
i
o f peace to  avlod the  d ev asta tio n  o f  h is  country. De Sa and
h is  o f f ic e rs  in te rp re te d  th i s  as a s ign  o f  weakness and 
decided to  re fu se  th e  o f fe r  and appeal to  Goa fo r  reinforcem ents
to  complete th e  conquest o f the  is la n
I f  in  1628 the  m il i ta ry  i n i t i a t i v e  la y  w ith S enerat, in  
1629 i t  was th e  Portuguese who took th e  o ffen siv e . Senerat *s 
aim in  the  blockade o f Trincomalee, th e  se ige  o f B a ttic a lo a , 
and th e  rouding o f th e  people o f  Ja ffh a  to  re b e llio n  had been 
not merely the  se izu re  o f  these  p laces but th e  d iv e rs io n  o f 
the cap ta in -genera l *s a t te n tio n  from an invasion  o f Kandy.
(180)Evora C-V 2/7  f .7 0 ; AHU Caixa 14. a n t .18.1.1644; JCBRAS.XI.572 
I t  i s  in te re s t in g  to  note th a t  de Sa*s a c t iv i t i e s  in  l a te
1628,shown c le a r ly  as a defensive o pera tion  in  contemporary 
documents (AHU Caixa. 14. an t. 18.1.1644) has been exagerated 
in to  an a ttack  in w w ri he w ith f i f t y  so ld ie rs  ravaged a 
g re a te r  p a r t  o f Kandy in  de Sa de Menezes 572 and Queyroz 757*
By the  time R ibeiro  heard the  s to ry  de Sa was repo rted  to  have 
marched w ith f iv e  hundred so ld ie rs  and burn t King S enera t(s  
palace in  Kandyt (R ibeiro 222) Baldaeus fu r th e r  e laborated  
the  s to ry . P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon 1 1 .176. and F r. S .G .Perera- 
H istory  o f Ceylon fo r sch o o ls .91 re ly in g  on de Sa de Menezees1'* 
and Queyroz mention th i s  m ythical campaign and asc rib e  i t  to  
1627 on which year h o s t i l i t i e s  had n o t even commenced.
(181) Evora C-V.2 /7 .f . 70
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De Sa however had resolved to  ca rry  th e  war in to  Kandyan te r r i to ry *  
In  March 1629 a f te r  th e  d ry  month o f February had transform ed 
many o f th e  Kandyan r iv e rs  in to  fo rdable  streams he a ttacked  
the  Kandyan kingdom* An invasion  o f th e  highland kingdom was 
not a ta sk  to  be undertaken lig h tly *  The normal Portuguese 
invasion  ro u te  la y  through Gantenna and Balane*The d i f f i c u l ty  
o f advancing over the  r i s in g  ground th a t  la y  before Balane was 
accentuated by the  th ic k  fo re s ts  which covered th e  whole area*
The snakes, th e  mosquitcj§ and the  leeches th a t  abounded in  
th is  ^ tro p ic a lju n g le  provided th e i r  own problems. De Sa however 
planned a ra id  ra th e r  than an invasion* His contingent o f  l ig h t ly  
armed men rap id ly  advanced on Balane and seized  th i s  s t r a te g ic  
p o s itio n  w ith l i t t l e  resis tance*  Senerat withdrew fu r th e r  
in lan d , bu t de Sa was no t to  be tempted and a f te r  th e  burning 
the  f o r t i f ic a t io n  a t  Balane sw if tly  withdrew to  K o t t i J ^
De Sa decided to  t r y  h is  fo rtune  once more in  l a t e  June 
the  whole o f the  mobile array w ith him* On the 
occasion however he ran  in to  g re a te r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  as ffiis fo rces
(182) Mandar ampurapuvat a * s ta n za 212; AHU 501*f« l?
Contemporary documents make i t  c le a r  th a t  i t  was in  e a r ly
1629 and not in  1628 as R ibeiro (221-222) makes o u t, th a t  de Ba 
made h is  f i r s t  invasion  o f Kandy* De Sa returned  from B a ttica lo a  
on 12 October 1628. On 8 November he was s t i l l  a t  Menikkadawara 
p reparing  fo r  th e  next year*s campaign. (AHU Uaixa 22*4*8.1654; 
TT.Ms.da L iv. 1699• f • 249v) Even by March 1629, th e  reinforcem ents 
he expected from Goa had no t arrived* (Queyroz 758)
(183) TT.Ms.da L iv .731*f»386 A c e r t i f i c a te  o f  de Sa h im self dated 
23 November 1629 d ates th e  begining o f th e  campaign as 23 June 1629.
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were exposed to  the  in cessan t ra in  o f th e  south-w est monsoon*
Many o f h is  so ld ie rs  were soon s ic k . #They were sc a rce ly  able
to  defend themselves in  the  stagnan t morasses and r iv e r s  over
which they  waded up to  th e i r  necks w ith  th e  g re a te s t  d i f f i c u l ty
and fa tig u e  marching barefo o t and alm ost naked, they  came out
w ith th e i r  f e e t  to rn  and la c e ra te d , b i t t e n  by lee^ches and
(184)
r e p t i le s  which breed and swarm in  th ese  w aters. • I t  i s  no t
c le a r  why de Sa, a ve teran  campaigner decided to  inaugurate
a new campaign in  such inclem ent w eather. He may have been
try in g  f o r e s ta l l  Kandyan co u n te r-a ttack  on th e  Four K orales.
De Sa entered the  c a p ita l  c i ty  o f Kandy and burn t i t ,  bu t when
he began h is  re tu rn  journey Senerat decided to  follow  him
w ith a l l  th e  fo rces he could m uster. A fte r some p re lim inary
manoewring th e  two armies met a t  Ambetenna. A fter a b a t t le
which raged from dawn t i l l  noon the  Portuguese forced th e
S inhalese fo rces to  r e t i r e  across th e  river*  The Portuguese
themselves were so badly shaken however, th a t  de Sa continued
(185)
h is  r e t r e a t  to  Menikkadawara. Both s id e s  claimed v ic tory*
(184) JCBRAS X I.574
(185) Jornada 18 a s s e r ts  th a t  th e  fo rces  o f Uva d id  no t f le e  but 
r e t i r e d  to  a s id e  o f the  r iv e r  in  c lose  form ation 'abou t which 
they  afterw ards mocked those o f Caadea and M ata le .9 Baldaeu s ta te s  
th a t  on the  o th e r hand th a t  9 encountering them near Ambatenna
we forced them to  r e t r e a t  w ith considerab le lo s s * 9 The Parangi Hat ana 
stanzas ?6- 85 a lso  gives the  im pression o f a S inhalese v ic to ry .
The debate as to  who won has been continued in  th e  tw en tie th  century  
by Fr. S .G .Perera and P .E .P ie r is .  ( P ie r i s -  Ceylon I I , 179;
Jornada IS )
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The S inhalese army fa ile d  to  cu t o f f  th e  Portuguese from th e i r
base. But Arabatenna l ik e  L e llo p itiy a  marked no gains fo r  th e
Portuguese : i t  merely ensured th e i r  sa fe  re tu rn  to  Menikkadawara.
( 186)
In  th is  sense i t  could be described  as a drawn b a t t l e .
was
On h is  re tu rn  the  cap ta in -g en era l/g ree ted  w ith grave
news. B a ttica lo a  was s t i l l  beseiged and th e  f o r t  in  danger
o f being l o s t .  B a ttic a lo a , un like  th e  o th er Portuguese co asta l
$ o rts  had i t s  p o r t th ree  m iles from the  open sea . In  th e  absence
o f  a la rg e  Portuguese v esse l th e  S inhalese could use th e i r
f ish in g  boats to  blockade the  narrow channel through which
ships had to  pass in to  th e  B a ttica lo a  lagoon. This was what
th e  S inhalese under two o f th e  son$ o f  Senerat had done.
De Sa decided to  re lie v e  B a ttica lo a  immediately. With a fo rce
o f two hundred Portuguese and a thoudand la s c a r in s  he marched
eigh ty  fiv e  m iles to  G alle . Though th e  monsoon iiinds had hard ly
abated de Sa h im self embarked w ith some o f him men in  a pinnace
(187)
and th ree  champanas and made fo r  B a ttica lo a  by sea . The r e s t  o f  
th e  fo rces under Domingos Carvalho Cao, d isava o f Matara proceeded 
overland along the  coast through M atara. The cap ta in -genera l 
also  sen t a message to  Ja ffn a  requesting  th a t  Miguel P e re ira  Borralho
$186) JCBRAS X V III.169; R ibeiro 249; Jornada 18,36; AHU 501.f f . 13.357; 
AHU 445 .f.45v; TT.Ms.da L iv .751 .f.386 ; P .da T rinidade 111.85
(187) TT.Ms.da L iv . 1699.f . 250
Champana -  a boat o f  up to  fo r ty  tons capable o f  carry ing  
twenty f iv e  o r t h i r t y  men.
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captain-m ajor o f  th e  f l e e t  o f Camorin who had a rriv ed  w ith
f iv e  sh ips in  Ja ffh a  to  leave the  v esse ls  th e re  and march
. (188)
overland with a l l  h is  fo rces to  B a ttic a lo a , The captain-m ajor-
o f - th e - f ie ld  Diogo Mendes de B rito  , who was l e f t  in  charge o f
K otte was in s tru c te d  to  keep th e  p ressu re  on Kandy by a p o licy
o f  ra id s  on th a t  kingdom,
De Sa had taken a chance in  d iv id in g  h is  fo rc es . However
fortune favoured th e  Portuguese once more. The Portuguese
l e f t  behind a t  K otte kep t Senerat occupied by continuous in cu rs io n s ,
Luis Gones P in to , a veteran  Portuguese commander le d  th e  f i r s t
incu rsio n  in  August 1629* In  September Diogo Mendes de B rito
drove away a Kandyan detachment which had entered th e  Seven Korales
(189)
and made a co u n ter-a ttacg  on Kandyan te r r i to r y .  Meanwhile de Sa
had su ccessfu lly  re lie v ed  B a ttic a lo a  and supervised th e  con tinuation
(190)
o f  f o r t  construction#
I t  was when he was a t  B a ttica lo a  th a t  de Sa received  th e
CL
word ofAsecond S inhalese attem pt to  se ize  Ja ffn a , This tim e Senerat 
had sen t a  t  s tro n g  fo rce  o f  n ea rly  four thousand men mnder one 
o f  h is  kinsmen. The S inhalese planned to  rouse the  Tamils ag a in st
(188) Filmoteca LM.13B 5/(p~Z
Borralho was on a ro u tin e  v i s i t  to  Ja ffn a , De Sa probably 
f e l t  he needed a l l  the  fo rces th a t  could be spared. Due to  th e  
south-w est monsoon winds Borralho could not s a i l  southwards to  
B a ttica lo a , Leaving th e  sh ips behind was th e  only so lu tio n ,
(189) TT.Ms da L iv .731 .ff.375 ,392
(190) TT,Ms da Liv#1699.f . 250
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the Portuguese and w ith th e  help  o f  a few Vadugai troops from
Tanjore d rive  the  Portuguese out o f J a ffh a . Very soon most o f
(191)
Ja ffh a  passed under th e i r  co n tro l.
De Sa despatched Domingos Carvalho Cao who had meanwhile,
(192)
made h is  way to  B a ttic a lo a  w ith a seaborne expeditionary  fo rce . 
Making h is  way northwards along the  Cab landed h is  fo rces a tA
the isthmus o f  th e  Ja ffh a  p en insu la , h is  o b jec t being to  But o f f  
the  paths of r e t r e a t  l e f t  to  th e  S inhalese . The S inhalese army 
was encamped in  th e  p la in s  o f P achch ilappala i. The S inhalese 
had found the  Tamils a f te r  th e  f a i lu r e  o f  th e i r  r e v o lt  o f  1628 
re lu c ta n t to  jo in  them. Cao decided i t  was time to  a tta c k  them. 
Leaving h a lf  o f  h is  fo rce under Lourenco T eixe ira  de Macedo 
to  advance north-westwards along th e  Ja ffh a  pen insu la , Cao 
marched along th e  southern shores o f th e  Ja ffn a  lagoon and 
crossed in to  th e  peninsu la by Elephant P ass. He also  sen t a 
message to  th e  captain-m ajor o f  Ja ffh a  Lancarote de Seixas to  
jo in  in  the a s s a u lt  on the  S inhalese . Before de Seixas could 
a r r iv e  however th e  two Portuguese detachments attacked  and 
defea ted  the  S inhalese fo rc e s , whose commander was executed.
(191) Queyroz 65h; Jornada 5» R ibeiro 222 Queyroz estim ated the  
S inhalese fo rce  a t  ten  thousand. R ibeiro gives the  f ig u re  o f f iv e  
thousand. The above estim ate i s  given in  th e  Jornada, 5*
(192) Queyroz*s f ig u re  o f  two hundred Portuguese and seven 
thousand la s c a r in s  i s  obviously too high. R ibeiro too g ives a high 
estim ate  o f two hundred and te n  Portuguese and s ix  thousand la s c a r in s .  
The exped itionary  fo rce could not have been much g re a te r  than
the  one brought by de Sa to  B a ttic a lo a .
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The Vadugai troops sen t to  a s s i s t  th e  Kandyans were also
(193)
defeated  on th e i r  be la ted  a r r iv a l  near Mannar. The people 
o f  Ja ffh a  escaped r e p r is a ls  o f  th e  type seen in  1620, because 
o f th e i r  re luc tance  to  jo in  th e  S inha lese , but they  were forced 
to  take a fre sh  oath o f a lle g ia n c e . Ja ffn a  made secure once more,
(19*)
th e  Portuguese so ld ie rs  re tu rned  to  K otte along th e  w estern coast*
(193) AHU 501.f .9
(19*0 Queyroz 65*^656; Jornada 5»36; R ibeiro 223
A ll these  th ree  sources r e f e r  to  only one S inhalese a ttac k  
on Ja ffn a  during  th e  war. Contemporary documents however in d ic a te  
th a t  th e re  were two sep ara te  a t ta c k s . A c e r t i f i c a te  o f Lanparotedts 
de Seixas to  Francisco Henriques mentions th e  f irfc t se ige  o f  Ja ffn a  
im plying th a t  th e re  was a second. (AHU 501.f.37v) An e x tra c t from 
a p e t i t io n  o f Lanparote de Seixas reads as fo llow s, 'El Rey de Candea. . .  
as d ito  Reino de Jaffhapatam  mandon hua esqpa^da da mil e tantos 
Homes com p a l vara a consentlmewt.r> Hns naturals dalla qua todos s e 
re b e lla ra m e a la vantarem marttaiidq dois padreis e queiraendo as 
iflre.las em tipo  quo o d ito  Lancarote de Seixas nao tin h a  mais_ 
que duas e s tan c ias  de soldados por lh e  t e r  mandado hua e o u tra  
gervda com o ite n ta  la s c a r in s  a c a s tig a r  hum alevantado. oorem ta n to  
que lh e  chegou e os inim igos ouviram comater lh e  sahio das tran o u e ira s  
qom a gente que tin h a  os poz em fugida com mortos de alguns sem 
penhua perda sua e na n o ite  segu in te  de a colherem e nam pararam 
$enam nos m attos e l im ite  do d ito  Reino aonde estandosse reformando 
pera. v a l g > s  fVi q dito Langa-rote de Seixas de.jLandag^anto 
que lh e  chegou a sua is ta n c ia  e o socorro que o d ito  cap g e ra l 
lh e  mandou^-de B aticaloa de la s c a r in s  encontrando os teve d e llo s  
.segundo v i to r ia  matando e captivando m uitos, tomando mu ita s  armas 
a. qua mandolhe os mantimentos com qua fico u  o d ito  Reino obediente
a-r VMr9—  * (Simancas SP .1523.f.5)
R ibeiro holds th a t  seven thousand o f the  S inhalese d ied  in  
th is  b a t t l e .  The estim ate  o f  one thousand s ix  hundred given in  
th e  Jornada appears n ea re r to  th e  t r u th  fo r  i t  i s  a lso  repeated  
in  a contemporary document. (AHU 501»f*13)
* P .da  T rinidade I I I . 85 g ives a much h igher estim ate o f  th ree  
.thousand S inhalese k i l l e d .
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At the  end o f 1629 Senerat again# o ffe red  to  n eg o tia te
f o r  p e a c e .  A l t h o u g h  h i s  k i n g d o m  h a d  n o t  s u f f e r e d  g r e a t l y
b y  w a r  h e  s a w  h o w  d i f f i c u l t  i t  w a s  t o  d i s l o d g e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e
f r o m  t h e  l a n d s  t h e y  h e l d .  H e  t h e r e f o r e  o f f e r e d  a  p e a c e  p r o b a b l y
o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  q u ^ a n t e .  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e
b o t h  i n  G o a  a n d  C e y l o n  h o w e v e r  h a d  n o t  y e t  l o s t  a l l  h o p e s  o f
(195)
conquering Kandy and refused  to  agree.
D e  S a  r e t u n n e d  f r o m  B a t t i c a l o a  a f f l i c t e d  w i t h  a  f e v e r .  H i s
sickness a t  tim es grew so bad th a t  he made a c o d ic il  to  h is
w ill  recommending th a t  in  case o f  h is  death peace be concluded 
(196)w ith Kandy. By th is  tim e he had despaired  o f o b ta in in g  
reinforcem ents from Goa and i t  was apparent to  him th a t  the  
conquest o f Kandy was a more d i f f i c u l t  p ro je c t than he had 
a n tic ip a te d . Meanwhile de Safs q u a rre l w ith th e  vedor Ambrosio 
da F re ita s  da Camara had reached such an acrimonious p itc h  
th a t  the  new v iceroy  Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares 
who had taken up o f f ic e  in  October 1629 was compelled to  d ir e c t  
Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara to  work on a new tombo while 
the  captain-m ajor o f  J a ffn a , Lan9a ro te  de Seixas was ordered to  
proceed to  Colombo and take up d u tie s  as th e  new vedor da fazenda.
(195) JC3RAS XI. 576
(196) This was 22 January 1630. Queyroz 759-760; JCBRAS X I.577-579
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For the  vacant p o st o f  captain-m ajor o f  Ja ffn a  was appointed 
Miguel P e re ira  Borralho who knew th e  area  w ell. A ll th ese
The f i r s t  campaign o f  1630 proved to  be an in d ec is iv e  one.
Senerat advanced w ith h is  fo rces up to  A tta p itiy a  on th e  
f ro n t ie r  o f K otte . The captain-m ajor o f the  Portuguese fo rces 
a t  Menikkadawara advanced w ith h is  fo rces to  meet the  Kandyans 
but find ing  th e  king s tro n g ly  entrenched awaited reinforcem ents 
which were brought up by de Sa. Senerat seeing  the  s tren g th  o f  
o f th e  Portuguese force r e t i r e d .  De Sa followed the  Kandyan 
forces across th e  f ro n t ie r  but a f te r  a fo r tn ig h t’s campaign
retu rned  to  K otte .
De Sa’s sickness a t  th e  end o f  1629 had taken much o f h is  
z e s t out o f  him. The meagre reinforcem ents sen t from Goa fu r th e r  
discouraged him. He had asked fo r  four hundred x a i Portuguese 
s o ld ie rs . A ship  which a rriv ed  in  e a r ly  Mtty May brought him
only f i f  „ _ he d is p i r i te d  cap ta in -genera l remained in  Colombo
in  A p ril, May and June, recu p era tin g  and hoping fo r  more a id
(200)
and b e t te r  fo rtu n e . Senerat on th e  o ther hand, proved as a c tiv e
(197) Assentos I .  266; AHU Caixa l 6 . a n t .18.1.1644
(198) TT.Ms da L iv . l 699 . f . 252v-257; Ajuda 51-V III-5 i.f.47 ,1565  
Jornada 21-22
(199) Film oteca LM.19D 23/4; Fiim oteca LM.13A. 67/68/3-1; AHU Caixa 14. 
18.1.1644; Evora C R .A m .V -V I.l4-5 .f.l66; Ajuda 51 -V II I -5 1 .f f .  
41 ,52,62,67,74,95
(200) TT.Ms da L iv .1099.f . 257
changes were completed by June
(198)
2 1 4
as ever. In  March-April 1630 a Kandyan force began to  blockade
B a ttica lo a  once again . The war o f  conquest was s lip p in g  out 
o f Portuguese co n tro l.
The Portuguese p o s itio n  foas however much worse than 
de Sa ever imagined. By ea rly  1626 the  la s c a r in  commanders^ o f  
Kotte had become d is i l lu s io n e d  w ith th e  Portuguese regime 
desp ite  the  e f fo r ts  o f de Sa to  ensure a f a i r e r  dea l fo r  taxx  
them. The allowance paid  by the  s ta te  to  th e  la s c a r in s  and th e i r  
ch iefs  had been d iscontinued  during  th e  second decade o f  the  
seventeenth century due to  f in a n c ia l ex igencies. N evertheless 
the Portuguese had in s is te d  th a t  they  should continue to  pay
q u it ren ts  fo r  a l l  lands th ey  he! he S inhalese f e l t  th a t  th is
was u n fa ir  and th a t  w ith th e  removal o f cash payments th e  
re tu rn  o f th e  o ld  se rv ice  tenure  system fo r  la s c a r in s  was the  
only answer. While th e  rank and f i l e  were d iscon ten ted  fo r  
f in a n c ia l reasons the  lead ersh ip  was more alarmed by th e  general 
l in e s  o f Portuguese p o lic y . The expulsion o f th e  Muslims 
coupled w ith th e  encouragement o f Portuguese and Ind ian  
C hristian^ co lo n is ts  roused fea rs  in  th e i r  minds as to  th e  u ltim ate  
in te n tio n s  o f  the  Portuguese regard ing  th e  S inhalese
(201)




people. They were th e re fo re  in  a mood recep tiv e  to  any proposals
to  overthrow th e  Portuguese.
The exact date  when th e  S inhalese m udaliyars decided to
attem pt to  overthrow Portuguese power in  Kotte i s  u n ce rta in .
(204)
Queyroz holds th a t  th e i r  conspiracy o rig in a ted  in  March 1626 .
I t  i s  more l ik e ly  th a t  th e  d e ta i l s  o f  th e  conspiracy wre worked 
out much l a t e r  even i f  a c tu a l d isco n ten t had ex is ted  as e a rly  as 
1626. The mudaliyars must have g rad u ally  re a l is e d  th a t  th e i r  
e f fo r ts  would have l i t t l e  chance o f  success unless they  e n lis te d  
th e  support o f th e  king o f  Kandy. Here th e  ro le  played by an 
in d iv id u a l, Domingos Fernandes proved v i t a l .
(205)
Domingos Fernandes was a sword smith l iv in g  in  Colombo. Fernandes 
sen t a l e t t e r  to  Senerat th a t  he was r e a l ly  the  son o f  R ajasinha o f
(203) Q u e y r o z  762-763* Q u e y r o z  a t t r i b u t e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  k k s  w o r d s  
t o  D .C o s m o ,  ’ . . . n o r  d o  y o u  r e f l e c t  o n  t h e  u n h a p p y  f a t e  o f  y o u r  
c h i l d r e n  f o r  i p  b y  o u r  w e a k n e s s  a n d  i r r e s o l u t i o n  w e a r e  r e d u c e d
to  s lav e ry , they  w ill  have e i th e r  a c e r ta in  death o r banishment 
before them; because i f  today they  w il l  l e t  you enjoy our p roperty
( in  o rder to  have men to  accompany them fo r  our ru in ) tomorrow they
w ill  become th e i r  owners; e i th e r  w ith  the  death and e x tin c tio n  
o f  th e  Chingala name o r a t  l e a s t  w ith  the  banishment and transm ig ra tion  
o f  a l l  your f a m i l i e s . . .*
(204) Q u e y r o z  755
(205) Q u e y r o z  753
Queyroz r e la te s  the  s to ry  th a t  he was a n a tiv e  o f  Tanjore 
and th a t  he was th e  son o f  a Moor and a Parava woman. The
sword sm ith was a b a tch e lo r.
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Sitawaka and asked fo r  a id  to  tfrggBE gain  th e  throne o f K otte . 
Senerat who was p reparing  fo r  war a t  th i s  tim e, knew q u ite  w ell 
th a t  Fernandes was an im poster, fo r  in  h is  very court he had 
two nobles who had themselves w itnessed th e  death o f  Rajasinha*s 
son. However he decided to  use Fernandes to  con tact th e  m udaliyars 
o f  K otte . Fernandes thereupon contacted  Dorn Theodosio, Dom A leixo, 
Dorn B althazar and Dom Cosmo who decided to  accept him as th e i r  
le ad e r.
Having achieved h is  o b jec tiv e  o f  opening communications 
w ith the  S inhalese commanders o f  K otte , Senerat decided to  
remove the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  Fernandes becoming a second N ikap itiya . 
Therefore in  1629 he persuaded Fernandes to  f le e  to  Kandy. On 
h is  a r r iv a l  in  court the  p re tender a t  len g th  discovered th a t  
Senerat had known him to  be an im poster a l l  along. However the 
k ing  o f Kandy d id  not prove u n g ra te fu l to  one who had, though
ft
i n a d v e r t e n t l y ,  d o n e  h i m  a  g r e a t  s e r v i c e .  O n  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  h ie
g a v e  u p  a l l  c l a i m s  t o  k i n g s h i p ,  F e r n a n d e s  w a s  g r a n t e d  l a n d s  i n
(206)
W ellassa.
M e a n w h i l e  t h e  f o u r  S i n h a l e s e  l e a d e r s  w h e  h a d  w o n  o t h e r s
(206) Queyroz 753-756; Jornada 43-48; AHU 501.f . 379
Fernandes was jo ined  in  W ellassa by h is  b ro th e r who was 
l a t e r  k i l le d  in  a skirm ish in  1631. Queyroz s ta te s  th a t  
Fernandes becoming disappoin ted  a t  th e  end o f h is  hopes to  
become king f le d  to  W ellassa and became an an ch o rite , thus 
drawing a moral th a t  t r a i t o r s  never propper.
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to  th e i r  cause. Among them were Dom Andre, th e  raohottiyar or 
se c re ta ry  o f th e  cap ta in -g en era l and Dom Manual, who was a 
S inhalese so tru s te d  by de Sa th a t  he had been awarded the  
p o s t o f  sh ie ld -b ea re r  o f  the  eap ta in -g en era l h im self. Dom Simao, 
le ad e r o f th e  la sc a r in s  o f  Sabaragamuwa was another r e c r u i t .
The f i r s t  two played a v i t a l  ro le  in  supplying the  co nsp ira to rs  
w ith inform ation as to  de Sa*s in te n tio n s  and p o lic ie s  w hile 
the  adherence o f  Dom Siman completed thh  a lie n a tio n  o f a l l  the  
prominent la s c a r in  lead ers  from the  Portuguese cause. A negro 
Muslim w&o had nom inally accepted C h r is t ia n ity  to  avoid expulsion
also  jo ined  in  when o ffe red  le ad e rsh ip  o f  the  Muslim community
(20?) 
in  K otte.
A fter th e  departu re  o f Fernandes, those co n sp ira to rs  
continued to  correspond w ith Senerat and apparen tly  decided to  
accept him as th e i r  le a d e r  when i t  became known th a t  Fernandes 
was an im poster. Early in  1630 they  planned means by which a 
f in a l  overthrow o f Portuguese power in  K otte could be achieved 
w ith  minimum r is k  to  them selves. I t  was decided to  w ait u n t i l  
the next la rg e  invasion  o f Kandy took p la ce . At a favourable
(207) Queyroz 762; JCBRAS 581-582, 584
This Muslim i s  described  as an armourer and was probably 
th e  same person who served as th e  kanakapulle o f Antonio de Souza 
Coutinho in  1630. See below page 2*34*
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opportunity th e  S inhalese were to  d e se r t to  th e  Kandyans and
destroy  the  Portuguese fo rce  thus iso la ted *  I t  was however re a lis e d
th a t  while th e  Portuguese held Colombo any S inhalese v ic to ry
would have bu t a temporary effect*  Moreover th e i r  fo rces in  Colombo
would be ab le  to  s e iz e  th e  la s c a r in  fam ilies  l e f t  behind a t
Peliyagoda and Mulleriyawa* Therefore the  p lan  was extended to
include the  se izu re  o f Colombo. Two o f th e  key fig u res  Dom Andre
and Dora Manual were to  be l e f t  behind in  th e  c i ty .  They, to g e th er
( 208)
w ith the Muslim negro and two o th e r men were to  remain in
C o lo m b o  w i t h  t h e i r  f o l l o w e r s *  T h e  m u d a l i y a r s  p r o m i s e d  t o  s e n d
them news o f th e  d ese rtio n  as soon as p o ss ib le , and on th e  n ig h t th a t
they  received th e  news they  were to  s e t  f i r e  to  a l l  th e  m z iB
houses o f th e  casados* w ith in  and ou tside  the  w alls o f  th e  c i ty .
I t  was estim ated th a t ,  in  th e  confusion, p r o f i l i n g  by th e  element
o f  su rp rise  th e  s ix  hundred S inhalese and Muslims who were a t
th e  d isp o sa l o f  the  p lo t te r s  could se ize  Colombo f o r t  and hold
(209)
i t  t i l l  the o thers  a rr iv ed .
The p lan  so c a re fu lly  arranged almost went awry. In  March 
1630 ju s t  before the cap ta in -g en era l s e t  o f f  towards Kandy an
(208) Chuti Naide (Cuti naide) and Chavan (Xaban) according to  
Jornada 38 .
(209) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f f . 251v-253v
2 1 9
(210) a  
a ra tc h i o f th e  paduwa caste  who had taken, message from th e
m u d a l i y a r s  o f  K o t t e  t o  K a n d y  g a v e  w o r d  o f  t h e  p l o t  t o
Fr. Paulino da Madre de Deus, an Augustinian serv ing  in  K alu tara .
(211)
Fr. Madre de Deus was no t h im self f u l ly  convinced but sen t the
a ra tc h i to  th e  cap ta in -g en era l, who refused  to  l i s t e n  to  th ese
charges th in k in g  th a t  i t  was merely a Kandyan move to  c rea te
d issen tio n  w ith in  K otte . The a ra tc h i th e re fo re  sought th e  a id  o f
(212)
a Franciscan F r. Antonio de Peixoto , who served a t  M atara.
F r. Peixoto was c le a r ly  convinced but h is  open charges ag a in st 
Dom Theodosio only roused th a t  S inhalese noble to  make th in g s so 
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  th e  a ra tc h i th a t  he f le d  from K otte . The f l ig h t  o f 
a ra tc h i and Dom Theodosio*s m arriage to  a lady  o f  mixed descent 
in  Colombo increased  de Sa*s t r u s t  in  th is  le a d e r  e sp e c ia lly
(313)
as Dom Theodosio wore European d ress fo r  h is  m arriage ceremony.
During the  sh o rt campaign o f 1630 th e  S inhalese apparen tly  
had no opportun ity  of p u ttin g  th e i r  p i  and in to  e f f e c t .  By th is  
time however they  were convinced th a t  delay  would be dangerous 
in  view of th e  chances th a t  the  p lo t  might be d iscovered . They
(210) *Pache* -  P .E .P ie r is  (R ibeiro 144) id e n t i f ie s  pachas w ith  
the  paduwa c a s te . According to  B.Ryan -  Caste in  modem Ceylon. 67 
paduwas were palanquin b ea re rs , la sc a r in s  and co o lie s .
(211) For he merely sen t th e  man w ith a note o f in tro d u c tio n  saying 
th a t  he had some im portant news to  im part.
(213) TT.Ms da L iv. l699 .ff.254-256v; F.de Souza V I.370; P .da Trinidad© 
XII. 108-109; Jornada 19,20
(212) P .E .P ie ris^  Ceylon 11 . 178) in c o rre c tly  assumes th a t  th e  
Franciscan re fe rre d  to  in  F aria  de Souza was F r. Negrao.
2 2 0
th e re fo re  requested Senerat to  make a provocative a tta c k  from
Uva in  th e  hppe o f persuading de Sa to  le ad  a r e ta l ia to r y  ra id
in to  Uva, thus p rovid ing  an opportun ity  to  d es tro y  the  main
Portuguese army. In  response to  th i s  c a l l ,  Kumarasinha, P rince
o f Uva crossed the  f ro n t ie r  and w ith th e  a id  o f  m udaliyar
(213)
A'bhayasinha who had deserted  th e  Portuguese fo rces , ravaged
(214)
much o f  the  Two Korales fo r  a month. The g a rriso n  o f  Sabaragamuwa
f o r t  made up o f  s ix ty  Portuguese and a hundred and f i f t y  la s c a r in s
(315)
was too sm all to  take e f fe c tiv e  measures ag a in st th e  invaders.
De Sa thereupon decided to  make a r e ta l ia to ry  ra id  on
Uva. Jo3fo Rodriguez de Sa de Menezes m aintains th a t  th i s  was
p a r t ly  in  response to  th e  appeals o f  th e  S inhalese la s c a r in
commanders who pretended to  be zealous in  the  defence o f
Kotte to  ensnare the  cap ta in -g en era l. This could w ell have
been a s ig n if ic a n t f a c to r  sp e c ia lly  as th e  sen io r Portuguese
, ( 216) 
so ld ie rs  were dividedbn th e  a d v is a b il i ty  o f  th e  campaign. However
th e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  the  c ru c ia l fa c to rs  which in fluenced
(213) Abhayasinha was one o f  th e  la s c a r in  le ad ers  o f  Sabaragamuwa.
I t  i s  u n ce rta in  as to  when he deserted  from th e  Portuguese.
(214) Queyroz 765; JCBRAS XE.585; R ibeiro 226; Ajuda 51-IV -32 .f.6
(215) Jornada 9*17
(216) Those who opposed the  expedition  included Francisco de B rito  
de Almeida and Lanparote de Seixas. (TT.Ms da L iv. 1699*f*259)
Do Sa de Menezes (JCBRAS XI.587-88) says th e re  was a d iv e r s i ty  o f  
opin ions. Louren9o T eix e ira  de Macedo, cap ta in  o f  Negombo in  a 
l e t t e r  to  th e  king dated  4.12.1630 s ta te d  th a t  de Sa*s expedition  
was undertaken ag a in st th e  advice o f  a l l ,  but Francisco Barbosa da 
Andrade in  a document dated 3 August 1634 m aintained th a t  a l l  four 
disavas agreed to  th e  exped ition . (TT.LM.31»f«43; Jornada 9) Jo rnada ,21 
s ta te s  th a t  Luis Gomes P in to , who had o ffe red  to  lend  money to  
finance the  exped ition , changed h is  mind a f te r  he met th e  people o f 
the  Four K orales and Sabaragamuwa and advocated a sm all sca le  ra id  
by th e  captain-m ajor w hile de Sa remained a t  Malwana.
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de Sa*s d ec is io n  were th e  l e t t e r  rece ived  from the  viceroy, U&
( 21?) 
conde de L inhares.
The conde de Linhares^ since  h is  a r r iv a l  in  In d ia  in
October 1629 had received  many l e t t e r s  from both de Sa and th e
vedor, Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara complaining about each o th e r.
The viceroy  who had no doubt heard o f  de Sa9s achievements in
Ceylon, considered him th e  man b es t f i t t e d  to  deal w ith Portuguese
problems in  th e  is la n d . This was why on fin d in g  th a t  de F re ita s
and de Sa d id  no t g e t along w ell to g e th e r , he decided to  remove
de F re ita s . N evertheless he was a lso  convinced th a t  th e  g re a te r
■feblame in  the  d ispu te  should r e a l ly  be apportioned de Sa.
He th e re fo re  wrote to  de Sa th a t ,  9th e  genera l a tten d  to  war
. (218)
and leave m atters o f  financejto th e  vedor. 9 Moreover th e  v iceroy  
was convinced th a t  de Sa9s involvement in  p r^ iv a te  tra d e  was 
p re ju d ic ia l to  Portuguese in te r e s ts  as i t  d is tra c te d  th e  cap ta in - 
general from th e  war, Thus h is  l e t t e r s  included in ju n c tio n s  in  
s trong  terms th a t  an e f f o r t  should be made to  conquer Kandy and 
also  contained remarks to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  the tru e  function  o f
(219)
th e  cap ta in -genera l was war and not commerce. De Sa was deeply
(217) Queyroz ?65f 769; JCBRAS X I.535-590
(218) Assentos 1.265
(219) Queyroz 769; JCBRAS X I.590; Jo rnasa  21; Assentos 1.265-266; 
TT.Ms da L iv. l699 .f.259v ; BNL.Pombalina ^90 .f .  1955 Film oteca LM.13B. 
13/1^5 Ajuda 51-V III-51 .f.270
The v iceroy  had probably no doubts as to  the  honesty o f th e  cap ta in - 
g enera l. He simply wished to  prod him to  ac tio n . This exp lains why when 
on 14 September 1630 the  v ice ro y -in -co u n c il decided to  r e c a l l  the  vedor 
Lan^arote de Seixas to  Goa to  answer charges o f  m anslaughter, i t  was 
decided to  leave the  co n tro l o f  th e  finance as w ell as war w ith de Sa.
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h u rt by th ese  reprim inds made by h is  su p e rio r and kinsman and
decided to  r is k  no fu r th e r  ta u n ts  as to  h is  in a c t iv i ty .  In  Ju ly
1630 he assembled h is  fo rces a t  Menikkadawara fo r  an invasion  
( 220) 
o f Uva,
De S a 's  expedition to  Uva i s  e a s ily  th e  b es t documented
(221)
o f the  Portuguese invasions o f Kandy. De Sa s e t  out w ith  th e
forces he had assembled a t  Menikkadawara on 3 August 1630 and
marching by le is u r e ly  stages a rriv ed  a t  Sabaragamuwa about
fo r ty  m iles away on th e  seventh o f th e  month. There th e  array
re s te d  fo r two days u n t i l  Luis 6abral P in to  a rr iv ed  w ith fu r th e r
men. The combined fo rces now amounted to  f iv e  hundred and e igh ty
Portuguese s o ld ie r s , one hundred and twenty casados and topazes
and almost four thousand f iv e  hundred la s c a r in s . On 9 August
1630 th is  array l e f t  Sabaragamuwa and began to  make i t s  way
(222)
towards Kandyan te r r i to r y .
The southern rou te  to  Uva across the  Idalgash inna pass 
was perhaps even more d i f f i c u l t  than  th e  well-known invasion  
rou te to  Kandy proper through Balane. The Portuguese army had to
(220) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f . 257v
(221) Three d is t in c ts  accounts o f  th e  campaign w ritte n  w ith in  
ten  years o f  i t  are  av a ila b le  to  u s , ( v iz . ,  Jornada; Ms da L iv .
1699*ff* 257-269; JCBRAS XI. 593-605$ besides many contemporary 
l e t t e r s  and a chron ic le  o f  a l a t e r  d a te .
(222) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699. f f .2 6 lv ,263; Jornada 22; Aesentos I .  525 
Jomada-Lomba 89; P .da T rinidade I I I .  110; Queyroz 770; R ibeiro 226; 
De Sa de Menezes 592-593*
The d iv e rse  estim ates o f de S a 's  fo rces are  ta b u la ted  below.
(C ontd., in  next page.)
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take a c irc u ito u s  rou te through Pelm adulla gap to  avoid th e  
mountainous te r r a in  o f  th e  Rakwana h i l l s .  A fter s ix ty  m iles 
o f marching through lands fo re s ted  and c r iss -c ro sse d  by 
numerous stream s the  invading army would a r r iv e  a t  Haldumulla, 
th re e  thousand fe e t  above seaQ level. From here la y  th e  
d i f f i c u l t  p a r t  o f th e  journey, a climb o f  two thousand f iv e  
hundred fe e t w ith in  two m iles, through tro p ic a l  jung le  up to  
Idalgash inna. This was th e  id e a l  country fo r  g u e r i l la  w arfare 
as th e  invading marching through th e  sp a res ly  populated land 
a lso  had to  carry  th e i r  p rov isions w ith them. From Idalgash inna 
onwards however th e  o b stac les  were few. The invader marching
(222) Contd., from
Sources and date  o f soldados casados and la s c a r in s
source. topazes
TT.Ms da L iv .l699 .f.263* 350 40 4300+
Dec.1630
Assentos I .  515- 3*1*1631 508 120 5000
Jornada 24 1.4.1635 450 (soldados and 5000
casados)
JCBRAS XI. 592-593 -  1630*s 500 - 13,000
P .da Trinidade I I I . 100, 1630 •s 400 — —  —
Jomada-Lomba 89,  l630fs 400 80 3 ,000
F.de Souza V I.370- 1675 400 - —
Queyroz 770- l680fs 500 200 13,000
R ibeiro  226- 1685 400 100 20,000
Baldaeus 88- l680*s 1300 1700 8 ,000
The estim ates in  Assefttos I . ^SKK^±Edxkszs are accepted he]
as they  rep resen t th e  o f f i c i a l  f ig u re s  quoted by the  v iceroy  to  
the k ing  w ith in  s ix  months o f th e  campaign. The f ig u res  quoted by 
Fr. Assumpacao (Ms.da L iv. 1699 f • 3^3 ) fo r  th e  Portuguese 
are considered too low, as th e  number o f Portuguese who f e l l  
in to  S inhalese lands numbered over two hundred and f i f t y .
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northwards came in to  more open country and had th e  advantage 
of descending from the  mountains to  a country w ith g en tly  
undulating h i l l s  covered w ith grass and small t r e e s .  In  th e  
cen tre  o f  th i s  Uva Basin was th e  c a p ita l  c i ty  o f  th e  province, 
Badulla.
D e S a ' s  i n v a d i n g  a r m y  h o w e v e r  h a d  a n  u n e x p e c t e d l y  e a s y
p a s s a g e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s .  A s  t h e  K a n d y a n  i n t e n t i o n  w a s  t o
draw the Portuguese as f a r  as p o ssib le  in to  th e i r  t e r r i to r y ,
l i t t l e  r e s i s t a n c e  w a s  o f f e r e d  t o  t h e  i n v a d i n g  a r m y  w h i c h  r e a c h e d
Idalgashinna on 15 August 1630. Three days l a t e r  th e  Portuguese
were a t  Badulla. Badulla, though the  p ro v in c ia l c a p ita l  was
l i t t l e  more than a sm all v i l lg e ,  fo r  ap a rt from the  residence
o f  t h e  P r i n c e  a n d  t h e  t e m p l e s ,  l i t t l e  h a d  b e e n  b u i l t  a f t e r
(223)
the  se ttlem en t was sacked by th e  Portuguese in  1615.
The invading army s e t  f i r e  to  th e  se ttlem en t. The m ajo rity  
o f houses having roofs tha tched  w ith straw  caught f i r e  e a s i ly . 
Thereupon the  Portuguese s e t  up th e i r  headquarters a t  Muthiyangana 
Vihara which was p ro tec ted  by th e  Beli-Hul Oya on one sid e  and 
a stone w all and a d itc h  on the  o th e r. From th is  base they  
sen t out fo rag ing  p a r t ie s  on the  18 and 19 o f August to  c o lle c t^
(223) Jornada 22-23; Jomada-Lomba 885 TT.Ms da L iv. 1699#f*263; 
Bocarro 406-407; F.de Souza V ol.6 . p g .78; Paranagi Hatana, stanzas 
85-94 ( in  R ibeiro 250); Maha Hatana. stanzas 41-45; Mandarampura- 
puvata , stanzas 212- 218 .
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prov isions and burn th e  rip en in g  r ic e  crop in  th e  areas
(224)
around Badulla, Meanwhile th e  Kandyans had completed th e i r  
p rep ara tio n s . The k ing  and th e  p rinces having ra ise d  the 
la rg e s t  army they  could m uster g radually  advanced up th e  
Beli-Hul Oya and took up p o s itio n s  around Badulla on 
20 August 1630, The t o t a l  Kandyan fo rce  numbered about twelve
(225)
thousand men, o f whom a t  l e a s t  a  thousand had muskets w hile
(226)
the o thers were armed w ith swords, p ikes and bows and arrows.
On the  very day th a t  the  Kandyan arm£ appeared a s e r ie s  
o f events a t  len g th  convinced de Sa th a t  th e  la s c a r in  commanders 
a t  the  p o in t o f  re v o lt  and th a t  the  Portuguese army being so 
fa r  away from th e i r  n e a re s t f o r t  and having no hope o f  r e l i e f  
were in  g re a t danger. E arly  in  the  morning a lo y a l la s c a r in  
found a message from th e  Kandyans to  th e  m udaliyars rev ea lin g  
the  p lo t .  S t i l l  th e  genera l was unconvinced, fe a r in g  th a t  th is  
was merely a Kandyan stratagem  to  sow m is tru s t. Soon a f te r
(227)
however a S inhalese a ra tc h i named Dom Jeronimo (o r Dharmasuriya)
(224) JCBRAS XI ,594; Queyroz 771; Jomada-Lomba 895 Baldaeus 885 
F,de Souza VI,370; Maha Hatana, stanza 55
(225) TT,Ms da Liv,l699«f*267 The Portuguese norm ally exaggerate 
the  number o f th e i r  opponents involved and freq u en tly  f a i l  to  mention 
th e  numbers o f th e  a u x i l l ia ry  troops th a t  supported them. In  th i s  
resp ec t F r, Assumpcao i s  b e t te r  than most and th e  above estim ate i s  
the  one given by him. Other estim ates are  as follow s -
De Sa de M,596 -20,000; Queyroz 771- 40,000; Jornada 26-30,000; 
Baldaeus 88-  23,000
(226) Parang! Hatana stanzas 9 4 - ll4 ( In  R ibeiro 250-251)
(227) 'Adamanasuri* according to  Jornada 23 and •Idrum araturi* 
according to  JCBRAS X I.594
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who had f a l le n  out w ith the  co nsp ira to rs  on a question  o f
lead ersh ip  came over to  de Sa and gave a l l  th e  inform ation
he had about the  p lo t .  The a ra tc h i advised th a t  the  b es t
course o f ac tio n  would be to  a r r e s t  the  le ad ers  o f  th e  p lo t
fo r th e  mass o f  la s c a r in s  who as y e t knew noth ing  about
i t  might remain lo y a l. De Sa however was re lu c ta n t to  r is k  a
b a t t le  w ith in  h is  own camp w hile th e  Kandyans remained close
a t  hand. He th e re fo re  summoned th e  m udaliyars and asked
fo r th e i r  advice on th e  course o f  ac tio n  to  be taken xgaxst
aga inst th e  Kandyans. The m udaliyars advised r e t r e a t  as th e
purpose o f  the  r e ta l ia to ry  ra id  was now achieved. De 8a thereupon
feign ing  fr ie n d sh ip , p ra ised  them fo r t h e i r  s e rv ic e s , re s to re d
to  them the  po sts  o f  vidana o f th e  foundry workers which the
vedor had taken from them and swore an oath  to  r e ta in  them
in  th e i r  p o sts  as long as he remain cap ta in -g en era l. A ll surp lus
s to re s  and sp o ils  accumulated in  th e  campaign were co llec ted
and burnt and th e  army prepared fo r the  r e t r e a t  planned fo r
th e  follow ing day keeping su p p lies s u f f ic ie n t  only fo r  a two
(228) 
day*s march.
This sudden d isp lay  o f g en ero sity  d id  no t d iv e r t
/
the la s c a r in  commanders from th e  course they  had planned fo r  so
TC0RAS "X|
(228) Queyroz 771-772; Pe-Sa de & 594; R ibeiro 226-227;
Jornada 24; TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f . 263v
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long. At day break on 21 August before th e  r e t r e a t  began
they  asked to  be placed in  th e  van o f  the  Portuguese fo rc e s .
De Sa agreed to  p lace some o f  them but by keeping the  la sc a r in s
in  the  van and th e  re a r  as w ell as in  th e  two flanks ho hoped
to  c rea te  a c o n f lic t  between them and th e  Kandyans before
th e  lead ers  could a c t .  Moreover by th e  d isp o s itio n  he kept
(229)
th e  Portuguese forces unbroken in  th e  cen tre .
As th e  Portuguese emerged from Badulla they  found th e
troops o f  Kandy blocking the  rou te  o f  r e t r e a t .  Before b a t t le
could be jo ined  Dora Jeronimo Rajapakse a t  nine in  th e  morning
d eserted  w ith th e  men o f th e  Seven K orales leav in g  th e  Portuguese
flanks unprotected . At the  same time Dom Cosmo, k i l l in g  th e
(230)
Portuguese n ea re s t to  him, deserted  w ith h is  fo rces followed 
by Dom A leixeio , Dom Theodosio and Dom B althazar.
De Sa re-organized  h is  fo rces . His p o s itio n  was a 
despera te  one. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  many o f th e  la s c a r in s .  who 
were unaware o f the  p lo t  were taken by su rp r is e , remained fo r
(229) Queyroz 77^5 De Sa de M. 59^5 Jornada 24-25
(230) His name was J 0T0 Bernades and he was a casado. Jornada 25, 
s ta te s  th a t  he marched near Dom Cosmo a t  Dom Cosmo's
own req u es t.
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(231)
the  moment w ith the  Portuguese fo rc e s . However i t  was 
c lea r  th a t  only a m inority  o f  th e se  men could be r e l ie d  on 
to  s tay  w ith them e sp e c ia lly  i f  conditions became d if f ic u l t*
Those who d eserted  exhorted the  la s c a r in s  who remained to  
follow  s u i t  and jo in  them in  th e  expulsion o f the  hated 
fo re ig n er. Moreover th e  ro u te  through which de Sa had come 
up to  Uva, through the  Idalgash inna p ass , was so w ell 
defended th a t  the  cap ta in -g en era l in  r e t r e a t  was forced to  
move south-eastw ards in s te ad  o f south-westwards thus reducing 
even fu rth e r  h is  chance o f su rv iv a l as he had now a much 
longer d is tan ce  to  tra v e rse  before he could reach f r ie n d jy  
t e r r i to r y .
On 21 August the  Portuguese made considerable progress 
towards the  f ro n t ie r .  By determined e f fo r ts  they  cu t through 
th e  Kandyan fo rces and advanced up to  th e  Lunugala h i l l s  
which separated  th e  Uva Basin from th e  so u th -easte rn  low lands.
On th e  o th e r hand they  su ffe red  considerable lo s s e s . Many 
o f the la sc a r in s  made away whhn th e  opportun ity  arose and
(231) R ibeiro  227 holds th a t  only a hundred and f i f t y  la sc a r in s  
remained w ith th e  Portuguese. F r. Assump^So1 s account (TT.Ms da 
L iv . 1699.f*267) however a s s e r ts  th a t  two hundred lo y a l la s c a r in s  
were k i l l d  on th e  f i r s t  day o f  th e  b a t t l e .  Queyroz 775 
in d ic a te s  th a t  a t  l e a s t  f iv e  hundred remained w ith th e  
Portuguese to  th e  l a s t .  Therefore th e  evidence in  Jornada 
25 ,27  th a t  a t  l e a s t  h a l f  th e  la s c a r in  troops remained w ith 
the  Portuguese a t  the  o u tse t appears l ik e ly .  This could explain  
how s ix  hundred Portuguese and topazes r e s is te d  f i f te e n  
thousand men fo r two days.
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l a te  in  the day th e  S inhalese cu t o f f  th e  r e a r  guard le d  
by disava Luis T eixe ira  Macedo and took twenty two
(232)
Portuguese p riso n e r . On th e  follow ing day, Tuesday 22 August 
1630, the  Portuguese army was com pletely surrounded in  an 
open f ie ld  a t  Randeniwela near Wellawaya and a n n ih ila ted  by
(233the  S inhalese forces le d  by th e  k ing  and th e  th ree  p rin c e s . 
The b a t t le  raged from morning u n t i l  m id-afternoon. At two 
in  the  a f te rn o o n ,a f te r  two hundred Portuguese had f a l le n ,
(232) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f . 267-2685 R ibeiro 227-228; J 0rnada 24-28; 
Queyroz 774-7755 De Sa de M. 599-604; Jornada-Lomba 89-91;
Paranagi Hatana stanzas 115-134(In R ibeiro 251-253) Mandarampura 
puvata stanzas 220-229
Queyroz basing h is  account on Jornada s ta te s  th a t  
the  Portuguese stru g g led  fo r  four days. A ll o th e r accounts 
(except Jornada-Lomba) agree th a t  the  Portuguese army 
was defeated  on th e  second day. R ibeiro  m aintains th a t  a 
shower o f  ra in  which f e l l  on th e  n ig h t before the  f in a l  b a t t le  
prevented th e  use o f fire -a rm s by th e  Portuguese. Other 
Portuguese accounts however mention the  use o f  fire -a rm s 
in  the  l a s t  day o f f ig h tin g . I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th e re fo re  th a t  
only a p a r t  o f  the  Portuguese stock o f powder was a ffec ted  
by the  ra in .
(233) Queyroz 771,730 a s s e r ts  th a t  Senerat who had caught 
a fever was not on th e  b a t t le  f i e ld .  S inhalese sources 
however in d ic a te  th a t  he was p re sen t and th a t  he re tu rned  
to  Senkadagala only a f te r  the  b a t t l e .
Ra.javaliya 101; Mandarampura Puvata. stanzas 2l4«24l
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(23*0
the  cap ta in -g en era l h im self was k illed *  The Portuguese continued 
to  s tru g g le  fo r  another hour under Luis Gomes P in to  bu t on
v ic to ry  hard earn
The s ig n ific an ce  o f Randeniwela la y  in  th e  complete 
d es tru c tio n  o f  the  Portuguese army* At L e llo p itiy a  and Ambatenna 
de Sa had managed to  preserve h is  array in ta c t  and had re tre a te d  
to  a p o s itio n  o f safety* At Randeniwela he fa i le d  to  do so* His 
d efea t in  1630 marked th e  g re a te s t  S inhalese v ic to ry  ag a in st 
the  Portuguese since th e  a n n ih ila tio n  o f th e  e x p e d itio n a ry
force o f Pero Lopes de Souza a t  Danture in  1594* Though perhaps
(234) The cap ta in -genera l h im self i s  s a id  to  have k i l l e d  many 
S inhalese before h is  dea th . (TT.Ms da Liv* 1699* f«305» Queyrox 777)
This may have due to  Senerat*s orders to  se ize  him alive*  There 
are  many versions as to  how de Sa a c tu a l ly  died* Knox*s v ersio n , 
th a t  he stabbed h im self w ith a k n ife  o f  a K a ffir  se rvan t
appears u n lik e ly  in  view o f th e  accounts o f th e  b a t t le  
av a ilab le  to  u s . Queyroz 778 (fo llow ing  Jornada 30) s ta te s  
th a t  de Sa was acc id en tly  sho t by a Portuguese Jo^ Co da Fonseca.
I t  i s  more l ik e ly  however th a t  he was k i l l e d  by th e  S inhalese 
as s ta te d  by h is  son (JCBRAS.XI. 604) Fr* Assumpcao (Msjda L iv .
1699*f*306) F.de Souza (V ol.V I.372) and in  th e  d ia ry  o f th e  
conde de L inhaees. (Ajuda 51-VIII-51*f*399)
(235) One hundred and t h i r t y  Portuguese and a hundred la s c a r in s  
formed th e  Portuguese fo rces which even tu a lly  surrendered .
CLR 3 se r.3 5 2 ; Queyroz 774; JCHttS XVIII. 169-1715 Baldaeus 965 
Assentos I .525
(236) Queyroz claims th a t  the  S inhalese l o s t  n ea rly  four thousand men*
(237) Queyroz 775-778; De Sa de M. 599-604; Jornada-Lomba 91>
Jornada 28-30; Haha Hatana stanzas 58- 66 ; Paran&i Hatana s tan za s , 135- 
209; (In  R ibeiro  253-256)T Mandarampura Puvata stanza  230;
R ibeiro 228; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699• f •268-269v
(238) Queyroz 483-4r 488; S .G .Perera- A h is to ry  o f Ceylon fo r  
sch o o ls .frp-32 - .
(235)
h is  death  they  even tually  surrendered* The S inhalese lo sse s
(236)




le s s  p o l i t i c a l ly  d ec is iv e  than  the b a t t le  o f Danture,
Randeniwela r e a l ly  l e f t  the  Portuguese in  Ceylon in  a worse 
m ilita ry  p o s it io n . In  1594 the  Portuguese d e fea t d id  not 
involve any r is k  o f  a Kandyan a ttack  on the  low lands. The 
cap ta in -in -charge  o f th e  Portuguese fo rces in  K otte had not
(239)
p a r tic ip a te d  in  the  campaign and was able to  o rganise re s is ta n c e .
The army which had been destroyed had consisted  c h ie f ly  o f
so ld ie rs  who had a rriv ed  in  Ceylon a sh o rt while before
fo r th e  sp e c if ic  ta sk  o f invading Kandy and thus the  reg u la r
(240)
Portuguese fo rces were more o r le s s  in ta c t .  In  1630 on the
o ther hand the  cap ta in -genera l la y  dead on the  f ie ld  o f  b a t t le
and h is  c h ie f  o f f ic e r s  were e i th e r  k i l l e d  or taken p riso n e r .
Except fo r a mobile force in  Ja ffn a  which was hard ly  adequate
to defend bven th a t  kingdom the Portuguese now had only th e
g arrisons o f  th e i r  f o r t s .  In  K otte i t s e l f  th e  Portuguese had
hard ly  fiv e  hundred able-bodied casados and soldados wi t h
two o r th ree  thousand la s c a r in s  o f a ra th e r  dubious lo y a lty .
Even these  fo rces were s c a tte re d  throughout the land  though
mainly in  and around th e  seven fo r ts  o f Colombo, Kegombo, K alu tara ,
(241)
G alle , Sabaragamuwa, Menikkadawara and Malwana. The fo rtunes
(239) Q u e y r o z  494
(240) Q u e y r o z  479
(241) Q u e y r o z  771; J o r n a d a - L o m b a  91; J o r n a d a  40; A j u d a  51*VIII- 51. 
f.303 ; AHU C a i x a  16. 18.1.1644; TT.Ms d a  L i v .  1699.f f .
274v, 275v, 279, 297, 313
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of war had a t  l a s t  swung on to  th e  Kandyan side*
The campaigns o f 1628-1630 demonstrated how g re a t a
recovery Kandy had made a f te r  th e  peace t r e a ty  o f 1017# While
in  the  f i r s t  two decades o f th e  seventeenth century the  Portuguese
in  K otte invaded and ravaged Kandy almost a t  w i l l ,  s tro n g er fo rces
under de Sa, who was as good a le a d e r  as any, fa i le d  to  g e t the
upper hand in  1620*s . A la rg e  share o f th e  c re d it  fo r  th i s  chainge
in  p o s itio n  must be a l lo te d  to  th e  refugees -  S inhalese , Tamils
and Muslims -who f led  from Portuguese t e r r i to r y  and revived th e
c u ltiv a tio n  o f the  areas abandoned during th e  wars o f th e  e a r l ie r
period* A p a r t  o f  th e  c re d it  can also  be claimed by Seberat whose
wise p o licy  o f encouragement o f s e t t l e r s  from abroad was a fa c to r
(242)
in  the growth o f th e  Kandyan population  during th i s  period*
De Safs m il ita ry  d e fea t was in  a sense a r e f le c t io n  o f h is  f a i lu r e
to  gain the  confidence and lo y a lty  o f  th e  conquered S inhalese . De Sa
wished to  wih th e i r  support and adherence and th e re  i s  l i t t l e
doubt th a t  he won genuine a f fe c tio n  and resp ec t from many
of the S inhalese who came to  know him. However by b i r th ,
upbringing and p o s itio n  he was firm ly  committed to  c e r ta in
p o lic ie s  which were c le a r ly  unpopular w ith th e  m ajo rity  o f
the people o f K otte . His a c t iv i ty  in  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f 
(243)temples and in  th e  propagation o f th e  C h ris tian  f a i th  in
(242) Mandarampura Puvata stanzas 179-209
(243) Jornada 15
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a land  where Buddhism had deep ro o ts , h is  usage oft th e  custom^ 
of ra .jakariya to  bu ild  fo r ts  fo r  the  Portuguese by S inhalese 
lab o u r, h is  w ar-like  p o licy  towards Kandy and h is  expulsion 
o f th e  peacefu l Muslim community, were fa c to rs  which more 
than  counteracted  a k ind ly  natu re  and a passion  fo r  
ju s t ic e  and f a i r  play* De Sa fo rg o t th a t  no conquer ear 
could a ffo rd  to  be l ib e r a l  to  the  conquered and depend 
on th e i r  support unless he com pletely id e n tif ie d  h is  in te r e s ts  
w ith th e i r s ,  and he even tually  paid  the  p ric e  fo r  t h i s .
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CHAPTER IV
The d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  Portuguese army a t  Randeniwela 
was merely th e  f i r s t  s tep  o f  a programme devised to  expel 
the  Portuguese from the  is la n d . The next step  was to  be the 
se izu re  o f  Colombo f o r t  from w ith in  by a band o f la s c a r in s  
organised by Dom Manual and the  Kanakapulle o f  Antonio de Souza 
Coutinho. The success o f  th i s  stage o f  the  p lo t  depended a 
g re a t deal on the  tim ing o f th e  r e v o lt  w ith in  th e  army under
Ur
de Sa and was here th a t  th e  weakness o f  the  whole p lan  la y .
A
The four la s c a r in  commanders who planned to  d e se rt could not 
g ive th e i r  confederates in  Colombo a d e f in i te  d a te  on which 
th e  r is in g  would take p la ce . Their p lan  was to  s t r ik e  whenever 
an opportun ity  presen ted  i t s e l f  and then  to  send a sw ift 
message to  th e i r  congpatriots in  Colombo. Thus everything 
depended upon whether Dom Manual received  th e  news before the  
Portuguese d id , fo r  he had only some s ix  hundred men w ith him 
in  Colombo and th e re fo re  needed the  element o f  su rp rise  to  
succeed. The reb e l le ad e rs  were a l l  th e  more concious o f  th is  
because the  fam ilies o f  Dom Cosmo^, Dom B althazar and Dom Aleixo 
liv e d  w ith in  a few m iles o f  the  f o r t  o f  Colombo and would be 
in  g re a t danger i f  the  Portuguese go t word o f the  p lo t .  This 
was why they  despatched Dom Aleixo w ith  a fo rce o f  two hundred
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(1)
men to  Colombo as soon as v ic to ry  was secured*
Dom Aleixo*s ta sk  was thus two fo ld  -  to  remove the
fam ilies o f th e  reb e l le ad e rs  to  p laces o f  sa fe ty  and to
in s t ru c t  and a id  Dom Manual in  the  r is in g  which was planned
to  take p lace w ith in  the  fo rt*  Marching sw if tly  across th e
country Dom Aleixo reached th e  environs o f  Colombo on the
n igh t o f  Monday 26 August 1630 having covered over a hundred
m iles in  four days. On h is  a r r iv a l  Dom Aleixo found th a t  he
could not send a message in to  th e  f o r t  because i t  was l a t e  and
the gates o f  the  f o r t  c losed . He th e re fo re  decided to  use h is
time to  take the  fam ilies  o f  th e  la s c a r in s  to  p laces o f s a fe ty  
(2)
in  the  in te r io r .  Meanwhile Antonio Gomes, a la s c a r in  lo y a l to  
the Portuguese, had made h is  escape from Uva to  th e  f o r t  o f 
Malwana. There he re la te d  to  i t s  cap tain  Francisco de B rito  
de Almeida whttafche had found out about th e  conspiracy to  d e fea t
(3)
de Sa and to  se ize  th e  f o r t  o f Colombo from w ith in . News was 
a t  once se n t to  Colombo and was in  the  hands o f th e  vedor
Lanparote de Seixas e a r ly  on th e  twenty seventh before th e
(1) TT.Ms da L iv. I699.f*270; P .da Trinidade I I I .  111,16?
(2) Fr. Assumpcao suggests th a t  immediate a ttack  was ru led  out 
because Dom Aleixo p re fe rre d  to  save h is  own fam ily before 
a ttac k in g  th e  Portuguese but th e  o th e r S inhalese lead ers  
appaeently  did  not hold him responsib le  fo r  th e  f a i lu re  to  
se ize  Colombo fo r  Dom Aleixo continued to  hold high p o sts  in  
l a t e r  y ea rs .
(3) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.ff.2?0-271 ; AHU Caixa 16 a n t. 18.1.1644, 
f t
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S inhalese could s e t the  p lo t  in  motion.
De Siexas acted prom ptly, o rgan ising  two mobile fo rces -  
one to  ra id  th e  residences of reb e ls  o u tsid e  Colombo, to  t r y  
to  se ize  th e i r  fam ilies and goods, and th e  o th e r to  round 
up the  p lo t te r s  w ith in  th e  c i ty .  A s tro n g  guard was placed
w
a t  the  c i ty  gates.Dom Manual was a r re s te d  and was a t  once made 
p riso n e r . When questioned he confessed th e  com plicity  o f the  
Kanakapulle o f  Dom Antonio de Souza Coutinho who was a rre s te d  
a f te r  a sharp s tru g g le  in  which one Portuguese and s ix  S inhalese 
were k i l l e d .  In  a l l  about one hundred and e igh ty  co nsp ira to rs  
were a r re s te d  bu t more than tw ice th a t  number who could not
(5)
be id e n t i f ie d ^ la te r  escaped to  jo in  th e  S inhalese fo rces . Colombo
had escaped capture from w ith in ; i t s  f a te  was now to  be
(6)
decided by the  seige from w ithout.
Meanwhile in  Uva Senerat had decided to  re tu rn  to  Kandy
(7)
to  ce leb ra te  h is  triumph and perhaps also  to  r e c r u i t  fu r th e r
fo rces and organise su p p lie s . The Portuguese p riso n ers  followed
under stro n g  guard, w hile th e  p rin ces reorganized th e i r  fo rces
(8)fo r  the  march on Colombo across the  Two K orales. However, even
(4) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.ff.270-271v
(5) Ib id . ff.271v-272v; Jornada-Lomba 92
(6) Perhaps th e  S inhalese might have fared  b e t te r  had th e  reb e ls  
sen t an urgent message to  Dom Manual immediately a f te r  th e i r  
d efec tio n  on 20 August in s tead  o f w aitin g  fo r  v ic to ry .
(7) Mandarampura Puvata. stanzas 241-242
(8) Jornada 53? TT.Ms da L iv. l699»f*269v
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before the  troops could be s e t in  motion, news o f th e  d e fea t
o f th e  Portuguese had spread and th e  lands o f  K otte had r is e n .
Iso la te d  Portuguese in  the  v i l la g e s ,  whether s o ld ie rs ,  casados
(9)
or p r ie s ts  were a ttacked  and k i l le d .  When the S inhalese forces
under the p rinces a rr iv ed , they  found the  lowlands a lready  in
S inhalese hands, except fo r  the  Portuguese f o r ts .  In  the  absence
o f any strong  supporting Portuguese f ie ld  army th e  in lan d  f o r ts ,
to o , soon proved vu lnerab le . Many o f th e  fo r ts  had been
badly garrisoned  and what g a rriso n  th e re  was, consisted  o f  o ld ,
s ic k , in ju red  o r convalescent so ld ie rs  who had not been able
( 10)
to  make th e  journey to  Uva. Only the  co a s ta l fo r ts  were sa fe , 
thanks to  the in a b i l i ty  o f the  S inhalese to  th rea ten  Portuguese 
supremacy a t  sea .
The f i r s t  o f th e  in land  fo r ts  to  go was th e  base a t  
Malwana, where th e  g a rriso n  had included only seventeen Portuguese. 
Francisco de B rito  de Almeida reported  from here th a t  s ix  
thousand S inhalese were expected sh o r tly  and th a t  even i f  he 
had the  support o f lo y a l la s c a r in s .  he would not be able to  
hold out fo r  long due to  th e  lack  o f a reg u la r  w ater supply 
in s id e  th e  f o r t .  Because th e re  was a g re a t shortage o f men in  
Colombo, de Seixas a f te r  consu lting  a h a s t i ly  summoned council
(9) TT.Ms da L iv . I699.ff.273-273v, 295v; Jornada-Lomba 93
(10) TT.Ms da L iv .1699.f.274v; TT.LM.31.f.42v; AHU Caixa 16 an t.
18.1.1644
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of ad v ise rs , in s tru c te d  de Almeida to  withdraw. Already the  
countryside had r ise n  ag a in st th e  Portuguese and de Almeida 
could get to  Colombo only under th e  cover o f n ig h t a f te r  
je t t is o n in g  a l l  h is  surp lus powder and shot in  th e  Kelani 
r ifre r. He d id  succeed however in  b ring ing  w ith him two sm all 
cannon, some sm all arms, and a l i t t l e  r ic e .  The morning a f te r
( ID
he l e f t ,  a S inhalese force a rriv ed  and occupied th e  f o r t .
S h o rtly  afterw ards th e  f o r t  of Santa Cruz a t  Sabaragamuwa,
the key to  th e  whole disava f e l l  bu t th is  time w ith th e  lo s s
of the  whole g a rriso n . The f o r t  here was in  good cond ition .
I t  was equipped w ith th ree  p ieces o f  a r t i l l e r y  and had f i f t y
Portuguese and some la s c a r in s  to  defend i t .  However, though
the cap tain  Joab de Seixas had two days n o tic e  o f th e  approach
o f the  S inhalese , in s tead  o f p reparing  to  r e s i s t  or withdraw,
he f led  from th e  f o r t  a lone, l o s t  h is  way and was even tu a lly
( 12)
k i l le d  by th e  S inhalese . His successor o ffe red  to  surrender^ 
th e  f o r t  to  Dom Theodosio and th e  P rince o f Uva on cond ition  th a t  
the  l iv e s  o f th e  g arriso n  were spared. This being agreed to ,
(11) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699 * ff .274-275; Jornada-Lomba 935
Queyroz 982; P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon 11.189; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; 
AHU Caixa 16, an t. 18.1.1644
(12) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699#f *273; Jornada 39? Jornada-Lomba 92
\ \ \ \  \ \ \ \ \ \  \  \ \  \  \
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the  Portuguese were sen t to  Kandy under e sc o rt and th e  S inhalese
(13)occupied the  f o r t .
In  strong  co n tra s t to  th e  cowardice d isp layed  a t
Sabaragamuwa was th e  te n a c ity  o f  th e  g arriso n  o f the  f o r t  o f
Santa Fef a t  Menikkadawara. This f o r t  commanded the  upper reaches
o f the  Kelani Valley and had o ften  served as a base fo r  in cu rsions
ag a in st Kandy. The f o r t  i t s e l f  was s tro n g , having been b u i l t
in  1627 by de Sa. I t  was amply provisioned and had a reg u la r
supply o f w ater w ith in  the  w alls . The cap ta in , Manual Mendes de
Motta w ith h is  g a rriso n  o f seventy Portuguese hung on determ inedly
from August to  mid November though th e re  seemed no p o s s ib i l i ty
o f r e l i e f  from Colombo which was by then  c lo ee ly  in v ested .
(14)
However when Maha Astana and Senerat appeared before th e  f o r t  
on th e i r  way back from Colombo to  Kandy fu r th e r  re s is ta n c e  
seemed hopeless. Nine so ld ie rs  had a lready  d ese rted . Therefore 
Mendes de Motta o ffe red  to  su rrender on condition  th a t  each 
Portuguese would be allowed to  take  h is  arras and a l l  th e  p roperty  
th a t  he h im self and h is  se rvan ts could ca rry . This being agreed 
to  the  Portuguese marched out and th e  S inhalese took possession
(13) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699* f f .273-274; Jornada 395 Queyroz 782; 
JCBRAS X V III,170,226; P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon I I .  190
(14) P .E .P ie r is  (Ceylon I I .  190)probably basing h is  account on 
R ajas in h a 's  l e t t e r s  to  th e  Dutch (JCBRAS X V III.170, 226) says 
th a t  i t  was Rajasinha (or Maha Astana as he was ca lle d  before 
he became king) who captured Menikkadawara bu t the  accounts o f  
the Jornada and F r. Assumpcab make i t  c le a r  th a t  the  Portuguese 
n ego tia ted  w ith Senerat though Rajasinha was w ith him.
Jornada 49-50; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699*f f *299-299v; Assentos I .  526
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(15)
o f th e  fo rt#
With th e  f a l l  o f  Menikkadawara th e  l a s t  v e s tig es  o f  Portuguese
con tro l over th e  lowlands o f K otte were swept away and fo r  the
time being they  were reduced to  t h e i r  strongholds upon the
coast* Even these  had not been preserved in ta c t  fo r  Manual Corea
de B rito , th e  cap tain  o f K alutara r e t i r e d  w ith a l l  h is  men
northwards to  Colombo as soon as he beared o f the d e fea t o f
( 16)
de Sa and th e  imminent Kandyan invasion . De B rito  m aintained 
th a t  o f th e  twenty two Portuguese in  h is  g a rr iso n , some were 
sick  and th a t  in  any case th e re  were no munitions or p rov isions 
in  the f o r t .  Unlike de Almeida however, he had not obtained 
perm ission to  abandon h is  p o s t. Moreover he had l e f t  th ree
(17)
p ieces o f  a r t i l l e r y  behind. De Seixas l a t e r  argued th a t  de B rito
should have defended K alu tara u n t i l  he was re in fo rced  or ordered
( 18)
to  withdraw from the f o r t .  The d isapproval de B rito  had to  face
in  Colombo was by no means lessened  when th e  S inhalese used
the a r t i l l e r y  he had l e f t  behind to  f i r e  ag a in s t th e  Colombo 
(19)
fort.Hgwever, the  lo ss  or re te n tio n  o f a minor p o st l ik e
(15) Jornada 49-505 Jornada-Lomba 935 Queyroz 7875 JCBRAS X V III.170; 
P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I .  190; Assentos I .  5295 TT.Ms da L iv .
1699. f  f . 299-299v;
(16) P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon I I .  189; Queyroz 782
(17) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f f . 275-276; Jornada-Lomba 92
(18) TT.LM.30.ff. 158; Filmoteca LM 13A 21/3; Queyroz 782 .
Queyroz i s  wrong when he says th a t  de Seixas ordered the
g arriso n  o f  K alu tara to  withdraw.
(19) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699* f *291 De B rito  was even tually  t r i e d  
fo r  the o ffence . See Film oteca LM. 19B 56-75/1-4
K alu tara was unimportant* The key to  th e  Portuguese-S inhalese 
stru g g le  was now Colombo* That th is  was so must have been 
c le a r  to  the  S inhalese and Portuguese a l ik e , and i t  i s  
necessayy th e re fo re  to  consider how e f fe c t iv e ly  th e  S inhalese 
pushed th e i r  advantage a f te r  Randeniwela. Queyroz m aintains 
th a t  the  P rinces delayed so long in  th e i r  march from Uva to  
Colombo th a t  they  gave th e  c i ty  twenty s ix  days to  prepare and 
he argues th a t  th is  was one o f  the  ch ie f reasons fo r  the  
su ccessfu l defence o f th e  c i ty .  The p rin ce s , he w rite s , ’marched 
to  Sofragao in  te n  days and re s tin g  a day, they  spent fonr £daysj 
on th e  one day’s march to  Colombo.* The Jornada even enlarges on 
th i s  account by a s se r tin g  th a t  th e  p r in ce s , ’EEgaddoig tianaxH±XKX
a f te r  tak in g  th e  f o r t  a t  Sabaragamuwa spent e igh t days ’reg a lin g
h 'JC (20)
themselves dancing g i r l s .*
Ak
For th i s  period  the  only evidence av a ilab le  i s  Portuguese, 
nevertheless i t  i s  easy to  show th a t  th e  p ic tu re  o f S inhalese 
in e p titu d e  and f o l ly  given above i s  wrong both in  d e t a i l  and 
probably in  g enera l. Note ha£ already  been taken o f  th e  speed 
w ith which th e  p repara tions fo r  an in su rre c tio n  w ith in  Colombo 
was s e t  on foo t a f te r  de Sa’s f in a l  d e fea t and death . Dom A leixo, 
marching l ig h t  w ith h is  sm all fo rce was under th e  w alls o f  the
(20) Queyroz 780-781; Jornada 38-39
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c i ty  by the evening o f  th e  twenty s ix th  o f  August, j u s t  four
days a f te r  th e  f in a l  v ic to ry  a t  Randeniwela* Eleven days l a t e r
the p rinces w ith th e  main S inhalese army had reached Colombo
( 21)
and begun i t s  seige* To have reorganised  th e i r  troops and supply 
and baggage t r a in s  a f te r  v ic to ry  and then to  have marched some 
one hundred and twenty m iles through jungle-covered h i l l s  
in  the  t a i l  o f  the monsoon, securing  th e  su rrender o f  th e  
Fort Santa Cruz on the  way, so as to  reach Colombo &n 7 September 
does not seem to  leave much room fo r a supposed e ig h t days 
d a llian ce  w ith  dancing g ir ls *  I t  may be th a t  even more speed 
could have been achieved and th a t  as F aria  de Souza argues the  
princes r e l ie d  too co n fid en tly  on th e  success o f  the  r is in g  
w ith in  Colombo by Dom Manual and the  Kanakapalle* Again the  
i l ln e s s  o f the  king a t  th i s  moment may have d is tra c te d  th e  
a tte n tio n  o f th e  p rinces Kumarasinghe and V ijayapala who were 
by no means content w ith  the  s iz e  o f  th e  p r in c ip a l i t ie s  awarded 
to  them or w ith the  sp e c ia l favours shown to  th e i r  b ro th er 
Maha Astana. I t  may be, as Portuguese sources say , th a t  the  
princes delayed so as to  l e t  the  king come from Kandy and take 
command o f  the  a s sa u lt  on Colombo* But th e re  i s  l i t t l e  need 
to  c a l l  in  th ese  explanations fo r  th e re  are  more obvious m il i ta ry
(21) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f . 276
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reasons fo r some delay  in  s e t t in g  off* No army was l ik e ly  to  
be ab le to  mobe o f f  d i r e c t ly  from a major b a t t le  to  a d is ta n t
i'e*
se ig e , q u ite  c e r ta in ly  not a S inhalese one, fo r  the  peasant
le v ie s  were no t obliged to  serve in  o ffensive  wars beyond the
f ro n tie r s  o f  th e i r  land* On th is  occasion i t  i s  known th a t  th e
forces of Uva refused  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  a campaign ag a in s t the
Portuguese in  th e  kingdom o f  K otte , d esp ite  an o f fe r  o f  four
f i f th s  o f the  plunder to  be taken* The p rin ces must th e re fo re
have had to  r e c r u i t  fre sh  tro o p s , in  p a r t  a t  l e a s t ,  fo r  th e i r
advance on Sabaragamuwa and thence on Colombo* Under such
circum stances th e i r  advance from Randeniwela to  Colombo in
s ix teen  days -  not twenty s ix  as Queyroz s ta te s  -  rep resen ts
(22)
a very vigourous e f fo r t  to  follow  up victory*
The Portuguese in  Colombo d id  not even have s ix teen  
days warning, fo r  as has been seen the  f i r s t  news o f th e  d is a s te r  
did  not a rr iv e  from Malwana u n t i l  th e  morning o f 27 August*
They th e re fo re  had ju s t  eleven days to  prepare fo r  th e  forthcoming 
struggle* I t  must be adm itted th a t  even th i s  sh o rt space o f time 
was o f immense value to  th e  Portuguese* Their f i r s t  ta sk  was to  
i n s t a l l  a new lead er to  rep lace de Sa* This was soon done, fo r 
the  day a f te r  th e  p lo t  o f Dom Aleixo had been crushed th e  members
(22) F.de Souza VI. 372-373; Queyroz 69-70, 5^5
244
of the  camara and o ther im portant o f f i c ia l s  gathered in  th e
council chamber and opened th e  l e t t e r  o f  succession l e f t  by
the cap ta in -genera l when he marched fo r  Uva, This named
Lan^arote de Seixas, th e  vedor, who was a t  once accepted as
the  new cap ta in -genera l u n t i l  fu r th e r  o rders could a r r iv e  from 
(23)
Goa,
The nex t ta sk  was to  streng then  the  defences o f  th e  c i ty .
The f o r t  a t  Colombo was the  s tro n g es t held by th e  Portuguese
and w ell p ro tec ted  by n a tu re . However the  l a s t  re p a irs  to  th e
fo r t  had been made fiv e  years e a r l ie r  and even then a t te n tio n
(24)
had been concentrated on th e  bulwarks p ro te c tin g  the  harbour.
Most o f th e  w alls were in  a poor s ta te  and had f a l le n  down in  
p a r ts  while some o f  the  lake fro n t o f Colombo was e n t i r e ly  
unprotected . During th e  lim ite d  tim e he had a t  h is  d isp o sa l 
Lan^arote de Seixas had th e  w alls r e b u i l t ,  rep a ired  o r supported 
by coconut and arecanut tru n k s . Repair^ o f  sp e c if ic  p a r ts  o f 
th e  w alls was a llo ca ted  to  c e r ta in  f id a lg o s . Some o f  th e  t r e e s  
th a t  had been allowed to  grow up near th e  w alls o f  th e  c i ty  
were also  cu t down so th a t  Portuguese a r t i l l e r y  could have the  
maximum e f f e c t .  F in a lly , when th e  re p a irs  were completed
(23) Jornada 76; F.de Souza VI.373; Assentos 1,293,307;
TT.LM.31• f • i43v; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f . 271v,311v; A&uda 51-VIII-51. 
f.291; Film oteca LM, 14 115/1-2
(24) JCBRAS H .  537-538; Queyroz 7**0; Reimers 52
twenty nine new watch towers (g u a r ita s )  and stockades were constructed  
on th e  w alls to  supplement the  eleven b as tio n s which defended
(25) 
the  fo rt#
To arm the  new defences was the  next ta sk  and in  th i s  
the g arriso n  had one p iece o f g re a t good fo rtune in  th e  e a r l ie r  
a r r iv a l  in  Colombo o f a g a lle y  taken from th e  Achinese by 
Nuno Alvares Botelho, the  adm iral o f  th e  high sea f le e t#  This 
was on i t s  way fl*om Malacca to  Goa under th e  command o f Antonio de 
Souza Coutinho who had undertaken to  d e liv e r  i t  to  th e  camara 
o f  Goa as a g i f t  from th e  admiral# Besides i t s  own armament 
th is  g a lley  a lso  contained s ix  p iecec o f  a r t i l l e r y  being sen t 
to  the  vedor a t  Goa to  be s e t  ag a in s t th e  expenses o f Botelho*s 
f l e e t ,  as w ell as two more p ieces fo r  the  c i ty  o f Cochin# When 
the  g a lle y  a rr iv ed  the  vedor and the  o f f ic ia l s  o f th e  Colombo 
camara had begged Coutinho to  remain w ith h is  crew fo r sometime 
time since th e  departure o f  so many casados w ith  th e  cap ta in - 
general had l e f t  the  c i ty  defenceless# F ortunately  fo r  the  
Portuguese, Coutinho had agreed, so th a t  when news o f Randeniwela 
a rriv ed  and th e  defences o f  Colombo were h u rrie d ly  s e t  in  
o rder much needed men and guns were av a ilab le  from th e  galley#
(25) Jornada 39-40; P .da T rinidade I II#  111-112; Jornada-Lomba 92; 
TT.Ms da L iv. 1699, f f .2 ? 8 , 312; Assentos I .  308,525;






When de Sa l e f t  Colombo th e  fo r t  had only s ix teen  p ieces o f
a r t i l l e r y  but by thie- tim e the  main S inhalese fo rces a rriv ed
before i t s  g a te s , i t  had forty* A ll th ese  e x tra  cannon except
fo r two from Malwana came from th e  g a lle y  as w ell as many
(26)
sm aller weapons and much ammunition*
Having repaired  and strengthened the  w alls and provided
them with ad d itio n a l a r t i l lB r y ,  Lan<jarote de Seixas s e t  about
apportioning so ld ie rs  to  th e i r  defence^. To th e  south-w est
the rocky sea coast was so in acce ss ib le  th a t  ap a rt from the
bastion  o f Santa Cruz which p ro tec ted  the  harbour, a dozen
la sc a rin s  were considered s u f f ic ie n t  to  p a tro l  th e  whole area*
The b as tio n  i t s e l f  which was not expected to  be th rea tened
was defended by th e  fa c to r  and the  customs o f f ic ia l s  w ith th e
aid  o f the  J e s u i ts .  Ten o th e r Portuguese and th e i r  se rvan ts
were posted to  keep a look out towards th e  sea , both to  give
the  alarm in  case o f  a su rp r ise  a ttack  and to  prevent any
(27)
attem pt a t  d ese rtio n  by sea* The eas te rn  side  o f  th e  f o r t  which 
was p ro tec ted  by the  lagoon, was th e  most neg lected . In  many 
areas th e  w alls had co llapsed  com pletely. To prevent the  S inhalese
(26) Queyroz $82; P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon I I .  189-1905 Jornada 39? 
Assentos I .  308, 520-521, 5295 TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f . 281v;285v; 
F.de Souza V I.37^5 *0 ehnojaista «de T-l -etmapy 5*4?5 TT.LM.29.f.6v5 
Ajuda 51-V III-51 . f f .303»3065 Film oteca LM .l4.1lV3-5* 115/ 1- 2 , 
115/2-^5 Filmoteca LM 16 13/5
(2?) TT.Ms da L iv . I699.f.284-284v5 Queyroz 7825 P .E .P ie r is  -  
Ceylon 11.190
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from making use o f  th i s  ppportun ity  to  en te r  th e  c i ty  s ix teen
stockades and guard towers were b u i l t  in  th i s  s tr e tc h  which
was placed under th e  o v e ra ll command o f  Antonio de S j b i m
(28)
Souza de Coutinho*
However, th e  areas most exposed to  a ttac k  were th e  n o rth ,
north-w est and th e  south . In  th ese  sec to rs  th e  w alls o f  the
f o r t  were fu r th e r  p ro tec ted  by deep moats connecting the  lake
(29)w ith th e  sea . The southern w all, from th e  sea to  th e  lake  was 
divided in to  two sec to rs  by the  cap ta in -genera l and the  cap ta in  
o f  Colombo, Diogo Bo to  Machado, was en tru sted  w ith the  defence 
o f  one one o f them while Francisco de B rito  de Almeida, the  
newly appointed c a p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld , was en tru s ted  w ith 
th e  o th e r. The former commanded the  area  from the sea coast 
to  a p o in t alm ost halfway between th e  b astio n s o f  Mapane and 
S t. Jeronimo. He was aided by Manual Vaz B arreto , who was in  
charge o f  Mapane, and by Pero de Abrew de Caza who now/th 
held  the  p o st o f  Wickramasinghe o r commander o f th e  la s c a r in s . 
This se c to r was strengthened by four new stockades and guard 
tow ers. The area  commanded by de Almeida included th re e  guard
(28) P .E .P ie r is  -Ceylon 11.189-190; Jornada 39; Queyroz 7^2; 
TT.Ms da L iv . 1699*f . 285
(29) S .G .Perera - The c i ty  o f  Colombo. 1505-1656. 13
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towers manned by F ranciscans, Augustin!ans and la s c a r in s
(30) 
respectively#
In  the  no rth  th e  key b as tio n  of S.Joao was p laced in  charge 
o f Jorge Coelho de Castro# The north-w estern  coast up to  
the  harbour was p ro tec ted  by th ree  newly b u i l t  stockades, 
two o f them being manned by th e  J e s u its  and Dominicans 
re sp e c tiv e ly . The n o rth -e a s te rn  sec to r up to  th e  lake  was w ell 
p ro tec ted  by the  th ree  bastions o f  S .Estevao, S.StEkxxfaxx ianx
(31)
S.Sebasti^io and Madre de Deus#
Lan^arote de S eixas, having thus organised th e  s t a t i c  
defence o f th e  c i ty ,  a lso  crea ted  two reserve  companies o f  
so ld ie rs  who were to  a id  any p o in t which was hard pressed#
These men were also  to  p a tro l  th e  w alls o f the  f o r t  regularly#
The lack  o f sho t was made good by fusing  th e  m a te ria l av a ilab le  
in  the  g a lley  brought by Antonio de Souza Coutinho bu t th e  
need fo r  powder was even more u rgen t, fo r  th e  gunpowder 
m ill constructed  by de Sa was no longer functioning# The making 
of powder was en tru s ted  to  Manual Barros, Jeronimo de Azevedo 
and B althazar Moniz who to g e th e r made about four b a rre ls  a day#
(30) P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon I I .  189; Simancas SP 1530.f . 130;
AHU Caixa l 6.a n t  18.1.1644; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f f . 283-284, 312; 
TT.LM.31.ff.31,355 Queyroz 782
(31) TT.Ms da L iv. l699.ff.279v-280v; AHU 501.f . 36
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The sto rage and d is t r ib u t io n  o f th e  powder and shot was
en tru sted  to  Domingos P e re ira  da Araujo and Antonio Rebelo,
(32)
casados o f Colombo*
A ltogether, Lan^arote de Seixas had no more than  th ree  
hundred and f i f t y  Portuguese in  h is  fo rce , fo r  most o f the  
casados had e i th e r  gone w ith  de Sa or were posted a t  Menikkadawara 
and Sabaragamuwa* He could also  count upon fcw some two thousand 
slaves and a thousand servan ts o f  th e  re s id e n t Portuguese, and 
le s s  c e r ta in ly  upon the  one thousand th ree  hundred la s c a r in s
(33)s t i l l  in  the  city*  With th ese  f iv e  thousand men he had to  hold 
the  whole c i r c u i t  o f  the  walls* Two g re a t advantages however 
were h is  -  he possessed an e f fe c tiv e  a r t i l l e r y  whereas the  enemy 
lacked any guns capable o f  b a t te r in g  th e  w a lls , and he had th e  
sea behind him, o f  which h is  countrymen were th e  m asters.
The S inhalese who appeared before Colombo were organided 
in to  four d iv is io n s  co n s is tin g  c h ie f ly  o f  th e  men o f  M atara, 
Sabaragamuwa, th e  Four K orales and th e  Seven Korales* Each d iv is io n
(32) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f f . 286-287
(33) Estim ates o f  Portuguese fo rces w ith in  th e  f o r t  in  August 1630 
are as follow s -
F*de Souza VI*373 -  **00 Portuguese in c lud ing  p r ie s t s
Jornada 40 -  200 Portuguese inc lud ing  p r ie s t s
Jornada-Lomba 91 -  le s s  than 300 Portuguese
TT.Ms da Liw* 1699. f f .  279v , 301 -  240 Portuguese,
60 p r ie s ts  and 20 c le r ic s  ap a rt from th e  g arriso n s 
o f  K alu tara and Malwana,
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was strengthened by a detachment o f Kandyan tro o p s. The
men o f Matara led  by the  p rin ce  o f Uva and Dom Theodosio
entrenched themselves in  the  p la in s  o f Mapane, to  th e
south o f the  b astio n  o f th a t  name. The forces o f  Sabaragamuwa
under Dom Simao were s ta tio n ed  near the bastion  o f S .Sebestiao
and Queen’s Gate. The kin|£ and Maha Astana had th e i r
headquarters in  th e  house o f Luis Gomes P in to  and were
with the  men o f the  Four Korales led  by Dom Cosmo, Dom B althazar
and Dom Aleixo. F in a lly , V ijayapala o f Matale and
Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha led  th e  men o f th e  Seven Korales
(3*)
to  p o sitio n s  near the  b as tio n  o f S.Joltb and th e  sea.
Though the reb e l la s c a r in  commanders were allowed to  
lead  th e i r  men, th e re  i s  no doubt th a t  the  o v e ra ll command 
o f operations re s te d  w ith the k ing  and in  h is  absence w ith 
the  p rinces advised by the  Kandyan general Maratana Bandara.
The king h im self and Maha Astana seem to have organised 
supp lies and reinforcem ents fo r  th e  besieg ing  fo rc e , fo r  
they made journeys to  Kandy tw ice w ith in  th e  f i r s t  th ree
(35)
months o f th e  s tru g g le .
(3*0 TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f f . 276-277? JCBRAS XVIII. 226 ;
P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon 11.190; Queyroz 782
(35) JCBRAS XVIII. 170, 227; Queyroz 781; P .E .P ie r is  -  
Ceylon I I .  189; F.de Souza VI. 421; Assentos I .  526; 
AHU Caixa 16, an t 18.1.1644
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The numerical s tren g th  of th e  beseig ing  fo rce  has 
been v a rio u sly  estim ated bu t i t  could not have exceeded 
f i f te e n  thousand men. A small p ropo rtion  o f th e  men had 
muskets bu t a m ajo rity  were armed w ith  swords, bows and 
sp ears . Save fo r  a few sm all p ieces brought up from 
Sabaragamuwa and K alu tara , th e  S inhalese had no a r t i l l e r y .  
N either d id  they  possess war elephants in  s u f f ic ie n t  numbers 
to  t r y  to  b a t te r  down the  g ates o f th e  f o r t .  The odds were 
th e re fo re  more even than the  Portuguese ch ro n ic le rs  would
have ug b e liev e .
(36) Apart from om itting  to  mention the  S inhalese le v e l  
on the  side  o f  the  defence most Portuguese sources exaggerate 
the numbers o f  the  b es ieg e rs , e g .,
TT.Ms da L iv . l699*f*276v 30,000 men
Queyroz (640) estim ates th a t  the  number o f la s c a r in s  in  
K otte in  th e  1590’s a t  12,000. By th e  1640’s the  number 
had fa l le n  to  under 5000. (Queyroz 33* Ajuda 5 i-V III*40 .f.266) 
I t  i s  a lso  known th a t  de Sa’s attem pts to  av e rt th e  d ec lin e  
had only lim ite d  success. Thus d e sp ite  the high estim ate  
o f 13,000 given in  Queyroz (770) the  number of la s c a r in s  
in  de Sa’s exped itionary  force must have been sh o rt o f  
10,000. F r. Assurapacao (TT.Ms da L iv . l699*f.276v) says 
th a t  Senerat brought 7000 Kandyans w ith him. Even so the  
t o t a l  besieg ing  fo rce  could no t have been over 15*000 
men e sp e c ia lly  as detachments had been sen t ag a in st 




F.de Souza VI. 421 








The f i r s t  move of th e  S inhalese once they  had 
entrenched themselves was to  send a captured Dominican 
p r ie s t  on 9 September w ith a message from the  k ing  to  
Lanparote de Seixas o ffe r in g  perm ission fo r  the  Portuguese 
to  l iv e  p eace fu lly  in  the  is la n d  in  re tu rn  fo r  th e  su rrender 
o f the  f o r t .  The p ro p o sitio n  was p red ic tab ly  re je c te d  by 
de Seixas and the  Sinhalese^who had occupied houses w ith in  
a hundred paces o f  the  walls^ began to  exchange f i r e  w ith 
the Portuguese. R ealising  however th a t  th e i r  muskets and 
sm all arms had l i t t l e  e f fe c t  on th e  Portuguese w ith in  the 
f o r t  while the Portuguese a r t i l l e r y  in f l ic te d  some lo s s  on 
them, the  S inhalese decided to  use th e i r  su p e rio r ity  in  
numbers in  a genera l a s s a u lt .  Accordingly on 16 September 
a general a ttack  was d e liv ered  on the  f o r t  both from th e
W A S  S e e n
north  and the  south . On the northern  s id e Ae f  th e  main a ttac k
w ith the a id  o f  sc a lin g  ladders and e lephan ts, ag a in st the
bastion  o f S.Joao by men o f  th e  Seven and Four K orales, le d
by Dom B althazar and Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha. Against the
southern w alls came the  men under Dora Theodosio, reinforced® !
by detachments under  mudaliyar Abeyasinghe and Dom Aleixo
and Maha Astana h im self. The f ig h tin g  was f ie rc e  but th e
aSinhalese being exposed to  Portuguse^ f i r e  su ffe red  heavy
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(37) (38)
lo sses  and were even tually  forced to  withdraw.
Having fa i le d  to  gain the f o r t  by d ir e c t  a s sa u lt  the
S inhalese now began to  co n stru c t stockades o f  wood around
northern  and n o rth -eas te rn  w alls o f  the  f o r t .  These were
b u i l t  up to  an e lev a tio n  higher than th e  w alls o f the  f o r t
so th a t  they  not merely enabled the  S inhalese to  p ro te c t
themselves but a lso  gave them an opportun ity  to  f i r e  a t  the
defenders w ith in  th e  bastions and the  w alls o f the  c i ty .
S im ilar use was made o f the  t a l l e r  coconut tre e s  which
remained w ith in  gun-shot o f th e  c i ty fs w alla , as snipers*
p o s ts .
De Seixas now began to  fe a r  th a t  the  S inhalese would 
mine the c i ty  w alls . The f i r e  from th e  stockades was a lso  
r e s t r ic t in g  movement w ith in  the  w a lls , so on th e  22 September 
he organised a fo rce o f fo r ty  Portuguese led  by Francisco de 
B rito  and four hundred la s c a r in s  le d  by Joao de Abrew and 
B althazar Moniz and ordered them to  s a l ly  from Queen*s Gate 
and destroy  th e  stockade in  th e  n o r th -e a s t . The p a r ty  took 
the  S inhalese guards by su rp rise  and su ccessfu lly  executed
(37) Over 500 S inhalese are sa id  to  have been k i l le d  th a t  day.
(38) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.ff* 287-289; Evora CXVl/2-3; Jornada- 
Lomba,92; P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I .  190; Queyroz 782;
AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; ARU Caixa l6 ,a n t  18.1.1644
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the m ission. The o th e r stockade was a lso  destroyed , but
th is  time by means o f a stratagem . By the  end o f September
the shortage o f food w ith in  th e  f o r t  had become acute
and the  Portuguese p e r io d ic a lly  drove numbers o f  S inhalese
who could not bear arras out o f the  main g a te s . The
besiegers received th e i r  fellow  countrymen in to  th e i r  l in e s .
Jorge Coelho de Castro decided to  send th ree  lo y a l la s c a r in s
w ith th e  next batch o f  people pushed out o f the  c i ty  from
the Gate o f S .Joao . They were in s tru c te d  to  ca rry  w ith them
th ree  bags o f inftammable m a te r ia l , f ix  them to  the  stockade
and s e t  them on f i r e .  This was su ccessfu lly  executed, fo r
(39)
the dry  wooden stockade caught f i r e  e a s i ly .
The S inhalese however recon stru c ted  the stockades 
and began f i r in g  in to  the  c i ty  once again and the defenders 
were fac ing  a d i f f i c u l t  period  when f iv e  Portuguese v esse ls  
appeared o f f  Colombo on th e  9 e f  October. The S inhalese 
fea rin g  th a t  su b s ta h tia l reinforcem ents had a rr iv ed , gave 
up th e i r  p o s itio n s  and r e t i r e d  a few m iles in lan d . The v esse ls  
were only th e  reg u la r f l e e t  sen t to  tak e  away the  annual 
consignment o f cinnamon, and th e  captain-m ajor o f  th e  
squadron, Gaspar Gomez, had no in tim a tio n  o f th e  s ieg e  u n t i l
(39) T T .M s  da L iv. 1699.f f . 289-291; Jomada-Lomba 92-93; 
JC B R A S XVIII.22?; AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa 16, 
18.1.1644
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he came to  Colombo. His arrival^how ever, marked th e  end 
o f the  f i r s t  stage o f the  siege  of Colombo, fo r  the  S inhalese 
having r e t i r e d  from th e i r  p o s itio n s  d id  no t henceforth  
t r y  to  in v e s t the  c i ty  c lo se ly . From then  on they  aimed a t  
r e s t r ic t in g  the  Portuguese to  Colombo f o r t  and denying them 
a l l  su p p lie s , hoping thus to  make th e i r  s ta y  in  Ceylon 
w orthless to  them. On th e  o ther hand they  d id  no t g ive up 
hopes o f  s ieg in g  Colombo but merely decided to  w ait more
*  (40)
favourable circum stances fo r  a fu rth e r  a tta c k .
The f i r s t  stage o f  the  siege of Colombo thus 
ended w ithout a c le a r  v ic to ry  to  e i th e r  p a r ty . The Portuguese 
could claim  some measure o f  success in  th a t  they  had survived 
the most dangerous period  o f  i n i t i a l  a s sa u lts  and had 
even tually  forced th e  S inhalese to  withdraw some m iles 
in lan d . Moreover th e i r  war c a su a ltie s  were l i g h t> amounting 
to  a l i t t l e  more than a dozen Portuguese and a few dozen 
S inhalese, w hile the  S inhalese had lo s t  Dom SimacS, th e  le ad e r  
o f the men o f Sabaragamuwa and a much la rg e r  number o f  men.
On the o th e r hand the  S inhalese had merely r e t i r e d  to  d efen sib le  
f o r t i f ie d  £o»ts w ith in  s ix  m iles o f the  c i ty  w alls and bands
(40) TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f f . 291-29lv ; F.de Souza C l.421;
Assentos 1 .526; AHU 510.f‘.l8 0 ; Jomada-Lomba 93; Queyorz 783; 
P. E .P ie r is -Ceylon I I . 190; Ajuda 51-V H I-51 .ff.282 ,305 ,379j 
Ajuda 51-V -3o.f.7^v; Film oteca LM.14. 115/2-4;
AHU CaixaI6 ,an t 18.1.1644
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o f armed men sen t from th ese  p o s ts , ambushed any Portuguese 
foraging  p a r t ie s  which ventured beyond the  w alls . The siege 
having begun before th e  harvesting , season and moreover 
having caught the  Portuguese by su rp r ise , th e re  soon arose 
a shortage o f  food s tu f f s  in  the  c i ty .  W ithin a month p ric e s  
had r is e n  f iv e - fo ld . The poor w ith in  th e  f o r t  began to  
d ie  in  in c re as in g  numbers from s ta rv a tio n  and d isease . The 
welcome th a t  th e  S inhalese gave to  those pushed out o f  the
(4D
gates had cooled n o ticeab ly  a f te r  the burning o f th e  stockades.
Thus the  s tru g g le  fo r  Colombo was by no means over.
The a r r iv a l  o f one hundred and f i f t y  Portuguese in  
(42)
the cinnamon f le e t  g re a tly  encouraged de Seixas and th e  
defenders o f Colombo, e sp e c ia lly  as they  had hopes o f  rece iv in g  
fu r th e r  supp lies o f men, munitions and p rov isions from 
In d ia . When th e  S inhalese appeared before Colombo, th e  
Portuguese re a l is in g  the  urgency o f summoning a id  had sen t 
Manual Pacheco fo r  th i s  purpose. Pacheco s e t  out from Colombo 
in  a f ish in g  boat on 11 September 1630 and reached Negapatam
(41) Jornada-Lomba 88; Queyroz 7835 P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I . 190 
F.de Souza VI. 373, 421; TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f f .3 1 3 v ,315
(42) TT.Ms da L iv . 1699.f f . 291-291v; Ajuda 51.-V III-5 1 .f f . 282,305,
379; Ajuda 51-V-36.f.76v; AHU 5 0 1 .f .l8 0 ; AHU Caixa 16 ,
an t. 18.1.1644; Assentos I .  526 ; Filmoteca LH.14. 115/2-4;
F.de Souza VI. 421; P .E .P ie r is  - Ceylon I I . 190; Queyroz 783; 
Jornada-Lomba 93
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o n  t h e  e a s t  c o a s t  o f  I n d i a  b y  t h e  l 6 t h .  H e s e n t  a  m e s s a g e  
t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  a t  G o a ,  t o  Dom F i l i p e  K a s c a r e n h a s  a t  C o c h i n  
a n d  t o  Dom B r a s  d e  C a s t r o ,  c a p t a i n - m a j o r  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
f l e e t  o f  t h e  C o r o m a n d e l  c o a s t *  P a c h e c o  h i m s e l f  r e m a i n e d  
a t  N e g a p a t a m  c o l l e c t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  m u n i t i o n s  t o  a i d  
t h e  f o r t s  s t i l l  h e l d  b y  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e *
On 14 September de Seixas sen t a second messanger,
F r *  F r a n c i s c o  d e  S a h t a  A p o l l o n i a ,  a  F r a n c i s c a n ,  i n  c a s e  
P a c h e c o  h a d  b e e n  l o s t  o n  t h e  w a y .  F r .  S a n t a  A p o l l o n i a  r e a c h e d  
N e g a p a t a m  b y  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  m o n t h  a n d  l e f t  o v e r l a n d  f o r
(43)
G o a  o n  8  O c t o b e r  t o  e x p l a i n  m a t t e r s  p e r s o n a l l y  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y .
The qu ickest response to  th e  appeal fo r  a id  came 
from Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas, cap ta in  o f  Cochin. He heard 
the news o f th e  siege on 3 October and immediately prepared 
to  embark on a v esse l belonging to  one Manual de Costa, a 
casado o f  Cochin. His r e l i e f  fo rce  included about seventy 
casados and soldados o f Cochin and th e i r  se rv an ts . The ship 
s e t  out on 9 October and reached Colombo on fek* 16 October.
T h e  a r r i v a l  o f  D o n  F i l i p e  w a s  d o u b l y  w e lc o m e  a s  h e  b r o u g h t  
e i g h t  c a n d i l s  o f  r i c e  a n d  t h r e e  b a r r e l s  o f  g u n p o w d e r  ( b o t h
(43) TT.Ms da Liv. 1699.f f . 293-294v; A&uda 51-VIII-51. f .322
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o f which were in  sh o rt supply) as w ell as a q u an tity  o f
m
s a l tp e tre .
Meanwhile the  v iceroy  had made g rea t e f fo r ts  to  send 
a sh ip  w ith men and supp lies to  re lie v e  Colombo. As no 
su ita b le  v esse l was av a ilab le  in  Goa th e  v iceroy  gave orders 
to  unload a pataxo belonging to  one Ruy Dias d£ C outinte 
which had ju s t  a rriv ed  from Mozambique and to  prepare i t
fo r  the journey. With some d i f f i c u l ty  e igh ty  Portuguese
\
so ld ie rs  and twenty s a i lo r s  were co llec ted  and the pataxo
(45)
was loaded w ith one thousand and two hundred fardos o f r ic e ,  
one hundred and twenty b a rre ls  o f  gunpowder, s ix ty  cand ils  
o f  wheat, te n  b a rre ls  o f  cheese, s ix  b a rre ls  o f  o liv e  o i l  
and f iv e  hundred muskets. Having s e t  o f f  from Goa on 
17 October, th i s  sh ip , th e  Nossa Senhora da Penha da Franca 
under Francisco R ibeiro , the  c h ie f  p i lo t  o f  Goa, s a ile d  in to  
Colombo harbour a t  noon on 1 November. The men abroad were 
immediately disembarked w ith th e i r  personal belongings but 
l i t t l e  e lse  was done th a t  day. The Portuguese were to  re g re t 
th is  in a c t iv i ty  fo r during  th e  n ig h t a storm broke out which
(44) Ajuda 51-V III-51♦f •322; Ajuda 51-V -36.f.77; Queyroz 783;
TT.Ms da L iv. I699.ff.307 ,312 ,286v; TT.LM.29.f.6v;
TT.LM. 3 1 .f .4 4 ; Film oteca LM.14. 115/116/5-1; F.de Souza VI. 
374,421; Assentos I .  308,526;
Estim ates o f th e  s iz e  o f  the  reinforcem ents brought by Dom F ilip e  
range from th i r t y  (Queyroz) to  hundred and th i r t y  (Assentos I .  308, 
Ajuda 51-VIII-51) but F r. Assump^ao and Aeeantos 1.526 s ta te  
th e  f ig u re  o f  seventy men.
Candil i s  euqal to  f iv e  hundred pounds or fourteen  bushels.
(45) Fardo i s  a bale  normally 100-125 lb s  in  w eight.
increased  in  in te n s i ty  on th e  follow ing day to  such an
ex ten t th a t  the cable which held  the  ship  snapped, and the
v esse l was l o s t  w ith a l l  supp lies on board. This was a
g rea t blow. Had the r ic e  been go t ashore much o f th e  c iv i l ia n
lo ss  due to  hunger and d ise a se , which in  th e  f i r s t  th ree
months o f the  siege  alone ca rr ie d  o f f  over two thousand
(46)
fiv e  hundred persons might have been avoided. Soon a f te r  th i s
however Dom Antonio Mascarenhas a rr iv ed  w ith two pinnaces
(47)
from Malacca b ring ing  two hundred men#
More su b s ta n tia l a id  had been expected from th e  f l e e t  o f 
the  Coromandel co ast. Dom Bras had l e f t  Goa w ith twelve 
ships in  February 1630 but try September h is  f l e e t  had been 
reduced to  seven v e sse ls . On rece iv in g  the  appeal from 
Ceylon he s e t  out on 19 September but was delayed f i r s t  by 
a c o n f lic t  w ith a Dutch ship  and then by a g rea t storm; on 
each occasion lo s in g  one more sh ip . When he even tually  
arrived  in  Ja ffn a  he sen t one o f  h is  fiv e  remaining v esse ls  
w ith supp lies and men to  B a ttiv a lo a . He h im self s a ile d  
southwards w ith th e  four o th e r sh ip s , and appeared o f f  Negombo
(46) AHU Caixa 18, 16.1.1646; AHU Caixa l6 ,a n t .  18.1.1644;
TT.Ms da L iv . i699*ff*307v-308v,313v-31$; Evora GR.Arm.V-VI, 
14-5 .f . 166; Ajuda 51-V riI-51 .ff.290,292,293,294,297,305; 
Filmoteca LM. 14.114/3-5; Film oteca LM 19D. 29^4; Queyroz 783; 
Assentos I .  298,302,308,527,529; P .E .P ie r is -Ceylon 11.191 
Queyroz and the  AHU Caixas mention th a t  e igh ty  men a rriv ed  from 
Goa. F r. Assumpqao estim ates one hundred. Film oteca, Ajuda, Evora 
and Assentos estim ate between a hundred and hundred and f i f t y  
besides t h i r t y  s a i lo r s .
(47) Queyroz 783; R ibeiro  94; TT.LM.29.f#7
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m
on 26 November 1630.
From 9 October 1630 up to  4 January 1632 th e  Portuguese 
were more o r le s s  continuously confined by th e  S inhalese 
forces to  a small area  around Colombo. The S inhalese concentrated 
on p reven ting  th e  Portuguese from gain ing  any supp lies from 
the country. Thus a l l  the  land from th e  w alls o f  Colombo 
to  th e  S inhalese encampments a few m iles away was d ev asta ted .
On the  th ree  main highways to  Colombo were posted th ree  
groups o f  la s c a r in s  -  the  men o f the  Four K orales a t  Nakalagama, 
Abeyasinha and th e  men o f  Sabaragamuwa a t  S .Sebestiao  and 
Don Theodosio Barreto on th e  road to  the south. As th ese  
men s e t  upon any sm all group o f Portuguese who ventured 
beyond the  w a lls , the  cap ta in -genera l forbade anyone to  
leave the  c i ty  w ithout h is  perm ission. However over s ix ty  
o f th e  casados in  Colombo a t  th a t  time had houses in  the 
area which had become a no man’s land , and being anxious to  
save what a r t ic le s  thay  could, they  sen t out th e i r  slaves 
and servan ts to  b rin g  back anything th a t  remained. Moreover 
food being in c re a s in g ly  scarce the  Portuguese could hard ly  
r e s i s t  sending out theiir servan ts to  look fo r  coconuts and
(48) Ajuda 51-V III-51 .f.305 ; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.f f . 309-309v; 
Assentos I .  308, 529* 521-523* Filmoteca LM.14. 62/1-5; 
TT.LI-l.29 . f f . 6- 6v; F.de Souza VI. 374; Queyroz 783
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f r u i t s .  T h e  S i n h a l e s e  s o m e t i m e s  p r o v i d e d  a  b a i t  b y  c a t t l e  
t o  s t r a y  w i t h i n  s i g h t  o f  t h e  w a l l s ,  a n d  t h e n  a t t a c k e d  a n y o n e
W )
who ventured out to  t r y  and seige them.
T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  m a d e  s e v e r a l  s a l l i e s ,  t h e  m o s t  s u c c e s s f u l
being th a t  made on 11 November 1630. On th a t  day de Seixas
m a r c h e d  t o  N a k a l a g a m a  a n d  d e f e a t e d  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  f o r c e s  o n
the south bank o f th e  Kelani and forced them to  r e t i r e  across
th e  r iv e r .  Even on th is  occasion, however, the  Portuguese made
no attem pt to  se ize  the  f e r ry  or pursue the  S inhalese beyond
(50)
the r iv e r .  In  f a c t  an a ttack  made on 29 November j u s t  a f te r  
the  a r r iv a l  o f  th e  f l e e t  o f Dom Bras revealed  once more th e  
weakness o f  th e  Portuguese fo rces and the  u n ce rta in  lo y a lty  
o f  the  la s e a r in  le v ie s .  While re tu rn in g  from a successfu l ra id  
on S inhalese p o s it io n s , a group o f la s c a r in s  suddenly jumped 
in to  the  jung le  and opened f i r e  upon th e  Portuguese, k i l l in g  
two and wounding sev era l o th e rs . The Portuguese fo rce  d id  not
( 5 1 )
fe e l s trong  enough to  do o th e r than  b ea t a has ty  r e t r e a t .
M e a n w h i l e  t h e  v i c e r o y  t h e  c o n d e  d e  L i n h a r e s  h a d  d e c i d e d  
t o  a p p o i n t  Dom  F i l i p e  M a s c a r e n h a s  a s  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  o f  
C e y l o n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n  t h a t  h a d  e x i s t e d
(49) T T .M s  d a  Liv. 1699.ff.300v-303, 292v-293, 308v
(50) T T .M s  d a  Liv. l699»ff»303v-306v; A s s e n t o s  1.526;
Q u e y r o z  783-^9^5 J o r n a d a - L o m b a  935 AHU C a i x a  18. 16.1.1646;
AHU C a i x a  16. 18.1.1646
(51) T T .M s  d a  L iv. l699.ff.310v-311v
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(52)
b e t w e e n  t h e m  s i n c e  t h e  v i c e r o y  a r r i v e d  i n  I n d i a ,  T h e  v i c e r o y  
h a d  b e e n  l o o k i n g  f o r  a  s u c c e s s o r  f r o m  t h e  t i m e  t h a t  h e  h a d  
h e a r d  o f  t h e  f a t e  o f  d e  S a ;  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  L a n < j a r o t e  d e  
S e i x a s  a s  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  m e a n t  a s  a  s t o p - g a p ,  
f o r  t h e  v i c e r o y  b e f o r e  h e  h a d  h e a r d  o f  d e  S a * s  v a l e d i c t o r y  
n o m i n a t i o n  o f  d e  S e i x a s  h a d  r e q u e s t e d  h i m  t o  t a k e  o n l y  t h e
(53)
t i t l e  o f  c a p t a i n - m a j o r .  M a s c a r e n h a s  t o o k  o v e r  a s  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  
i n  D e c e m b e r  1630 a n d  d e  S e i x a s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  s e r v e  u n d e r
h i m  a s  t h e  v e d o r .
W h e n  h e  h a n d e d  o v e r  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l c y  t o  M a s c a r e n h a s ,  
L a ^ a r o t ^ t e  d e  S e i x a s  h a d  h e l d  t h a t  o f f i c e  f o r  s o m e  t h r e e  
m o n t h s .  A l l  t h i s  t i m e  h a  h a d  b e e n  s p e n t  i n  w a r  w i t h  t h e  
S i n h a l e s e  f o r c e s  i n v e s t i n g  C o l o m b o ,  a n d  t h o u g h  t h e  e n e m y  h a d  
b e e n  c o m p e l l e d  t o  d r a w  b a c k  a  f e w  m i l e s ,  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n
l i t t l e  opportun ity  fo r  co n stru c tiv e  ac tio n . The main f  de Seixas
had been to  ensure th e  su rv iv a l o f  th e  Portuguese co as ta l 
strongho lds. He had a lso  exercised  the  functions o f  th e  vedor. 
but here too  th e re  was l i t t l e  he could do except by way o f
(52) Ajuda 5 1 -V III-4 0 .ff . 192-19**; Assentos 1.308;
Mascarenhas however considered th i s  new appointment an
attem pt to  deprive him o f a b e t te r  p o st to  which he fel& he was 
e n t i t le d  .i® .
(53) Assentos I .  299, 307, 526
(5ft) Assentos I .  308; Queyroz 784 suggests th a t  th e  c i t iz e n s  o f 
Colombo who d id  not l ik e  Lancarote de Seixas removed him and 
e lec ted  Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas and th a t  the viceroy* s approval was 
granted subsequently . There i s  no evidence to  support such a 
p ro p o sitio n . The v iceroy  had decided to  appoint Dom F ilip e  as e a rly  
as 23 October 1630 and even a week e a r l ie r  de Seixas h im self had 
o ffered  th e  p o st to  Dom F ilip e , who had refused .
Assentos I .  308, 527; TT.Ms da L iv. l699#f.30?v
(5ft)
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retrenchment and economy, no tab ly  by reducing th e  number o f  
disavas to  two* Jorge Coelho de Castro was appointed d isava 
o f th e  Four and th e  Seven Korales* Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, 
the nephew o f the  former v iceroy  o f  th a t  name, and de S eixaS 's
(55)
own son-in-law >was appointed d isava o f Sabaragamuwa and Matara*
Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas had no wigh? to  be cap ta in -g en era l
o f Ceylon as a t  th i s  stage he was hoping to  gain  th e  captaincy
of Mozambique as soon as i t  f e l l  vacant* Hw th e re fo re  wrote
immediately to  the  v iceroy  asking him to  name someone e lse
fo r the  post in  Ceylon. Mascarenhas also  found th a t  th e
forces av a ilab le  in  Colombo were inadequate fo r  the  ta sk  they
had to  perform. The inflow  o f  reinforcem ents d id  not improve
the s i tu a tio n  very  much as some o f th e  defenders o f Colombo
who had come in  during the  tim e o f acute danger l e f t  th a t  c i ty ,
now th a t  the  S inhalese had p u lled  back. The cinnamon f l e e t  and
th e i r  crew s a ile d  fo r  Goa on 29 November and some o f th e
casados whom Dora F ilip e  h im self had brought over from Cochin
s e t  o f f  fo r th e i r  homes. The v iceroy  on th e  o th e r hand being
d isp leased  w ith MascarenhaSs re fu sa l to  serve in  Ceylon thought
(56)
h is  requests fo r  reinforcem ents and supp lies in o rd in a te ly  la rg e .
(55) TT.Ms da L iv . l699 .f.313
(56) Ajuda 51*V III-40 .ff.396 , 193v; BNL.FG.939.f.i3a,39a; 
Assentos 1*5X3
Dora F ilip e  had seven hundred and t h i r t y  Portuguese troops in  
1630. 3y the end o f Jthe yejp* he asked fo r  a fu r th e r  two thousand 
Portuguese and two o th e rs , u n t i l  the continuing
stalem ate forced h is  hand. Kt wtemy pv^paore-c & se*jC
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T o  r e p l a c e  Dom  F i l i p e  M a s c a r e n h a s  t h e  v i c e r o y  c h o s e
i
Dom  J o r g e  d e  A l m i d a  w h o  t h o u g h  o l d  w a s  w i l l i n g  e n o u g h  t o  a c c e p t  a
a post which was by no means sought fo r  in  Goa. With g rea t 
d i f f i c u l ty  he co llec ted  a hundred and s ix ty  nine men 
inc lu d in g  eigh ty  Portuguese and s e t  ou t on 29 February 1631 
in  the  same Achinese g a lle y  th a t  Antonio de Souza Coutinho
(57)
h a d  b r o u g h t  t o  C o lo m b o  f r o m  M a l a c c a  i n  1630. T h e  g a l l e y  t h o u g h  
l a r g e  a n d  w e l l  a r m e d  h a d  b e e n  s o m e w h a t  b a t t e r e d  b y  l o n g  
s e r v i c e  a n d  w a r  a n d  t h e  v i c e r o y ,  f o r s e e i n g  t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  a  
s h i p w r e c k ,  a s k e d  t h e  c a p t a i n  o f  a n o t h e r  s h i p  t a k i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  
t o  C e y l o n  t o  s a i l  w i t h i n  s i g h t  o f  t h e  g a l l e y .  A s  i t  t u r n e d  
o u t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  t w o  v e s s e l s  w e r e  s e p a r a t e d  i n  a  s t o r m  a n d  
t h e  g a l l e y  w a s  l o s t  w i t h  a l l  o n  b o a r d  s a v e  Dom J o r g e  d e  A l m e i d a  
h i m s e l f  a n d  t w e n t y  e i g h t  o t h e r s  w h o  m a n a g e d  t o  g e t  i n t o  t h e  
s h i p ' s  b o a t  a n d  r e a c h  t h e  M a l d i v e s .  A f t e r  r e m a i n i n g  i n  t h e  
i s l a n d s  f o r  a b o u t  a  m o n t h  d e  A l m e i d a  a n d  h i s  c o m p a n i o n s  m a d e  
t h e i r  w a y  t o  C o c h i n  b u t  s o o n  a f t e r  a r r i v a l  t h e r e  d e  A l m e i d a  
f e l l  s i c k  a n d  t o o k  s e v e r a l  m o n t h s  t o  r e c o v e r .  I t  w a s  n o t  u n t i l  
17 O c t o b e r  t h a t  d e  A l m e i d a  w a s  a b l e  t o  r e c r u i t  n e w  t r o o p s ,  
c o l l e c t  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  b e g i n  h i s  s e c o n d  a t t e m p t  t o  r e a c h  C e y l o n .
(57) F.de Souza VI.422 and P .da Trinidade I I I .  124 give the  
date as 23.2.1631 and Queyroz 7^5 and Ajuda 5 i-V -36 .f.79  say 
he l e f t  Goa on 19*2.1631, bu t the  d ia ry  o f Conde de L inhares 
makes i t  c le a r  th a t  he was s t i l l  in  Goa up to  th e  tvgyfeyr fefr 
twenty e ig th  o f  February.
BNL.FG. 939 .f f . la ,3 a ,4 a ,5 a .
2 6 6
Thus fo r th e  major p a r t  o f 1631 Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas
(58)
remained cap ta in -g en era l o f Ceylon.
During th is  period  Mascarenhas had the g re a te s t  d i f f i c u l ty
in  ob ta in ing  funds to  pay the  tro o p s , being d riven  even tually
to  borrow money from th e  m iserico rd ia  o f Colombo fo r
(59)the  purpose. He was a lso  pu t to  g rea t s t r a i t s  to  fin d  s u f f ic ie n t
food fo r  th e  c i ty ,  fo r a l l  north  In d ia , both on the  e a s t and
west coasts was a t  th is  time in  the  g rip  o f  famine. He was
ac tiv e  m i l i t a r i ly ,  o ften  ven turing  out o f the  f o r t  to
skirm ish w ith the  S inhalese , but though he once penetra ted
as f a r  as Panadura, s ix teen  m iles south o f Colombo, he was
unable to  d islodge th e  S inhalese from th e  two g re a t stockades
*
they  had b u i l t  s ix  m iles e a s t o f Colombo on e i th e r  side  o f  
(60)
th e  Kelani r iv e r .
The S inhalese on th e i r  p a r t  had not y e t abandoned 
the  hope o f  se iz in g  Colombo. What they  had f a i le d  to  win 
through fo rce , they  attem pted to  gain  through g u ile . They 
neg o tia ted  w ith V icente da S ilv a , a cap ta in  o f th e  la s c a r in s  
to  l e t  the k in g 's  fo rces in to  th e  f o r t  a t  Queen's G ate. The
(58) Queyroz 785; F.de Souza V I . f f .422-425; Ajuda 51-V -36.ff. 
76-905 Ajuda 51-V III-51. f .4195 BNL.FG.939.f f .la ,5 a ,2 3 a ,2 8 a , 
29a,39a; Botelho de Souza I I I .  488; TT.LM .29.ff.6v,37t197;
P .da T rinidade I I I .  123-126
(59) The Santa casa de m iserico rd ia  o r the  Holy House o f Wjercy 
was an in s t i tu t io n  assigned to  re lie v e  the  su ffe r in g  o f  the  
poor and th e  needy.
(60) Queyroz 783; Jornada 77; BNL.FG.939.f.i3a; BNL.FG. 76*JO.
f .7 v ; V.A.Smith -  Oxford h is to ry  o f  In d ia . 377-378
2 6 7
reasons which im pelled da S ilv a  to  agree to  th e  p lan  are  not
c lea r  fo r he was one o f those who f le d  from Wellawaya
and brought th e  news o f th e  d e fea t o f  de Sa. He i s  sa id  to
have been the  f i r s t  la s c a r in  o f the  army o f de Sa to  reach
Colombo. According to  Queyroz he was moved by th e  promise
of the  d isavash ip  o f Matara o r  a l te rn a t iv e ly  th e  governorship
of Ja ffn a . In  any case the  p lan  came to  naught fo r  a mudaliyar
ca lled  Ekanayake revealed  the  p lo t  to  Francisco de B rito  de
Almeida who had da S ilv a  shot from th e  mouth o f  a cannon to
(61)
i n s t i l l  t e r r o r  in to  would-be d e s e r te r s .
The v iceroy  was by th i s  tim e g e ttin g  in c re a s in g ly  
concerned regard ing  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  Ceylon. E ight months had 
passed by since th e  d e fea t o f  de Sa and fo rces amounting to  
over nine hundred men as w ell as p rov isions and m unitions had 
been sen t to  Ceylon a t  a co s t o f  over e igh ty  f iv e  thousand 
Goa x e ra f in s . Yet th e  Portuguese in  K otte were s t i l l  r e s t r ic te d  
to  the  th re e  fo r ts  o f  Colombo, G alle and Negombo and th e re  
seemed no p rospec t o f a v ic to ry  in  s ig h t .  There was as y e t 
no news o f Dom Jorge de Almeida and h is  g a lle y  and i t  was feared  
th a t  he and h is  men were a l l  l o s t .  D isputes had a r ise n  between 
the vedor Lan$arote de Seixas and th e  cap ta in -genera l Dom F ilip e  
Mascarenhas. Hardly any cinnamon had a rriv ed  from Ceylon
(61) Queyroz 784; Jornada 77; AHU Caixa 16. 18.1.1644
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since th e  cinnamon f l e e t  o f  1629 and th i s  represen ted  a lo s s  
o f seventy thousand x era fin s  a year, i f  not more. Therefore 
on 14 May 1631 the  v iceroy  suggested in  council th a t  he h im self 
should go to  Ceylon w ith a force o f one thousand two hundred 
Portuguese and two thousand o th e r troops as soon as th e  annual 
f l e e t  a rriv ed  from Lisbon. The galleons o f  th e  f l e e t  themselves 
were to  be used fo r  the  tra n sp o r t o f the  fo rces . The v iceroy  
intended th is  expedition  to  have a twofold purpose. The f i r s t  
and most im portant was to  recover the  lands o f  K otte and to  
conquer th e  kingdom o f  Kandy, thus completing th e  conquest 
o f th e  is la n d . A su b sid ia ry  o b jec tiv e  was the  expulsion of 
the  Dutch from P u li c a t fo r which a force was to  be se n t to  
jo in  Diogo de M ello, cap ta in  o f  the  Coromandel co ast, a f te r  
the  subjugation  o f  Ceylon.The p lan  was a bold one and i f  
su ccessfu lly  executed could have d e a lt  a heavy blow to  the 
expansion o f  Dutch power on th e  Coromandel co ast. The lo ss  
of P u lic a t would also  have h u rt the  c lo th  trad e  o f th e  Dutch 
which was so v i t a l  to  th e i r  economic re la tio n s  w ith  th e  East 
In d ie s . From the  Kandyan p o in t o f  view th e  a r r iv a l  o f  such a 
la rg e  Portuguese fo rce  would have presen ted  th a t  kingdom 
w ith a challenge i t  might w ell have found d i f f i c u l t  to  overcome.
The scheme however depended on th e  safe  and e a rly  
a r r iv a l  o f the  f l e e t  from P o rtu g a l. As th e  galleons were expected
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s t a r t  th e i r  re tu rn  journey to  P ortuga l by Deceraber-January 
time became a very  im portant fa c to r ,  fo r  un less th e  galleons 
l e f t  Goa fo r Ceylon before the  end o f September they  would 
not have time to  re tu rn  sa fe ly  before th e  north-tfd£t monsoon 
se t in .  During the  f iv e  months from May to  September the 
viceroy made e lab o ra te  p rep ara tio n s fo r  the  expedition^, 
re c ru it in g  over one thousand two hundred Canarese from Bardes, 
S a lse tte  and Goa as w ell as about f iv e  hundred K a f f i r s .  One 
thousand Parava C h ris tian s  were expected from fcifc the  
F ishery Coast. By the  end o f August 1631 the  v ic e ro y 's  
advisers had convinced him th a t  i t  was b e t te r  no t to  r is k  the 
galleons in  the north-w ast monsoon winds ni
and th a t  h is  expedition  should s a i l  from Goa in  th e  f a s te r  
pataxos which could a lso  more e a s ily  avoid an a ttack  by a 
Dutch f l e e t .  Eventually  the  reinforcem ents which the  v iceroy  
expected from Portugal in  the  annual f l e e t  f a i le d  to  a r r iv e  
even by th e  f i r s t  week o f October, and th e  v iceroy  re lu c ta n tly  
gave up h is  grandiose p lan . As an a l te rn a tiv e  he decided to  
send a l l  p o ssib le  aid  to  de Almeida to  help him to  recover 
th e  l o s t  t e r i t o r i e s .  I t  was w ith th i s  ob jec tiv e  th a t  on 6 October 
two pataxos were sen t from Goa w ith th ree  hundred and t h i r t y  
seven Canares and a hundred K affirs  to  jo in  Dom Jorge de Almeida 
a t  Cochin w ith in s tru c tio n s  to  proceed to  Ceylon. On 13 October
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four o th er ships w ith supp lies o f food , money and m unitions 
as w ell as e igh ty  Portuguese, e ig h t hundred Canarese-and 
two hundred K affirs  s a ile d  d ir e c t ly  from Goa to  Colombo*^
A few days l a t e r  the  v ice ro y -in -eo u n c il decided to  send the 
f le e t  o f  Dom Alvaro de Castro to  serve in  Ceylon* This f l e e t  
o f te n  ships w ith almost two thousand men was o r ig in a l ly  
intended fo r  Malacca bu t the  v iceroy  apparen tly  decided tac 
th a t  i t  was more u rg en tly  needed in  Ceylon* With th e  a r r iv a l  
o f Dom Alvaro on 17 October and Dom Jorge de Almeida on 21 
October the  Portuguese a f te r  a y e a r’s defensive a c t iv i ty  were
(63)
once more in  a p o s itio n  to  attack* The landward blockade o f 
Colombo only broken in  January 1632 when the  Portuguese 
advanced up the  Kelani v a lle y , had la s te d  s ix te e n th  months®* 
During th a t  time th e  S inhalese had l o s t  a few hundred men in  
b a t t le ,  the  Portuguese perhaps ra th e r  l e s s .  The Portgguese 
casados l o s t  th e i r  v il la g e s  and possessions*But the  r e a l  
su ffe re rs  were th e  S inhalese C h ris tian s  who had remained w ith in  
the fo rt*  Without any form o f  equ itab le  ra tio n in g  system or 
adequate medical se rv ice  over four thousand o f them died  o f
(64)
d isease  and sta rva tion*
(62) Ajuda 51-V -36.ff.90v, 210; JCBRAS XXX.95-9& Assentos I .  
347-350, 353, 359, 366-376,379-381, 35^-355; TT.LM .29.ff.37v-38, 
91, 103, 127,133,141; Film oteca LM.17.13/2-2; 14/4; ffiJL.IU.
939.f f . 25a , 26a ,27a ,2 9 a ,31a ,38a ,39a,43a,45a,48a,49a,54a,59a,
(63) Ajuda 51-V -36.f.90v; BNL. JG. 7640. f .  117; Queyroz 791 
Queyroz im plies th a t  Dom Alvaro de Castro a rriv ed  in  Ceylon
Meanwhile the  fo r ts  o f Trincomalee, B a ttica lo a , Negombo 
and G alle had continued to  be feeld by Portgguese troops 
ag a in st the  a ttack s  o f  th e  S inhalese fo rc es . Trincomalee f o r t  
i t s e l f  was not f ro n ta l ly  a ttacked  though i t s  cap ta in  Francisco 
de Mello de Noronha and h is  seventy men were ready to  face 
an a s s a u lt .  The ch ie f  aspect o f the  c o n f l ic t  here was the 
naval one, fo r  the  king o f Kandy being the m aster o f most p f  
Ceylon t r i e d  to  export i t s  produce to  ob ta in  valued m unitions 
o f  war in  re tu rn . The dozen Portuguese sh ips based on Trincomalee, 
B a ttica lo a  and Ja ffn a  made i t  th e i r  ta sk  not m erely to  supply 
th e  beseiged fo r ts  w ith p rov isions b u t a lso  to  impede the
(65)
commercial ven tures o f  th e  Kandyans and th e i r  Muslim a l l i e s .
The cap ta in  o f  B a ttica lo a , Manual Pessoa de Carvalho, d id  have
to  face a Kandyan a tta c k , bu t by January 1631 he had received
enough reinforcem ents to  ra id  th e  nearby v illa g e s  on the
mainland. In  August 1631 h is  successor Theodosio Affonso da Gama
( 66)
made a ra id  fu r th e r  in lan d .
(63) Contd., a f te r  de Almeida bu t in  f a c t  Dora Alvaro a rriv ed  
e a r l ie r  and served under Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas fo r  a  few days.
Dom Jorge de Almeida took over h is  p o st only on 24 October 1631. 
Simancas SP. 1530.f*59v
(64) Jornada-Lomba, 885 P .E .P ie r is  -  Ceylon 1 1 .190; Queyroz 783? 
F.de Souza VI.373,421; TT.Ms da L iv . l699 .f.315
( 65) AHU 445.f . 55? AHU Caixa 23. 26.1.1655? Simancas SP. 1530.f . l i b  
Film oteca LM.20. 9-10 /4-2 ; AHU 501. f .  124
( 66) Simancas SB. 1530*f .  l iv ;  Queyroz 785? AHU J>01.f.379
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G alle and Negombo faced heav ier onslaugh ts. In  e a r ly  
September a p a r t  o f th e  reb e l fo rces numbering about f iv e  
hundred men was placed under Andre Godinho, a n a tiv e  o f 
Colombo and d irec ted  to  a ttack  Galle# The cap ta in  o f  the  f o r t  
Joao T eix e ira  M eireles had about s ix ty  Portuguese inc lu d in g  
soldados, casados and p r ie s t s ,  besides a few hundred la sc a r in s  
under h is  command and these  w ith the  a r t i l l e r y  o f  the f o r t  
proved to  s u f f ic ie n t  to  keep th e  S inhalese a t  bay# However 
r e a l is in g  th a t  th e  force they  saw might be merely the  vanguard 
o f a s tro n g er force the  Portuguese prepared fo r  a longer siige#
As M eireles was o ld  and unable to  d ir e c t  the fo rces a c tiv e ly  
he was rep laced  by common consent by a casado^ Antonio da Cunha 
as cap ta in  t i l l  a new cap ta in  was named from Colombo# Da Cunha 
appealed to  Colombo fo r  a id  and de Seixas sen t him tw enty men 
w ith powder, shot and s a l tp e t r e  in  th ree  f ish in g  boats# In  
October a f te r  the  a r r iv a l  o f Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas in  Colombo, 
de Seixas sen t a fu r th e r  reinforcem ent o f  te n  men w ith  p rov isions 
and sometime l a t e r  twenty more in  a ship under Dom Louren$o 
Sotomayor#
While the  Portuguese g a rriso n  was thus being strengthened 
the  S inhalese fo rces ou tside  had increased  in  number# As 
communications w ith Colombo were being ca rr ie d  on by means 
o f tones or f ish in g  boats the S inhalese t r i e d  to  prevent th ese
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boats from leav in g  th e  port# The Portuguese could not allow 
th is  th r e a t  to  th e i r  communications, e sp ec ia lly  as i t  would 
have also  meant the  end o f th e  valuab le supply o f  fre sh  f is h  
th a t  the fishermen brought in .  So they  sen t armed guards w ith 
th e i r  f ish in g  boats and beat o f f  the  S inhalese vessels#  F a ilin g  
in  th is  venture the besiegers t r i e d  to  persuade the la sc a r in s  
to  d e liv e r  th e  fo r t  to  them. The p lo t  was w sll advanced when
th e  acc id en ta l death o f  a la s c a r in  revealed  the  ex istence  o f
( 6?) ( 68) 
the scheme# The r in g  le ad e rs  were promptly executed#
By A p ril 1631 G alle had gained many reinforcem ents 
and the g a rriso n  was organised under Dom Antonio Mascarenhas, 
the  captain-m ajor o f  th e  fo rces a t  G alle who organised a ttack s  
on the v illa g e s  near the  f o r t .  In  th i s  he was a s s is te d  by the 
new cap tain  o f  G alle , Manual P in to  and th e  two lead ers  a ttacked  
Kathaluwa, B e lito ta  and Weiigama# They a lso  made ra id s  on 
co as ta l towns up to  Dondra. D espite th ese  e f fo r ts  however, th e  
Portuguese in  G alle , l ik e  those in  Colombo remained more o r
(69)
le s s  confined to  the  f o r t  up to  e a r ly  1632#
( 67) F r. Assumpcao r e la te s  how a Portuguese l e t  o f f  h is  gun 
acc id en tly  and k i l le d  a la s c a r in .While th e  la s c a r in  was being 
ca rrie d  away a palm l e a f  l e t t e r  hidden in  h is  c lo thes f e l l  o u t.
This revealed  a p lo t  to  b e tray  the  fo rt#
( 68) TT.Ms da L iv. l699.ff.296v-298v, 312v; Film oteca LM. 1^,115/1-2 
Ajuda 51-V III-51 .f.303
(69) Simancas SP. 153 0 # f.llv ; AHU 5 0 1 .f f .i8 0 , 1553;
P .da Trinidade ILL. 115
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Negombo had a s tro n g er force than  the  o th e r o u tly in g  
Portuguese fo r ts  c h ie f ly  because the  cap ta in , Lourenpo T eixe ira  
de Macedo had acted sw if tly  on hearing  th e  news o f the  d e fea t 
o f th e  Portuguese army in  1630, He had immediately re c ru ite d  
fiv e  hundred men o f  th e  Seven Korales to  a id  th e  fo r ty  
Portuguese in  the  f o r t  and was thus ab le to  keep co n tro l o f 
the  surrounding v illa g e s  and o b ta in  p rov isions from them long 
a f te r  the  commencement o f the  siege o f Colombo* In  October 
1630 a force o f one thousand f iv e  hundred S inhalese le d  by 
Dom Jeronimo Rajapaksha and the  Prince o f Matale was sen t to  
a ttack  Negombo but th i s  fo rce  was beaten o f f  by th e  la sc a r in s  
led  by Manual G il, a casado of Colombo who was a t  th e  time 
serv ing  in  Negombo. As th e  S inhalese continued to  a ttac k  across 
the  r iv e r  as w ell as on th e  landward s id e  o f  th e  f o r t  and la id  
siege to  i t ,  Louren9o T eixe ira  appealed fo r  help from Colombo 
and was sen t twenty men under Jorge Fernandes de Abreu.
De Seixas had a lso  meanwhile devised a strategem . He to ld
Louren9o th a t  when Dom Bras de Castro appeared w ith h is  f l e e t
he was to  ask th a t  a l l  the  men be landed s e c re tly  and arrange
th a t  th e  sh ip  should s a i l  away th e  follow ing day. Then w ith
a l l  h is  fo rces to g e th er w ith  those o f Dom Bras he was to  a ttack
the  S inhalese who were entrentched before th e  f o r t ,  hoping to
on
catch them by su rp r is e . However when Dom Bras appeared/26 November
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the plan f e l l  through as n e ith e r  he nor Lourenpo T eixe ira
was w illin g  to  take charge o f th e  operation  as both feared
to  tak e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  th e  t a s k .  The S in h a le se  p r o f i t i n g
by the Portuguese delay  brought in  reinforcem ents and
Don Bras de Castro even tu a lly  l e f t  w ithout accomplishing
anything. Negombo remained besieged by f iv e  hundred men
up to  th e  end o f i631 during which period  th e  S inhalese made
(70)
sev era l a ttack s  on the  f o r t  w ithout success.
In  th e  north  the feared  Kandyan invasion  o f  Ja ffn a  
w ith the  a id  o f  South Indian  troops d id  no t m a te r ia liz e  
and the Ja ffn a  peninsula i t s e l f  remained secu re ly  in  Portuguese 
hands. The rumours o f  an a ttack  were however s u f f ic ie n t ly  
strong  to  make a l l  the  p r ie s ts  to  take refuge in  th e  f o r t  o f 
Ja ffn a . The Kandyans d id  a ttack  Mannar whose cap ta in  
Francisco T elles de Menezes bea t o f f  th e i r  a s s a u lts ,  bu t 
ap a rt from th is  a l l  th a t  the  captain-m ajor o f  Ja ffn a ,
Miguel P e re ira  Borralho (1630-1633) had to  contend w ith  were 
a few skirm ishes in  th e  Vanni reg ion . However th e  work o f 
conversion, always a good index o f Portuguese a u th o rity , was
,(71 )
not resumed t i l l  1632.
(70) BNL.FG. 939 .f . l a ;  79JW>.f.7; AHU 501.f f . 9,379}
Assentos I .  529} TT.LM .31.ff.^2-if3; AHU Caixa 23, 26.1.1655;
TT.Ms da L iv . l6 9 9 .ff.2 9 6 v , 298v-299, 309-310v, 313; TT.LM. 29. 
f .l2 5 v ; Ajuda 5 1 -V IIl-5 1 .f.l3 0 9
(71) Assentos I .  529; BNL.F3.7640.f.7-8
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Everywhere th e  Portuguese held  th e i r  ground through 1631,
bea ting  o f f  a ttack s and in  some p laces co u n ter-ra id in g
w ith g radually  in c reas in g  freedom. With th e i r  command o f  th e
sea they  were able to  deny to  the  k ing  o f Kandy any g re a t
extension o f h is  trad e  w ith the  ou tside  world which would
have enabled him to  arm h is  troops more e f fe c t iv e ly . They were
also  able to  b rin g  in  troops in  in c reas in g  numbers in  p rep ara tio n
fo r  fc s tru g g le  fo r  th e  domains o f  K otte . With the  cro ssing  o f
the  Kelani r iv e r  by th e  Portuguese army on 5 Januray 163?,
(72)
th a t  s tru g g le  was begun. Contrary to  what Queyro^. s ta te s  
de Almeida d id  not delay  fo r two months in  Colombo aw aiting 
th e  outcome o f n eg o tia tio n s fo r  peace. Such n eg o tia tio n s  d id  
not in  f a c t  commence t i l l  August 1632. The delay  i s  b e t te r  
explained by th e  cautious d isp o s itio n  o f da Almeida h im self.
The heavy ra in s  which f e l l  in  November and December had made
the  countryside marshy and de Almeida favoured w aiting  fo r  b e t te r
weather and making use o f the  time thus made av a ilab le  fo r the
reo rg an iza tio n  o f th e  armed fo rces and th e  co lle c tio n  o f
supp lies and m unitions. Miguel Fernao de Castelbranco was
appointed the  cap ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld  and Dom Antonio Mascarenhas,
Jorge Coelho de C astro , Antonio de Motta Galvao and Antonio Barbosa
(72) Queyroz 791
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were made d isavas o f  th e  Seven K orales, Four K orales, Matara
(73)
and Sabaragamuwa re sp e c tiv e ly .
De Almeida's major problem was th a t  o f  supply, fo r  th e re  
was a g rea t lack  o f c o o lie s . As h is  f i r s t  ta rg e t  was the  
K elani v a lle y  he hoped to  circumvent th i s  problem by using  
sh ips s a i l in g  u p -riv e r as tra n sp o r ts  o f  food and m unitions.
He th e re fo re  asked Andre Coelho fo r  s ix  o f  h is  sm aller v esse ls  
to  be made ready fo r th e  ta s k . This was th e  f i r s t  time th e  
Portuguese had used sea-going v esse ls  on a r iv e r  in  Ceylon fo r 
m il i ta ry  purposes. The success o f  th e  experiment i t s e l f  was 
a lim ite d  one, fo r one o f th e  s ix  caught f i r e ,  another ran  
aground and two more f a i le d  to  proceed beyond a few m iles from
(7*0
the  r iv e r  mouth.
To understand de A lm eida's m il i ta ry  plans i t  i s  e s s e n tia l  
to  review the  defence pland o f th e  S inha lese . The K elani v a lley  
was not merely a f e r t i l e  a g r ic u ltu ra l  reg ion  but the  main 
rou te  from Colombo to  th e  h ighlands. The king o f Kandy was 
th e re fo re  determ ined to  hold i t  and fo r  th i s  purpose had b u i l t  
stockades to  form two l in e s  o f  defence.About s ix  m iles to  the  
e a s t o f Colombo were two la rg e  stockades o f wood and mud on 
e i th e r  s id e  o f  the  r iv e r .  These were f o r t i f i e d  by sev era l p ieces 
o f a r t i l l e r y  captured from th e  Portuguese. The second l in e  of
(73) Ajuda 51-V -36.ff.91v-95* BNL.FG.7640.f. 17; Queyroz 791-792; 
TT.LM.29.f.219; F.de Souza VI. 425-426
(74) Ajuda 51-V -36.ff.95-96v; Queyroz 792; F.de Souza VI. 426-427
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defence was a f o r t  a t  Kaduwala to  the  south o f  K elani and 
another a t  Malwana to  th e  n o rth . A few m iles west o f  Malwana 
y e t another stockade had been b u i l t  to  streng then  th i s  systegu 
The fo rces o f  th e  Four and the  Seven Korales re in fo rced  by a 
s trong  contingent o f Kandyans under Maha Astana and V ijayapala 
were ready to  defend these  p laces . De Almeida's p lan  -  somewhat 
conditioned by h is  supply problem -  was to  advance eastwards 
along the  northern  bank up to  Malwana and then  to  cress the  
r iv e r  and re tu rn  along th e  southern bank destroy ing  a l l  the  
fo r ts  on the  way.
Leaving a s trong  force to  g a rriso n  Colombo, de Almeida 
took w ith him four thousand men, one th i rd  o f  them Portuguese, 
one th ird  la s c a r in s  and th e  r e s t  K a ffirs  and Canarese. He marched 
eastwards along th e  no rthern  bank w ith g re a t cau tion . The two 
stockades on the  northern  bank were taken a f te r  heavy f ig h tin g  
on 7 and 8 January 1632 and de Almeida reached Malwana, twelve 
m iles from Colombo on th e  n in th , four days a f te r  he had s e t  
o u t. The S inhalese recognising  th e  s tren g th  o f h is  force d id  not 
o f fe r  open b a t t le  and a t  Malwana Maha Astana abandoned the  f o r t ,  
doubtless hoping to  draw de Almeida fu rth e r  away from h is  base.
The o ld  so ld ie r  however stuck to  h is  p lans and having su ccessfu lly  
attacked  and demolished the  stockades on the  southern bank 
s ta tio n ed  h im self w ith h is  fo rces a few m iles o u tsid e  Colombo
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where he sen t h is  s ick  and wounded. Having thus secured fourteen  
v illa g e s  w ith in  a dozen m iles o f  Colombo de Almeida tu rned  to
(75)
Raigama, S a lp i t i  and Pasdun K orales.
During th i s  period  de Almeida took g re a t pains to  ensure 
the lo y a lty  o f the  la sc a r in s  fo r  he re a l is e d  th a t  th is  was 
the key to  th e  conquest o f  th e  lands in  Ceylon. Those who 
brought back heads o f  th e  S inhalese k i l le d  in  b a t t le  were given
(76)
l ib e r a l  rewards on the  sp o t. With the  se izu re  o f  the  stockades
a sp e c ia l bonus o f ten  x era fln s  each was p resen ted  to  each o f
the la s c a r in s .  One o f the  newly conquered v illa g e s  was ceremoniously
handed over to  a la s c a r in .Those who re tu rned  to  obedience
(77)
were given red b e re ts  as a sign  o f approval.On the  o th e r hand
the reb e ls  once captured were tre a te d  roughly. Many were
d is tr ib u te d  as slaves and se rvan ts to  the  cap tains and ftudaliyars
and one was even handed over to  th e  cam bal K affirs  who k i l le d
(78)
and devoured him in  f ro n t o f  h is  own fam ily .
By now th e  S inhalese were organized in to  two main mobile 
u n its  -  the  army o f the  West and th e  army o f the  South. The 
f i r s t  consisted  o f th e  men o f th e  Four and Seven Korales aided 
by fo rces o f Maha Astana and V ijayapala. The second was le d  by
(75) ENL.PG. 7640.f f .  17-18; Ajuda 51-V -36 .ff.97-108; Queyroz 792; 
Jornada 79? F.de Souza VI. 427^429; AHU 501.f f . 4,38
(76) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.975 F.de Souza V I.427
(77) Ajuda 51-V -36.ff.l00v-101v
(78) Ajuda 51-V -36 .f.102; F.de Souza V I.428; Queyroz 792
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Kumarasinha and Dorn Theodisio and was made up o f men from 
Matara, Sabaragamuwa and Uva. A fter p o stin g  a g a rriso n  to  
p ro te c t Colombo from sudden a tta c k , de Almeida attem pted to 
subjugate the  Four and Seven K orales. The S inhalese array o f 
the west le d  by the  two p rinces was defeated  a t  Daladagamwela 
and Methiangane, and in  th e  l a t t e r  c o n f l ic t  V ijayapala 
narrowly avoided cap tu re . I t  was to  contain  th is  advance 
th a t  the  two p rinces ca lle d  in  the  fo rces o f the south . To 
meet th is  combined force de Almeida advanced to  Vadaruwa, 
six teen  m iles west o f  Methiangane where he f o r t i f ie d  h is  
p o s itio n  w ith a stockade. Once more however fo rtune favoured 
the  Portuguese fo r  Dom Theodosio f e l l  ou t w ith th e  p rinces 
and r e t i r e d  to  K alutara pursued by a force o f Kandyans le d  by
(79)
Kumarasinha.
The reasons fo r  th e  estrangement between Dom Theodosio 
and the p rin ces are no t c le a r .  Dom Theodosio during  th e  p a s t 
two years had emerged as th e  s tro n g es t o f the  reb e l le a d e rs . 
Senerat had made him d isava o f  Matara and Dom Theodosio s e t  
up h is  headquarters a t  Dondra where he r e b u i l t  the  an c ien t tem ple. 
I t  may w ell have been th a t  he resen ted  the  au th o rity  o f 
Kumarasinha who had been designated  k ing  o f  Matara by h is
(79) Queyroz 794-795; Jornada 80; BNL.FG.7640.f.il8;
Ajuda 51-V -36.f.l07v; AHU 501*fT*l6v,47; Raghavan- The karava 
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fa th e r .  The lo y a lty  o f the men o f Matara were to  Dom Theodosio
and not to  Kumarasinha, the  nominal k ing , and th is  may have
made co-operation  between the  two d i f f i c u l t .  I t  may also
have been th a t  Dom Theodosio d isagreed  w ith  th e  s tra te g y  o f
the  p rinces who wanted to  concentrate a l l  fo rces on the  K elani,
( 80)
fo r th a t  l e f t  h is  own p r in c ip a l i ty  open to  Portuguese in v asio n s.
The r e s u l ts  o f  th e  break were d ec is iv e . Dom Theodosio*s
troops amounted to  n ea rly  four thousand men- about a th i rd  of
the fo rces th e  S inhalese had in  th e  f i e ld .  Finding h im self
besieged in  Kalufcara by the  Kandyans under th e  p rince  o f  Uva
Dom Theodosio o ffe red  to  submit to  the  Portuguese. De Almeida
accepted the  o f fe r  and se n t Antonio da Motta Galvao w ith troops
to  aid  him, whereupon Kumarasinha withdrew to  Uva. Thus the
whole d isava o f Matara passed in to  Portuguese hands w ith
(81)
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l ty .
At sea too th e  Portuguese soon began to  r e a s s e r t  th e i r  
power. S ho rtly  a f te r  r a is in g  the  blockade o f Colombo, de Almeida 
appointed Francisco Tenreiro as captain-m ajor o f  the  coasts 
o f Ceylon w ith in s tru c tio n s  to  d is t ru p t  th e  trad e  th e  Kandyans 
had s ta r te d  w ith south Ind ian  merchants. By th is  time Chilaw 
had become a cen tre  o f exchange o f  arecanu t, cinnamon and elephants
(80) F.de Souza V I.431; Queyroz 79^795; AHU 501.f.236v; 
Ajuda 51-V -36.f.l07v
(81) F.de Souza VI.430; Queyroz 7955 Jornada 80; AHU 4^5*f*55
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fo r  r ic e ,  s a l tp e t re  and c lo th  from south In d ia . The Portuguese
raided  Chilaw tw ice. On th e  f i r i t  occasion the  tra d e rs  received
a warning which enabled them to  escape bu t on th e  second
one hundred and t h i r t y  v esse ls  f e l l  in to  the  hands o f th e
Portuguese. The p o rts  o f M atara, Dondra and Alutgama were also
(82)
attacked  and pu t to  the  flam es.
During the  second h a lf  o f  1632 de Almeida took measures 
fo r  the  c o lle c tio n  o f revenue from the areas recovered. Captains
(83)were appointed to  the  p o rts  o f  K alu tara , Alutgama and Weligama.
De Almeida a lso  attem pted to  organise the  cinnamon p ee le rs  fo r 
the  c o lle c tio n  o f th is  sp ic e . I t  was th is  step  which brought 
him in to  c o n f lic t  w ith the  F ranciscans. The Franciscans claimed 
th a t  a l l  th e  p ro p e rtie s  o f  those who had abjured C h r is t ia n ity  
and died in  the  war should be confiscated  while Dom Jorge de Almeida 
refused  to  enforce th is  measure due to  the  need to  a t t r a c t  men 
bade to  the  low lands. The d isp u te  soon degenerated in to  a
(84)
personal one between one o f  th e  Franciscans and th e  cap ta in -g en era l.
I t  was not th a t  Dom Jorge de Almeida had h ith e r to  lacked
(85) .enemies. Re was very o ld  and in firm ,and  in  th e  campaigns ovepr
(86)
the  marshy K elani v a lle y  he had to  be c a rr ie d  in  a palanquin .
(82) AHU 50i.ff.l6v ,38 ,47v ,199»236v; Ajuda 51-V -36.f.l08} Queyroz 795* 
BNL.BG.7640.f . 17; TT.LM.32.f.270; Ajuda 51-V III-51• f f .309,402;
BNL.FG. 939 .f .5 9 a
(83) Film oteca LM.15, 20-21/2-5
(84) TT.LM .3i.ff.595-597; TT.LM.3 0 .f f .2 5 3 ,264v; TT.LM.3 6 .f . 443;
TT.LM.37.f.375; Film oteca LM.20. 36/2; Evora GR Arm. V-VI.14 -5 .f .  108-109
(85) TT.LM.35-f.37; TT.LM.36 .f . 13; Queyroz 797
(86) Ajuda 51-V-36.f.96v
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For th is  he was sub jected  to  c r i t ic is m  by the  so ld ie rs  as
unwarlike in  conduct* The so ld ie rs  had l i t t l e  ap p rec ia tio n  o f
the engineering s k i l l  he d isp layed  in  the  co nstruc tion  o f  the  
(37)
b astio n  o f Mapane,while he l o s t  re sp e c t a lso  due to  h is
extreme caution  in  th e  fie ld *  I t  was charged th a t  he rewarded
h ia  frien d s  l ib e r a l ly  w hile those who served in  th e  army were 
(88)
forgotten* The unpopularity  o f h is  a sso c ia te s  c e r ta in ly  re f le c te d
on him* He was seen as an o ld  man surrounding h im self w ith
o ther o ld  men unaware o f  th e  needs o f  the  army and th e  needs 
(89)
of th e  casados. Perhaps h is  g r e a t e s t  f a u l t  was th a t  he was
(90)
moved to  anger easily* I t  was th is  th a t  le d  him in to  a l te rc a tio n s
w ith h is  subord inates, in  one o f which a casado was k i l l e d ,
(9fl) “
while the  general h im self was tw ice in ju re d .
To add to  de Almeida*s d i f f i c u l t i e s  a v io le n t tem pest
on 29 November 1632 damaged many bu ild ings and brought down 
some o f th e  w alls o f th e  f o r t  o f  Colombo* The lak e  overflowed
(87) Queyroz 797
(88) D iario  do 3 conde de L inhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia , 63
(89) At l e a s t  two o f h is  o f f ic e r s  Lan9a ro te  de Seixas (vedor) 
and Manual F re ire  de Andr*de( cap ta in  of Colombo) were very 
old and very co rru p t,
(90)TT.LM.35.f.37 ‘
De Almeida h im self was above co rru p tio n , but th e  suggestion 
in  Queyroz 797 th a t  e f fo r ts  to  check corrup tion  may have caused 
h is  unpopularity  had no fu r th e r  evidence to  support i t ,
(91) Queyroz 797; F.de Souza V I.4315 Jornada 78-795 
TT.LM .30.ff.158, 253; Ajuda 50-V -38.f. I84v
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and the ra in s  continued u n t i l  only the Franciscan monastery
and a small church eemained stand ing . The annual f l e e t  sen t to
Ceylon to  take  cinnamon to  Goa was l o s t  w ith  many o th er v esse ls
(92)
th a t  were in  th e  harbour. Moreover th e  Portuguese fo rces
having been weakened by th e  departu re  o f  th e  f le e ts  o f  Andre Coelho,
Dora A lvaro de C astro  and Don: E ras de C astro  d u rin g  th e  cou rse
(93)
o f  1632, were checked a f te r  they  had recovered M atara, a p a r t  
o f Sabaragamuwa, the  c o a s ta l sec to r o f  th e  Seven K orales and
(9*0
the  Kelani v a lle y  up tfl» P itig a ld e n iy a . Though de Almeida 
re c ru ite d  many la s c a r in s  to  dompensate fo r the dec lin e  in  the  
number o f Portuguese, by 1633 he had lo s t  the confidence o f
(95)
the  c lergy , the  casados and the army. On the re c e ip t o f th is  
news and on the  complaints o f the  casados o f Colombo the  v iceroy  
decided to  r e c a l l  Dom Jorge de Almeida and rep lace  him w ith
(96 )
Diogo de Hello de C astro , cap ta in  o f  S.Thome.
(92) BNL.FGe 7640.f . 66; Filmoteca LM.19A.22/2-3; TT.LM.3 1 .f .  1995
TT.LM.3 0 .f.264v; AHU 5 0 1 .f .« $ *  326; JCERAS. XXX.97
(93) The v iceroy  d id  sen t reinforcem ents when the  annual f le e t  
a rriv ed  in  1632 (Film oteca LM.19A. 17/1) bu t these  were too few. 
Evora GR.Arm. V-VT. 14-5ff* 84-85
(94)P .da T rinidade I I I .  118
(95) D iario  do 3° conde de Linhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia . 21, 65; 
Queyroz 796
(96) BNL.PG. 7640.f . 61; Evora C X V l/2-3 .f.ll4 ; Ajuda 50-V-3S. 
f .l8 2 v ; StibrafcHEX kM.
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Meanwhile n eg o tia tio n s  fo r  peace had s ta r te d  between
the  Portuguese and th e  king o f Kandy. The Portuguese successes
on land and sea in  1632 had made Senerat w illin g  to  consider
peace. H6 and h is  people were weary a f te r  f iv e  years o f
continuous w arfare . Though the Portuguese blockade o f Kandyan
trad e  was by no means complete, supp lies o f  food were ir re g u la r
and sometimes s a l t  was in  sh o rt supply. Senerat h im self was
ageing and saw d iv is io n s  a ris in g ^  w ith in  th e  S inhalese ranks.
Dom Theodosio had a lready  re jo in ed  the  Portuguese. The p rince o f
Matale was becoming in c re a s in g ly  d iscon ten ted  w ith the  favours
shown to  Maha Astana. In  fa c t  as e a rly  as 1631 V ijayapala had
attem pted to  d e se r t to  the  Portuguese by marching to  B a ttica lo a
w ith some o f  h is  own men and twenty two p r iso n e rs . I t  was
only the  opposition  o f  h is  own mwn th a t  had stopped him from
doing so . F in a lly  the  Kandyan e f fo r ts  to  se ize  Mannar and
Ja ffn a  had been e f fe c t iv e ly  checked by Miguel P e re ira  Borralho,
captain-m ajor o f Ja ffh a  (1630-1633)#In  fa c t  by 1631 Borralho
(97)
had begun ra id s  in to  the  Kandyan co n tro lled  Vanni d i s t r i c t s .
By August 1632 the v iceroy  too had re a l is e d  the  a d v is a b il i ty  
o f  a peacefu l se ttlem en t. The p a s t two years had been d i f f i c u l t  
ones fo r th e  Portuguese in  th e  E ast. In  1630 the  lo s s  o f
W ) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AHU 501.f f . 38,3795 FUmoteca LM.15. 20/21 /2 -5 ;
P .E .P ie r is  -  P rince V ijayapala o f Matale -255 AHU Caixa 22, 
4.8.1634
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Nuno Alvares Botelho w ith h is  high seas f l e e t  in  th e  s t r a i t s  o f
Malacca had bean added to  th e  d e fea t o f  Constantino de Sa in
Ceylon. In  1631 came d iso rd e rs  on th e  Zambesi w ith  over th ree
hundred Portuguese deaths and th e  lo s s  o f  Mombapa to  the
reb e llio u s  forces o f  Dom Jeronimo C hingulia. No a id  a rr iv ed
(98)
from P ortuga l in  1631, and in  Bengal th e  Portuguese were 
heading fo r  d ir e c t  c o n f lic t  w ith  Mughal a u th o r i t ie s .  In  such 
circum stances a peace t r e a ty  was obviously d e s ira b le . I t  would 
re le a se  the  two hundred Portuguese p riso n ers  held  by the  king 
o f Kandy and free  o th e r troops t ie d  up in  Ceylon fo r  se rv ices  
elsewhere. Peace would a lso  b rin g  to  an end the  outpouring o f 
men and m a te ria l to  Ceylon which had co st over two hundred 
thousand x era fin s  in  th e  l a s t  two y ea rs , and would perm it the  
exporta tion  once again o f  such lu c ra tiv e  commodities as cinnamon
(99)
and arecanu t. W ithin Ceylon th e  casados represen ted  by the  
camara o f Colombo were s tro n g ly  in  favour o f  peace. Two years 
o f  campaigns in  K otte had deprived them o f  th e i r  major source o f 
income -  th e  revenue from th e  v i l la g e s .  The r is in g  co s t o f 
foodstu ffs  was an added blow. To th e  casados o f Ceylon th e re fo re
(98) E . A x e l s o n  -  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a .  1600-1700, ^
76-77» 86- 87 ; C.R. Boxer - Commentaries o f Ruy F re ire  de Andretcie. 315
t r  rv--£ -Li-11 u u m u  •
(99) BNL.P3.939.f. 139a; TT.LM.29 . f .  197; TT.LM.3 0 .ff.108,264v;
B N L .P C r, 7640.f . 7; F i l m o t e c a  LM . 16. 4-3-44/4-1; Q u e y r o z  786 ;
F.de S o u z a  V I .  425
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peace represen ted  th e i r  chance to  re tu rn  to  normalcy and 
( 100) 
p ro sp e rity .
While w illingness to  suspend war ex is ted  on both s id e s ,
d i f f i c u l t ie s  arose regard ing  the  terms o f  peace. The two main
issu es in  d isp u te  were th e  possession  o f B a ttica lo a  and the
payment o f  t r ib u te .  A fter p relim inary  soundings through
( 101)
Fr. Antonio Peixo to , de Almeida sen t an ambassador to  o f fe r  
Senerat peace on th e  terms o f  1617 on condition  he agreed to  
B a ttica lo a  remaining in  Portuguese hands. Senerat on the  o ther 
hand held  th a t  B a ttica lo a  was a p a r t  o f h is  kingdom and 
refused to  pay any t r ib u te  in  th e  fu tu re .
As th e  Portuguese envoy would not agree, Senerat dism issed 
him and decided to  send an embassy to  Goa. The d ec is io n  to  
send envoys to  Goa was a lso  in fluenced  by another f a c to r .  Senerat 
considered th a t  a t r e a ty  made d ir e c t ly  w ith th e  v iceroy  would 
not be s e t  aside  w ith im punity by a subsequent cap ta in -g en era l.
De Sa*s d isreg a rd  o f  the  t r e a ty  o f  1617 apparen tly  d is i l lu s io n e d  
him on t r e a t i e s  made w ith  the  cap ta in -g en era ls . Jayasundara 
Mudaliyar, d isava o f Udunuwara and Kuruppu Rala were chosen as 
the k in g fs envoys. Domingos Carvalho Cam, Gaspar da Costa and
(100) Evora CXVI /  2-3 and 114
(101) Jornada 72 and Queyroz 790 name the  ambassador as 
Jeronimo T aveira . Biker 11.^9 and 3 CLR se r  I I I . 352 name 
him as Jeronimo O liv e ira  da Cunha.
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M i g u e l  d e  F o n s e c a  a c c o m p a n i e d  t h e m  a s  t h e  k i n g ' s  p r o c u r a t o r s
( 102)
w h i l e  Dom  D i o g o  w a s  t h e  o f f i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t e r *
C a m , a  v e t e r a n  s o l d i e r  o f  C e y l o n  t r i e d  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e
v i c e r o y  t h a t  l e n i e n c y  w a s  t h e  b e s t  g u a r a n t e e  o f  a  s t a b l e  p e a c e
w i t h  K a n d y .  T h e  f o r m e r  s e r & e a n t - m a j o r ,  M i g u e l  d e  F o n s e c a  o p p o s e d
t h i s  v i e w  a r g u i n g  t h a t  l e n i e n c y  w o u l d  b e  t a k e n  f o r  w e a k n e s s .
A m b r o s i o  F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  w h o  h a d  d i f f e r e n c e  w i t h  C am  w h i l e
s e r v i n g  i n  C e y l o n  w a s  a l s o  a n  a d v o c a t e  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  h a r d
n e g o t i a t i o n .  A s  A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  w a s  t h e  o n l y  p e r s o n  i n
t h e  v i c e r o y ' s  c o u n c i l  w i t h  a  f i r s t  h a n d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  C e y l o n
h i s  i n f l u e n c e  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  d e c i s i v e  i n  t h e  c o u n c i l  m e e t i n g
of 11.3.1633 which reso lved  th a t  n e ith e r  B a ttica lo a  nor the  
(103)
t r i b u t e  c o u l d  b e  d i s p e n s e d  w i t h  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  p e a c e .  A s  t h e
P o r t u g u e s e  s t o o d  f i r m  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  e n v o y s  w e r e  c o m p e l l e d  t o
y i e l d  a n d  o n  3 A p r i l  1633 s i g n  a  t r e a t y  i n v o l v i n g  b o t h  p a y m e n t
o f  t r i b u t e  a n d  t h e  c e s s i o n  o f  B a t t i c a l o a .  S e n e r a t  w a s  t o  p a y
tw o  e l e p h a n t s  a  y e a r  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  a r r e a r s
o f  t r i b u t e  f o r  t h e  p a s t  s e v e n  y e a r s .  H o w e v e r  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s i x
y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  t r e a t y  t h i s  p a y m e n t  w a s  t e m p o r a r i l y
(104)
l i m i t e d  t o  o n e  e l e p h a n t  a  y e a r .  T h e  f o r t  o f  B a t t i c a l o a  a n d  
a l l  l a n d  w i t h i n  tw o  t h o u s a n d  p a c e s  o r  a n  a r t i l l e r y  s h o t  f r o m
(102) CLR /  s e r . I I I . 291-293; P . d a  T r i n i d a d e  I I I .  118-1205
B i k e r  I I . 38-40;47; E v o r a  CXVl/2-3f. 114; A s s e n t o s  1.573
A s s e n t o s  I  n a m e s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r  a s  Dom  R o d r i g o .  S o  d o e s  B i k e r  11.38* 
b u t  B i k e r  I I .  47 n a m e s  h i m  a s  Dom  D i o g o .
(103) A s s e n t o s  I .  467-468; CLR 3 s e r  I I I . 291; Q u e y r o z  790-791; 
A j u d a  5 0 -V -3 8 .f.l8 l
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the  w alls was to  belong to  the  Portuguese. The revenue from
( 10$)
the  customs d u tie s  was to  be shared.
The v iceroy  also  refused  to agree in  to to  to  two o th e r
proposals o f  Senerat. Senerat had suggested th a t  those who
fle d  from the  Portuguese to  Kandy or v ice  versa  should be
allowed to  l iv e  in  the  land they  wished to .  The v iceroy , probably
re a l is in g  th e  problems th is  would c rea te  in  time o f a r is in g
in  K otte included the proviso th a t  th i s  would apply only to
( 10$)
persons who had not commited treaso n . Senerat had also  requested
l e t t e r s  o f  au th o rity  fo r  h is  ships to  tra d e  on the  high seas, w ith
the p ro tec tio n  o f the  Portuguese but here th e  v iceroy  in se rte d
a clause which meant th a t  con tro l o f  the  trad e  in  arras and
( 103)
ammunition remained in  Portuguese hands.
Thus th e  d r a f t  t r e a ty  o f 1633 while i t  ceded B a ttica lo a  
to  the  Portuguese, awarded Senerat l i t t l e  more than  what he 
had obtained in  1617. He s t i l l  remained a v assa l o f  P o rtu g a l.
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  he now had sp e c if ic  perm ission to  trad e  in  
goods o th e r than arms. Moreover a t  h is  in s is tan c e  a clause had
(104)Clause 9* Record o f th e  t r e a ty  n eg o tia tio n s are av a ilab le  
in  Portuguese in  Assentos 1.573-577 and Biker I I .  42-47 and in  
English tr a n s la t io n  in  CLR 3 se r  I I I . 291-295* 350-354, 402-405.




been in se r te d  s t ip u la t in g  th a t  no cap ta in -g en era l could make
(108)
war w ithout good reasons fo r  doing so to  the  viceroy* But 
these  were sm all comforts a f te r  s ix  years of waw. I t  i s  no t 
su rp ris in g  th e re fo re  th a t  Senerat re je c te d  the terms agreed 
to  by the  envoys a t  Goa*
There was considerable specu la tion  in  the  Portuguese camp 
as to  what reasons prompted Senerat to  take th is  s te p . One 
o f them was probably the sudded a r r e s t  o f Dom Theodosio by 
the Portuguese a t  the  end o f 1632. The Portuguese probably 
never forgave Dom Theododioji fo r  h is  ro le  a t  Randeniwela.His 
opponents w ith in  th e  Portuguese camp were le d  by Fr. Antonio 
Peixoto who had suspected Dom Theodosio*s f id e l ty  even in  
the days o f  de Sa. Antonio da Motta Galvao w ith whom Dom Theodosio 
had never been on good terms was now appointed as h is  su p e rio r . 
When Senerat o ffe red  to  n eg o tia te  fo r  peace and h is  envoys 
s e t  out fo r  Goa Dom Theodosio *s value to  the  Portuguese dim inished 
g re a t ly . On th e  f i r s t  rumour o f treach ery  th e re fo re  he was 
a rre s te d  and sen t to  Goa fo r  t r i a l .  To S enera t, Dom Theodosio*s 
f a l l  was a r e l i e f .  I t  ensured a t  l e a s t  fo r  the  tim e being the  
lo y a lty  o f  the  o ther reb e ls  and weakened th e  Portuguese hold 
over th e  la s c a r in s  o f  Matara who no doubt resen ted  th e  a r r e s t
(108) Clause 6
I f  the  cap ta in -genera l d id  not observe th is  c lause 
th e  king o f  Kandy was expected to  inform  the  v iceroy  through the  
camara o f Colombo.
2 9  1
(109)
of th e i r  respected  le a d e r . Another fa c to r  which may have 
swayed Senerat was the  pauc ity  o f  th e  Portuguese reinforcem ents. 
As the considerable Portuguese fo rces sen t from Goa in  l a t e  
1631 to  recover Ceylon and Momba9a had hard ly  been made yp by 
the a r r iv a l  o f  fre sh  troops from Lisbon th e re  was not much 
the v iceroy  could have done to  make up th e  d efic ien cy . The 
year 1632 had not seen many Portuguese successes in  th e  E ast, 
save in  Ceylon. The Mughal siege o f the  Portuguese f o r t  a t  
Hugli (June to  September 1632) had ended w ith th e  abandonment 
o f th e i r  p o s itio n  by th e  Portuguese a f te r  tfrgfag th ree  hundred 
o f th e i r  number as w ell as seven hundred n a tiv e  C h ris tian s  
had been k i l le d .  In  both 1632 and 1633 th e  Dutch were ac tiv e  
in  the Arabian sea and in  the l a t t e r  year alone f iv e  o f the  
Portuguese ships tra d in g  between Ceylon and Goa f e l l  in to  th e i r
( n o )
hands. But the  weakness o f  the  Portuguese fo rces was a t  most
a co n tribu to ry  fa c to r  to  Senerat*s d ec is io n . The c h ie f  reason
was, w ithout doubt, the  in s is te n c e  o f th e  Portuguese on the
vi-tw
re te n tio n  o f  B a ttic a lo a . From th e  Kandyan p o in t o f View the  
main reason fo r the  outbreak o f war in  1628 was the  unauthorised 
construc tion  o f a Portuguese f o r t  on Kandyan s o i l  in  B a ttic a lo a . 
Furthermore i t  was apparent th a t  th is  f o r t  was b u i l t  to  con tro l 
and r e s t r i c t  Kandyan tra d e  and fo re ign  r e la t io n s .
(109) Queyroz 796; CLR 3 s e r .I I I .2 9 1 ;  P .da Trinidade I I I . 117
(110) Jornada 75$ Queyroz 798; Ajuda 51-V -38.f.l83v;
JCBRAS XXX.97; V.Smith -  Oxford h is to ry  o f In d ia . 379-380.
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Thus when Diogo de Mello a rr iv ed  a t  Colombo on 22 November
1633 to  take up h is  appointment as cap ta in -genera l he was faced
w ith the prospect o f  continued war. With g re a t e f fo r ts  he was
able to  muster four hundred Portuguese, a thousand K affirs
( i n )
Canarese, and f iv e  thousand la s c a r in s  fo r  h is  army. The
Sinhalese a t  th is  time were organized in to  two armies ; th a t  o f
Maha Astana and V ijayapala defending th e  upper regions o f
the  Four Korales and th a t  o f Kumarasinha which fought in
Matara. Maha Astana f o r t i f i e d  h im self a t  A tta p itiy a  and
V ijayapala a t  Moratenna w hile th e  king h im self was reported
( 112)
to  be a t  Ganetenna on th e  Kandyan f ro n t ie r .  The m il i ta ry  
s itu a tio n  had not apparen tly  changed very g re a t ly  fo r  de Mello 
had no more troops than  de Almeida had but de Mello was able 
to  u n ite  a l l  elements behind him and though perhaps le s s  
g if te d  as a ta c t ic ia n  he probably in sp ire d  the  troops w ith 
h is  g re a te r  aggressiveness. He se ized  th e  stockade a t  Moratenna 
and marching up to  A tta p itiy a  made ready to  a ttack  the  p o s itio n s  
held by Maha Astana who had been jo ined  by th e  k ing  and the  
two o th e r p r in ce s . The Kandyans had s ix teen  thousand men ready
(111)Jornada 75; Queyroz 798; Ajuda 50-V -33.f.l83v;
(112) Queyroz 798/ s ta te s  th a t  th e re  were seven hundred Portuguese. 
The statem ent in  a l e t t e r  o f  de Mello th a t  he had only one 
hundred and f i f t y  Portuguese so ld ie rs  when he took up o ff ic e
is  c e r ta in ly  a m isrep resen ta tion  (D iario  62) but h is  f in a l  
figu re  o f seven hundred men in  a l l  (D iario  65) t a l l i e s  w ith 
th a t  o f Queyroz. Jornada 84 gives the  f ig u re  o f  four hundred 
Portuguese and f iv e  thousand la s c a r in s .
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fo r  b a t t le  but de Hello*s venture was a success fo r  Maha Astana 
a f te r  vain  e f fo r ts  to  e x tra c t b e t te r  terms agreed w ithout
(113)
f ig h tin g  to  r a t i f y  the  d r a f t  t r e a t  drawn up in  Goa.
I f  the  war was a drawn b a t t l e ,  th e  peace was a Portuguese
v ic to ry . The Kandyans had to  give up fourteen  K orales which
they  had held  since 1630. Two hundred and twelve Portuguese
p riso n ers  held  in  Kandy fo r  th re e  years re tu rned  once more
(11^)
to  take th e i r  p laces in  th e  Portuguese army. But when th e  peace
(U5)
was signed on 14 January l63£ a t  A tta p itiy a  Senerat secured
one advantage. I t  was Maha Astana, now c a ll in g  h im self R ajasinha,
k ing  o f Kandy who signed th e  peace t r e a ty .  This to  Senerat
was the  cu lM nation  o f a long e f fo r t  to  have h is  youngest son
( 116)
in s ta l le d  and recognised as the  r ig h tfn l  k ing  o f Kandy.
The way in  which Rajasinha and Senerat agreed to  terms 
they  had re je c te d  b e fo re ^ ,a f te r  a mere show o f  fo rc e , was to  
leave an unfortunate  im pression in  the  mind o f Diogo de M ello.
He was convinced th a t  the  king o f Kandy had merely postponed
(£13) Queyroz 798; Jornada 84; AHU ^ O l.f .38 ; D iario  do 
3 conde de L inhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia . 65.
1114) Queyroz 798-799; D iario  do 3 conde de Linhares v ic e - re i  
da In d ia , 65 ; P .da Trinidad© I I I .  121
(115) CLR 3 s e r .  J I I .4 0 5 ; Biker 11.46; Jornada 13
(116) D iario  do 3 conde de Linhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia . 68; 
Film oteca LM19D. 34/1-2
Maha Astana had been adm inistering  Kandy on b eh a lf  o f 
S enerat fo r  many years but before th i s  had not taken h im self 
th e  t i t l e  o f  k ing  o f Kandy or th e  name R ajasinha.
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the day o f reckoning and would make war on th e  Portuguese
again, once he thought the  opportun ity  favourable* Having
served fourteen  years on th e  Coromandel and the  Malabar coasts
he knew how in te re s te d  th e  Dutch were in  gain ing  the
cinnamon tra d e  o f Ceylon. He considered th a t  the  only way to
secure th e  is la n d  was to  conquer the  kingdom o f Kandy. Thus
ju s t  th ree  and a h a lf  months a f te r  sign ing  th e  peace t r e a ty
he wrote to  the  k ing  o f  P ortugal warning th a t  peace would not
be kept fo r long and th a t  the  Portuguese should make war
kcuL
against the  king whoAdefeated  de Sa and brought d is c re d i t  
on them. He attem pted to  convince the  k ing  o f P ortuga l th a t  the  
peace was o f g re a te r  advantage to  Kandy than to  th e  Portuguese 
by p o in tin g  out th a t  under i t s  p ro tec tio n  the  k ing  o f Kandy 
used Portuguese p o rts  to  s e l l  h is  elephants to  the  Nayak o f
T „ 3i : ; 7)
These views o f  th e  cap ta in -genera l received  no support
from farii th e  v iceroy , conde de Linhares who being hard-pressed
to  meet e x is tin g  commitments in  Asia had no wish to  undertake 
( 118)
new ones. The v iceroy  was glad enough th a t  the  c o s tly  war 
had ended. He considered th a t  o th e r p ro je c ts ,  no tab ly  th e  
defence o f Malacca g ravely  th rea tened  by the  Dutch were 
questions o f  higher p r io r i ty .  He thus looked forward to  a
(117) T T .L K .36 .f.ll6
(118) P .E .P ie r is  -  Ceylon I I .  200
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considerable reduction  in  the  expenses o f  Ceylon. This
fundamental divergence o f  views le d  to  a c lash  between the
cap ta in -genera l and th e  v iceroy  on almost a l l  aspects o f  p o licy .
i t s
The expenses o f  Ceylon had f a r  exceeded revenues
in  the  p a s t few y ea rs . The v iceroy  now aimed a t  re ad ju s tin g
the  balance. U n til th e  l620#s th e  Ceylon a u th o r it ie s  had
received  th e  proceeds o f land  revenues and money from the
sa le  o f  crown commodities, most no tab ly  cinnamon, and in  th e
years before 1628 and th e  outbreak o f  war, these  revenues had
g en e ra lly  been s u f f ic ie n t  to  cover the  t o t a l  Portuguese expenditure.
War obviously q u ite  up s e t  th a t  balance, but the  cinnamon monopoly
was th e re a f te r  so handled by the  conde de L inhares as to
produce a considerable surp lus over the peace-tim e costa  o f 
i%L
of' Ceylon government. The v iceroy  in  1634 proposed th a t  while 
q u it  ren ts  and revenues from the  sa le  o f  government products 
should go as before to  the  vedor o f Ceylon, v i r tu a l ly  the  whole 
o f  the cinnamon revenues should go to  th e  c e n tra l government 
a t  Goa. He also  concluded an agreement in  1634 w ith  th e  Nayak 
o f Madura by which he agreed to  exchange th e  elephants caught 
in  Ceylon fo r  s a l tp e t r e .  To make good p a r t  o f  th e  lo s s  to  the  
Ceylon exchequer caused by these  two changes, he a lso  provided 
fo r a subvention from Goa. This he fixed  in  1634 a t  the  low 
f ig u re  o f t h i r t y  thousand x era fin s  o f  Goa -which was to  be the
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th i s
maximum g ran t p er year* Not content w ith /q u ite  d r a s t ic  change
in  the handling  o f Ceylon revenus, th e  v iceroy , in  co n su lta tio n
A
with de Almeida and Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara, the  
ex -cap tain -general and ex-vedor o f  Ceylon, drew up a new 
regimento fo r Ceylon which among o ther in s tru c tio n s ,p ro p o sed
to- r eoofrve fu r th e r  economies by cu ttin g  th e  r ic e  ra tio n  to
(119) 
troops in  Ceylon*
The p o licy  o f  s tr in g e n t economy la id  down by the  viceroy
made inroads on th e  m il i ta ry  s tren g th  o f the  Portuguese in
Ceylon* I t  se rio u s ly  a ffec ted  the  re p a ir  and reb u ild in g  o f
the  f o r ts ,  which were now ix  c e r ta in ly  in  a bad s t a t e .  De Almeida
had rep a ired  some o f the  damage done to  Colombo by th e  tempest
o f 1632, and during  the  time o f de Mello, the  cap ta in  o f  Colombo
was busy re p a ir in g  th e  s tr e tc h  o f  w all from th e  b as tio n  o f
S.Iago to  the  sea and in  co n s tru c tin g  a new bulwark -  th a t  o f
( 120)
S*Augustino* But besides the  re p a ir  work on the  f o r t  o f  Colombo 
de Mello envisaged a v a s t scheme to  r e f o r t i f y  a l l  th e  o ld  
Portuguese stro n g  points* The defences a t  E a lu ta ra , Malwana 
and Sabaragamuwa had been aibmost com pletely destroyed by the  
S inhalese during  the  war, th e  f o r t  a t  Menikkadawara needed 
extensive re p a ir s ,  w hile Mannar, B a ttica lo a  and G alle a lso
(119) TT.LM *36.ff*M5-15v
This regimento which was sen t to  Ceylon, does no t seem to  be 
now ex ta n t, and i t  i s  by in ference  th a t  th e  rearrangem ent o f  the  
revenues and the  cu t in  the r ic e  ra tio n  are  here a t tr ib u te d  to  i t .
(120) AHU Caixa 16 , 18.1.1644
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needed a t te n tio n . De Mello considered th a t  Chilaw too should
be f o r t i f ie d  to  prevent the  Kandyans from using  i t  to  ob ta in
( 121)
supplies during  any fu tu re  c o n f l ic t .  He a lso  po in ted  out th a t
fo r ts ,  e sp e c ia lly  those s itu a te d  ferns f a r  away from Colombo
should be provided w ith supp lies fo r  a t  l e a s t  a year to  enable
( 122)
them to  stand a long s ieg e .
The v iceroy  h im self appreciated  th e  need fo r  th e  re p a ir
o f fo r ts ,  and in  1634 he conceded to  Colombo the  revenue from
the fo r ty  bahars o f  cinnamon allowed to  th e  c i ty  fo r  fiv e
years in  advance, as w ell as a fu r th e r  g ran t o f twelve thousand
Goa x e ra f in s .a l l  o f  which was to  be used to  r e p a ir  th e  f o r t .
However though he agreed w ith the  p o licy  o f re p a ir in g  the  fo r ts
on the coast he d id  no t see any urgency in  the  re -co n s tru c tio n
o f in land  fo r ts  as th e  Portuguese were a t  peace w ith Kandy.
For the same reason the  v iceroy  considered th a t  th e  s iz e  o f
(123)
the standing  army could s a fe ly  be reduced.
Diogo de Mello having f a i le d  to  convince th e  v iceroy  
appealed to  Lisbon. He complained th a t  th e  v ic e ro y 's  p o licy  
was u n re a l is t ic  fo r when cinnamon and elephants were taken by 
the  Goa government o th e r revenues were in s u f f ic ie n t  to  meet
(121) TT.LM.36.f.24
( 122) TT.LM.3 6 .f . l5 v
(123) Film oteca LM. 19a,22H2-3; Coimbra 459.f.360v
293
(124)
the expenses o f  the  is la n d . The v ic e ro y 's  agreement w ith  Madura 
he claimed, was disadvantageous fo r  the  p r ic e  s tip u la te d  fo r  
elephants was low while th a t  fixed  fo r s a l tp e t re  was very
(125)
high. Moreover even th i s  s a c r if ic e  d id  no t secure fo r  the
Portuguese a monopoly o f s a l tp e t re  which the  Nayak o f Madura
s.. (126)
was also  s e l l in g  to  the Dutch. To circumvent the  a u th o rity
o f the v iceroy over the supply o f so ld ie rs  he requested  th a t
th ree  hundred so ld ie rs  be sen t d ir e c t  from Lisbon to  Colombo,
assuring  the  k ing  th a t  he would not lo se  f in a n c ia lly  as the
ship th a t  was used xscx to  tra n sp o r t them to  Colombo could
re tu rn  w ith a cargo o f s a l tp e t r e ,  pepper, c lo th , cinnamon and
(127) 
precious sto n es.
Diogo de Mello d id  not r e s t  content w ith  complaining to
the k ing . I t  would have taken a t  l e a s t  two years fo r  him to
rece ive a royal o rder rev ersin g  the  dec isions o f  the  v iceroy ,
and de Mello had not the  patience to  w ait th a t  long. Moreover
h is  problems were immediate. By June 1634 the  payments to  so ld ie rs
( 128)
were a lready  one year in  a r re a rs , and e a rly  in  1634 the  cap ta in -
(124) TT.LM. 36. f .  15
( 125) TT.LM. 36. f .  17
(126) TT.LM.3 6 .f .  16
The motives off de Mello in  opposing the agreement w ith 
Madura may no t have been e n t i r e ly  d is in te re s te d , e sp e c ia lly  in  
view o f  h is  in te r e s t  in  tra d e . (R ibeiro  97-9$) I t  i s  noteworthy 
th a t  he abandoned a l l  opposition  to  th i s  t r e a ty  during  h is  
second term o f o f f ic e .
(127) BM.Add. Ms s . 4 2 0 5 6 .ff.2 ,4
(128) TT.LM*3 6 .f . 15* D iario  do 3 conde de L inhares v ic e - re i  
da In d ia . 145
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raa jo r-o f- th e -f ie ld  Antonio da Motta Galvao had complained o f
the lack  o f coo lies and provisions* He had a lso  recommended
th a t the  reduction  o f th e  r ic e  ra tio n  one o f the ecnnomy
* (129)
measures in  the  viceroy* s new res&mento be done away w ith .
)
In  October 163**, nine cap tains o f th e  army sen t a rep re se n ta tiv e
(130)
to  Colombo to  voice th e i r  g rievances. Thus Diogo de Hello had 
a choice between v io la tin g  the  orders o f  the  v iceroy  and facing  
a mutiny in  the  tro o p s . He chose th e  former.
With the  concurrence o f the new vedor^Amaro Roiz, de Mello 
prevented th e  despatch o f elephants to  Madura and used the
(131)
proceeds o f  th e i r  sa le  fo r  the  expenses o f  the  is la n d . When 
th is  proved in s u f f ic ie n t  he sen t some o f th e  cinnamon fo r  
sa le  to  Negapatam in  defiance o f  royal and v ic e reg a l o rders 
regarding the  cinnamon monopoly. To keep th e  fo rces contented 
he and th e  vedor assumed possession  o f v illa g e s  which had 
been granted  to  p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls  and used th e i r  revenue and 
serv ices fo r  the  army. De Mello a lso  granted  v illa g e s  on h is  own 
au th o rity  w ithout consu lting  th e  .1 Tint a th a t  had been s e t  up
(129) Assentos 11.52-53 says th a t  de Mello a f te r  co n su ltin g  the 
cap tain  o f  Colombo, th e  vedor and th e  guardian o f  th e  Franciscans 
decided not to  enforce the  cut in  th e  ra tio n  t i l l  h is  rep resen ta tio n s  
to  the v iceroy  were answered. The cu t was even more resen ted  
because o f  th e  general s c a rc ity  o f r ic e  a t  th is  tim e. P .da T rinidade 
( I I I# 121) a s s e r ts  th a t  the  f ie ld s  had not been c u ltiv a te d  fo r
th ree  years due to  war. This a s se r tio n  however may have been tru e  
only fo r  p a r ts  o f K otte .
(130) TT.LM.3 6 .f f . 10,20} TT.LM.35 .f . 37
(131) For th i s  he had a  good excuse fo r  th e  drought o f  l63*f-35 made 
the tak in g  o f  elephants across the  one hundred and twenty m iles
o f dry land  from Colombo to  Mannar a very  d i f f i c u l t  and r isk y  ta sk .
(132)
fo r land  allocation*
These ac ts  incensed the  v iceroy  who e a r l ie r  had viewed
(133)
Diogo de Mello w ith favour* In  p a r t ic u la r  he resen ted  the  
sabotaging o f h is  arrangements to  s e l l  e lephan ts. The Portuguese 
envoy had promised the  Nayak o f Madura the  f i r s t  consignment 
o f elephants by August 1634 and then by November o r December 
a t  the la te s t*  By January 1635 no elephants had y e t been 
delivered  and consequently no s a l tp e tre  could be obtained? ^
The v iceroy  also  heard th a t  some o f  th e  cinnamon so ld  by de Mello
(135)
had fpund i t s  way in to  the  hands o f the  Dutch a t  Musalipatara
and i t  was a lso  about th i s  time th a t  he found th a t  th e  cap ta in -
(136)
general w ritte n  l e t t e r s  ag a in st h is  p o licy  to  Lisbon.
A
By the end o f 1634 the  v iceroy  had decided to  remove both 
the  cap ta in -genera l and the vedor from o f f ic e .  The ju d ic ia l  
in q u iry  which had in v e s tig a te d  the  d istu rbances in  th e  time o f  
Dora Jorge de Almeida had com pletely exonerated him and i t  was 
considered necessary  to  send him back to  Ceylon as cap ta in -g en era l 
to  s a t i s f y  h is  honour. In  p lace o f  Amaro Roiz who had aided
(132) TT.LM.36.f.7} Filmoteea LM.19B. 26/3-5
(133) Evora GR.Arm.V-VI,14 -5 .f.164
(134) D iario  do 3°conda de L inhares v lc e - re i  da In d ia . 260
(135) TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LK.40.f.40; TT.LM .34.ff.9-9v;
TT.LM .37.f.l; Jilm oteea LM.19B.26/3-5
(136) D iario  do 3 conde de L inhares v lc e - re i  da In d ia . 260
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(137)
de Mello to  defy him, the  v iceroy  appointed Antonio Pinho da Costa.
)U
Antonio da Motta Galvao who de Mello had dism issed from h is
(138)
post was reappointed as c a p ta in -ra a jo r-o f-th e -f ie ld . These
moves seem to  have been made to  secure a complete change o f
a l l  the  p r in c ip a l o f f ic e rs  in  Ceylon, fo r  a t  the same time
the v iceroy  a lso  removed B althazar de Camara da Noronha,
captain-m ajor o f J a f fn a ,1633-1635 and appointed in  h is  p lace
(139)
Lopo Gomez de Abreu, the  son-in-law  o f Antonio Pinho da Costa.
Amaro Roiz was d irec ted  to  continue th e  making o f  th e  tombo
(140) 
of Ja ffn a .
De Almeida s e t  s a i l  from Goa on 1 A pril 1635 w ith a force
of s ix ty  nine men. The tim ing o f h is  appointment was hard ly
a fo rtu n a te  one. J u s t  over a year e a r l i e r  he had aided the
v iceroy , conde de Linhares and th e  se c re ta ry  o f  s t a te ,
Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara to  d r a f t  the  new regimento fo r
(141)
Ceylon. T his, among o th e r th in g s , had ordered a reduction  a t
in  the  allowance o f r ic e  allowed to  each so ld ie r , from two to
(142)
one and a q u a rte r  Goa measures a day. G reat u n re s t In  th e  army
(137) TT.LM.3 4 .f f .9 -9 v ; 11
Da Costa did  no t take up h is  p o s t ,  o f fe r in g  to  work in  
Ja ffh a  w ith  h is  son-in-law , th e  captain-m ajor o f J a f fa a . Eoiz 
th e re fo re  continued as vedor.
(138) Queyroz 799
(139) TT.LM.34 .f .  11; TT.LM.40.f.33; TT.LM.42.f.66v; AHU 501.
f f .  293.379. 24,102v; Filmoteea LM.19D. 41-43/115,35/1
(140) TT.LM. 35. f .  5; TT.LM. 34. f .9 -9 v
(141) TT.LM.3 4 .f f .9 -9 v ; TT.LM.35 .t . 37; Coimbra 459.f . 361
(142) T.Abeyasinghe 190; TT.LM.3 6 .f f . 20,10; Assentos 11.52 
From evidence a v a ilab le  i t  appears th a t  t h i r t y  e ig h t to
fo r ty  two Goa measures was the  equ ivalen t o f  twenty f iv e  Ceylon 
measures. The a c tu a l reduction  in  th e  ra tio n  to  be made in  Ceylon 
was from one and a h a lf  to  one Ceylon measure.
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had followed and de Mello had h im self found tro u b le  in  keeping 
o rder. The a r r iv a l  o f one o f  th e  very men who had d ra fted  
the regim ento. as the  cap ta in -g en era l, was a s ig n a l fo r  fu r th e r  
un rest.U nrest developed in to  open mutiny when de Almeida 
in s is te d  on the  array accepting  Galvao as t h e i r  captain-m ajor.
The so ld ie rs  se lec ted  Luis T e ix e ira , who had served as th e i r  
captain-m ajor since the  d ism issa l o f Galvao, to  speak fo r 
them. T eixe ira  conveyed the  so ld iers*  demands th a t  the old 
r ic e  ra tio n  be re s to red  and someone o th e r than the  unpopular 
Galvao be appointed as captain-majoi?. When de Almeida refused  
to  y ie ld  the so ld ie rs  marched on Colombo and forced him to
(143)
accept th e i r  term s.
De Almeida thereupon t r i e d  to  win th e  support o f  the
e c c le s ia s tic s  by a vigorous p o licy  o f aid  in  th e i r  m ission work.
He granted  many v il l ig e ^ to  them.He expelled  a l l  Buddhist and
Hindu p r ie s ts  from Portuguese lands and forbade them to  re tu rn
(144)
on pain  o f dea th . Kis ru le  n everthe less remained as unpopular
(145)
in  1635 as i t  had been in  1633* The casados o f Colombo a lleged
th a t  de Almeida seized  v illa g e s  which they  had held  t6  give
(146)
them to  h is  personal fo llow ers. The v icero y -in -co u n c il heard 
renewed complaints about de Almeida and even tually  decided to
(143) TT.LM.3 1 .f . 2515 TT.LM.35*f*29; Assentos I I .  52
(144) T T .L M .45*f . 303
(145) TT.’lM .33^^2665 TT.LM.3 5 .f.4 3 v ; TT.LK.37.T.423
(146) TT.LM.3 9 .f .3 l !  TT.LM. 4 0 .f . 31
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re c a l l  him* When th is  news reached Ceylon, a group o f so ld ie rs  
se t out from Menikkadawara to  s e t t l e  accounts w ith him before 
he l e f t  the  islanch!^)e Almeida had to  embark h u rrie d ly  even 
before h is  successor a rriv ed  bu t having escaped h is  enemies
he died a t  Mangalore on h is  way to  Goa apparen tly  from old  age
(148) 
and exhaustion*
Before he l e f t  Ceylon de Almeida a lleged  th a t  th e  mutiny
of the so ld ie rs  ag a in st him had been organised w ith the
encouragement o f Diogo de Mello* At the  enquiry which followed
(149)
de Mello was c leared  o f a l l  re s p o n s ib il i ty . De Mello*s movements 
during th is  period  however give r i s e  to  susp icion  th a t  he d id  
not expect de Almeida to  l a s t  long in  h is  p o s t. He d id  not 
leave Colombo u n t i l  September 1635 &nd then went on to  Mannar
(%S9)
where he stayed t i l l  e a r ly  1636* I t  was here th a t  he heard o f
h is  reappointm ent by th e  new v iceroy , Pero da S ilv a  who had
(1 5 1 1 )
brought o rders to  th i s  e f fe c t  from Lisbon*
The mutiny i t s e l f  showed the  r is in g  in d is c ip l in e  in  
the Portughese forces in  Ceylon and th e  in a b i l i ty  o f  the  
a u th o rit ie s  to  dea l w ith th is  problem* The army was immobilised
(147) TT.LM.3?Tff.1,423; TT.LM.38 .f.396
(148) fiueyroz 799; F.de Souza VI. 432; TT.LM.3 7 .f f . 1,423;
EM.Ad.Mss.41996.f .64
(149) TT.LM.4 2 .f .6 6 ; TT.LM.40.f.31
(150) Queyroz 799} TT.LM.3 5 .f . 5 , AHU Caixa 16 .a n t. 18.1.1644
(151) De Mello may. o f  course have delayed in  o rder to  avoid
meeting th e  conde de L inhares who was due to  be re c a lle d .
De H ello ’s connivance in  the  mutiny cannot be proved*
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fo r twenty th ree  days. The m utineers wre le d  by th e  most
experienced so ld ie rs  in  Ceylon -  those who had been p riso n ers
in  Kandy fo r  th ree  y ea rs . The viceroy  confessed th a t  due to
lack  o f troops these  men could not be punished as they  could
not be rep laced . One o f them, Thome Gomez was a r re s te d  as an
example to  o thers bu t even he was even tually  re leased  fo r
(152)
serv ice  in  o th e r p a r ts  o f Portuguese In d ia . The o ld  ra tio n
of r ic e  was re s to re d . To rep lace  Galvao th e  new v iceroy
appointed Constantino de Sa de Miranda, a so ld ie r  who had
(153)
held th e  p o st o f  captain-m ajor once b efo r in  Ceylon. Such
a p o licy  o f  dea ling  w ith  an army mutiny would have been
unthinkable in  the  time o f  Azevedo o r de Sa.
Perhaps one o f  th e  reasons fo r  th e  len iency  was the
worsening o f re la tio n s  w ith  Kandy. A fter th e  conclusion o f
peace th e re  had appeared d iv is io n s  among the  th re e  p rin ce s .
Eumarastnha and V ijayapala , the two sone o f Vimaladharmasuriya
(154)
un ited  ag a in st Rajasinha and h is  fa th e r  S enerat. Before they  
could take any ac tio n  howwver Kuraarasinha died in  mid 1634. 
While the  p rin ce  o f Matale stood i r r e s o lu te ,  R ajasinha se ized
(152) TT.LM.4 0 .f . 31; TT.LM.3 9 .f . 31; TT.LM.37.f . 423;
TT.LM. 42. f f .  66-66v; Assentos 11.52
(153) TT.LM.39.f.31; TT.LM.4 0 .f . 31; TT.LM.3 1 .f . 251;
TT.LM. 35. T.29; ^ssen tos I I .  54
(154) D iario  do 3 conde de L inhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia . 145.
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(155)
K u m a r a s i n h a * s  p r i n c i p a l i t y  o f  U v a .  S o m e  o f  t h e  m e n  o f  U v a  
a p p a r e n t l y  p r e f e r r e d  V i j a y a p a l a  f o r  t h e y  k i l l e d  t h e  d i s a v a  
s e n t  b y  R a j a s i n h a  a n d  f l e d  t o  B a t t i c a l o a .  T h e  c a p t a i n  o f
(156)
B a t t i c a l o a ,  P e r o  S o a r e s  d e  B r i t o  p r o m p t l y  g a v e  t h e m  r e f u g e *
T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  h a d  i n  f a c t  e v e n  e a r l i e r  b e e n  e n c o u r a g i n g  
d i s s e n s i o n  w i t h i n  K a n d y  a n d  R a j a s i n h a  w a s  a w a r e  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  
o f  f r i e n d l y  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  b e t w e e n  V i j a y a p a l a  a n d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e
(157)
e v e n  b e f o r e  t h i s  o v e r t  a c t i o n  o f  d e  B r i t o .  T h e s e  f a c t o r s  l e d
R a j a s i n h a  t o  s e e k  f o r e i g n  a i d  t o  e x p e l  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  f r o m
t h e  i s l a n d .  A p o l i c y  o f  e n c o u r a g i n g  d i s s e n s i o n  w i t h i n  K a n d y
h a d  p r o v e d  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  a  p o l i c y  o f  p e a c e  w i t h  t h a t
k i n g d o m .  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  k i n g  o f  K a n d y  h a d
tr
b e c o m e  h o s t i l e .  H e  o m m i t e d  t o  s e n d  t h e  c u s t o m a r y  m e s s e n g e r
A
t o  w e lc o m e  t h e  n e w  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l ,  Dorn J o r g e  d e  A l m e i d a  i n
(158)
A pril 1635. N evertheless, due to  th e  death o f King Senerat 
in  mid 1635 Rajasinha was in  no p o s itio n  to  in te r f e r e  w ith
( 159)
t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  .
W h en  d e  M e l l o  a r r i v e d  i n  e a r l y  1636 he d e t e r m i n e d  t o
(155) P .E .P ie r is  -  P rince o f  V ijayapala o f M atale .17
(156) J C & A S  X V I I I , i?0 ; Baldaeus 975 TT.LM .3^.f.9;
Filmoteea LM.19D. 4 l-^ 3 /l-5
(157) P .E .P ie r is -  P rince V ijayapala o f M atale. 29-335 Assentos 11.52; 
TT.LM.31 .f .251; TT.LM.3 5 .f .29
(158) TT.LM .3^.ff.9-9v
(159) TT.LM.3 1 .f .2515 TT.LM.35.f.29
to  take vigourous measures to  streng then  Portuguese power
in  Ceylon. R ealising  th a t  d isco n ten t among th e i r  S inhalese
sub jec ts  could be a dangerous th r e a t  to  th e  s e c u rity  o f
Portuguese possessions he encouraged them to  pu t forward
th e i r  grievances. The r e s u l t  was a g ia n t p e t i t io n  p resen ted  
(16°)
in  December 1636. The rem edial measures taken  by de Mello
a f te r  co n su lta tio n  w ith th e  ju n ta  and proclaimed on 28 March
1637 removed some o f th e  w orst elements o f  oppresion. For
in stance  a S inhalese could no longer be forced to  pay fo r
arecanut due according to  the  tombo i f  th e  t o t a l  produce o f
h is  garden f e l l  sh o rt o f  th i s  amount. A fte r paying dues the
Sinhalese were allowed to  s e l l  th e i r  surp lus products f re e ly .
Portuguese and S inhalese landowners were forbidden to  l iv e  in
the v illa g e s  they  h e ld , fo r  th i s  compelled th e  in h a b ita n ts  
( 161)
to  feed them. Yet de Mello*s reforms f e l l  f a r  sh o rt o f h is
own id e a l th a t  the  conquest o f Ceylon must be founded on ju s t ic e
( 162)
and reason . The reason fo r th is  i s  no t d i f f i c u l t  to  see .
(160) TT.LM. 31. f  .2515 TT.LM. 35. f  .29
(161) Queyroz 1020-1022
Queyroz i s  our only source on th is  p e t i t io n  which he s ta te s  
was pu t forward by the  la sc a r in s  and by headmen and o th e r lo c a l 
le a d e rs . He provided a long l i s t  o f  grievances voiced^ fo r  which 
the reader i s  re fe rre d  to  Queyroz. The measures adopted regarding  
arecanut had already  been advocated in  th e  v ic e ro y 's  regimento 
to  Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro on h is  appointment as vedor 
on 13 September 1636.
Goa Regimentos e in s tru c c o e s .I I I .  2-3
(162) D iario  do 3^condV de  ^L inhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia . 66
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Portuguese power in  Ceylon u ltim a te ly  depended on th e  army
and the  casados.They were the  two elements no general could
affo rd  to  a liena te*  Thus n a tiv es  were forbidden t a  t r a v e l
(163)
(164)
in  palanquins but not the  Portuguese* S im ila rly  reforms which 
could h u rt the exchequer were not considered. Thus though 
the  p ric e  a t  which arecanuts had to  be supplied  to  the  vedor 
was ra ise d  to  fiv e  x e ra fin s  an amuna.th e  compulsory purchase
of arecanut was re ta in ed  as government pol „ .
De Mello a lso  continued th e  work o f  re p a ir in g  tfrs and 
reb u ild in g  the  f o r ts .  Repairs to  th e  w alls o f Colombo went on.
The work o f reb u ild in g  Malwana begun by de Almeida was 
continued under de M ello. The new v iceroy , Pero da S ilv a  encouraged 
him in  th e  p o licy  and also  in s tru c te d  him to  see to  re p a ir in g  
the  f o r t  o f  Mannar. In  Ja ffn a  Lopo Gomes de Abrew was en tru s ted
w ith the  reb u ild in g  o f a p a r t  o f  the  w alls o f Ja ffn a  f o r t .
Diogo de Mello had been in s tru c te d  by the v iceroy  to  
take no sjaeps which might p re c ip i ta te  war. Pero da S ilv a  agreed 
w ith the  p o lic y  followed by th e  conde de L inhares in  as much
(163)Dom Jorge de Almeida did  so a t  h is  c o s t.
(164) Queyroz 1017
(165) Goa regimentos e in s t ru c c o e s .I I I . f f .2 - 8
An smuna was equ ivalen t to  24,000 -25.000 arecanuts in  th e  
s ix teen th  century . The Portuguese demanded up to  3Jp more nu ts 
fo r  an amuna in  the  1630*s .
(166) T T .L M . 37* f*410 The finances fo r  these  works were av a ila b le  
as the  king in  response to  de Mello*s l e t t e r s  o f  1634 had in s tru c te d  
th a t  a l l  revenues from cinnamon and elephants be used to  p ro v is io n  
and supply th e  fo r ts  o f ^eylon.
( 166)
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as he considered the  Dutch to  be the  prim ary enemy and the
(167)
r e - f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f th e  co a s ta l p o r ts  the  f i r s t  p r io r i ty .
Diogo de Mello adhered to  these  in s tru c tio n s  fo r  a tim e. In
fa c t  when he received  a l e t t e r  in  March 1637 from th e  queens 
( 168)
of Kandyoffering to  come over to  the  Portuguese s id e , he re p lie d
in  a non-commital fashion  and re fe rre d  the  whole m atter to
(169)
Goa.
Eight months l a t e r  the  whole p ic tu re  had changed. In  th e  
f i r s t  p lace a personal d ispu te  had a r ise n  between Rajasinha 
and de H ello . According to  R ibeiro  th is  followed from th e  
se izu re  o f  an elephant g if te d  by R ajasinha to  a Portuguese 
and consequent r e ta l ia t io n  by th e  k ing , who confisca ted  two
(170)
horses belonging to  the  cap ta in -g en era l. Queyroz s ta te s  th a t  
th e  d isp u te  arose because o f th e  se izu re  o f  some jew e lle ry  
which de H ello had sen t fo r  sa le  to  Kanciy^Both m aintained 
th a t  th i s  was the  immediate cause o f th e  invasion  o f Kandy 
in  I 638 .
Thus personal motive however could no t have been as
(172)
im portant as has h ith e r to  been made o u t. The l e t t e r s  o f  the
(167) TT,LM.37.f.Jte3
(168) T h e  w id o w e d  q u e e n  o f  S e n e r a t  a n d  t h e  q u e e n  o f  R a j a s i n h a .
(169) T T .L M .4 0 .ff .3 1 v ,9 ^ v ,285; A s s e n t o s  I I .  174-175
(170) $Hgjoras R ibeiro 231-235
(171) Queyroz 801
(172) P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I .  203-204
P ro fesso r K.W.Goonewardane c o rre c tly  po in ts out th a t  
the  d ispu te  must have occured before 21 November 1637 and no t 
a f te r  as P ie r is  makes i t  to  be.
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camara o f  Colombo to  Diogo de Mello before h is  invasion  o f 
Kandy and to  the  viceroy  a f te r  i t ,  make no mention o f  de M ello1 s
in d iv id u a l anim osity towards Rajasinha# From Rajasinha*s 
po in t o f view he d id  not need personal enemity to  be h o s ti le  
to  de Mello fo r  de Mello *s ac tio n  in  g iv ing  continued 
p ro tec tio n  to  th e  reb e ls  who f le d  to  B a ttic a lo a , was reason
enaugh fo r that#
About th i s  time th e re  was a lso  a change o f p o lic y  in
Goa# In  March 1637» even before th e  news o f th e  o f fe r  o f  th e
queens o f Kandy reached Goa, d esp ite  opposition  from some
viceroy
members o f  h is  council,the/sw ung fcround to  the view expressed 
by de Mello since 1634 -  th a t  d esp ite  th e  peace t r e a ty  the  
Portuguese should be ready fo r  war a t  any time and should
se ize  any favourable opportun ity  to  conquer Kan
More s ig n if ic a n t ,  in  1637 fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e de Mello 
obtained perm ission to  use th e  enormous revenue th a t  cinnamon 
now annually  provided, tm streng then  the  defences in  Ceylon. 
De Mello*s arguements ag a in s t th e  p o licy  o f  conde de L inhares 
in  reducing th e  defence expenses to  a minimum as expressed
(173)
(17*0
(173) TT.LM .43.ff.l05-108 
( W )  Baldaeus, 97 
(175) TT.LM. 43. f f . 9 ^ ,2 8 5
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in  l e t t e r s  w ritten  du ting  163^ in  h is  f i r s t  term o f o f f ic e
in  Ceylon, had won the  day in  Lisbon* The k ing  in  a l e t t e r
dated 28 January I 636 ordered th a t  Ceylon*s revenues should
be used to  provide Ceylon*s needs. The revenues could be used
fo r o th e r areas only i f  a su rp lus occured. This re v e rsa l o f
the  p o licy  o f tfte conde de Linhares was d iscussed  and approved
(1?6)
in  the conselho do estado a t  Goa on k March 1637*
N evertheless even Af none o f these  events had occured
i t  i s  q u ite  l ik e ly  th a t  war would s t i l l  have broken out
in  la te  1637, fo r on 27 October 1637 a Dutch ship  appeared
o ff  B a ttic a lo a . This was in  response to  an appeal fo r a id  by
(177)
Rajasinha in  September 1636. The Dutch envoys landed a t  Kalmunai 
and sen t messages to  th e  king* E ventually  they  were le d  to  
Pangaragama, a v illa g e  near th e  Mahaveli where they  neg o tia ted  
w ith Rajasinha and h is  m in is te rs  from 19 to  26 November. A fter 
th i s  they  departed fo r  th e i r  sh ips accompanied by th ro e  
S inhalese o f f ic ia l s  to  d iscuss th e  f in a l  terms w ith  the  Dutch
(178)
conmader.
(17$) Assentos I I .  161-162; Coimbra 4 6 0 .f f .228-230
The l e t t e r  w ritte n  on b eh a lf  o f  the  king embodied the 
recommendations made by th e  conselho da fazenda on Zk November 1635*
(177) TT.LM.43*f f . 176-178; P .E .P ie r is -  Ceylon I I .  201-202;
Mahahatana. stanza 116;
Kirimatiyawe names tfee envoy as Galterabuwe Mantree* Manual 
P in to , cap ta in  o f  B a ttica lo a  in  a l e t t e r  to  de Mello says th a t  th e  
Dutch came a t  the  request o f  Acidappa Chetim. Valentyn s ta te s  th a t  
the  messenger was a brahmin -  v iz . tr a n s la t io n  in  the  O r ie n ta l is t  IV. 
53* The v ersio n  o f Kirimatiyawe rece iv es fu r th e r  support from the 
Mat a le  Kadayimpota published in  pages 103-105 of D^D.Ranasinghe’s 
Puraw ritha*For th e  Dutch p o in t o f  view on these  n eg o tia tio n s  (Con^/)
31 1
Diogo de Mello heard o f th e  a r r iv a l  o f  the Dutch on 18
November, The follow ing day he proposed to  th e  cap ta in  of
Colombo and the  o f f ic ia l s  o f  th e  camara th a t  the  Portuguese
should dec lare  war and inVade Kandy, He was ad v ised  to  aw ait
(179)more d e f i n i t e  news o f the  k in g ’s a c t iv i t i e s ,  De Mello
complied p a r t ly  because h is  fo rces were inadequate and p a r t ly
because the  weather was inclem ent. Confirmation o f the
nego tia tions o f the king o f Kandy w ith the  Dutch was not
long in  comingj Fr, F re i Christavao de Madre de Deus, a p r ie s t
re s id en t in  Kandy sen t an urgent message th a t  a combined
Kandyan-Dutch a ttack  on Colombo should be expected sh o r tly ,
A trad e r-sp y  Chettynagar swore to  the  cap ta in -genera l th a t
the Maravas o f south In d ia  le d  by the  Hayak o f Madura were also
being in v ite d  to  jo in  the  a l l ia n c e . Their adherence seemed
more than l ik e ly  fo r  they  had attacked  Mannar unsuccessfu lly  
( 180)
in  March 1636, De Kello also  received  l e t t e r s  from Baerent P e ssa e r t,
p resid en t o f  th e  Danes in  the e a s t  warning him o f  a Dutch 
( 181) 
a ttack .
De Mello sen t Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo as a personal
(177) Contd. see K.W.Goonewardane, 14-16
(178) P .E .P ie r is  -  Ceylon I I .  202-203; Baldaeus 92-93
(179) TT.LM.4 3 .f f . 188-189
(180) TT.LM.4 3 .f f .  179-180; AH0 501.f,155
(181) Danvers -  Report on the  Portuguese a rch iv es, 134,152 
In  1637 th e  Danes o ffe red  to  a id  the  Portuguese in  exchange
for tra d in g  r ig h ts  in  cinnamon, arecanut and e lephan ts. This o ffe r  
was re je c te d  by th e  Portuguese bu t renewed again by th e  Danes in  
1638. P e ssa e r t, a former V0C employee was b i t t e r l y  h o s t i le  
towards th e  Dutch. (JCBRAS XVIII,253)
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emissary to  the  viceroy asking fo r a id . In  the  meantime he
opened h o s t i l i t i e s  by sending h is  nephew^ Fernao de Mendoza
with f i f t y  Portuguese and f iv e  hundred la s c a r in s  to  a ttack
a Kandyan supply depot a t  Hagaraa. De Mello had h is  own problems
w ith th e  army. The in d is c ip lin e  which had grown in  th e  time
of de Almeida had not y e t been suppressed. There were rep o rts
a mutiny in  Mannar, where the g arriso n  encouraged by two
p r ie s t s ,  drove etrt the  cap ta in  Miguel de Almeida de Sampayo
out o f  the  f o r i .  Ihe g a rriso n  of b a t t ic a lo a  refused  to
accept Manual Pessoa de Carvalho as th e i r  new cap ta in  in  1637,
as he had not brought forces to  re lie v e  those Portuguese who
(183)
had completed th e i r  period  o f  se rv ice  in  the f o r t .  De Mello
him self had disagreem ents w ith Constantino de Sa de Miranda,
h is new ca p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld . By th e  end o f  1637 however,
th is  l a s t  problem had been s e t t le d  by the  re tu rn  o f de Miranda
( 18*0
to Goa and th e  appointment o f Daraiao Botado in  h is  p la ce .
Ejy e a rly  1638 reinforcem ents had a rriv ed  from Goa. Two 
ships under Gaspar de Araujo and four more under Miguel Rangel 
de Castelbranco a rr iv ed , b rin g in g  two hundred men in  a l l .
(182) The two p r ie s ts  were a Franciscan F r. Jeronimo Nossa 
Senhora and a Dominican F r. Domingos B eltrao .
(183) TT.LM.43, f .l7 6 v ; TT.LM. 40. f . 9**
(184) TT.LM.4 0 .f . 95; Assentos I I .  198- 201,228
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Further a id  was expected from Cochin. In  February 1638 s ix  
shipd led  by Gon9alo de Souza Chichorro to g e th e r w ith two more 
under Antonio Soares da Guerra and two o th e r merchant^ ships
(185)
ca lled  a t  Colombo on th e i r  way from Malacca to  Goa. On 18
February de Mello in v ite d  th e  le ad e rs  o f th e  squadrons to  the
house o f  th e  cap tain  o f Colombo, Francisco Barbosa da Andrade,
( 186)
and in  th e  presence o f  the  new vedor. Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro
and the  ouvidoh. Joao Nougueira Coelho and many o th e r f id a lg o s .
asked them to  remain in  Ceylon th a t  w in ter and help to  defend
i t .  He also  poin ted  out th a t  i f  the  sh ips proceeded to  In d ia
they might w ell encounter the  Dutch f l e e t  re tu rn in g  from
the blockade o f Goa. I t  was decided th a t  th e  inform ation as to
the s ta te  o f Malacca which was brought by Chichorro should
be sen t by a messenger to  Goa. The Dutch p riso n ers  aboard the
(187)
f le e t  were to  be sen t in  the  cinnamon v e s se ls .
At th i s  stage th ^ e r  arose two views among the  Portuguese 
as to  what course o f ac tio n  would b es t serve th e  in te r e s t s  o f  
the s ta te .  The vedor. ouvidor. cap ta in  o f Colombo and the 
members o f  the  camara considered i t  b es t to  remain on the 
defensive. They argued th a t  th e  S inhalese of. K otte could reb e l
(185) TT .LM .4l.ff.7v-8; TT.LM.4 3 .f f . 17-18
(186) Ozouro was sen t as vedor in  1637 to  rep lace  Amaro Roiz 
who was re c a lle d  to  Goa.
(187) TT.LM. 43. ff.l8 1 -1 8 1 v
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a t any moment and th a t  i f  they  d id  so th e  supply l in e  to  any 
force a ttack in g  Kandy would be cut o f f .  Moreover, many o f 
the  troops newly a rriv ed  were s t i l l  tooinexperienced fo r  use 
in  a f u l l  sca le  campaign in  Ceylon. F in a lly  they  argued th a t  
while an invading army was in  Kandy the  Dutch might w ell 
a ttack  Colombo. They th e re fo re  recommended th a t  the cap ta in - 
general should merely make a dem onstration o f  force by 
marching up to  Menikkadawara. This view would have been s tro n g ly  
supported by th e  c as ados who feared  to  lo se  a l l  in  one a tta c k , 
and had th e  backing o f  men o f experience such as Francisco de
Diogo de Mello and h is  captain-m ajor advocated the 
bo lder though r i s k ie r  p o licy  o f invading Kandy. They argued 
th a t  th e  b es t chance o f v ic to ry  la y  in  f ig h tin g  and d efea tin g  
th e  k ing  o f  Kandy before Dutch aid  reached him. De Mello 
pointed out th a t  th e  Dutch would not a ttack  Colombo w ithout 
support on th e  landward s id e . He assured th e  camara th a t  th e
c i ty  was sa fe . De M ello, s reso lve to  s t r ik e  soon must have 
been strengthened by the  f a c t  th a t  he knew the men from Malacca 
would leave in  a few month*s tim e. The viceroy*s council was
(189)
(188) TT.LM.4 3 .f f . l7 - 1 8 v ,187; TT.LM. 41. f .  Tv
(189) TT.LM. 4 3 .f . 188
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also  d ivided in to  those who advocated defensive measures aga in st
the Dutch in  Colombo and G alle and those who urged the
f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f Balane and th e  conquest o f Kandy. The v iceroy
urged the f o r t i f ic a t io n  o f Colombo and G alle and asked
de Mello to  consu lt o th ers  on the  a d v is a b il i ty  o f  fo r t i fy in g
Balane. His views however had l i t t l e  e f fe c t  fo r  h is  in s tru c tio n s
of 5 March 1638 and 6 May I 638 a rriv ed  only a f te r  de Mello
(190)
had l e f t  fo r  Kandy.
Learning o f  the Portuguese p rep ara tio n s to  invade Kandy,
Rajasinha sen t envoys to  the  cap ta in -genera l and the camara
o f Colombo adm itting  h is  dealings w ith the Dutch but lay in g
the blame fo r  h is  ac tio n  on the  Portuguese themselves and
asking fo r  peace* I t  i s  im possible to  determ ine whether th i s
was merely delay ing  ta c t i c  bu t i t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  i t  was so.
De Mello however determined to  go through w ith th e  invasion
and was undeterred  when the  k ing  sen t an A ugustinian to  request
peace once more. De Mello also  had hopes o f e n tic in g  V ijayapala
(191)
to  the  Portuguese s id e .
In  f a c t  the  whole campaign turned  on th e  a t t i tu d e  o f 
V ijayapala. Whatever de Mello may have hoped to  achieve, he
(190) TT.LM. 4-1.f .8 v ; TT .LX .43.f.l8; Assentos I I .  230-232
(191) Queyroz 802-803
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could not r e a l ly  have expected to  conquer Kandy w ith a force
o f only seven hundred Portuguese, th ree  hundred K a ff irs , two
hundred Canarese and f iv e  hundred la s c a r in s  aided by a regiment
(192)
topazes. None o f  h is  four d isavas had p rev iously  served 
in  an£ ac tiv e  campaign in  Ceylon. Moreover having re c ru ite d  
a l l  av a ilab le  Portuguese s o ld ie r s ,  he had to  leave th e  defence 
o f the in land  fo r ts  to  th e  s a i lo r s  o f  the  f l e e t s .  He knew 
th a t  he had no reserve l e f t .
De Hello l e f t  A tta p itiy a  on 26 March 1638 and reached 
Kandy next day w ithout meeting w ith any re s is ta n c e . The c i ty  
was burn t and th e  Portuguese began to  withdraw. At th i s  
moment Rajasinha s tru ck . The way back to  Balane was obstructed  
and the  Portuguese were forced to  camp fo r  the  n ig h t fo r  the  
near th e  banks o f  Mahaveli. Having f i r s t  prevented them 
from crossing  the  r iv e r ,  the  S inhalese then moved in  a t  n ig h t­
f a l l  and bea t o f f  a l l  detachments sen t out to  b rin g  supplies
o f w ater. The follow ing day 28 March I 638, R ajasinha ignoring  
(193)
a p lea  fo r  peace brought in  forces amounting to  f i f te e n
('?*)Queyroz 802-803; TT.LM .4l.f.8v; TT.LM.4 3 .f . 18; BH.Ad.MSS.41966, 
f .6 6  Queyroz mentions nine hundred Portuguese, a l l  o th er sources 
mention seven hundred. R ajavaliya . 102 estim ates de M ello ^  
fo rces a t  nine thousand men in  a l l .
(193) R ibeiro 236-237 says th a t  de Mello sen t de Mendon^a w ith 
an o f fe r  o f  peace on the  b as is  o f a re tu rn  to  th e  s ta tu s  quo i f  
allowed to  re tu rn  to  Colombo and th a t  R ajasinha handed him over 
to  V ijayapala. Baldaeus 94 says th a t  de Mello sen t two p r ie s t s  
to  o f fe r  term s. The former account i s  u n lik e ly  to  be tru e  as each 
b ro th e r kep t h is  own cap tives and Queyroz 805 d ta te s  th a t  de Mendonpa 
was wounded and escaped death w ith the a id  o f  V ijayapala.
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(194)
thousand S inhalese re in fo rced  by a thousand men o f Middraa.
V ijayapala remained lo y a l to  him and th e  Portuguese were
surrounded. A shower of ra in  ju s t  before b a t t le  reduced the
effec tiv en ess  o f  th e i r  f i r e  arms. The S inhalese by a w ell
d irec ted  a ttack  se ized  the  Portuguese baggage t r a in  and cut
th e i r  army in  two. The Portuguese attem pted to  reform but
the la s c a r in s  who had by now lo s t  a l l  hope d ese rted . The
Portuguese were then  com pletely defeated  and de Mello and
(19$)
Botado both k i l l e d .
M il i ta r i ly  the  b a t t le  o f  Gannoruwa was a g re a te r  d is a s te r  
to  th e  Portuguese than  even the  b a t t le  o f Randeniwela. I t  
weakened them a t  a moment when they  needed a l l  t h e i r  s tren g th . 
Moreover un like events in  1630 when the  Portuguese army had to  
be lu red  a long  d is tan ce  away from th h i r  lan d , in  1638 they  
were an n ih ila ted  w ith in  a dozen m iles o f  th e  f ro n t ie r .  A fu rth e r  
c o n tra s t between the two b a t t le s  stands out c le a r ly . In  1630, 
Senerat was in te n t  on cap turing  a liv e  as many Portuguese as 
p o ssib le  w ith a view to  a fu tu re  se ttlem en t. In  1638, R a jasin ja  
had a lready  burn t h is  boafcfc, and so while th e re  were two 
hundred Portuguese p riso n ers  a t  Randeniwela only t h i r t y  th ree
(194) JCBRAS (new s e r ie s )  V .I63
(195) Queyroz 804-805; Baldaeus 94-95} R ibeiro 236-237; 
Ra.javaliya 101-102; TT.LM. 43. f .  185;
Of the  expeditionary  fo rce  over two thousand and f iv e  
hundred were k i l l e d .
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(196)
Portuguese were spared a t  Gannoruwa. This meant th a t  the  
Portuguese lo sse s  a t  th e  l a t t e r  engagement was almost double 
those a t the  former.
The s ig n ifican ce  o f Gannoruwa could be exaggerated. 
P .E .P ie ris  im plies th a t  the  b a t t le  saved Kandy and i t s  people
(197)
from the  Portuguese. This was hard ly  th e  case fo r though the  
campaign o f 1638 was fought on Kandyan s o i l  the  b a t t le  i t s e l f  
was forced by Rajasinha in  an attem pt to  destro y  the Portuguese 
army. Even had de Mello won he would merely have saved the 
Portuguese army. N evertheless the  Kandyan victory* showed th a t  
the balance o f  power in  Ceylon had a l te re d  somewhat s ince  th e  
days o f de Azevedo and de Sa. Fob the  f i r s t  time since  the 
days o f R ajasinha o f S itaw aka,a Portuguese army had been defeated  
in  the  f ie ld  before the  d e se rtio n  o f the  la s c a r in s .I n  th e  wider 
context o f the  Kandyan-Dutch a llia n c e  Gannoruwa thus means 
the begining o f  the  end o f  Portuguese dominance in  Ceylon.
(196) R ibeiro  237}estim ates the  number o f p riso n ers  as t h i r t y  
th ree ; Baldaeus 95 seventy and Queyroz 805 as one hundred.
(197) P .E .P ie r is  -  Ceylon I I .  212
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CHAPTER V
During the  twenty one years from 1617 to  1628, th e  
ad m in istra tiv e  s tru c tu re  o f K otte remained, in  th e  main, th a t  
which had c ry s ta l l i s e d  under the  d ire c tio n  o f Dom Jeronimo 
de Azevedo in  the e a rly  years o f  the  seventeenth century .
The b asis  o f th is  s tru c tu re  was the  o ld  S inhalese adm in istra tive  
o rgan iza tion  modified and a l te re d  to  s u i t  th e  needs o f the  
conquerors.
The system thus evolved had been adequately d iscussed
CD
elsewhere. However a sh o rt account o f  th i s  system seems a
necessary prelude to  a d iscussion  o f  what fu r th e r  changes
i t  underwent during th e  period  under co n sid era tio n . The Portuguese
domains in  K otte were div ided in to  four  d isavas or  provinces
each adm inistered by an o f f i c i a l  a lso  known as the  d isav a .
The province or d isava was in  tu rn  d iv ided  in to  sm aller 
r
te r r i to r ia l  u n its  ca lled  k o ra le s .Each k o ra le  was placed  in  
charge o f  an o f f ic e r  named the  ko ra le  vidane who had a number 
o f  o f f ic e r s  to  a id  him. Some o f  th ese  o f f ic ia l s  l ik e  the  
m ohottalas and th e  kanakapulle were concerned w ith th e  keeping 
o f accounts and reco rds, o th ers  l ik e  th e  headmen were executive
( l )  T.Abeyasinghe 69
The conten ts o f the  next paragraphs un less otherw ise 
in d ica ted  are  drawn from Dr. A beyasinghe^ work.
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o f f ic ia l s  who ca rried  out the  orders o f  th e i r  ko ra le  vidane
or d isav a . The d isava h im self had immense power. He appointed
(2)
a l l  subordinate o f f ic e rs  w ith in  the  province. Up to  l6l*f much 
o f th e  land  a llo tm ent was done by the d isav as . He a lso  le d  
the p ro v in c ia l la sc a r in s  in  war and had ju d ic ia l  powers w ith in  
h is  p rovince. The korale  vidane, besides having a more 
r e s t r ic te d  a u th o rity  was in  charge o f a sm aller area  and had 
no m il i ta ry  powers.
YIn  ad d itio n  to  th e  t e r i t o r i a l  d iv is io n s , under o f f ic ia l sA 9
whose functions were mainly p o l i t i c a l  or m il i ta ry , th e re  were 
o ther departm ents, concerned w ith the co lle c tio n  o f revenues 
or u t i l i z a t io n  o f labour se rv ic e s . These departments were not
(3)
d ivided geograph ically  b u t by function , covering as they  d id
the  r e la t io n s  o f  the  s ta te  w ith members o f  p a r t ic u la r  caste s
or c ra f ts  throughout th e  is la n d . These departments n e c e ssa r ily
Yin te rp e n e tra te d  the  t e r i t o r i a l  ad m in is tra tio n . They were 
u su a lly  organised  under v idanas. a s s is te d  by m ohottalas and 
kanakapulles.
Under th e  cap ta in -genera lsh ip  o f  Dorn Jeronimo de Azevedo 
th e re  had occured two im portant changes in  the  S inhalese system.
(2) S .G .Perera ( t r a n s . , )  The tombo o f  the  Two Korale s . 30/ 
records th e  appointment o f a gamea (gamaya in  S inhalese) 
o r headman by d isava Dorn Constantino B a rre tto .
(3) The o rg an iza tio n  fo r  the  ad m in istra tio n  o f  Bulatgama
was an exception .
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F ir s t ly  the  S inhalese in  th e  higher p o s ts  tended to  be 
replaced by Portuguese. Secondly th e re  was a re la x a tio n  o f
f1
! c e n tra l co n tro l over th e  flisavas r e s u l t in g  in  a s u b s ta n tia l
in c rease  in  th e i r  power* During th e  q u a r te r  century  th a t  
followed Azevedo*s departu re  from Ceylon the  tren d  regarding 
the  change o f personnel in  the  h igher reaches o f  th e  ad m in is tra tiv e  
system continued unabated* The l a s t  S inhalese to  hold th e  
post o f  d isava was Dorn Constantino B a rre tto  in  1621* Thenceforth 
i t  became a m atter o f  p o lic y  to  appoint only Portuguese to
w
th is  key post* The o th er no tab le change, the  in c re ase  in  the  
power o f  th e  h igher ad m in is tra tiv e  o f f ic ia l s  was recognised 
as an e v i l  and e f fo r ts  were made to  c u r ta i l  i t .  One o f the  
powers gained by th e  d isavas in  th e  e a rly  years o f  Portuguese 
ru le  was th a t  o f  g ran tin g  lands w ith in  th e i r  province* During 
the  tim e o f  Azevedo ap a rt from a few g ran ts  by the  cap ta in -genera l 
h im self a l l  g ran ts  o f  se rv ice  lands to  th e  Ceylonese were
(5)
made by th ese  disavas* The estab lishm ent o f  a ju n ta  made
up o f th e  ca p ta in -g en era l, th e  vedor and th e  cap ta in  o f  Colohbo
or the  bishop o f  Cochin, in  161** could in  a sense fcp be viewed
(**) Dorn Constantino B arre tto  was succeeded as d isava o f  Matara 
by Joa9T de F re i ta s . Evora CXVl/2-3.f*67-67v; AHU Caixa 12,
6.12.1635; Filmoteea LM.15*33/2-3; S .G .P e re ra ( tra n s .,)
The tombo o f  the  Two Korales* 5
(5) T.Abeyasinghe 110-111
3 2 2
as an attem pt to  c u r ta i l  th is  power o f  the  disavas fo r  the
.junta was expected to  be the  so le  source o f revenue g ran ts
i n  th e  y e a rs  to  come# However i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  th e  d isa v a s
did not lo se  a l l  r ig h ts  to  g ran t lan d . When Miguel P e re ira  Ravasco
made the tombo o f the  Two Korales in  1622 he recorded f i f te e n
o f the twenty e igh t o f th e  Ih a la  P a ttu  o f  the  Meda Korale
as having been granted by the  d isava . only one by th e  cap tain -
general and none by the  .junta.The Two Korales however may
have been exceptional in  th a t  i t  was a land  re c e n tly  subjugated
and not included in  Vaz F re ire*s tombo^fo r  i t  i s  known th a t
the .junta was ac tiv e  in  making Innd g ran ts  as e a r ly  as 1614.
N evertheless i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  escape th e  conclusion th a t
to
the disavas continued/have a hand in  land  g ran ts e sp ec ia lly
as Vaz F re ire*s tombo had in a d v e rtan tly  om itted a number of
sm aller v i l la g e s  and thus deprived the .junta o f inform ation
regarding them. However by th e  I620, s th e  power o f  the  d isavas
to  g ran t land  seems to  have been lim ite d  by the  a c t iv i t i e s  
(6)
o f the  .junta.
The d isavas had also  increased  th e i r  ju d ic ia l  powers 
during th e  e a rly  years o f Portuguese ru le .  For in s tan ce  tkyy 
they acquired the  r ig h t  to  sentence people to  dea th . In  h is
(6) S .G .Perera ( t r a n s . , )  The tombo o f  the  Two K orales. k-J2; 
AHU Caixa 4, 18.1.1615
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f i r s t  term  o f  o f f ic e , Constantino de Sa attem pted to  reverse
th is  tren d  by tr a n s fe r r in g  the  ju d ic ia l  powers o f  th e  d isavas
to  Portuguese judges each o f  whom was to  be in  charge o f
about te n  k o ra le s . The scheme was abandoned due to  opposition
from the  king who, probably influerffcnced by rep o rts  o f the
d isturbances o f  1616-1620, forbade any ra d ic a l a l te r a t io n
(7)
in  the  e x is tin g  ad m in istra tiv e  system. D espite t h i s ,  th e
extensive powers o f  th e  d isavas induced the  Portuguese to
look fo r  fu r th e r  means o f reducing th e i r  powers. The p lan
advanced by Lanparote de Seixas in  1625 was perhaps th e  most
rad ic a l o f th e se . De Seixas proposed th a t  th e  p o st o f d isava
be abolished  a lth g e th e r  and th e  four d isavas rep laced  by
ten  o r tw elve b th e r o f f ic ia l s  each in  charge o f  two o r th re e
k o ra le s . Whereas the  d isavas had been granted  lands fo r  th e i r
snsitMcfelw subsistance , th ese  new o f f ic ia l s  were to  be paid
servants o f  the  s ta te  rece iv in g  cash s a la r ie s ,^ n d  were to  be
en tru sted  w ith  ju d ic ia l  and ad m in is tra tiv e  d u tie s  as w ell
(8)
as those o f  revenue c o lle c tio n . This p lan  never bore f r u i t ,  
owing to  th e  re luc tance  o f  th e  Portuguese in  Lisbon and Goa 
to  r is k  re b e llio n  by innovations.
(7) TT.LM.1 6 .f . 802
(8) Ajuda 5 1 -V III-4 0 .f .225-226
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In  on© resp ec t however the  power and a u th o rity  o f  the
disavas d id  su f fe r  a dec line  in  the  f i r s t  four decades o f
the seventeenth century . This was a d i r e c t  co ro lla ry  o f  the
replacem ent o f  S inhalese by Portuguese o f f ic e r s .  The S inhalese
disavas o f  K otte l ik e  Dom Constantino B arretto  and Simao Correa
had in sp ire d  fee lin g s  o f  personal lo y a lty  among th e  la s c a r in
troops o f  th e i r  p rov inces. By the  1620*s and l630*s however
the p o licy  o f  appoin ting  Eortuguese alone to  th ese  p o sts  le d
to  la s c a r in  lo y a lty  being tra n s fe r re d  to  the  most sen io r
S inhalese o f f i c i a l ,  th e  m udaliyar. Thus in  1630 the  la s c a r in s
o f Matara p re fe rre d  to  follow  Dom Theodosio or K a tto ta  Rala
ra th e r  than  th e i r  d isava Domingos Carvalho Cam* When
Dom Theodosio re tu rned  to  Portuguese a lleg ian ce  h is  la s c a r in s
followed s u i t .  N evertheless i t  was only on ra re  occasions
th a t  th e  S inhalese mudaliyars dared to  challenge th e  a u th o rity
o f the  Portuguese disavas and on the  whole in  l6 3 f the d isavas
(9)
had l i t t l e  le s s  power than  in  1617* However the  exclusive 
appointment o f  Portuguese to  th i s  post e lim inated  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
dangers l ik e ly  to  a r is e  from th e  ex istance of over mighty 
su b je c ts .
To assure themselves o f  p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l over K otte
(9) TT.LII.£5*f.304
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the Portuguese conquerors had crea ted  new p o sts  which were
incorporated  in to  th e  K otte ad m in is tra tio n . The most im portant
of these  were those o f cap ta in -g en era l o f  Ceylon, vedor da
fazenda or c o n tro lle r  o f  revenue, ouvidor o r the  crown judge
and the  fa c to r . Of th e  occupants o f th ese  posts  the  cap ta in -
general was undoubtedly the  most pow erful. In  theory  h is
appointment and d ism issa l was a p re ro g a tiv e  o f th e  k ing  o f 
( 10)
P ortugal. In  p ra c tic e  th e  slow communications between Goa 
and Lisbon o ften  allowed and sometimes forced th e  v iceroy  
to  take th e  ta sk  on h im self; thus only one o f the  fomt 
cap ta in s-genera ls  o f  th e  period  was d i r e c t ly  appointed by 
the  k ing . However the  a u th o r it ie s  in  Lisbon kept a s t r i c t  
superv ision  over the  viceroy* s ac tions fo r  whenever a cap ta in - 
general was removed from o f f ic e  w ithout convincing reasons
( U )
prompt orders were sen t fo r  h is  re in s ta tem en t.
The cap ta in -genera l once appointed was subordinate
( 12)
to  th e  v iceroy  o f  In d ia  and had to  obey h is  o rd e rs . However
(10) Such appointments were to  be made by th e  king on the  
recommendation o f  the  conselho da fazenda, a body which d e a lt  
w ith  p o l i t i c a l  and economic a f f a i r s  r e la te d  to  Portuguese co lon ies. 
The appointment o f  Don Nuno Alvares P e re ira  in  1615 and the
need to  delegate  au th o rity  to  choose h is  successor in  l6 l8  shows 
c le a r ly  th a t  th e  appointment was one to  which the  v iceroy  
had no claim  o f r ig h t .
(11) Two such in stan ces occur in  th i s  p erio d : 'fee d ism issa l
o f  Constantino de Sa in  1621 and th a t  o f  Diogo de Mello de Castrp 
in  1635* (see above chapters I I  and IV) In  th e  case o f  the  removal 
o f  Francisco de Menezes Roxo in  1614 however the  conselho da fazenda 
apparen tly  accepted th a t  i t  was a d es ira b le  measure.
(12) Diogo de H ello de Castro was removed from o f f ic e  in  1635 
on th e  grounds o f  disobedience to  the  v iceroy .
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he had the  r ig h t  o f  d ir e c t  communication w ith the  king o f 
P o rtuga l, though the f a c t  th a t  the  vedor da fazenda or the 
c o n tro lle r  o f revenue , the  captain-m ajor o f Ja ffn a  and the 
camara o r th e  m unicipal council o f  Colombo had the  same 
p r iv ile g e  somewhat reduced i t s  va lu e . The re la tio n sh ip  between 
the cap ta in -genera l and the  v iceroy  depended la rg e ly  on the 
p e rso n a lity  o f  th e  in d iv id u a ls  who occupied the re sp ec tiv e  
posts bu t g en e ra lly  the  cap ta in -g en era l • s opinion i f  not 
always accepted was held in  high regard , i f  only fo r  th e  f a c t  
th a t  he was the man on the  sp o t.
W ithin the  is la n d , th e  cap ta in -g en era l had wide powers 
and was not obliged to  consu lt anyone in  th e  exerc ise  o f these
(13)
powers. On occasion however he consulted a council chosen 
by h im self to  advise him on an urgent problem. This s tep  i s  
known to  have been taken in  1617 and again in  1638. As th e  name 
of h is  o f f ic e  in d ic a te s  he was th e  supreme commander o f  a l l  
the armed fo rces in  the  kingdom. He could dec la re  war and
(i4 )
make peace. He was also  the  head o f the  c iv i l  ad m in is tra tio n  
and t i l l  1630 had th e  power to  m int coins.The cap tains o f
(13) Evora CX V l/2-3.f.6?
(1^) The king on 2 January 1607 held  th a t  the  genera ls o f  Ceylon 
had no r ig h t  to  dec lare  war -  only to  a c t in  se lf-d e fen c e . 
However as events proved the  d is t in c t io n  was d i f f i c u l t  to  draw, 
TT.LM.2.f.^5
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the  Portuguese fo r ts  as w ell as th e  d isavas o r ru le r s  o f 
provinces in  K otte were a l l  responsib le  to  him. The m issionary 
clergy  looked to  him fo r  support and patronage. Although 
revenue m atters were considered ou tside  h is  purview, u n t i l  
such time as the  is la n d  was fu l ly  subjugated the  cap ta in -genera l 
had th e  r ig h t  to  in cu r ex trad rd in a ry  expenses on condition  
th a t  he req u is itio n e d  the  money from the  fa c to r  alone, showed 
the re q u is i t io n s  to  the  vedor and sen t a statem ent o f  expenditure
(15)
to  the v iceroy . Furthermore, th e  cap ta in -genera l had ju d ic ia l
powers and could in v e s tig a te  a l l  crim es, in c lu d in g  cases o f
suspected murder and m anslaughter. Though in  cases o f  crimes
committed by cap tains o r fid a lg o s he could only a r r e s t  them
( 16)
and send them to  the  v iceroy  a t  Goa fo r  sentence, he was 
empowered to  pass the  sentence o f  death  upon o th e r Portuguese
(17)
and Sinhalese# The cap ta in -g en era l could a lso  au thorize  the
co n fisca tio n  o f  a l l  th e  p ro p erty  o f  those who p lo tte d  o r
(18)
rose ag a in st th e  Portuguese. Moreover w ith th e  conquest o f 
Ja ffn a  the  area  under the  cap ta in -genera l * s ju r is d ic t io n  
was g re a t ly  extended.
N evertheless the  powers envisaged fo r  the captainGgeneral
(15) T.Abeyasinghe 85-865 Goa C.Pe AS VI. f . 3^5-352
(16) TT.LM .36.f.l3v
( l? )  This power was a lso  possessed by th e  d isav as . T.Abeyasinghe 82
( 18) TT.LM .l6.f.57l5 AHU 33 .f.2 1
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b y  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  L i s b o n  f e l l  f a r  s h o r t  o f  
t h e  p o w e r s  f o r m e r l y  w i e l d e d  b y  t h e  l o c a l  r u l e r s  w h o s e  g r a n d e u r
(19)
h e  i n h e r i t e d .  T h e  c a p t a i n s  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  f o r t s  o f  K o t t e
( 20)
w e r e  a l l  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l .  T h o u g h  t h e  d i s a v a s
o r  p r o v i n c i a l  r u l e r s  w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  c a p t a i n -
g e n e r a l  e v e n  t h i s  o f f i c e  w a s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  g r a n t e d  b y  t h e  k i n g
( 21)
t o  f i d a l g o s  o f  m e r i t #  T h e  h i g h e s t  r e v e n u e  o f f i c i a l ,  t h e
v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a  o w e d  n o  a l l e g i a n c e  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l
w ho  m o r e o v e r  h a d  n o  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a n d  d i s m i s s a l
(22)
o f  e v e n  t h e  l e s s e r  r e v e n u e  o f f i c i a l s .  T h e  g r a n t  o f  l a n d  a n d  
t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  m a t t e r s  w e r e  e n t r u s t e d  t o
(23)
t h e  j u n t a  o f  w h i c h  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  b u t  o n e  m e m b e r#  
F i n a l l y  i n  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  j u s t i c e  t h e  c i v i l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  
c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  h a d  a n  u p p e r  l i m i t  o f  c a s e s  i n v o l v i n g  o n e  
h u n d r e d  m i l  r e i s  o r  t h i r t y  t h r e e  a n d  o n e  t h i r d  x e r a f i n s  w h i l e
(19) T.Abeyasinghe 76
(20) As th e re  was always a w aiting  l i s t  fo r  each p o s t, the  
cap ta in -genera l ra re ly  had a chance o f making h is  own nomination. 
BNL.FG. 1982 .ff.l25v-126; T T .C hancellarias, F ilip e  Il(D oacoes) 
l iv ro  I.105v ; F ilip e  I I I .  l iv ro  32.f.232v
The fo r ts  in  Ceylon to  which appointments were made from Lisbon 
included Colombo,W eligaaa,Jaffha,M annar,G alle,K alutara and 
E attica loa#
(21) BNL FG.I982 .f .1 5 0  records the  g ran t o f  th e  d isava  o f  th e  
Seven Korales to  Jac in to  Rebelo by th e  k ing . Queyroz 1044 
mentions another in s tan ce . However the  conde de L inhares, v iceroy  
o f In d ia  held  th a t  the  appointment o f  the disavas was b e s t
l e f t  to  th e  judgement o f  the  cap ta in -genera l and th a t  appointments 
should not be made w ithout consu lting  him.
TT .LM .27.f.ll6; Filmoteca LM.14 6/2
(22) T.Abeyasinghe 865 AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635; AHU Caixa 8 ,
17.1.162^
(23) APO VI 804; Simancas SP 1473*f*278 also  see below page f/ *
3 2 9
the maximum fin e  he could impose was fixed  a t  f iv e  hundred
(24) 
m il r e i s .
By 1617 however the cap ta in -genera l had a lready  found 
ways and means to  circumvent some o f  th e  r e s t r ic t io n s .  This 
was done p a r t ly  by rev iv in g  in s t i tu t io n s  th a t  had formed 
p a r t  o f  th e  K otte ad m in is tra tio n  in  th e  s ix teen th  century  
and had since fa l le n  in to  abeyance. One such body was the  
S inhalese mahanaduwa o r high co u rt. The re v iv a l o f  th is  
court enabled Dora Jeronimo de Azevedo and h is  successors to  
acquire c iv i l  ju r is d ic t io n  beyond th e  l im i ts  allowed to
(25)
them by the  king*s ord inances. The cap ta in s-g en era l also  
re so rted  to  e x tra - le g a l ac ts  to  extend th e i r  power. This i s  
b es t i l l u s t r a t e d  in  the case o f land  g ra n ts . In  th e  regimento 
issued on 27 February 1608 by th e  k ing  to  Antao Vaz F re ire  
newly appointed as vedor o f  Ceylon i t  was sp e c if ied  th a t  
once th e  tombo o r land  r e g is te r  was completed a .junta co n s is tin g  
o f the  cap ta in -g en era l, the vedor da fazenda and th e  bishop 
o f Cochin was to  be s e t  up. In  the  absence o f any one o f th ese  
th ree  persons the  cap tain  o f  Colombo was to  deput/Cise. The
$2k) (24) TT.LM .13.f.l3v
(25) T.Abeyasinghe 77
Some S inhalese in s t i tu t io n s  were a lso  revived to  serve the 
personal requirem ents o f  th e  cap ta in -g en era l. One such was the  
post o f  bhandagarika r a la  (b an d ig arra la  according to  TT.LM.45#f. 
360v) o r  tr e a s u re r  whose function  now became the c o lle c tio n  o f 
the personal income o f th e  cap ta in -g en era l.
T h e  j u n t a  w a s  t o  f i x  t h e  q u i t  r e n t s  f o r  t h e  v i l l a g e s  a n d
g r a n t  l a n d s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  k i n g f s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  A l l  s u c h
(26)
g r a n t s  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n f i r m a t i o n  b y  t h e  k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l .
A s  f e w  v i l l a g e  g r a n t s  w e r e  a c t u a l l y  c n f i r r a e d  b y  t h e  k i n g  o f
P o r t u g a l ,  t h e  c a p t a i n a - g e n e r a l  t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  p e r i o d  t o o k
a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  l o o p - h o l e  i n  t h e  l a w  t o  r e s u m e  g r a n t s  m a d e
b y  t h e  j u n t a  a n d  g r a n t  t h e m  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  t o  t h o s e  w hom
t h e y  w i s h e d .  T h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  f u r t h e r
s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  a n  o r d e r  o f  t h e  v i c e r o y  Dom J e r o n i m o  d e  A z e v e d o
a u t h o r i z i n g  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  t o  r e s u m e  a n y  l a n d s  h e e d e d
t o  s u s t a i n  o r  r e w a r d  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s .  R e p e a t e d  r o y a l
i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r b i d d i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l s  t o  d e p r i v e  v i l l a g e  h o l d e r s
( 2 7 )
o f  t h e i r  l a n d s  a p p a r e n t l y  h a d  n o  e f f e c t .
D u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 6 1 4 - 1 6 3 8  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  l i m i t i n g
f a c t o r  o n  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  t h e  p r e s e n c e
o f  t h e  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a .  T h o u g h  t h e  p o s t  o f  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a
o f  C e y l o n  h a d  e x i s t e d  s i n c e  1 5 9 7 *  t h e  h o l d e r  o f  t h i s  p o s t  w a s
a l l o w e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  l i t t l e  p o w e r  by  t h e  c a p t a i n s - g e n e r a l
( 2 8 )
Dom J e r o n i m o  d e  A z e v e d o  a n d  Dom  F r a n c i s c o  d e  M e n e z e s  R o x o .
( 2 6 )  APO V I . 8 0 4 - 8 0 5
( 2 ? )  T T .L IT . 1 2 . f f . 3 7 4 , 4 2 3 ;  T T .L M . 1 6 . f f . 5 0 0 , 5 8 0 ;  T T . L M . 4 5 . f . 3 0 5
T T .L M .3 5 .* ‘* 5 v ?  T T . L M . 4 4 . f . 6 3 ;  AHU C a i x a  7 *  4 . 3 . 1 6 2 2 ;
T T , L M . l 8 . f . 2 4 0 v  A s  l a t e  a s  1 6 2 2  J o r g e  d e  A l b e r q u e r q u e ,  c a p t a i n -  
g e n e r a l  o f  C e y l o n  g r a n t e d  t h e  v i l l a g e  o f  P a n a n e  t o  a  S i n h a l e s e  
m u d a l i y a r .  S . G . P e r e r a  t r a n s . ,  T h e  to m b o  o f  t h e  Tw o K o r a l e s . 2 8
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T h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  v e d o r  w a s  t h e  r e g i m e n t o  o f
A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e .  T h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  o f f i c e r  c o u l d  b e
c o n v e n i e n t l y  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s *  F i r s t l y ,  h e  w a s
e x p e c t e d  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e  m a c h i n e r y  o f
r e v e n u e  c o l l e c t i o n *  I t  w a s  h i s  d u t y  t o  s e e k  t o  m a x i m i s e
r o y a l  r e v e n u e  a n d  t o  s u b m i t  p r o p o s a l s  t o  t h i s  e n d  t o  t h e
v i c e r o y  a n d  t h e  k i n g *  A c c o r d i n g l y  h e  w a s  g i v e n  t h e  p o w e r  t o
(29)
a p p o i n t  a n d  d i s m i s s  a l l  m i n o r  r e y e n u e  o f f i c i a l s .  I n  1 6 1 5  t h e  
v e d o r  a l s o  r e c e i v e d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  f i n e  p e r s o n s  u p  t o
( 3 0 )
f i v e  h u n d r e d  c r u z a d o s  i n  m a t t e r s  d e a l i n g  s o l e l y  w i t h  r e v e n u e *  
S e c o n d l y ,  i t  w a s  h i s  d u t y  t o  c o m p i l e  a  t o m b o  o r  l a n d  r e g i s t e r .  
T h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  v e d o r * s  f u n c t i o n s  w a s  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  r e v e n u e  c o l l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  to m b o  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  a  
r e c o r d ^  o f  a l l  t h e  s e r v i c e s  d u e  a n d  t h e  t a x a b l e  p r o d u c e  o f  
e a c h  v i l l a g e *  T h i r d l y ,  a l l  n o r m a l  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  w a s  
u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  v e d o r  w h i l e  h e  h a d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  b e
( 2 8 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  a s s u m e s  t h a t  A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e ,  a p p o i n t e d  i n  
1607 w a s  t h e  f i r s t  v e d o r * H o w e v e r  i t  i s  c l e a r  f r o m  t h e  to m b o  
o f  K o t t e  c o m p i l e d  b y  J o r g e  F r o l i m  d e  A l m e i d a  i n  1 5 9 7  t h a t
d e  A l m e i d a  h i m s e l f  w a s  a p p o i n t e d  a s  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a  o f  t h e  c o n q u e s t  
o f  C e y l o n  t h o u g h  h e  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  a l l o w e d  l e s s  p o w e r  t h a n  
V a z  F r e i r e .  I t  i s  h o w e v e r  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  d e  A l m e i d a  r e m a i n e d  i n  
K o t t e  u n t i l  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  A n t a o  V a z  ' F r e i r e .
T • A b e y a s i n g h e  89 , 1 2 9 ;  T T *M a n u s c r i t o s  d o  C o n v e n t o  d a  G r a g a *
to m o  6D . f f . 3 2 5 , 3 3 3
( 2 9 )  AHU C a i x a  6 ,  2 . 1 1 . l 6l 8




n o t i f i e d  o f  a l l  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n s e s  r e q u i s i t i o n e d  f o r  
b y  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l *  F o u r t h l y ,  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  m e m b e r s  
o f  t h e  j u n t a  h e  h a d  a  s h a r e  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
v i l l a g e s  a n d  l a n d s  t o  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  p e t i t i o n e d  f o r  t h e m .
F i n a l l y ,  h e  w a s  a l s o  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  f o r t i f y  t h e  i m p o r t a n t
( 3 1 )
p o r t s  o f  K o t t e .  T h e  c o n q u e s t  o f  J a f f n a  i n  1 6 1 9  a d d e d
f u r t h e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  t h e  v e d o r  w h o  w a s  t h e n c e f o r t h
e x p e c t e d  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  o f  J a f f n a  a n d
M a n n a r  a n d  a l s o  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  l a n d  r e g i s t e r  o f  J a f f h a .
I n  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  t h e  v e d o r  w a s
r e s p o n s i b l e  o n l y  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  o f  I n d i a .  I n d e e d  D r .  T . A b e y a s i n g h e
h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  r e g t m e n t o  o f  A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  d i d
( 3 2 )
n o t  r e q u i r e  h i m  e v e n  t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y .
H o w e v e r  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  v e d o r e s  i n c l u d i n g  V a z  F r e i r e  r e c e i v e d  
a n d  o b e y e d  o r d e r s  f r o m  t h e  v i c e r o y .  A l t h o u g h  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
s t a g e s  t h e  p o s t  o f  v e d o r  w a s  u s u a l l y  f i l l e d  b y  p e r s o n s  
d i r e c t l y  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  k i n g p i n  t h e  1620*s  a n d  t h e  1630*s
( 3 1 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  8 4 - 8 5 ;  APO V I  8 0 2 - 8 0 8 ;  
F i l m o t e c a  R e i s  V i z i n h o s  I .  4 0 / 2 - 4
( 3 2 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  86
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t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  v e d o r  b e c a m e  a l m o s t  e x c l u s i v e l y  t h e
( 3 3 )
t a s k  o f  t h e  v i c e r o y *  T h e  v i c e r o y  a l s o  c e r t a i n l y  a c q u i r e d  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  d i s m i s s  a n y  v e d o r  w h o  r e f u s e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t
( 3 3 )  A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  v e d o r  a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e
k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l .  O n  r e c e i p t  o f  n e w s  t h a t  V a z  F r e i r e  w i s h e d
t o  r e t u r n  t o  P o r t u g a l ,  t h e  k i n g  o n  8 J a n u a r y  1 6 1 7  a p p o i n t e d
P a u l o  d a  S e r r a  d e  M o a a e s  t o  s u c c e e d  h i m .  D e  M o r a e s  w a s
u n a b l e  t o  com ©  t o  t h e  E a s t  d u e  t o  s i c k n e s s  a n d  t h e  k i n g  t h e r e u p o n
r e q u e s t e d  t h e  v i c e r o y - i n - c o u n c i l  t o  m a k e  a  c h o i c e  b e t w e e n
L a n p a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s  a n d  P e d r o  d e  A l m e i d a  d a  C a b r a l .  A f t e r
d e  S e i x a s  h a d  b e e n  c h o s e n  a n d  h a d  s e r v e d  f o r  s o m e  t i m e ,  i n
1 6 2 3  t h e  k i n g  n o m i n a t e d  J o a o  P e r e i r a  E o r » a c h o  t o  s u c c e e d
h i m .  B o r r a c h o  d i e d  b e f o r e  t h e  o r d e r s  r e a c h e d  I n d i a .  (D R  I V . 2 2 1 ,
m  V .106; T T . L M . 1 7 . f . 8 3 ;  T T . L n . 2 0 . f . 2 6 9 5  T T . L M . 3 7 . f . ^ 2 5 ;
T T . L H . 4 0 . f . 9 4 ;  T T L H . 4 l . f . 2 5 3 ;  AHU 5 0 1 . f . 2 8 7 v ;  AHU C a i x a  5,
1 . 2 . 1 6 1 8 ;  AHU C a i x a  5 ,  6 . 1 . 1 6 1 8  )
T h e  v e d o r e s  d a  f a z e n d a  o f  C e y l o n  1 5 9 7 - 1 8 3 9  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s -  
J o r g e  F r o l i m  d e  A l m e i d a  (  1 5 9 7 -  ? )
A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  ( 1 6 0 8 - 1 6 1 6 )
M a n o e l  d e  O l i v e i r a  d e  A z e v e d o  ( 1 6 1 6 - 1 6 1 8 )
L a n p a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s  ( 1 6 1 8 - 1 6 2 2 )
I H g u e l  P i n h e i r o  K a v a s c o  (  1 6 2 2 - 1 6 2 3 )
A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  ( 1 6 2 3 - 1 6 2 6 )
C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  d e  H o r o n h a  ( 1 6 2 6 - 1 6 2 7 )
A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  ( 1 6 2 8 - 1 6 3 0 )
L a n p a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s  ( 1 6 3 0 - 1 6 3 1 )
A n d r e  S i m o e s  ( 1 6 3 1 )
J o r g e  d e  A l m e i d a  ( 1 6 3 1 - 1 6 3 3 )
A m a ro  R o i z  ( 1 6 3 3 - 1 8 3 8 )
A n t o n i o  d a  F o n s e c a  O z o u r o  ( I 636- I 638)
G a s p a r  d a  A r a j o  ( 1 6 3 8 - 1 6 3 9 )
D i o g o  H e n d e s  d e  B r i t o  ( 1 6 3 9 - 1 6 ?  )
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(34)
h is  o rd e r s .  Com plaints a g a in s t  th e  vedo r were in v e s t ig a te d  
in  th e  conselho  da fazenda  o r  t r e a s u r y  c o u n c il  a t  Goa, j u s t  
as th o se  a g a in s t  th e  c a p ta in -g e n e ra l  were d isc u ssd d  i n  th e
( 3 5 )
v ice ro y * s  conselho  do e s tad o  o r  c o u n c il o f  s t a t e .
Indeed  th e  need  f o r  a s u p e rv iso ry  a u th o r i ty  o v e r b o th
th e  c a p ta in -g e n e ra j. and th e  vedor was enhanced by th e
c o n tin u a l c o n f l i c t s  t h a t  occu red  betw een th e  two o f f i c i a l s .
These c o n f l i c t s  were c h ie f ly  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  la c k  o f  p r e c is io n
in  th e  d i f f e ^ f i a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  fu n c tio n s  and r e s p e c t iv e  sp h e res
o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  For example i t  was d i r e c te d  t h a t  th e
vedor shou ld  be i n  charge o f  a l l  norm al e x p e n d itu re  and a c c o rd in g ly  
'  ( 3 6 )
subm it annual accoun ts o f  revenue and expenses to  th e  v ic e ro y .
However, th e  r i g h t  o f  th e  c a p ta in -g e n e ra l  to  r e q u i s i t i o n
funds from th e  f a c to r  f o r  e x tra o rd in a ry  expenses made th e
( 3 7 )
vedor*s c o n tro l  over e x p e n d itu re  a  f a r c e .  The s i t u a t i o n
( 3 4 )  L a te  i n  1 6 3 4  th e  v ic e ro y  conde de L in h a re s  d ec id ed  to  
remove th e  vedor Araaro Roiz from  o f f i c e  f o r  p r e c i s e ly  t h i s  
re a so n . Araaro R oiz was a b le  to  c o n tin u e  i n  o f f i c e  o n ly  because 
th e  su c c e sso r  nom inated by th e  v ic e ro y , A ntonio P inho da C osta  
was r e l u c ta n t  t o  s a c r i f i c e  h is  b u s in e ss  and t r a d in g  i n t e r e s t s  
to  ta k e  up re s id e n c e  i n  Colombo and because  th e  v ic e ro y  h im s e lf  
was re p la c e d  by a su c c e sso r  who p a r t i a l l y  re v e rse d  h i s  p o l i c i e s .  
The conde de L in h a re s  a ls o  removed Ambrosio F r e i ta s  da Camara 
from th e  p o s t  o f  vedor i n  1 6 3 0 . (See above c h a p te rs  3  and 4 )
( 3 5 )  The v ic e ro y * s  c o u n c i l - o f - s ta te  ( conselho  do e s ta d o )  d e a l t  
w ith  q u e s tio n s  o f  im portance  to  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  s t a t e .
I t s  membership u s u a l ly  in c lu d e d  th e  v ic e ro y  h im s e lf ,  th e  
vedor d a  fazen d a  o f  I n d i a ,  th e  c h a n c e l lo r ,  th e  i n q u i s i t o r ,  th e  
a rc h -b ish o p  o f  Goa, th e  c a p ta in  o f  Goa and o th e r s  chosen by
th e  v ic e ro y ,  The conselho  da fazen d a  d e a l t  w ith  f i n a n c ia l  m a tte rs  
and c o n s is te d  o f  revenue o f f i c i a l s .
( 3 6 )  APO V I . 1 2 1 9 ;  T T . L M . 1 3 . f . l 9 3 ;  T T . L M . 1 7 . f . 8 5 ;  T T . L H . l 6 .
f . 3 5 5 ;  T T . L M . 3 8 . f . 3 9 6 v
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p e r h a p s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a v o i d  i n  t i m e  o f  w a r ,  c o n t i n u e d  e v e n
i n  t i m e s  o f  p e a c e  f o r  s i n c e  t h e  t e r m * e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n s e s *
w a s  n o t  d e f i n e d ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  p r o t e s t  o f  t h e  v e d o r  t h e
c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  c o n t i n u e d  t o  u s e  t h i s  l o o p h o l e  i n  t h e  l a w
(38)
t o  o b t a i n  f u n d s  f o r  d i v e r s e  p u r p o s e s #  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  
v e d o r  c o u l d  s a b o t a g e  o r  a t  l e a s t  d e l a y  t h e  s c h e m e s  o f  t h e  
c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  b y  p l e a d i n g  l a c k  o f  f u n d s .  T h i s  w a s  w h a t  
A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  d i d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
B a t t i c a l o a  a n d  H e n i k k a d a w a r a *  I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  
o n l y  r e s o u r c e  o p e n  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  t o  s p e r x t  h i s  
o w n  m o n e y  a n d  l a t e r  r e c l a i m  i t  f r o m  t h e  r o y a l  t r e a s u r y *
A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  j u r i d s i c t i o n  w a s  t o  
b e  s e e n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o r t s  o f  C e y l o n .  
T h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  g i v e n  t o  V a z  F r e i r g ,  b y  t h e  k i n g  c l e a r l y  
s h o w  t h a t  t h e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o r t s  o f  K o t t e  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  
t o  b e  a  p a r t  o f  t h e  v e d o r * s  f u n c t i o n s *  T h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l
(37) Luis de Seixas in  a rep o rt to  the  conselho da fazenda in  
Lisbon argued th a t  the  vedor could no t f u l f i l  h is  functions as 
the cap ta in -genera l held  the  fa c to r  in  subservience. Of the 
fa c to r  he s ta te s  *que e s ta  tremendo quando fallacam  o g e r a l*
( AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635)
(38) AHU Caixa 6, 7*11.1618; AHU 2 1 0 .f.l2 4 v ;
Both Lanparote de Seixas and Antonio de Fonseca Ozouro are 
knuwn to  have p ro te s ted  ag a in s t th i s  p ra c t ic e . They suggested 
co n tro ls  such as a maximum l im i t  on ex trao rd in ary  expenses, 
the enforcement o f  the  g e n e ra l 's  l i a b l i t y  to  submit accounts 
to  the  v iceroy  which had h ith e r to  been ignored and a d e f in it io n  
o f what c o n s titu te d  •ex trao rd inary  expenses '.
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n a t u r a l l y  r e s i s t e d  t h i s  i n t r u s i o n  i n t o  t h e  p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  
s p h e r e  w h i c h  h e  r e g a r d e d  a s  e x c l u s i v e l y  h i s  o w n  c o n c e r n .
A t  n o jf  t i m e  d u r i n g  t h e  tw o  d e c a d e s  u n d e r  r e v i e w  d i d  t h e
v e d o r  s u c c e e d e d  i n  a s s e r t i n g  h i s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  b u i l d i n g
o f  f o r t s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  a d v i s e
t h e  v i c e r o y  o n  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  a n d  c a m e  t o
b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  v a l u a b l e  s o u r c e  o f  c r i t i c a l  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e
p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n = g e n e r a l .  T h i s  w a s  t o  p r o v e  a n  i r r i t a n t
t o  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f
A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a ,  t h e  v e d o r  h a d  v i e w s  d i s t i n c t l y
o p p o s e d  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l .  H o w e v e r  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l * s
p r o t e s t s  w e r e  o f  n o  a v a i l .  T h e  r e g i m e n t o  i s s u e d  t o  D i o g o
M e n d e s  d e  E r i t o  o n  8 F e b r u a r y  1 6 3 9  n o t  o n l y  r e q u e s t e d  h i m  t o
g i v e  h i s  o p i n i o n  o n  t h e  a d v i s a b i l i t y  o f  f o r t i f y i n g  K a l u t a r a
a n d  o n  t h e  s a ± x  s t a t e  o f  t h e  f o r t  a t  H e g o m b o  b u t  e v e n  i n s t r u c t e d
(39)
h im  t o  k e e p  a  c l o s e  c h e c k  o n  t h e  w o r k  o f  f o r t i f y i n g  C o lo m b o .
Y e t  a n o t h e r  i n s t a n c e  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  o f  a u t h o r i t y  m a y  b e  f o u n d  
i n  t h e  d i v i d e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  l a s c a r i n  f o r c e s .  T h e  
l a s c a r i n s  a s  s o l d i e r s  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  
a n d  h i s  s u b o r d i n a t e s .  Y e t  t h e y  w e r e  r e w a r d e d  f o r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  
b y  l a n d  g r a n t s .  A s  l a n d h o l d e r s  t h e y  w e r e  a l s o  u n d e r  t h e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  v e d o r .
(39) APO V I .  805;  TT.LM.45.ff.363-363v; F i l m o t e c a  L M .i4 .H 9/l-3
3 3 7
D e f e c t s  i n  d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  a l o n e  h o w e v e r  w o u l d  
n o t  e x p l a i n  a l l  t h e  c l a s h e s  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  tw o  anrhfrwicxfci i tg 
i m p o r t a n t  o f f i c i a l s .  T h e  p r o b l e m  l a y  p a r t l y  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f
pi
K o t t e  a n d  m a k e  o n l y  p e a o o f u l  c h a n g e s  t o  s u i t  t h e i r  i m m e d i a t e
p b j e c t i v e s .  S u c h  a  p o l i c y  i n e v i t a b l e )  l e d  t o  u n f o r s e e n  p r o b l e m s
w h i c h  a f f e c t e d  t h e  s m o o t h  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
U n d e r  t h e  k i n g  o f  K o t t e  o n l y  t h e  k i n g  h a d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o
m a k e  p r o c l a m a t i o n s .  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  t o o k  t h e  p o w e r s  o v e r  r e v e n u e
t h a t  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  k i n g  a n d  i n v e s t e d  t h e m  i n  t h e  v e d o r  b u t
t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  i n s i s t e d  o n  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  s o l e  p o w e r
t o  m a k e  p r o c l a m a t i o n s  b y  i s s u i n g  t h e  d o c u m e n t  i n  o l a  o r
p a l m  l e a f .  T h e  p e r s i s t a n t  e f f o r t s  o f  A m a ro  R o i z  ( v e d o r  1 6 3 3 - 1 6 3 6 )
f a i l e d  t o  c o n v i n c e  t h e  v i c e r o y - i n - c o u n c i l  o f  t h e  n e e d  f o r
a n y  c h a n g e  i n  p r o c e d u r e  a n d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  v e d o r
h a d  t o  d e o e n d  o n  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  i n
(§0)
i s s u i n g  n e w  o r d e r s  r e g a r d i n g  r e v e n u e .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  s u c h  p r o b l e m s  d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  
t o  c l a s h e s .  A s  i n  m a n y  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e s  i n  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
P o r t u g u e s e  C e y l o n  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  p e r s o n a l  a t t i t u d e s  m a t t e r e d  
a  g r e a t  d e a l .  I n  1 6 3 0  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  d e  N o r o n h a  d e c l a r e d
*
t h a t  h e  w a s  w i l l i n g  t o  w o r k  w i t h  a n y o n e  e x c e p t  A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e t a s
( 4 0 )  T T .L M ,3 6 . f f . 1 1 , 2 8 , 3 0 , 3 2
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d a  C a m a r a .  L a n 9a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s ,  t w i c e  v e d o r  o f  C e y l o n  w o r k e d  
a m i c a b l y  w i t h  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  o n  b o t h  o c c a s i o n s  b u t  h a d
(4 i )
d i s p u t e s  w i t h  b o t h  J o r g e  d e  A l b e r q u e r q u e  a n d  Dom F i l i p e  M a s c a r e n h a s .
H o w e v e r ,  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  w h i c h  l e f t  s o  m u c h  r o o m
(42)
f o r  d i s p u t e d  w a s  c l e a r l y  i n  n e e d  o f  r e f o m . T h e  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  
t h e  tw o  p r e m i e r  o f f i c i a l s  i n  C e y l o n  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  b r i n g  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  a  s t a n d s t i l l  a n d  t h i s  w a s  s o m e t h i n g  t h e
( 4 3 )
P o r t u g u e s e  c o u l d  i l l - a f f o r d .
T h e  s o l u t i o n  a d v o c a t e d  b y  tw o  o f  t h e  a b l e s t  c a p t a i n s -  
g e n e r a l  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d  -  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  a n d  D i o g o  d e  H e l l o  
w a s  s i m p l e  t h o u g h  d r a s t i c .  T h e y  p r o p o s e d  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  
t h e  p o s t  o f  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a . T h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  t o  t a k e  
o v e r  t h e  d u t y  o f  g e n e r a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e  
a n d  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  a c c o u n t s  o f  r e v e n u e  a n d  e x p e n d i t u r e .
T h e  r o u t i n e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a f f a r i s  w a s  t o  b e  
d  l e g a t e d  t o  t h e  f a c t o r .  M a n y  a r g u e m e n t s  c o u l d  b e  a d v a n c e d  
i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  a d v o c a t e d  b y  t h e  
b i s h o p  o f  C o c h i n  a s  w a r l y  a s  1 6 1 9 *  D i o g o  d e  H e l l o  p o i n t e d  o u t
( 4 1 ) F i l r a o t e c a  L M .1 3 B .1 1 / 3 - 5 ;  A s s e n t o s  1 . 2 6 5 , 5 3 , 3 5 3 ;  T T .L M .1 8 .  
f . 2 4 0 v
( 4 2 )  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  w h o  t u r n e d  s o  b i t t e r  a g a i n s t  A m b r o s i o  d e  
F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  i n  l a t e r  y e a r s  h a d  w r i t t e n  a  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  
k i n g  o n  i  D e c e m b e r  1 6 2 3  w a r m l y  p r a i s i n g  h i m  f o r  g o o d  w o r k
a s  v e d o r .  T h u s  t h e  a n i m o s i t y  h e  l a t e r  a c q u i r e d  w a s  a  p r o d u c t  
o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  1 6 2 4 - 1 6 2 5 *
( 4 3 )  T T . L H . 2 4 . f . 2 1 v ;  F i l m o t e c a  LM.21. 2 1 / 2 - 4
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t h a t  t o  h a v e  b o t h  a  v e d o r  a n d  a  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  l i k e
h a v i n g  tw o  h e a d s  t o  o n e  b o d y .  T h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  i n
t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l ,  i t  w a s  h e l d ,  w o u l d  l e a d  t o
g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y .  M o r e o v e r  t h i s  m e a s u r e  w o u l d  s a v e  t h e  s u b s t a h t i a l
e m o l u m e n t s  p a i d  b y  t h e  t r e a s u r y  t o  t h e  v e d o r .  T h e s e  w e r e
t h e  a r g u s m e n t s  t h a t  i n d u c e d  t h e  c o n d e  d e  V i d i g u e r a ,  v i c e r o y
o f  I n d i a  t o  a c c e p t  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a * a  o f f e r  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e
( 4 4 )
t a s k  o f  v e d o r  a s  w e l l  a s  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l .
T h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  L i s b o n  d i d  n o t  a g r e e .  T h e  v e d o r  d a  
f a z e n d a  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  n o t  m e r e l y  a s  a  r e v e n u e  o f f i c i a l  b u t  
a l s o  a s  a  u s e f u l  c h e c k  o n  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l .
T h e  w h o l e  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  E a s t  
h a d  b e e n  b a s e d  o n  t h i s  s y s t e m  o f  # c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e . *  T h e  
f a c t o r ,  a  m i n o r  o f f i c i a l  c o u l d  n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  f u l f i l  t h i s  
a s p e c t  o f  t h e  v e d o r * s  f u n c t i o n s .  T h i s  w a s  w h y  t h e  k i n g  r e f u s e d
(45)
t o  a g r e e  t o  p r o p o s a l s  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  v e d o r .
H o w e v e r  i t  w a s  s o o n  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  g r e a t e r  c o - o p e r a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  v e d o r  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  w a s  a n  u r g e n t  n e e d .
A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  v i c e r o y * s  a u t h o r i t y  t h e  m a i n  i n s t r u m e n t  u d e d  
t o  e n s u r e  t h i s  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  w a s  t h e  . j u n t a .  T h e  . j u n t a  a s  d e f i n e d  
i n  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r ^ 4 n d  a s  s e t  u p  i n  1 6 1 4
( 4 4 )  TT.LM. 2 4 .  f f .  6l v - 62;  EEL F G .1 9 3 2  f . l 4 7 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 3 v ;
AHU C a i x a  1 2 ,  .- 6 * 1 2 . 1 6 3 5 ;  AHU 3 3 . f . 2 2 ;  A j u d a  5 1 - V H I - 4 0 .  
f f . 2 l 6 v , 2 1 7 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 7 ;  T T .L M . 2 2 . d T .9 1 v
( 4 5 )  T T .L M ,2 6 .  f f . 3 1 9 , 3 3 5 ;  AHU C a i x a  1 2 ,  6 . 1 2 . 1 6 3 5 ;
AHU C a i x a  1 6 ,  2 8 . 1 . 1 6 4 4
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w a s  a  c o u n c i l  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l #  t h e  v e d o r  a n d
t h e  b i s h o p  o f  C o c h i n  o r  i n  t h e  a b s a n c e  o f  a n y o n e  o f  t h e s e
t h e  c a p t a i n  o f  C o lo m b o .  I t s  o r i g i n a l  o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  d e f i n e
t h e  q u i t  r e n t s  t o  b e  f i x e d  a f t e r  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d
r e g i s t e r  o f  K o t t e  a n d  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  v i l l a g e s  t o  p e r s o n s
( 4 6 )
o f  m e r i t .  I n  a  s e n s e  i t  c o u l d  b e  v i e w e d  a s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  g a i n  
f o r  t h e  v e d o r  a  h a n d  i n  t h e  g r a n t  o f  l a n d s  w h i c h  h a d  h i t h e r t o  
b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  m a i n l y  b y  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  a n d  h i s  d i s a v a s .  
H o w e v e r  b y  t h e  s e c o n d  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t h e  
k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l  h a d  a l r e a d y  b e g u n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h i s  b o d y  a s  
o n e  w h i c h  s h o u l d  h a v e  m u c h  w i d e r  f u n c t i o n s .  T h u s  o n  2 3  F e b r u a r y  
I 6l 3 f o r  e x a m p l e  h e  w r o t e  t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  r e q u e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
j u n t a  b e  a s k e d  t o  m a k e  i n q u i r i e s  a s  t o  h o w  c h a l e a s  r e s i d e n t  
i n  x^£a3dcagE s: v i l l a g e s  h e l d  b y  p r i v a t e  p e r s o n s  c o u l d  b e  r e g a i n e d
( 4 ? )
f o r  t h e  k i n g ' s  s e r v i c e s .  A c c o r d i n g l y  b y  t h e  l 6 2 0 ' s  t h e  j u n t a  
h a d  b e c o m e  a  c o u n c i l  o f  f i n a n c e n s  w e l l  a s  a  m e s a  d a  r e p a r t i c a o  
o r  a  b o a r d  o f  ( l a n d )  a l l o c a t i o i .  W i t h  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  
t o m b o  a n d  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  l a n d ,  a l l  t h a t  r e m a i n e d  o f  t h e  j u n t a * s  
o r i g i n a l  f u n c t i o n s  w a s  t o  r e v i e w  p e t i t i o n s  f o r  l a n d s  t h a t  h a d  
f a l l e n  v a c a n t .  I t  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  n o w  r e v i e w e d  x x  a l s o  a s  a  b o d y
( 4 5 )  APO V I .  8 0 4 ;  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  1 2 2
T h e  j u n t a  s e t  u p  o n  2 2  H a y  1 6 1 4  w a s  s u s p e n d e d  i n  M a y  1 6 1 5  t j y  
t h e  v i c e r o y  Dom J e r o n i m o  d e A z e v e d o  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t ,  i t  d i d  
n o t  a d h e r e  t o  t h e  k i n g ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  F o l l o w i n g  p r o f i t s  b y  
A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  i t  w a s  r e i n s t a t e d  o n  t h e  k i n g ' s  o r d e r s  a  f e w  
y e a r s  l a t e r .  (AHU C a i x a  4 , 1 9 « l l * l 6 l 5 ;  AHU C a i x a  4 ,  7 « 9 » l 6 l 5 »
T T . L H . 1 2 . f . l 7 5 )
( 4 7 )  APO V I . 1 0 7 8 ;  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  1 1 0
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w h e r e  t h e  v e d o r  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  c o u l d  e x c h a n g e  v i e w s  
o n  p r o b l e m s  o f  f i n a n c e #  I n  1 6 1 9  t h e  k i n g  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h e  c o u n c i l  
t o  b e  e n l a r g e d  t o  a c c o m o d a t e  a  F r a n c i s c a n .  T h e  . j u n t a  c o n t i n u e d  
t o  f u n c t i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  l 6 2 0 * s  a n d  t h e  1 6 3 0 ' s  d u r i n g  w h i c h  
p e r i o d  i t  s o m e t i m e s  a c t e d  a s  a  j u d i c i a l  b o d y .  D u r i n g  t h e  
b r i e f  p e r i o d s  w h e n  t h e  g e n e r a l  t o o k  o v e r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
v e d o r .  a s  i n  1 6 2 6 - 2 7  a n d  1 6 3 1 - 3 3 »  t h e  v e d o r * s  p l a c e  w a s  f i l l e d  
f i r s t  b y  a n  A u g u s t i n i a n  F r .  F r e y  J a c i n t o  d e  J e s u s  a n d  t h e n  b y
( 4 8 )
t h e  v e t e r a n  s o l d i e r  L o u r e n p o  T e i x e i r a  d e  K a c e d o . H o w e v e r , c o n t i n u e d  
d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  v e d o r  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  s h o w  t h a t  
t h e  . j u n t a  t o o  f a i l e d  t o  c o p e  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l  
c o n f l i c t .
I n  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h o s e  a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  p o s t  
o f  f a c t o r  w a s  a  m i n o r  o n e .  T h e  p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
f a c t o r  l a y  i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e  u n d e r  t h e  o v e r a l l  
s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  v e d o r . T h e  f a c t o r ' s  f u n c t i o n s  w e r e  c o n f i n e d  
t o  t h e  d a y - t o - d a y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e m a t t e r s  a n d  t h e  k e e p i n g  
o f  r e c o r d s  a s  t o  t h e  a m o u n t s  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  e a c h  l o c a l  c o l l e c t o r  
w h i l e  t h e  v e d o r  d e t e r m i n e d  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  r e v e n u e .
T h e  f a c t o r  w a s  e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  t h e  r e c o r d i n g  o f  a l l  r e g u l a t i o n s  
s e n t  b y  t h e  k i n g  a n d  t h e  v i c e r o y  a n d  t h o s e  p r o c l a i m e d  b y  t h e  
c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l .  H e a l s o  h a d  m i n o r  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r s .  E a c h  f a c t o r
( 4 8 )  D a  3 5 3 ;  AHU C a i x a  8 ,  2 7 . 1 . 1 6 2 5 ;  T T . L M . 3 0 . f . 2 8 4 v ;
T T . L M . 2 4 . f . 3 4 9 ;  T T . L i - l . 1 2 . f f . 1 1 3 ,  1 7 5 - 7 6 ;  T T . L i - I . 2 2 . f . l 3 v ;
T T . r - i . l 6 . f . 4 0 9 ;  T T . L M . 2 0 . f . 2 2 5 ;  B i iL .K J .  1 9 8 3 .  f .  1 3 6 ;
APO V I . 1185-1186; TT.LM.45.f.355v
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se rv ed  fo r  a th r e e  y e a r  te rm .T h e re  were two f a c to r s  i n  K o tte  
d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d  -  th e  f a c to r  o f  Colombo and th e  f a c to r  o f  
G a lle . There had a ls o  been a f a c to r  i n  Mannar s in c e  th e  
s ix te e n th  c e n tu ry  and w ith  th e  conquest o f  th e  J a f f n a  kingdom 
a n o th e r  such o f f i c e  was c re a te d  to  d e a l  w ith  revenue c o l l e c t io n
(W
i n  Ja ffn a *  Each f a c to r  had a w r i t e r  to  a s s i s t  him*
The o n ly  P o rtuguese  o f f i c i a l  whose fu n c tio n s  were e x c lu s iv e ly  
j u d i c i a l ,  was th e  o u v id o r o r  judge* The ev idence  a v a i la b le
( 4 9 )  P .E .P ie r i s  -  The k i n g d o m  o f  J a f f n a p a t a m *  1 6 4 5 * 2,37;
A s s e n t o s  I .  5 ^ 5  P a n d u r o n g a  S . S . P i s s u r l e n c a r  -  R e g i m e n t o s  d a s  
f o r t a l e z a s  d a  I n d i a *  5 1 1» AHU C a i x a  5»  2 9 * 1 . 1 6 1 8 ;  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  89 
T . A b e y a s i n g h e  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  C o lo m b o  s e r v e d  a s  
t h e  c h i e f  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  ( a l c a i d e  m o r )  a n d  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  o f  
w o r k s  ( v e d o r  d a s  o b r a s )  a n d  s o m e t i m e s  a l s o  a s  t r u s t e e  f o r  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  d e a d  ( p r o v e d o r  d o s  d e f u n c t o s * ) * H e a l s o  s e r v e d  
a s  J u i x  d e  a l f a n d e g a  o r  c h i e f  c u s t o m s  o f f i c e r *
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e  k n o w n  t o  h a v e  s e r v e d  a s  f a c t o r s  o f  C o lo m b o  -
Dom B r a s  V i e r a  d e  H o r a e s  I 6 l 4 - l 6 l 6
F r a n c i s c o  Q u i z a n t e  1 . 1 1 . 1 6 1 9 - 3 1 * 3 « 1 6 2 2
J o a o  d a  C o s t a  1 . 4 . 1 6 2 2 - 3 1 . 1 . 1 6 3 3
J o r g e  d e  A b r e u  1 . 2 * 1 6 2 3  - 3 1 * 5 « l 6 2 6
F r a n c i s c o  f r i s t a o  1 . 6 . 1 6 2 6  - 3 1 * 3 » l 6 2 9
T h o m e  d e  G o u v e a  I 636- I 639
T h e  f a c t o r s  o f  J a f f n a  i n c l u d e d -
A n t o n i o  T e n e l e s  1 0 . 1 6 1 9 - 4 ' . ! 6 3 4
H a n o e l  d e  B a r r o s  4 . l 6 2 4 * - 4 . l 6 2 5
F r a n s i 8 c o  d e  H e l l o  d e  S i l v a  e a r l y  l 6 3 0 f s
3 4 3
does no t p re c ise ly  in d ic a te  the ex ten t o f  h is  ju r is d ic t io n  but
the regimento issued  to  the  vedor Diogo Mendes de B rito  in  1639
indicates th a t  he could no t sentence in  case o f  major crimes
except w ith the  concurrence o f the  cap ta in -g en era l. In  o th er
se ttlem ents o f the Portuguese co lo n ia l empire the  ouvidor’s
powers were u su a lly  r e s t r ic te d  to  the imposing o f f in e s , corporal
punishment and imprisonment fo r  minor o f f i c i a l s .  However during
th is  period  the  ouvidor was responsib le  fo r  the  p relim inary
in v e s tig a tio n s in to  a l l  charges a f te r  which the major cases
were t r ie d  by the cap ta in -genera l and the  ouvidor to g e th e r o r
sen t up to  the .junta in  Ceylon or the relacab  or high court in
Goa. The ouvidor also  c e r t i f i e d  a l l  a f f id a v i ts ,  g ran ts  and
copies o f  th ese  documents. In  1618 th e re  were two &uvidors in
Kotte -  the  ouvidor o f Colombo and the  ouvidor o f th e  conquest
o f Ceylon. On the recommendations o f Jeronimo de B rito , a ju d ic ia l
o f f ic e r  (des embargador) was sen t from Goa to  in v e s tig a te  to
complaints in  Ceylon, the  king in  1620 ordered these  two po sts
(50) (51)
to  be amalgamated. This was done in  1621.In  1617 th e re  was
also an ouvidor in  Mannar and another such o f f i c i a l  was appointed
(50) From I6 l2 - l6 l6  the  two o ff ic e s  had been held by the  dame 
person but the two posts  were regarded as d i s t in c t  ones. The 
bishop o f  Cochin also  recommended the amalgamation bu t th e  
a u th o rit ie s  in  Lisbon had decided on i t  before th e  b ish ip  o f Cochin 
reached th e re . (TT.LM.13.f.253S TT.LM .i6.f.57l)
( 5 1 )  T h e  o u v i d o r  o f  C o lo m b o  a l s o  h e l d  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  m a g i s t r a t e  
o f  t h e  p r o v i n c e s  ( c o r r e g e d o r  d a  c o m a r c a )  a n d  t h e  j u d g e  o f  t h e  
n a t i v e  p e o p l e  C. j u i z  d e  j u r i s d i c a o  d a ^ e n t e  d a  t e r r a ) . I n  c a s e  o f  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  o u v i d o r  t h e  m o s t  s e n i o r  a l d e r m a n  o f  t h e  c a m a r a
Contd.,
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to  Ja ffn a  a f te r  th6 conquest o f  th e  kingdom in  i6 l8 . 3y 1638
(52)
there  was a sepera te  Portuguese m ag istra te  ( .ju iz) in  G alle .
The ouvidor was accountable fo r  h is  ju d ic ia l  functions 
only to  th e  high cour^t a t  Goa. However due to  the  need fo r  a 
close working re la tio n sh ip  w ith the  cap ta in -g en era l, the  
ouvidor o f  Colombo o ften  tended to  be subserv ien t to  him.This 
must have p laced  him in  a ra th e r  awkward p o s itio n  due to  the 
c o n f lic t between the  vedor and the  cap ta in -g en era l, fo r  the  
ouvidor was expected to  render accounts of f in es  imposed and 
co llec ted  by him to  the vedor and he a lso  received  h is  pay 
from him, In  f a c t  d ir e c t  c o n f lic ts  between the vedor and the
(53)
ouvidor are  known to  have occured in  the  ea rly  1620*s .
(51) Contd.,
(vereador mais velhos) o f Colombo took h is  p la ce .
Goa C.Pe As V I I . f f .34-36
(52) T T .L M . 45. f . 3 5 5 v j  AHU Caixa 15, 29,12,1643; AHU G aixa,22, 
4.8.1654; T T .L M . 16.f . 794; C.R.Boxer and C.de Azevedo *
Fort Jesus and th e  Portuguese in  I iombaga, 1593-1729. 4*--44 
The fo ra l  o f  Ja ffn a  (1W5) in d ic a te s  th a t  th e re  was a fixed  
sca le  o f  ju d ic ia l  fees (eg . fanams to  r e g is te r  a p a te n t, two 
fanams to  make an en try  in  the  tombo and to  is su e  a c e r t i f i c a te  
e t c . , )  and th a t  the  ouvidor in  Ja ffn a  had no power to  a c t 
ag a in st revenue c o lle c to rs  ( recebodeg^s) except in  charges 
o f a s s a u lt .  P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f  Jaffhapatam . 1645* 2 ,3 8
( 53) T T .L M . 15. f . 191;  T T .L M . 17. f . 5 9  5 T T .L M . 1 3 .  f . 253 
T T .L 1 1 .1 8 .  f.240v; Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I .  1 1 J2
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The adm in istra tion  o f the  newly acquired t e r i t o r i e s  was
kept separa te  from th a t  o f K otte , p a r t ly  ofcourse due to
geographical reasons but p a r t ly  a lso  as a m atter o f  p o licy ,
fo r the Portuguese had le a rn t  in  K otte th a t  the e x is tin g
adm in istra tive  s tru c tu re  could o ften  be made to  serve th e i r
purposes more oV le s s  s a t i s f a c to r i ly .  The ch ie f  Portuguese
o f f ic e r  in  Ja ffn a  was the  cap ta in - m ajor. He was responsib le  fo r
the defenc®. o f  th e  areas under d ir e c t  Portuguese ru le , namely
the Ja ffn a  pen insu la  i t s e l f ,  th e  ad jacen t is lan d s  and th e
is lan d  o f Mannar. In  the 1620*s the newly constructed  fo r ts  o f
Trincomalee and H attica lo a , more accessib le  from Ja ffn a  than
from K otte, were also  p laced under feis o v e ra ll superv is ion . The
captain-m ajor o f Ja ffh a  was th e o re t ic a l ly  under the  command
of the cap ta in -genera l o f Ceylon b u t, w ith the  exception o f
Constantino de Sa, no cap ta in -g en era l ever v is i te d  Ja ffn a  while
in  o f f ic e  during the twenty one years from 1617-1638. Moreover
the captain-m ajor had the  r ig h t  to  communicate d i r e c t ly  w ith  
(54)
the v iceroy , and was so le ly  responsib le  fo r the g ran t o f
(55)
v il la g e s .
Like the cap tain -general in  K otte, the captain-m ajor 
to
in  Ja ffn a  tended use lo c a l  t r a d i t io n s  connected w ith th e  lo c a l A
ro y a lty  to  enhance h is  p re s tig e  and p o s itio n . He moved about
(54) P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Jaffnaoatam .l ;  Assentos 1 .50; 
APO (New ed) IV.Tomo I I .P a r t  A. 4l$
(55) TT.LM.2 6 .f . 291v
3 4 6
th e  country surrounded by a guard o f e ig h ty  la s c a r in s  and
ten  Portuguese. The bea ting  o f tora-toras announced h is  approach
and l ik e  th e  king o f Ja ffn a  he had the  serv ice  o f two sh ie ld -
bearers (rodeleiros).H ow ever the powers o f th e  captain-m ajor
l ik e  those o f the  cap ta in -genera l were r e s t r i c t e d  in  the  sphere
o f  revenue. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  the f i r s t  captain-m ajor o f Ja ffn a ,
F ilip e  de O liv e ira , not merely had the  r ig h t  to  appoint fcevenue
o f f ic ia l s  but was even au thorized  to  complete the land  r e g is te r
began by the vedor Ambrosio de Fret&h da Camara.However from
th e  o u tse t the  co lle c tio n  of revenue and the disbursement of
expenditure was made the re s p o n s ib il i ty  o f  the fa c to r  in  Ja ffn a
w h o  w o r k e d  under t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  the v e d o r  o f  Beylon. By the
ea rly  1630*s the ad m in istra tio n  o f  Ja ffn a  had been brought
completely in to  l in e  w ith th a t  o f  Kotte by the  sep ara tio n  o f
revenue from o ther aspects o f ad m in is tra tio n . The conde da L inhares,
v iceroy  o f In d ia  (1629-1635) decreed th a t  revenue o f f ic ia l s
( receb^dores) could henceforth  be appointed only by the  v iceroy
of In d ia  or th e  vedor da fazenda o f Ceylon and forbade the
(56)
captain-m ajor to  in te r f e re  in  th e i r  work.
Of th e  working o f the lower reaches o f  the ad m in is tra tio n  
in  Ja ffn a  l i t t l e  evidence i s  a v a ila b le . C iv il ad m in istra tio n  
continued to  be in  the hands o f  the  m udaliyars as in  the  days
(56) P .E .P ie r is -  The kingdom o f  Jaffnapatam .1645. 1; AAsentos I . 50 
TT.LM.4 5 .f . 362-363
l
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of the Tamil k ings. However the mudaliyars having lo s t  th e i r  
b es t lands to  the  Portuguese were never the  power they  had 
been in  the  l a te  s ix teen th  century . For revenue purposes the  
t r a d i t io n a l  four fo ld  d iv is io n s  o f  Valikamam, Vadamarachchi, 
Tenraaradchi and P ach ch ila ip p a la i remained. The is lan d s  o f f  the  
coast were attached  to  th e  proximate revenue d iv is io n  on 
the  mainland. The revenue c o lle c tio n  i t s e l f  was done by means 
o f recebfldores or c o lle c to rs  who had adigars to  a id  them .In the  
l 6 4 0 * s  th e  two province o f  Vadamarachchi and P ach ch ila ip p a la i 
were placed under a s in g le  recebgdor.The o ther provinces had one 
each. These posts were u su a lly  held  by Tamil m udaliyars. The 
land ren ts  o f the Portuguese were co llec ted  by a separa te  £ 
o f f ic ia l  c a lle d  recebedor dos fo ro s .The c o lle c to rs  were paid  
1$ o f the  c o lle c tio n  they  made. They were appointed fo r  l i f e
in  the  years o f  Portuguese ru le  but abuses o f  o f f ic e  soon
compelled the  Portuguese to  l im i t  th e i r  tenure  to  th re e  y ea rs . 
The f i r s t  captain-m ajor, F ilip e  de O liv e ira  had the  r ig h t  to  
appoint c o lle c to rs  but a f te r  him i t  was decided th a t  e i th e r  
the  vedor o f  Ceylon o r the  v iceroy  o f In d ia  should make these  
appointm ents. Like th e  vidanas o f  K otte, the  adigars o f  Ja ffa a  
were revenue c o lle c to rs , not only o f t e r i t o r i a l  areas but o f 
caste  groups. They themselves were sometimes a s s is te d  by cas te
h e a d m e n  c a l l e d  t a l a i y a r s  a n d  p a t t a n g u t t i e s .
( 5 7 )  P .E .P ie r is  -  The k i n g d o m  o f  J a f f n a p a t a m . l ^ ;  S.Navaratnam -  
Tamils a n d  C e y l o n .  1 6 7 - 1 6 8 ;  TT.Ks d a  ^ i v . 7 3 i . f . 3 5 9 v ;
T T .L M .4 5 . f f . 3 6 2 - 3 6 3
( 5 7 )
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The nain land  to  th e  sototh o f th e  Ja ffh a  pen insu la  'too W  * 3 
had some revenue o f f ic ia l s  but except along th e  coast the  
Portuguese never excercised  any re a l  a u th o rity  in  th e  area
(58)
and were content w ith c o lle c tin g  t r ib u te  from th e  lo c a l  c h ie f ta in s .
As in  the  decade preceding 1617, in  the two decades th a t
Ufa
followed th a t  yearAmain co n stru c tiv e  work o f  th e  Portuguese 
addL nistra tive system itfas the making o f the tombos o r land 
reg is te rs .T h e  urge to  make a d e ta ile d  survey o f Ceylon’s 
lands and resources was p rim arily  economic. The Portuguese wished 
to  ob ta in  the  maximum revenue from the  lands they  had subjugated.
In  consonance w ith th e i r  view o f  the  S inhalese and Tamils as 
’tra id o re s  por n a tu reza*the b es t means o f making sure o f 
the maximum revenue seemed to  be to  b u ild  up a d e ta ile d  knowledge 
of the resources o f th e  country fo r  themselves.However i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  r e s i s t  th e  conclusion th a t  tombo making had p o l i t i c a l  
overtones to o . One o f the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  the Portuguese faced 
a f te r  conquering lands in  Ceylon was th e i r  dependence on 
native  o f f ic ia l s  fo r in form ation . This fa c to r  had enabled th e  
disavas in  K otte and th e  m udaliyars in  Ja ffn a  to  in c rease  
th e ir  powers and in fluence  in  the  ea rly  years o f  Portuguese 
ru le . The tombo was thus regarded as a means o f checking and 
even rev e rs in g  th i s  tre n d . This was most successfu l in  th e  case
(53) N allu r, Achchuvely, Hallakam, Sanderupay, A raly, Uduppidy 
and Kachchai according to  Tamil chron ic le  Yalpana Vaibhava 
M alai. (S.Navaratnam -  Tamils and beylon. 167-168)
3 4 9
o f  l a n d  g r a n t s .  I n  K o t t e  f o r  i n s t a n c e  u p  t o  l 6 l 4  m o s t  l a n d s  
w e r e  . g r a n t e d  b y  t h e  d i s a v a s  . A f t e r  1 6 1 4  t h e  . j u n t a  b e c a m e  t h e
(59T~
c h i e f  i n s t r u e m e n t  f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  l a n d s .
B y  t h e  b e g i n i n g  o f  o u r  p e r i o d  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  t h e  t o m b o  
h a d  a l r e a d y  a d v a n c e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  b e y o n d  t h e  e a r l y  e f f o r t s  
o f  J o r g e  F r o l i m  d e  A l m e i d a .  D e  A l m e i d a ’ s  w o r k  t h o u g h  c a l l e d  
a  to m b o  b y  t h e  c o m p i l e r  h i m s e l f  w a s  m o r e  a  f o r a l  o r  r e c o r d  o f  
r e v e n u e .  A p a r t  f r o m  t w e n t y  p o r t s  a n d  c o a s t a l  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  t h e  
o n l y  v i l l a g e s  e n t e r e d  i n  d e  A l m e i d a ' s  w o r k  w e r e  t h e  r o y a l
(6M
v i l l a g e s  o r  g a b a d a g a m .A  l i t t l e  o v e r  t h i r t e e n  y e a r s  l a t e r  t h e  
s e c o n d  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a  o f  C e y l o n  h a d  b e g u n  a  n e w  a t t e m p t  
a t  a  l a n d  r e g i s t e r .  T h i s  w a s  a  m o r e  a m b i t i o u s  v e n t u r e  a n d  a i m e d  
a t  r e c o r d i n g  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e  n u m b e r  a n d  n a m e s  o f  v i l l a g e s ,  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  c u l t i v a b l e  a n d  c u l t i v a t e d  l a n d ,  a n d  t h e  t y p e  o f  
c r o p ,  b u t  e v e n  t h e  a v e r a g e  y i e l d  p e r  a c r e ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
c r a f t s m e n  i n  e a c h  v i l l a g e  a n d  a l l  c u s t o m a r y  d u e s  o w e d  t o  t h e  
k i n g .  T h e  t a s k  w a s  a  m o n u m e n t a l  o n e  f o r  e x i s t i n g  S i n h a l e s e  
r e c o r d s  h a d  t o  b e  t r a n s l a t e d  a n d  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  o f f i c i a l s  o f  
e a c h  a r e a  c o n s u l t e d .  H o w e v e r  d e s p i t e  v a r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  a n d  h i s  w r i t e r  B a l t h e z a r  K a r i n h o  c o m p l e t e d  
t h e  to m b o  i n  t w e n t y  tw o  m o n t h s .  T h e  f o r a l  o r  r e g i s t e r  o f  r o y a l
( 5 9 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  81-83,110-111; T T .L M .2 1 .f . l 4 l  T h e  c a p t a i n -  
g e n e r a l  a s  t h e  d o m i n a n t  v o i c e  i n  t h e  . j u n t a  r e t a i n e d  h i s  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  l a n d  g r a n t s  t o  a  g r o a t  e x t e n t .
(60) T T .M s  d a  L i v .  T om o 6D f f . 3 2 5 - 4 1 1
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r e v e n u e s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  to m b o  w a s  c o m p l e t e d  s i x  m o n t h s  l a t e r
( 61)
o n  6  J u l y  1 6 1 5 .
T h u s  a t  t h e  c o m m e n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
t h e r e  w a s  a l r e a d y  a  f a i r l y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  k i n g d o m  o f  K o t t e .  H o w e v e r  
b e f o r e  l o n g s u g g e s t i o n s  a r o s e  a s  t o  h o w  t o  s u p p l e m e n t ,  r e v i s e  
a n d  e v e n  r e - m a k e  t h e  t o m b o ,O n e  o f  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  to m b o  w a s  t h a t  i t  b e c a m e  o u t  o f  d a t e  s o o n  a f t e r  
i t  w a s  r e c o r d e d .  T h e  to m b o  m e r e l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
e x i s t i n g  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  w a y  i n  w h i c h  
c h a n g e s  i n  l a n d  o w n e r s h i p  o r  i n  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  c u l t i v a t e d  l a n d  
c o u l d  b e  i n s e r t e d  a n d  t h e  to m b o  r e v i s e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y .  I l o r e o v e r  
i n  K o t t e  t h e  r e b e l l i o n  o f  N i k a p i t i y a  ( 1 6 1 6 - 1 6 1 7 )  a n d  t h e  
c a m p a i g n s  o f  M a y a d u n n e  a n d  K u r u w i t a  R a l a  ( l 6 l 6 - 1 6 2 0 )  h a d  c a u s e d  
d e v a s t a t i o n  i n  t h e  i n l a n d  a r e a s .  T h u s  b y  t h e  e a r l y  1 6 2 0 * s  
t h e  d u e s  f i x e d  f o r  m a n y  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e s  h a d  b e g u n  t o  b e  u n r e a l i s t i c .  
O n t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  o t h e r  v i l l a g e s  h a d  g r o w n  i n  s i z e  a n d  
p o p u l a t i o n  b u t  t h e  i n c o m e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e m  b y  t h e  s t a t e  h a d
( 62)
r e m a i n e d  s t a t i c .
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  w e r e  n o w  g e t t i n g  t o  k n o w  t h e
( 6 $ )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  1 2 7 - 1 3 4 ;  AHU C a i x a  4 ,  2 3 . 1 0 j !  1 6 1 5 ;
AHU C a i x a  4 ,  2 0 . l l . l 6 l 5  I n  N o v e m b e r  1 6 1 5  V a z  F r e i r e  w r o t e  t o  
t h e  k i n g  t h a t  t h e  to m b o  c o m p l e t e d  6 n  2 6  J a n u a r y  1 6 1 3  c o v e r e d  
t h i r t y  f i v e  M o r a l e s  a n d  4 , 6 4 0  v i l l a g e s  a s  w e l l  a s  e l e v e n  p o r t s .
I t  w a s  i n s c r i b e d  i n  f o u r  b o o k s  c o n t a i n i n g  1 , 3 3 4  f o l i o s .
( 62) T f . L M . 2 1 . f . l 7 1 ;  I T . C o l i e c a o  d e  S . V i c e n t e  X I X .D o c  2 76
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c o u n t r y  b e t t e r .  V a z  F r e i r e * s  t o m b o  a f t e r  a l l  h a d  b e e n  i n  m a n y
w a y s  a  p i o n e e r  e f f o r t h w i t h  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t i m e  i t  w a s  d i s c o v e r e d
s e t t l e m e n t s
t h a t  m a n y  o f  t h e  s m a l l  g g t t lM a u tg d m  h a d  b e e n  o v e r l o o k e d  b y  t h e  
c o m p i l e r s  o f  t h e  to m b o  a n d  i t  w a s  s o o n  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  
r e v e n u e s  o f  s o m e  v i l l a g e s  h a d  b e e n  g r e a t l y  u n d e r  e s t i m a t e d .
T h i s  w a s  n o t  r e m a r k a b l e  a s  V a z  F r e i r e  h a d  n o t  t h e  t i m e  t o  v i s i t  
e a c h  o f  t h e  s m a l l  v i l l a g e s  s c a t t e r e d  a l l  o v e r  K o t t e .  I n  f a c t  
m u c h  o f  t h e  to m b o  w a s  m a d e  i n  E o lo m b o  a t  t h e  v e d o r * s  r e s i d e n c e  
w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  l o c a l  S i n h a l e s e  o f f i c i a l s  s u m m o n e d  b e f o r e  
t h e  v e d o r . T h e s e  o f f i c i a l s  h a d  m u c h  t o  g a i n  b y  n o t  d i s c l o d i n g  
a l l  s o u r c e s  o f  r e v e n u e  a n d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  o f t e n  h a d  n o  m e a n s  
o f  c h e c k i n g  t h e i r  a c c o u n t s  a s  t h e  o l d  S i n h a l e s e  r e c o r d s  h a d  
i n  m a n y  c a s e s  b e e n  d e s t r o y e d .  W i t h  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  p e a c e  
i n  K o t t e  i n  1 6 2 0  c a m e  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  a w a r e n e s s  o f  w h a t  h a d
( 6 3 )
h a p p e n e d  a n d  a  d e s i r e  t o  r e m e d y  i t  b y  r e v i s i m g  t h e  t o m b o .
Two f u r t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  a  n e w  t o m b o  w e r e  
a d v a n c e d  b y  C o n s t a n t i n o  d e  S a  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  k i n g  d a t e d  
1 D e c e m b e r  1 6 2 3 *  T h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  w a s  p r i m a r i l y  e c o n o m i c .
T h e  f o r a l  o f  K o t t e  m a d e  b y  A n t a o  V a z  F r e i r e  e s t i m a t e d  t h e  f o r o s  
o r  q u i t  r e n t s  d u e  f r o m  l a n d  a t  2 2 , 0 0 0  x e r a f i n s .  O f  t h e  s u m  
4 , 7 0 0  x e r a f i n s  w e r e  d u e  f r o m  P o r t u g u e s e  l a n d h o l d e r s ,  a n d  t h e  
r e s t  f r o m  S i n h a l e s e ,  m o s t l y  l a s c a r i n s .  T h e s e  l a s c a r i n s  h a d
( 6 3 )  T T . L M . l 6 . f f . 2 3 8 . 7 1 7 5  T T . L H . 2 2 . f . 8 8 ;  P . S . P i e r i s  -
T h e  C e y l o n  l i t t o r a l  1 5 9 3 .  6 , 2 2 , 4 7
o r i g i n a l l y  b e e n  p a i d  s o m e  s o r t  o f  s t i p e n d  a n d  t h u s  l i k e  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  h a d  h e l d  l a n d s  o n  c o n d i t i o n  o f  p a y i n g  q u i t  r e n t s .
B y  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
h o w e v e r  t h e  p a y m e n t  t o  l a s c a r i n s  h a d  b e e n  s t o p p e d  d u e  t o  r e a s o n s  
o f  e c o n o m y .T h e  l a s c a r i n s  t h e r e f o r e  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t h e n c e f o r t h  
t h e y  s h o u l d  b e  r e l i e v e d  o f  p a y i n g  d u e s  f o r  t h e i r  l a n d s  w h i c h  
t h e y  n o w  h e l d  i n  l i e u  o f  p a y .  D e S a  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n  
t o  t h i s  d i s o u t e  w a s  t o  m a k e  a  n e w  t o m b o  a n d  r e s u m e  a l l  l a n d s
m
a n d  r e g r a n t  t h e m  o n  m o r e  f a v o u r a b l e  t e r m s  t o  t h e  l a s c a r i n s .
T h e  o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  a d v o c a t i n g  a  n e w  to m b o  w a s  p r i m a r i l y  
m i l i t a r y .  D e  S a  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i n  v iw w  o f  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
r e n e w e d  w a r f a r e  w i t h  K a n d y  t h e  l a s c a r i n s  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  b e s t  
a d v a n t a g e  b y  s e t t l i n g  t h e m  i n  a r e a s  o f  t h e  F o u r  K o r a l e s  n e a r  
C o l o m b o . T h i s ,  i t  w a s  f e l t ^ w o u l d  n o t  m e r e l y  e n a b l e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
t o  p r o v i d e  s e c u r i t y  f o r  t h e  f a m i l i e s  o f  t h e  l a s c a r i n s  w i t h i n  
f o r t i f i e d  p o s t s  n e a r  C o lo m b o  b u t  w o u l d  a l s o  s e c u r e  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  C o lo m b o  a n d  r l a l w a n a  a l o n g  t h e  K e l a n i  v a l l e y .  T h i s  
p l a n  c o u l d  a l s o  h a v e  p r o v i d e d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  w i t h  a  s t r o n g  
f o r e e ,  b a s e d  c e n t r a l l y  a n d  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  m o b i l i s e d  e a s i l y  
w h e n  n e c e s s a r i l y .  T h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  t h a t  t h e  l a n d s  n e a r  C o lo m b o  
w h i c h  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a l l o c a t e d  t o  l a s c a r i n s  w e r e  a l r e a d y  g r a n t e d  
t o  o t h e r s .  D e  S a  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  f e l t  t h a t  a  n e w  to m b o  a n d  a  
g e n e r a l  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  l a n d s  w a s  t h e  o n l y  w a y  t o  o v e r c o m e
C6 * 0  T T . C o l l e c a o  d e  S . V i c e n t e  X IX  Doc.276 ; 
AHU C a i x a  6 ,  13.11.1619
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t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h o u t  u n d u e  b i t t e r n e s s  a n d  r e c r i m i n a t i o n s  
b y  t h o s e  w h o  w o u l d  b e  f o r c e d  t o  e x c h a n g e  v i l l a g e s  i n  t h e
(65)
F o u r  K o r a l e s  f o r  t h o s e  f u r t h e r  a f i e l d .
D e S a * s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a  n e w  t o m b o  i n  K o t t e  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e
s a n c t i o n  f r o m  L i s b o n .  T h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  L i s b o n  w h o  h a d
a s  y e t  n o t  s e e n  V a z  F r e i r e * s  w o r k  w e r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  e m b a r k  o n
( 66)
t h e  e x p e n s i v e  t a s k  o f  r e - m a k i n g  t h e  w h o l e  t o m b o .  S o  t h e  w o r k  o f
t h e  n e x t  t w o  d e c a d e s  i n  K o t t e  w a s  o n e  o f  s u p p l e m e n t i n g  V a z  F r e i r e * s
w o r k  b y  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  s e p a r a t e  v o l u m e s  c o v e r i n g  a r e a s  n e w l y
s u b j u g a t e d  a n d  v i l l a g e s  n e w l y  d i s c o v e r e d .  T h u s  i n  1 6 2 2  t h e
v e d o r  M i g u e l  P i n h e i r o  R a v a s c o  m a d e  a  to m b o  a n d  a  f o r a l  o f  t h e
Two K o r a l e s  c o v e r i n g  a  h u n d r e d  a n d  f i f t y  t h r e e  v i l l a g e s .
H e w a s  a s s i s t e d  Tqy t h r e e  o f  t h e  S i n h a l e s e  o f f i c i a l s  w h o  h a d
a s s i s t e d  i n  V a z  F r e i r e * s  w o r k  *  Dom J e r o n i m o  B a s n a y a k a ,  Dom
(67)
J e r o n i m o  A l a g i y a w a n n a  a n d  Dom  J e r o n i m o  S a m a r a d i w a k a r a . A  f e w  
y e a r s  l a t e r  a n o t h e r  v e d o r  A m b r o s i o  d e  F r a i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  m ad e: a
( 65)  T T . C o l l e c a o  d e  S . V i c e n t a  X IX  276;  T T . L M . 2 2 . f . 8 8
( 66)f AHU C a i x a  8 ,  2 3 . 1 . 1 6 2 5
( 67)  T h e  t o m b o  o f  t h e  Tw o K o r a l e s  i s  p r e s e r v e d  a s  m a n u s c r i p t  
FG 2 6 3 7  a t  t h e  B i b l i o t e c a  N a c i o n a l  i n  L i s b o n  a n d  h a s  b e e n  
t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  E n g l i s h  a n d  p u b l i s h e d  b y  F r .  S . G . P e r e r a .  T h e  
to m b o  c o v e r s  t h e  w h o l e  o f  t h e  M e d a  K o r a l e  a n d  t h a t  p a r t  o f  
X a d a w a t u  K o r a l e  t h a t  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .  I t  a l s o  
i n c l u d e d  t h e  v i l l a g e s  o f  t h e  K a n d a v e l  P a t t u  o f  t h e  A t a k a l a n  
K o r a l e  t h a t  w e r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  t o m b o  o f  V a z  F r e i r e .
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to m b o  o f  v i l l a g e s  d i s c o v e r e d  s i n c e  t h e  d a y s  o f  V a z  F r e i r e ,
w h i c h  c o v e r e d  a n o t h e r  h u n d r e d  v i l l a g e s .  F i n a l l y  A m a ro  R o i z
( v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a  1 6 3 3 - 3 6 ) a d d e d  a n o t h e r  s u p p l e m e n t  c o v e r i n g
t h e  v i l l a g e s  f o u n d  t o  b e  o m i t t e d  f r o m  a l l  f o r m e r  t o m b o s .  T h e
r e g i m e n t o  i s s u e d  t o  t h e  v e d o r  i n  1 6 3 9  r e q u e s t e d  h i m  t o  c o n t i n u e  
( 68)
t h i s  w o r k .  A p a r t  f r o m  t h e s e  w o r k s  i t  i s  k n o w n  t h a t  A m b r o s i o  d e  
F r e i t a s  d a  C a m a r a  m a d e  a  f o r a l  o r  l i s t  o f  r e v e n u e s  o f  a l l
( 6 9 )
t h e  D a s - o d a  v i l l a g e s .  A l l  t h e s e  w o r k s  w e r e  h o w e v e r  m u c h  s m a l l e r
( 7 ) )
i n  s c a l e  t h a n  t h e  m o n u m e n t a l  l a b o u r s  o f  V a z  F r e i r e .
W i t h  t h e  c o n q u e s t  o f  J a f f n a ,  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  to m b o  i n  
t h a t  k i n g d o m  b e c a m e  a p p a r e n t .  I n  t h i s  a r e a  t h e r e  w e r e  t w o  
P o r t u g u e s e  o f f i c i a l s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  r e v e n u e  c o l l e c t i o n  -  t h e  
f a c t o r  o f  M a n n a r  a n d  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  J a f f n a .  T h e  f a c t o r  o f  M a n n a r  
w a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e s  o f  t h e  p e a r l  
f i s h e r y ,  t h e  i s l a n d  o f  K a n n a r  i t s e l f  a n d  t h e  t r i b u t a r y  p a y m e n t s  
f r o m  t h e  a r e a  o n  t h e  m a i n l a n d  o f  f i e y l o n  i m m e d i a t e l y  o p p o s i t e  
t h e  i s l a n d .  T h e  f a c t o r  i n  J a f f n a  w a s  i n  c h a r g e  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  t h e  
r e v e n u e  f r o m  t h e  J a f f n a  p e n i n s u l a  a n d  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  t r i b u t e  f r o m  
t h e  V a n n i  a r e a .  T h e r e  i s  n o  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  f a c t o r  i n  M a n n a r
( 6 3 )  T T .L M . 4 5 .  f .  3 G 4 v ;  T T .L M .4 5 .  f .  3 5 5
( 69) T T .L M . 2 1 .  f .  1 7 5  P a g o d a  v i l l a g e s  o r  v i h a r a g a m  a n d  d g v a l a g a m  
a s  t h e y  a r e  k n o w n  i n  S i n h a l e s e  w e r e  l a n d s  g i f t e d  b y  t h e  k i n g  
a n d  o t h e r  p e r s o n s  t o  t h e  B u d d h i s t  a n d  H i n d u  t e m p l e s .  T h e
k i n g  o f  P o r t u g a l  h a d  o r d e r e d  t h e s e  t o  b e  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  o t h e r  
v i l l a g e s  a n d  u s e d  f o r  t h e  m a i n t a i n e n c e  o f  t h e  ^ a t h o l i c  m i s s i o n a r y  
e f f o r t .  T T . l I s  d a  C a u v e n t o  d a  G r a p a  T om o 6 D . f . 3 3 2
(70) T h e  to m b o  o f  t h e  Tw o K o r a l e s  f o r  i n s t a n c e  c o v e r e d  o n l y  
s e v e n t y  f o l i o  l e a v e s .
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was in  any sense subordinate to  the fa c to r  in  Ja ffn a . In  fa c t 
the former had the r ig h t  (o r perhaps the  duty) to  send rep o rts  
d ire c t ly  to  the v iceroy  regarding the cond ition  of the  lo c a l  
in h ab itan ts  and re la te d  m a tte rs . Both were equally  subordinate 
to the  vedor da fazenda of Ceylon. This perhaps explains why 
the Portuguese sought to  make two separate  tombos -  one fo r  
Mannar and Mantota and the o th e r fo r the Ja ffn a  oeninsu la
(71)
proper.
The making o f a tombo of the  lands o f Mannar and Ilantota 
had been advocated as e a rly  as 1590*s by lla tia s  de Alberquerque,
(72)
viceroy o f In d ia . The work on the  tombo however never a c tu a lly  
got under way. In  June 1620 Lanyarote de Seixas, vedor o f Ceylon 
v is i te d  Mannar and reorganized the co lle c tio n  o f revenue but the
(73)
lands remained u n reg is te red . Seven years l a t e r  when Ambrosio de
F re itas  da Camara was ordered to  take up the  ta sk , he asked
for the  power to  co n fisca te  lands from those who had usurped
possession and also  the r ig h t  to  g ran t such lands to  o th e rs ,
arguing th a t  th is  was the b est means o f d iscovering  hidden
(74)
sources o f revenue. Amaro Roiz i s  known to  have v is i te d  Mannar 
twice -  in  March 1635 and August 1636 but on n e ith e r  occasion 
did he $ have time to  do much more than issu e  a s e r ie s  o f  
reg u la tio n s on the  co lle c tio n  o f revenue and the disbursem ent of
(71)P*E .Pieris -  The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam  1645. 2,37
(72) Panduronga S .S .P issu rle n ca r - Regimentos das fo r ta le z a s  da In d ia .481
(73) AhU 3 5 .f .2 4
(74) TT.LM.2 6 .f . 292v
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(75)
e x p e n s e s .
Probably because i t s  revenues were la rg e r  the  Ja ffn a
peninsula a t tra c te d  more a t te n t io n  than Mannar from the  Portuguese
revenue o ff ic e rs .B a re ly  a few months a f te r  th e  conquest o f
Ja ffna  th e  v icero y ’s council in  Goa agreed th a t  a responsib le
(76)
person should be sen t to  the  area  to  a sc e r ta in  i t s  revenues. 
Accordingly in  June 1620 the  vedor o f Ceylon, de Seixas v is i te d  
Ja ffn a , remained th e re  fo r  a few weeks and made a fo ra l  or
(77)
l i s t  o f dues based on the  inform ation  given by the  lo ca l  m udaliyars. 
However due to  th e  d istu rbed  s ta te  o f the kingdom a t the time 
and the sh o rt period  o f h is  s ta y  the  vedor*s l i s t  could not 
have been e i th e r  d e ta ile d  or complete.
The primary o b jec tiv e  o f the Portuguese in  Ja ffn a  in  the  
ea rly  l620*s was to  provide fo r  i t s  defence. For th is  purpose 
s u f f ic ie n t  revenue to  pay the  soldados and s u f f ic ie n t  land 
av a ilab le  to  a t t r a c t  Portuguese casados x^ere the prim ary requirem ents. 
I t  i s  th e re fo re  no su rp rise  th a t  th e  a u th o r it ie s  in  Goa decided 
th a t  a tombo and fo ra l to  secure these  ends were urgent requirem ents
( 785“
in  Jaffna.T he king o f Portugal had urged the same measure in
(79)
a l e t t e r  dated March 1622. I t  was however not u n t i l  1623 
th a t  th e  f i r s t  p o s it iv e  s tep s in  th i s  d ire c tio n  were taken .
In  th a t  year the  v iceroy  Dom Francisco da Gama, conde de V idiguera
(75) TT.LM.4 1 .f f . 253-254
(76) Assentos 1.113
(77) AHU 35.T .24; TT.LM.18.f . 284
(78) TT.LM.1 5 .f . 45
(79) TT.LM.26.f.291v
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| requested the  then vedor o f  Seylon Anbrosio de F re ita s  da Camara
If
; to  v i s i t  J a f f n a ,  make a  tonbo ®f i t s  la n d s  and a s c e r ta in  w hether
t
!
| th e  expenses o f th e  g a rriso n , the  o f f ic ia l s  and the  m issionary
p r ie s ts  in  Ja ffn a  could be n e t from the  av a ilab le  revenues 
; o f  the province,
Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara a rriv ed  in  Ja ffn a  in  A pril 1623* 
His work however su ffe red  g re a t ly  due to  d isp u tes which sprang 
up between him and F ilip e  de O liv e ira , captain-m ajor o f Uaffna,
De O liv e ira  who by mid 1623 had had almost four years experience 
in  governing Ja ffn a  seems to  have o ffered  much advice th a t  
de F re ita s  was slow to  ap p rec ia te . Koreover de O liv e ira  
being by f a r  the  most pox^erful and feared Portuguese o f f i c i a l  
in  Ja ffn a  seems to  have expected de F re ita s  to  re p o rt to  him
on p ro g re s s  made w ith  th e  tombo, De F r e i ta s  on th e  o th e r  hand
/
held  th a t  h is  o b lig a tio n  was only to  re p o rt to  the v iceroy .
As vedor he in s is te d  on a guard o f la s c a r in s  and Portuguese in  
h is  t r a v e ls  in  the  pen insu la . Two issu es  s tra in e d  th e  re la tio n s  
between the  two o f f ic ia l s  almost to  a breaking p o in t. One was 
the d e s ire  of de F re ita s  to  ob ta in  complete co n tro l over the  
revenue aspects o f  the ad m in istra tio n , This could hard ly  be 
achieved while de O liv e ira  had the r ig h t  to  appoint revenue 
o f f ic ia l s  and had the  so le  power to  a llo c a te  lan d s . De F re ita s  
however t r i e d  h is  b es t by p ro te s tin g  to  the v iceroy  and by 
sending orders to  the fa c to r  o f  tfaffna w ithout consu ltin g  the
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cap ta in -m ajo r*  The o th e r  i s s u e  was th e  re sen tm en t o f  de O l iv e i r a
a t  th e  powers g iv en  to  de F r e i ta s  to  r e p o r t  on m i l i t a r y  q u e s t io n s ,
th e  number o f  tro o p s  r e q u ir e d ,  th e  number, s i z e ,  p o s i t io n
and s t r e n g th  o f  f o r t s  n e c e s sa ry  and th e  l ik e *  The e s s e n t i a l
outcome was t h a t  w h ile  de O liv e ir^ k rg u e d  t h a t  th e  revenue
e s tim a te s  o f  th e  vedor were g r e a t ly  ex ag g era ted  th e  vedor
claim ed t h a t  de O l iv e i r a  had e x p ro p r ia te d  custom ary payments
( 80)
due to  th e  k in g  in s te a d  o f  p ay in g  them to  th e  tre a su ry *
The v ic e ro y  t r i e d  to  in d u ce  a more am icable r e l a t io n s h ip
and on h is  i n s t r u c t io n s  de F r e i t a s ,  who had re tu rn e d  to
Colombo a f t e r  a few months i n  J a f f n a  made a second v i s i t  to
th e  pen in su la*  However as b o th  de O l iv e i r a  and de F r e i ta s
rem ained u n y ie ld in g  th e  e f f o r t  ended w ith  each w r i t in g  to  th e
v ic e ro y  re fu s in g  to  work w ith  th e  o ther*  D esp ite  th e s e  d is p u te s
(81)
however de F r e i ta s  com pleted a tombo and f o r a l  o f  J a f f n a .  Almost 
in e v i ta b ly  th e re  came c r i t i c a l  comments from de O liv e ira *
De O liv e ira * s  c h ie f  o b je c tio n  was t h a t  de F r e i ta s  w ith  a t o t a l  
s ta y  o f  l e s s  th a n  e ig h t  months i n  J a f f n a  had no u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  th e  revenue c o l l e c t io n  i n  th e  a re a .  He argued t h a t  th e  
Tamil documents cou ld  n o t be alw ays r e l i e d  upon, f o r  th e  
w arfa re  o f  th e  p a s t  decade had caused  c o n s id e ra b le  d e s t r u c t io n .
In  su p p o rt o f  t h i s  c o n te n tio n  he p o in te d  o u t t h a t  d u r in g  th e
(8»TT.LH.26.f.293v5 AHU C aixa 9, 2 0 .1 1 .1626
( 81) AHU Caixa 8, 26.1.1625; TT.LH.23.f.93
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t h e  p a s t  f e w  y e a r s  t h e r e  h a d  o f t e n  b e e n  a  s h o r t  f a l l  i n  r e v e n u e
b y  tw o  t h o u s a n d  t o  t h r e e  t h o u s a n d  c r u z a d o s .D e  O l i v e i r a  a l s o
h e l d  t h a t  t h e  c o m m u t a t i o n  o f  c u s t o m a r y  p a y m e n t s  i n  g o o d s  f o r
f i x e d  p a y m e n t s  i n  c a s h  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  h a r d s h i p  a m o n g  t h e  p o o r e r
c l a s s e s .  F i n a l l y  h e  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b u r d e n s
(82)
d o n e  o n  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  m u d a l i y a r s  w a s  u n j u s t .
T h e  v i c e r o y  r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  t h e  a r g u e m e n t s  o f
o n e  w h o  h a d  r u l e d  J a f f n a  f o r  f i v e  y e a r s  a n d  d e c i d e d  i n  v i e w  o f
d e  O l i v e i r a * s  e x c e l l e n t  r e c o r d  t h a t  h e  h i m s e l f  s h o u l d  b e
e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  o f  r e v i s i n g  t h e  t o m b o .  B y  2 0  N o v e m b e r
1 6 2 6  d e  O l i v e i r a  w a s  a b l e  t o  r e p o r t  t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  p r o v i n c e
n o t
( W a l ig a m a m )  w a s  a l r e a d y  d e a l t  w i t h  b u t  i t  i s / k n o w n  ± k a ±  h o w  
m u c h  m o r e  w o r k  w a s  d o n e  b e f o r e  d e  O l i v e i r a  h i m s e l f  d i e d  o n
(83)
2 2  I l a r c h  1 6 2 7 #  T h a t  t h e  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  t o m b o  r e m a i n e d  i n c o m p l e t e  
i s  e v i d e n t  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n  1 S e p t e m b e r  1 6 2 7 *  j u s t  f i v e  
m o n t h s  a f t e r  t h e  d e a t h  o f  d e  O l i v e i r a ,  t h e  v i c e r o y * s  c o u n c i l  
a t  G o a  d i s c u s s e d  w h e t h e r  t o  s e n d  d e  F r e i t a s  b a c k  t o  J a f f n a  
t o  w o r k  o n  i t .  A m b r o s i o  d e  F r e i t a s  h o w e v e r  w a s  a t  t h i s  t i m e  
e n g a g e d  i n  a  d i s p u t e  w i t h  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  d e  S a  a n d  h a d  
l i t t l e  t i m e  t o  s p a r e .  B e i n g  r e l u c t a n t  t o  l e a v e  t h e  f i n a n c e s  o f  
K o t t e  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  f a c t o r  F r a n c i s c o  ' ^ r i s t a o  w h o  w a s  
p r o v i n g  t o  b e  a  p a r t i s a n  o f  d e  S a * s ,  d e  F r e i t a s  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  v e d o r  m a k i n g  a  j o u r n e y  t o  J a f f n a ,  t h e
( 8 2 )  T T .L M .2 3 . f . 2 1 3
( 8 3 )  ENL F G . ’ l 9 3 3 . f . ^ 5 ;  3 5 - 8 5 b ;  T T .L M . 2 2 .  f f . l i v , 3 8 v , l l M 3 2 ;
T T .L M .2 5 . f . 2 6 ? ;  T T .L M . 2 6 . f . 3 3 5
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m u d a l l y a r s  o f  t h e  n o r t h e r n  k i n g d o m  b e  r e q u e s t e d  t o  j o u r n e y
t o  C o lo m b o  a n d  H a l w a n a  t o  a i d  t h e  v e d o r  i n  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  t h e
t o m b o .H e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  m e a n w h i l e  P o r t u g u e s e  c o u l d  b e  a p p o i n t e d
b y  t h e  v e d o r  t o  t h e  p o s t s  o f  v i d a n a  o r  a d i g a r  t o  f i n d  o u t  m o r e
a b o u t  t h e  r e v e n u e s .  L a n j a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s ,  t h e  n e w  c a p t a i n - m a j o r
o f  J a . f f n ^ g r e e d  t o  t h e s e  s u g g e s t i o n s  b u t  d u e  t o  t h e  b i t t e r
p e r s o n a l  d i s p u t e  t h a t  d e v e l o p e d  b e t w e e n  d e  S a  a n d  d e  F r e i t a s
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  w a r  w i t h  K a n d y  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t
d i s t u r b e d  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  J a f f n a  t h e  w o r k  o f  r e g i s t e r i n g  l a n d s
a n d  r e v i s i n g  t h e  t o m b o  w a s  f u r t h e r  p o s t p o n e d .  I n  J u n e  1 6 3 0
d e  F r e i t a s ,  f i n a l l y  r e m o v e d  f r o m  o f f i c e  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  d i s p u t e s
w i t h  d e  S a ^ w a s  r e q u e s t e d  t o  p r o c e e d  t o  J a f f n a  a n d  c o m p l e t e  t h e
t o m b o .  b u t  a d  h e  d i d  n o t  r e m a i n  v e r y  l o n g  i n  J a f f n a  i t s e l f ,
i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  h e  c o m p l e t e d  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  r e v i s i n g  t h e
(8*0
to m b o  d u r i n g  t h i s  t h i r d  a n d  f i n a l  v i s i t  o f  h i s  t o  t h e  a r e a .
H a r d l y  t h r e e  y e a r s  a f t e r  d e  F r e i t a s  h a d  l e f t  t h e  i s l a n d  
t h e  n e w l y  a p p o i n t e d  v e d o r  o f  C e y l o n  A m a ro  R o i z  w a s  r e q u e s t e d  
b £  t h e  v i c e r o y  t o  m a k e  a  t o m b o  o f  t f a f f n a . C e r t a i n l y ^ b y  t h i s  
t i m e  t h e r e  w e r e  v e r y  s t r o n g  r e a s o n s  f o r  m a k i n g  a  n e w  l a n d  
r e g i s t e r .  A f t e r  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  r u l e  m u c h  o f  t h e  
l a n d  h a d  p a s s e d  i n t o  t h e  h a n d s ^  o f  t h e  c o n q u e r o r s .  T h e  K a n d y a n  
i n v a s i o n  o f  1 6 2 8  a n d  t h e  r i s i n g  o f  t h e  T a m i l s  t h a t  f o l l o w e d  
h a d  a c c e l l e r a t e d  t h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t .  M o r e o v e r  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  J a f f n a  w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  e v e r ,  f o r
( 8 * 0  T T .U s  d a  L i v .  7 3 1 . f . 3 5 9 v ;  E N L . F G r  1 9 8 2 . f f .  1 ^ 7 , 1 5 ^ v ;
A j u d a  5 1 - V I I I - 5 1 # f . * * 0 ;  S i m a n c a s  SP  1 5 2 2 . f . 2 0 ;  T T .L M .4 0 . f . 3 4 5 ;
T T . L M . 2 6 . f . 2 9 0
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w i t h  t h e  d e a t h  o f  F i l i p e  d e  O l i v e i r a  a n d  L a n y a r o t e  d e  S e i x a s  
t h e r e  w e r e  f e w  P o r t u g u e s e  l e f t  w i t h  a  t h o r o u g h  k n o w l e d g e  
o f  t h e  J a f f n a  k i n g d o m ,
N e v e rth e le ss  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  one o f  th e  rea so n s  f o r
th e  v ic e ro y * s  d e s i r e  to  r e g i s t e r  th e  la n d s  o f  J a f f n a  may have
been th e  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  th e  o ld  tombo by a c c id e n t o r  d e s ig n .
No s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r ^  d o c u m e n t  d a t e d  l a t e r  t h a n  1 6 3 0  r e f e r s  t o  
t h e  to m b o  m a d e  b y  d e  F r e i t a s .  A m a ro  R o i z  i n  a  r e p o r t  d a t e d  
3 0  N o v e m b e r  1 6 3 7  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  s o u r c e s  f o r  h i s  l a n d  r e g i s t e r  
w e r e  t h e  o l d  T a m i l  o l a  d o c u m e n t s ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  
t h e  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  o p i n i o n s  g i v e n  b y  P o r t u g u e s e  w h o  k n e w
t h e  a r e a .  T h e  r e p o r t  m a d e  n o  r e f e r e n c e  a t  a l l  t o  a n y  p r e v i o u s
(85)
t o m b o .
T h e  w o r k  o n  t h i s  n e w  to m b o  w a s  o r g a n i s e d  m e t h o d i c a l l y  
b y  R o i z .  R o i z  s p e n t  t h e  w h o l e  o f  h i s  f i r s t  v i s i t  t o  J a f f h a ,  
l a s t i n g  s e v e n  m o n t h s  f r o m  M a r c h  t o  O c t o b e r  1 6 3 5 *  c o l l e c t i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  h i s  l a n d  r e g i s t e r . D u r i n g  h i s  s e c o n d  v i s i t  f r o m  
A u g u s t  1636 t o  J a n u a r y  1637* h e  e n l i s t e d  t h e  a i d  o f  L o p o  G o m e s  
d e  A b r e u ,  t h e  c a p t a i n - m a j o r  o f  J a f f h a  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  m a k i n g  o f  
t h e  r e g i s t e r  i t s e l f .
T o  A m a ro  R o i z  t h e  t o m b o  w a s  n o t  m e r e l y  a  r e c o r d  t h a t  
w o u l d  e n s u r e  a n  a c c u r a t e  e s t i m a t e  o f  r e v e n u e s  d u e .  I t  w a s  b y  
r e a s o n  o f  i t s  s t a t i n g  e x a c t l y  w h a t  w a s  d u e  a n d  e x p e c t e d  f r o m
(85) TT.LM.in.ff.253-255
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th e  v i l l a g e  ho lder*  a sa fe g u a rd  a g a in s t  e x c e ss iv e  demands upon
th e  su b jec t*  Thus h i s  tombo s p e c i f ie d  n o t m ere ly  th e  names o f
th e  h o ld e rs  o f  la n d s ,  th e  n a tu re  and e x te n t  o f  th e s e  la n d s
and th e  dues owed to  th e  k in g  b u t th e  r e g u la t io n s  o a ssed  by
(36)
P o rtu g u ese  a u th o r i t i e s  on m a tte rs  r e l a t i n g  to  rev en u e .R o iz
in te n d e d  t h a t  t h i s  tombo sho u ld  e v e n tu a l ly  be t r a n s l a t e d  I n to
T am il, to  be used  as a gu ide  by th e  l o c a l  revenue c o l l e c t o r s .
The tombo i t s e l f  was made up o f  s i x  volum es, two o f
w hich covered Waligamam. Each o f  th e  o th e r  th r e e  p ro v in ce s
T enm aratch i, iJadam aratchi and P a c h c h ila p p a la i  were r e g i s te r e d
s ix th
in  a s e p e ra te  volum e. The arioc volume c o n ta in e d  a r e g i s t e r  o f
la n d s  o f  a l l  th e  is la n d s  o f f  th e  J a f f n a  p e n in s u la .  The la n d s
o f  th e  Vanni and o f  Mannar and M antota were n o t r e g i s te r e d .
A f o r a l  based  on t h i s  tombo was a ls o  begun by R oiz b u t was
l e f t  in c o m p le te . The o u tb reak  o f  war w ith  Kandy i n  1638 and
Dutch in te r v e n t io n  i n  uey lon  i n  th e  same y e a r  d e lay ed  th e
com pletion  o f  t h i s  ta s k  t i l l  1645 when th e  f o r a l  o f  fra ffn a  was
com pleted under th e  d i r e c t io n  o f  Dora F i l ip e  M ascarenhas.
t h i s  tim e  i t  had become th e  d u ty  o f  th e  vedor o f  Ceylon and
(8?)
th e  f a c to r  o f  J a f f n a  to  keep th e  tombo up to  d a te .
( 86) For in s ta n c e  th e  r e g u la t io n s  re g a rd in g  th e  monopoly o f  
e le p h a n ts  were a l l  re c o rd e d .
( 87) TT.LM.41 . f f . 253-255; TT.LM. 45 . f .3 6 lv ;  T T .L l-i.43 .f.91;
TT.LM. 4 0 .f f . 3 1 ,9 5 ; TT.LM. 39. f .3 1 ;  TT.LM. 44. f .2 3 0 v
The f o r a l  o f  J a f f n a  i s  p re se rv e d  as cod ice  220 o f  th e  A rchivo 
i i i s to r ic o  U ltra ra a rin o , L is b o n .I t  has been summarizerf by 
P .E .P ie r i s  -  The kingdom o f  Ja ffn ap a tam  1645.
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T o  c o n c l u d e  t h e  s u r v e y  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n
C e y l o n  tw o  m o r e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  T h e  c a r a a r a
o r  m u n i c i p a l  c o u n c i l  o f  C o lo m b o  a n d  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a r n g i  -jorte£t
A l t h o u g h  t h e  e a r l i e s t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a  m u n i c i p a l  c o u n c i l  o f
C o lo m b o  o c c u r s  i n  1 5 3 0  t h e r e  a r e  r e a s o n s  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e /
c a n a r a  o f  C o lo m b o  w a s  o r g a n i s e d  a s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  b o d y  e v e n  e a r l i e r .
I n  f a c t  i t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  C o lo m b o  f o r m e d
s u c h  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  n o t  l o n g  a f t e r  t h e  a b a n d o n m e n t  o f  K o t t e  
( 3 3 )
i n  1 5 6 5 «  I n  t h e  l a s t  t w o  d e c a d e s  o f  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  n o t
o n l y  t h e  l o c a l  m o n a r c h  Dora J o a o  D h a r m a p a l a  b u t  e v e n  o f f i c i a l s
o f  t h e  k i n , o f  P o r t u g a l  r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  e x i s t a n c e  o f  s u c h  a  
( 3 9 )
b o d y .  H o w e v e r  i t  w a s  n o t  u n t i l  t h e  d i r e c t  a n n e x a t i o n  o f  K o t t e
t h a t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  C o lo m b o  a p p l i e d  f o r  a  c h a r t e r  o f  p r i v i l e g e s .
P o r t u g u e s e  c o l o n i a l  s e t t l e z n e n t s  i n  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y
r e c e i v e d  tw o  t y p e s  o f  c h a r t e r s .  L a r g e r  a n d  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t
s e t t l e m e n t s  l i k e  G o a  o b t a i n e d  t h e  p r i v i l e g e s  o f  L i s b o n .  S m a l l e r
s e t t l e m e n t s  l i k e  H a c a o  a n d  C o c h i n  w e r e  a w a r d e d  t h e  m o r e  l i m i t e d
( 9 0 )
p r i v i l e g e s  o f  E v o r a .  T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  C o lo m b o  a s p i r e d  o n l y  t o  
g a i n  t h e  l a t t e r .  T h e  p r o v i n c i a l  g r a n t  o f  t h e s e  p r i v i l e g e s  b y  Ifa 
v y c e r o y s  A y r e s  d e  S a l d a n h a  a n d  A f f o n s o  d e  C a s t r o  a p p a r e n t l y
( 8 8 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  9 3 ;  E v o r a  C - V / 2 - 2  f f . 2 1 6 - 2 2 1
( 89) T . A b e y a s i n g h e  9 ^ ;  AHU C a i x a  6 ,  1 0 . 1 1 . l 6 l 8
( 9 0 )  C .R .B O x e r  -  P o r t u g e s e  s o c i e t y  i n  t h e  t r o p i c s .
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lapsed due to  lack o f  confirmation by the king. The p e titio n
o f the camara in  the 16209s also  had no appreciable e f fe c t .
However in  the early  16309 s the conde de Linhares, viceroy
of India,probably influenced by the sa c r if ic e s  made by the
Portuguese casados in  the war against Kandy once more granted
the p riv ileg es o f  Evora to  Colombo. This grant was f in a l ly
(91)
confirmed by the king in  1641.
No d irect evidence e x is ts  on the composition o f the
senate o f  the council ( senado da camara). However from the
signatures o f  the p etitio n s  forwarded by the council i t
appears that there were s ix  regular members apart from the
escrivao or w riter . I t  seems reasonable to  assume that in
Colombo as in  Macao these s ix  o f f ic ia ls  consisted o f three
vereadores or aldermen elected  b£ the c itiz en sa , two ju izes
ordinarios or m agistrates and the procurador or procurator.
Elections to  the camara were annual and involved a complicated
(92)
system o f b a llo t  and lo t .  The w riter o f  the camara o f Colombo
(93)
was appointed for l i f e .
Disputes between the camara and the ch ie f adm inistrative
(91) AHU 210.f.257v-258; AHU 2 1 1 .f .l3 0 ;  TT.LM. 18 .f .2 4 lv  
TT.LM. 55. ^ 2 3
(92) AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 5, 22.10.1617*
AHU Caixa 6,21.11.1618; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644; TT.LM.4 3 .f.l8 6 v ;  
Filmoteca LM 14.115/1-2; C.E.Boxer -  Portuguese so c ie ty  in  
the trop ics -5-7» 45 
T933” Filmoteca LM.14 6/2
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o f f ic ia ls  were by no means rare. They were usually  the resu lt  
o f the attempt o f  a vedor to  impose some dues on the casados 
o f Colombo or the attempt o f the camara i t s e l f  to  spear-head
(955—
opposition to  an unpopular general. However the lack  o f a 
charter o f  p r iv ileg es  crippled the camara. Thus when 
Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira arrested the o f f ic ia ls  o f  the camara 
and sent them to  Goa in  161? for t r ia l  they could only plead 
for a pardon as they had no le g a l status and therefore no
(95)
ju d ic ia l immunity. Nevertheless the lack o f  a formal charter
did not prevent the camara o f  Colombo from exercising many
o f the r igh ts i t  claimed. The o f lc ia U  da camara could and did
correspond d ire c tly  with the king. They co llec ted  revenues
due from municipal lands and provided public f a c i l i t i e s  with
(96)
the funds thus obtained.
During the l620*s and 1630*s there was l i t t l e  change in
the council• e power and in fluence. Already in  1618 the council
had obtained an order from the king s p e c if ic a lly  forbidding the
captain-general to in terfere  with the administration o f the c ity ,
^  di^
In 1623 follow ing representations by Fernao^Albuquerque and
(9*0 These factors explain the councilfs clashed with vedor 
Vaz Freire and captain-general Manoel Mascarenhas Homera,
Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira and Jorge de jtlbe^querque. There were 
no recorded disputes in  the times o f Azevedo or de Sa,
DR 111.398; DR IV.46-47,3555 APO V I.114751218,1220-1221;
TT.LM. 16. f .  582
(95) TT.Corpo chronologlco part I«maco 116 doc.87; a i w m  xtrffift
(96) TT.LM. 18 .ff,240v-241v; TT.LM. 19.f.2*fv; TT.LM. 12 .f . 134;
Simancas SP. 1473. f .  539
The h e c e ss it ie s  given p r io r ity  were the making o f  a storehouse 
for p so v is io n s , a slaughter house for the supply o f meat, a 
new building for the camara and a j a i l .
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h is son Jorge de Albuquerque, the governor o f  India and 
the captain-general o f  Ceylon resp ective ly , the king forbade 
the camara to  issu e  testim onials o f  merit for serv ices rendered 
to the crown. However in  practice th is  prohibition  seems to  
have had l i t t l e  e f fe c t  for such testim onials were issued  
even as la te  as i630. The camara had no statutory duty to  
advice the captain-general on matters o f  p o licy  but in  times 
o f c r is is  such as 1617 and 1638 the captain-general invariably
(97)
consulted the camara to  obtain advice and support.
The revenue o f the camara was obtained p artly  by renting  
some o f the ferr ie s  across the Kelanl river w ithin a few 
m iles o f  Colombo, In January 1607 Azevedo had granted to the
council the revenues from a l l  ferr ies  within the lim its  o f
(98)
the city,Up to the la te  1620*s however, only three o f  the four 
ferr ies  so granted were handed over to  the council as a 
Portuguese s e t t le r  fernao Sanches had su ccessfu lly  asserted h is
(99 )
rights to  the ferry a t Wattala, Apart from th is  revenue i t  i s  
p ossib le that the camara gained some income from the rents o f  
municipal property, taxes on non-staple food and fin es  imposed
( 100)
on those who v io lated  municipal regulations. However, the bulk
(97) T,Abeyasinghe 98; DR IV.355; APO VI.1147; TT.LM. 16 .f f ,  118, 
582; TT.LM.17.f.l2
From the correspondence and records o f  the membership o f  the 
camara i t  appears l ik e ly  that i t  was a body representing the 
Portuguese s e t t le r  in te r e s ts .
(98) T. Abeyasinghe 95-96
(99) TT.LM.21,f,133; Filmoteca LM 12. 1/2-35 TT.LM.2 4 .f . 450;
AHU Caixa 4 , 2 .1.1616
( 1 0 0 )  C.R.Boxer -  Portuguese so c ie ty  in  the trop ics - 1 0
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o f  i t s  Income must have been derived from the right to  
esport forty  bahars o f  cinnamon#
This • lib e r ty 1 was one which the Portuguese casados had 
obtained from the la s t  Sinhalese king o f  Kotte* Dom Joao 
Dharmapala# The orig in a l purpose o f  the grant was that money
i
derived from the sa le  o f  cinnamon should be d istributed  among 
( 101)
the poorer se ttler s#  This continued undisturbed under Portuguese
rule t i l l  1614# The establishment o f  the monopoly o f  the production
and sa le  o f  cinnamon in  that year struck at th is  lu cra tive
source o f  revenue for the camara# I t  was e f fe c t iv e ly  argued
that tfcre c i ty ’s ’l ib e r ty 1 should be abolished as any relaxation
o f the monopoly o f cinnamon wpuld defeat i t s  very purpose -
the maximization o f  royal revenue by control o f  i t s  supply#
The council was therefore compelled to find reasons to  ju s t i fy
the continuance o f these grants# In  response to  the p etitio n s
o f th e  cam ara/the k ing  on 14 February 1615 requested  th a t  th i s
(102)
question be examined by the junta in  Ceylon* The recommendations 
o f the junta are not known^  but i t  i s  clear that desp ite the 
monopoly the camara continued to  c o lle c t  and s e l l  forty  bahars 
o f cinnamon annually t i l l  1619* In  1619 Lan?arote de Seixas* 
the vedor ^ forbade th is  practice on the grounds that i t  was
(101) T*Abeyasinghe 94* AHU Caixa 6* 1 0 .1 1 .l6 l8
(102) DR 11.224; TT.LM. 15 .f .  182; AHU Caixa ?t 11.2.1622; 
TT.Collecao de S.Vicente XIX doc.144
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contrary to the v iceregal order enforcing the monopoly i f
(103)
cinnamon and moreover reduced royal revenue* At th is  stage
the c ity  council brought in  a new issue* I t  was pointed out
that the settlem ent in  Colombo was growing rapidly and was
s t i l l  without many basic public f a c i l i t i e s ,  ikkw k  parity As
the revenues o f  the camara apart from those derived from
cinnamon were very small i t  was held that only the restoration
o f the permission to export forty  bahars o f  the product would
provide necessary funds* Fernao de Alb«?querque, the Portuguese
governor a t Goa s t i l l  did not favour the request o f  the
(104)
camara and I t  was only a fter  the camara obtained the support 
o f  h is successor the conde de Vidiguera that the king agreed
(105)
in  January 1624 to restore th is  f lib e r ty  *• A year la te r  however
he q u a lified  th is  grant*On 26 March 1625 he ordered that
a l l  revenue from th is  source should in  future be used for the
(106)
fo r t if ic a t io n  o f  Colombo* This requirement was adhered throughout 
the next f if t e e n  years, the cinnamon revenue being used to
(107)
rebuild w a lls , cast ft a r t i l le r y  and buy arms. In the 1640* s
(103) Filmoteca Reis Vizinhos I* 40/5 5 TT.LM.18 * .f f . 240-241
(104) The governor *s opposition to  the grant was perhaps 
influenced by the camarAs vociferous opposition to  h is  
sonfs rule in  Ceyloiu ?AHU Caixa 7 ,  11*2*1622)
(105) TT.LM. 18*ff*240-24lv; TT.LM. 19.f .2 4 v
(106) TT.LM. 21. f f .  131,159; Simancas SB. 1519.f.25v;
AHU Caixa 8, 15, 12.1625
(107) Filmoteca LM 19A. 22/2-3
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in  view o f  the Dutch threat the grant was increased to  one
( 108)
hhndred bahars o f  cinnamon a year#
The camara in  the 1620*8 and 1630*8 appeared to  champion
the in te re sts  o f  the married Portuguese s e t t le r s  in  the
island# This i s  best seen in  the dispute over the payment o f
customs dues# On 3 October 1584- king Dom Joao Dharmapala had
granted the Portuguese casados and th e ir  descendents freedom
from the payment o f  customs dues at Colombo# In 1597 follow ing
a request b y  the casados to confirm th is  grant the viceroy
Dom Francisco da Gama agreed to  respect th is  privilege#
However when the camara asked that th is  p r iv ileg e  be confirmed
by the king in  I6 l29 the au thorities in  Lisbon decided against
it#  Nevertheless for some unknown reason the king*s orders 
(109)
were not executed# In the 1620* s when the growth o f  the number 
o f Portuguese s e t t le r s  began to  have increasingly  harmful 
e ffec ts  on customs revenues in  Colombo the issu e  was revived  
again# B y the end o f 1624> the conde de Vidiguera, viceroy o f  
India had instructed  the vedor o f Ceylon to apply the exem ption  
from customs dues only in  the case o f casados who had actu a lly  
helped King Dharmapala# The descendents o f  these casados
-tr
were also  en tit led  to  th is  p r iv ileg e  but only i f  they coninued
A
(108) TT.LM.57 .f . 1^5
(109) Da H I . 224; AHU Caixa 4 , 2.1.1616; AHU Caixa 3, 20.10.1613  
Filmoteca LM 12. 1/2-3
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to reside in  Colombo. A ll new s e t t le r s  thus lo s t  the p r iv ileg e
o f exemption from customs dues. This decision  was confirmed
in  an assento or resolution  o f the conselho da fazenda at
( 110)
Goa on 17 March 1625# When th is  matter was put before the
king in  1627 he la id  down two p rin cip les that were to  guide
the settlem ent o f  the is su e . F ir s t ly , no one was to  have
complete exemption from customs dues. Secondly, some concession
in  the form o f  payment o f lower duties might be allowed
to those who had h itherto b e n e f ite d  by King Dharmapala's
(111)
grant. However, no such settlem ent seems to  have been arrived  
a t. During the viceroyalty  o f the conde de Linhares (1629- 
1^35)» the guiding prin cip le remained the assento o f 17 March 
1625. Meanwhile the camara continued i t s  e f f o r t s  to secure 
the grant o f  th is  p r iv ileg e  to  a l l  Portuguese s e t t le r s  o f  
Colombo. The council eventually achieved success in  the early  
1640's .  With the arr iva l o f  the Dutch in  Ceylon i t  was 
rea lised  that Portuguese strength in  the islan d  had to  be 
maintained at a l l  cost and for th is  greater inducement to  
p otentia l s e t t le r s  was one n ecessity . This was a l l  the more so
(110) Panduronga S.S.P issurlencar -  Repjmentos das forta lezas  
da India, 510; TT Ms da Convento da Graca. tomo 6D. 328-329; 
BNL.FG 1983 .ff 62v-63j Filmoteca LM.19D. 101/3-4
(111) AHU 285 .f . 70 ;; TT.LM.2 4 .f . 375
in  an age when w arfare lim ite d  revenue from land* Thus on
5 March 164*3 the  conselho da fazenda decided th a t  a l l  s e t t l e r s
( 112)
in  Colombo should be allowed exemption from customs dues*
The camara achieved a sw if te r  v ic to ry  in  i t s  e f fo r ts  
to  ob ta in  favoured r ig h ts  fo r  th e  casados who held  garden 
lands in  th e  environs o f  Colombo* The r ig h ts  o f  th e  s e t t l e r s  
to  th ese  lands dated from the days o f Azevedo, who  ^when 
captain-general^ordered  th e  s e t t l e r s  to  take possession  o f 
and c u lt iv a te  th e  waste lands around th e  city*  By th e  time 
Vaz F re ire  began making h is  tombo th e  s e t t l e r s  had held  
these  lands fo r  years w ithout paying any dues* Vaz F re ire  
wished to  impose th e  standard q u it  re n t od 12$ $ o f revenue 
on th ese  lands or f a i l in g  th a t  a t  l e a s t  the  ta x  on coconut 
palms (pol aya) ♦ However* as a r e s u l t  o f rep re sen ta tio n s  made 
by th e  council which also  held some o f th ese  lands in  i t s  
corporate cap ac ity , o rders were sen t from Lisbon in  th e
(113)
16209 s g ran tin g  th ese  lands i n  p e rp e tu ity  fre e  o f a l l  dues*
The l a s t  branch o f th e  ad m in istra tio n  which has to  
be d iscussed , th e  m ainstay o f Portuguese ru le  in  Ceylon, i s  
the  armed forces* Of th ese  fo rces the  naval arm i s  le s s  w ells  
known, bu t i t s  ro le  was v i t a l  and i t  w i l l  bejJ t r e a te d  f i r s t*
(112) AHU 210*f.257v; TT.LM. 52. f . 73
(113) T.Abeyasinghe 96-97$ AHU 31.ff*197v-198 ; Simancas 
SP 1473.f . 539; BR V.366
While th e  army secured e f fe c tiv e  possession  o f th e  lands and 
revenues o f K otte and Ja ffn a , th e  Portuguese naval fo rces 
ensured th a t  the  communications and supply rou tes to  Goa 
and o th e r p a r ts  o f  th e  estado da In d ia  remained open* At l e a s t
once w ith in  our period  -  in  1630 -  Portuguese naval s tren g th
..
saved 'them a f te r  th e i r  army had been d isa s tro u s ly  defeated*
The ro le  o f  th e  navy in  Ceylon however, was no t confined 
to  conveying supp lies and reinforcem ents and p ro tec tin g  
Portuguese tra d e , im portant though these  functions were*
Naval power gave th e  Portuguese army in  Ceylon g re a te r  
m ob ility  and enabled i t  to  take the  enemy unawares* This 
was b es t seen in  1630-31 when th e  Portuguese were confined 
to  a few co a s ta l p o rts  in  Kotte* S urprise  a ttack s  by sea 
on u n fo r t i f ie d  fo r ts  and v illa g e s  held  by th e  Sinjfcalese no t 
on lt| enabled them to  d e l iv e r  t e l l i n g  blows upon th e i r
r  a * 1*)
opponents, but a lso  secured q u a n ti t ie s  o f much needed provisions* 
De Sa*s r e l i e f  o f B a ttica lo a  in  1628 provided another in s tan ce  
o f th e  use o f  sea power in  campaigns A in  Ceylon* F in a lly , 
naval power enabled th e  Portuguese to  blockade Kandy during 
years o f  war and cu t o f f  her tra d e  amd communications w ith 
powers ou tside  the  island*  Even during years o f peace th e  
kingd o f  Kandy d id  no t f in d  communications w ith th e  Dutch
(114) AHU Caixa 23, 26*1*1655
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an easy ta sk  due to  Portuguese co n tro l o f  th e  seas around 
Ceylon.
The only reg u la r  naval fo rce  s ta tio n e d  in  Ceylon in  th e
f i r s t  four decades o f  th e  seventeenth  century  was th e  one
used to  guard the  p e a r l  f ish e ry  and blockade the  ea s te rn
coast in  tim e o f war. This f l e e t  was o r ig in a l ly  s ta tio n e d  a t
Mannar and numbered only  th ree  v esse ls  in  the  e a r ly  seventeenth
(115)
cen tury . Soon a f te r  1605 however, when th e  Portuguese decided
on an in te n s if ie d  economic blockade o f  Kandy,the number o f 
m r i l  v esse ls  was increased  to  s ix  o f  which th re e  were to
( 116)
remain a t  Mannar. The two d u tie s  o f guarding th e  p e a r l f ish e ry  
and o f blockading the  ea s te rn  coast d id  not d a s h  w ith each 
o th er fo r  th e  normal period  o f tra d in g  a c t iv i ty  in  th e  ea s te rn  
coast o f  Ceylon was from March to  November w hile th e  p ea rl 
f ish e ry  was u su a lly  hald  in  February-March. In  any event 
the  p e a r l f ish e ry  was not held between 1604 and 1634. In  th e  
1620*s th i s  f l e e t  was made more e f fe c tiv e  by th e  * a v a i la b i l i ty  
o f two more bases a t  frincom alee and B attiw aloa. The only o th e r 
s ta te  owned v esse l which was based on Ceylon was a r iv e r - c r a f t  
on th e  K elani which was used to  tra n sp o r t supp lies  from
(117)
C o lo m b o  t o  M a l w a n a .
(115) DK 1*10; In  1571 however th e re  were te n  v esse ls  guarding 
th e  p e a r l f ish e ry . By 1574 the  number had f a l le n  to  e ig h t.
(Ajuda 51-V-36.f.375 S tud ia Vol.IV. 264)
(116) DR I .  58-59, 113,138
(117) APO (New ed) Tomo IV.Rxxfc V o l.II  P a r t  I .  385
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The p o te n tia l  s tren g th  o f  Portuguese naval power in
(118)
Ceylon however was by no means lim ite d  to  th is  f l e e t .
Many o f  th e  casados in  Ceylon owned armed v esse ls  ranging 
from fo r ty  to  a hundred tons which were used in  co a s ta l 
tra d e . As a t  Goa, these  v esse ls  were sometimes re q u is itio n e d  by 
the  Portuguese a u th o r it ie s  fo r  use in  m il i ta ry  exped itions.
The expedition  to  Ja ffn a  in  1619 saw th e  r e q u is i t io n  o f  two 
such v e s se ls . De Sa in  1628 no doubt re so r te d  to  th e  dame 
expedient when he a rr iv ed  a t  G alle  on h is  way to  re lie v e  
B a ttic a lo a . One cannot be c e r ta in  whether th e  v esse ls  based 
on Ceylon, s ta te  o r p r iv a te  owned, used fo r  m il i ta ry  o r 
commercial purposes, were a c tu a lly  b u i l t  in  th e  is la n d  o r n o t. 
Shipbuild ing had been c a rr ie d  out in  the  p o rts  o f K otte in  
the  s ix teen th  century . In  1614 however, th e  k ing  o f  P ortuga l 
had decreed th a t  owing to  the  shortage o f wood necessary  
fo r  th e  co n stru c tio n  o f dw ellings and th e  l ik e ,  th e  making 
o f v esse ls  over one hundred tons burden in  Ceylon was forbidden. 
The co n stru c tio n  o f  sm aller v esse ls  however undoubtedly
(118) The conten tion  th a t  no la rg e  sh ips were based in  Ceylon 
i s  supported by a l e t t e r  o f th e  v iceroy  to  th e  k ing  dated 
5 October 1631 which g ives th e  lo c a tio n  o f th e  navios do rein lio . 
Muscat 22, Diu 11, Armada o f  th e  North 24, Goa 10, 
pepper f l e e t  to  Cochin (Malabar f l e e t ) 7 , Canara coast ( f l e e t  
o f Cape Camorin) 15 , Malacca 10; Ceylon 16. T o tal 115 
The f ig u re  o f s ix teen  sh ips in  Ceylon i s  explained as te n  
ships o f  th e  Malacca f l e e t  and s ix  o f th e  Coromandel which were 
tem porarily  in  th e  is la n d  help ing  in  war. (TT.LM.2 9 .f . 38)
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continued, fo r  in  th e  1620*s th e  v iceroy  gave se rious a tte n tio n ^
to  the  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f  t r a n s fe r r in g  th e  shipyards o f Goa
to  Ceylon in  th e  in te r e s ts  o f  economy and o f  increased
(119) 
output*
The sh ips based on 6eylon were supplemented a t  various
periods by v is i t in g  f l e e t s .  The most reg u la r  o f th e se  was
the  cinnamon f le e t^ .  In  th e  e a rly  years o f the  seventeenth
century  a s in g le  la rg e  v esse l had conveyed th e  cinnamon o f
Ceylon to  Goa. ESy th e  1620*s the  in c reas in g  th r e a t  o f  a Dutch
a ttack  had forced the  Portuguese to  r e s o r t  to  f iv e  o r s ix
vessel*
sm aller but sw if te r  veec le s .  The cinnamon f l e e t  o f 1632
( 120)
consisted  o f eleven v esse ls  -  e ig h t g a lley s  and th re e  pinnaces. 
This f l e e t  a rr iv ed  in  e a rly  October and u su a lly  l e f t  by the  
end o f th e  month a f te r  unloading supplied  and load ing  the
Hot*
cinnamon. The th re e  Portuguese o f f  South In d ia  -  th e  Malabar
f l e e t ,  th e  Coromandel f l e e t  andHhe f l e e t  o f th e  Cape Camorin
( 121)
o ccasio n a lly  c a lle d  a t  Ja ffn a  fo r  r e p a ir s .  The annual China
f le e t  a lso  c a lle d  a t  one o f  th e  p o rts  o f  K otte on i t s  re tu rn  
( 122) 
journey to  Goa.
(119) Evora CV /2-7.ff.58-69v; DR 111.51,61; TT.LM .95.ff.358-
358v; Evora CXVI /  2 -3 . f .  68 da
(120) Goa Realraentos e in s tru c c o es . Vol I I I . f . 9 ;  TT.HMs/Liv. 
8 l6 .ff.257v ,260
(121) P .E .P le r ls  -  The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam  -  11
(122) See chap ter I I .p a g e  fc( .
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Though in  th e  twenty one years under considera tion
Portuguese Ceylon was hard ly  eve* in  danger o f being
completely cu t o f f  from th e  r e s t  o f Portuguese A sia, challenges
to  Portuguese supremacy a t  sea came often* I t  was a challenge
of th is  k ind -  by Dom Pedro, a K unjali c o rsa ir  -  which
f a r i i r i  p rec ip a ted  th e  expedition  to  Ja ffn a  in  1619*
The a r r iv a l  o f the  Danish f l e e t  in  1620 provoked another
c r is is*  Once more however,the Portuguese resources proved
adequate to  dea l w ith  a sm all is o la te d  squdron* The Dutch 
though *
t h r e a t , / a n  slower to  develop was more d i f f i c u l t  to  r e s i s t ,
fo r th e  Dutch by 1617 l ik e  th e  Portuguese were a w ell
estab lish ed  power in  Asia* In  1619 the  Portuguese cap tain
Andre Coelho b a re ly  escaped w ith h is  l i f e  a f te r  h is  sh ip  was
(123)
sunk in  an encounter w ith th e  Dutch in  th e  Gulf o f  Mannar*
By th e  1620's w ith in c re a s in g  E nglish  and Dutch p ressu re  on
the Portuguese in  th e  Arabian Sea, the  coasts around Ceylon
(124)
were becoming unsafe fo r  Portuguese sh ipping , and th e  v iceroy  
a t  Goa was beginning to  breathe a sig^i o f  r e l i e f  every tim e a 
Portuguese f l e e t  re tu rned  sa fe ly  home* The lo s s  o f th e  high 
seas f l e e t  o f  Nuno A lvares Botelho in  1630 made th e  p o s it io n
(123) Hi.Add Mss. 28432 f .9 7
(134) The Dutch fac to ry  a t  P u lic a t  formed an adequate base 
fo r tra d in g  and p r iv a te e r in g  expeditions*
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even worse* When th e  Dutch f l e e t  under Westerwoldt a rr iv ed
o ff  Ceylon in  May 1633 no Portuguese f l e e t  s trong  enough to
challenge him was availab le*
The army, the  Portuguese r e l ie d  on defend th e i r
possessions and even conquer Kandy was a heterogeneoud one
made up o f S inhalese , Tam ils, Canarese, and K affirs  besides
the Portuguese themselves* The core o f th e  armed fo rces
however was a body o f seven or e ig h t hundred Portuguese
(125)
soldados o r unmarried so ld iers*  These were organised  in
companies ( e s tan c ias) o f  t h i r t y  to  t h i r t y  e ig h t so ld ie rs
each under cap ta in s , ensigns ( a l f e r e s ) and sergean ts ( sa rg en to s)*
Three hundred and f i f t y  to  four hundred o f th ese  so ld ie rs
were s ta tio n e d  under th e  ca p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld  a t
( 126)
Menlkkadavara as a la rg e  mobile force* Another one hundred
so ld ie rs  were s ta tio n e d  a t  Ja ffn a  f o r t  to  rep e l any a ttac k  
(127)
upon th a t  kingdom* The r e s t  were d is t r ib u te d  in  th e  fo r ts  
o f B a ttic a lo a , Trincomalee, K ayts, Mannar, Negombo, Colombo, 
K alu tara , G a lle , Menikkadawara, Malwana and Sabaragamuwa.
Though th e  Portuguese dispense^ w ith th e  use o f  armour due to  
th e  clim ate and the  te r r a in ,  they  were w e ll armed w ith  muskets
and swords* Perhaps due to  th e  d i f f i c u l ty  o f  tra n s p o r t however,
6
4125) Evora CV/St t^ 2 -? .f .8 0
(126) APO {Now ed) Tono IV .V o l.I I .P a rt 1.378-379} R ibeiro  132
(127) P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam . 3
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they  d id  no t take any a r t i l l e r y  w ith them while on th e  march.
The heavy munitions and the  food supp lies o f  th e  Portuguese 
were ca rr ie d  by n a tiv e  co o lie s . In  camp to o , the  task& o f 
cooking and cleaning were performed by S inhalese and Tamil 
servicemen.
The Portuguese casados o r m arried s e t t l e r s  and th e
topazes or descendents o f Portuguese-native m arriages
were no t members o f th e  reg u la r  army. Being r e t i r e d  so ld ie rs
however, th e  casados o ften  v o lu n ta r i ly  e n lis te d  fo r  a p a r t ic u la r
a «rtr
campaign. They could, be coup e l l  ed to  take up arms except in
(128)
defence o f  th e i r  homes or in  a grave emergency. The casado 
co n tin g en w t in  th e  Portuguese army never exceeded a hundred 
in  any mobile campaign but as each s e t t l e r  o ften  took h is  
se rv an t or slave w ith  him to  ca rry  a spare musket, to  help
9
him in  load ing  i t  and to  tra n sp o r t h is  food ra t io n s ,  they  o ften  
formed a very  u se fu l a c q u is itio n  in  the  f i e ld .  When th e  news 
o f  th e  lo s s  o f  a la rg e  number o f  casados in  de Safa i l l - f a t e d  
expedition  reached L isbon, i t  was decided th a t  to  ensure th e  
s e c u r ity  o f  Colombo, th e  casados should no t be used in  
o ffen siv e  campaigns in  th e  fu tu re . This d ire c tiv e  however was 
v io la te d  in  th e  very next invasion  o f Kandy le d  by Diogo de Hello
( 129)
da C astro .
(128) TT.LM.15.f.l9
(129) TT.LM.36.f.ll9} TT.LM .3?.f.ll
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The la s c a r in s  formed a v i t a l  p a r t  o f  the  Portuguese
v
army. In  J a f fn a , where th e  Tamil army had fo^long been mainly a
mercenary fo rce  only a sm all contingent o f  a few hundred Tamil
(130)
la sc a rln s  was re ta in e d . In  K otte , where th e  land  tenure
system provided a la sca rin g  fo rce  a t  l i t t l e  a c tu a l expense,
a
Sinhalese la sc a r in s  formed/much more numerous force.The la s c a r in s
a ttached  to  the  Portuguese army appeared to  have dec lined
s te a d ily  in  numbers throughout th e  seventeenth  century  whether
(131)
due to  appropria tion  o f land  by th e  Portuguese, em igration
(132)
to  Kandy o r death  in  war. Conteraporaty estim ate^  in  th e  1630*s
as to  the  a c tu a l s iz e  o f th e  la s c a r in  contingent ranged between
(133)
four thousand and seven thousand men. In  view o f  th e  overwhelming 
evidence o f  a gradual dec lin e  in  th e i r  numbers, th e  t o t a l  in  
the  1620's must have been a few thousand more. The la sc a r in s  
fought w ith th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  arms -  bows, swords, spear* and 
daggers bu t a sm all p ropo rtion  o f  th ese  m ilitia -m en  were a lso  
provided w ith  muskets.
f in a l ly ,  th e re  were the  Canarese and the  K a ff irs . The 
Canarese were mercenary troops from th e  West coast o f  In d ia .
(13^)
The K affirs  were mainly Portuguese slaves tra in e d  in  war. Both 
these  elements appeared in  s iz ab le  numbers in  th e  Portuguese army
(130) Ajuda 50-V -51.f.i63
(131) T.Abeyasinggie 117-118
(132) P .da S rin idade I I I .  9 ; ffoario do conde de Linhares 1^5 
In  the re b e llio n s  o f  1617-1618 alone over seven thousand men are  
estim ated to  have d ied .
(133) Coimbra 4 5 9 .f .3 6 l; Evora CXVI /2 -3 .ff .6 8 -6 8 v
(134) BNL FG. 939 .f .5 4 a
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only in  l a t e  1631. Bty 1634 a l l  th e  Canarese had re tu rned  to
(135)
th e i r  homes and only two hundred e igh ty  K a ffirs  were l e f t .
The K affirs  in troduced a new weapon to  fceylon -  th e  assaga i -
(13$)
a sh o rt wooden spear w ith a m etal p o in t.
The Portuguese so ld ie rs  were paid  twenty x e ra fin s  
a year as sa la ry . They a lso  rece ived  a monthly payment o f 
one x e ra f in  a month as curry  allowance (conduto) to g e th e r w ith  
two measures o f  r ic e  a day. These two l a s t  item s however, 
were ftanded over to  the  captains^ each o f  whom provided h is  
company w ith  food. The cap tains them selves were paid  two
(137)
hundred x e ra f in s  a y ea r, to g e th er w ith ten  la r in s  a month as 
curry  allowance and f iv e  measures o f  "rice a day. The so ld ie rs  
were provided w ith  arms and ammunitions by th e  s ta te  and when 
wounded given medical a t te n t io n  a t  th e  h o sp ita ls  in  Colombo, 
Mannar and J a f fh a . The casados were paid  on th e  same terms but 
only during periods o f  a c tiv e  se rv ic e . The la s c a r in s  were 
u su a lly  paid  by land  g ran ts  and were expected to  b ring  th e i r  
own prov isions during campaigns. When on continuous duty  th e
la sc a r in s  were paid  an allowance ranging from th re e  hundred and
t h i r t y  to  fou r hundred and f i f t y  g e is  (1 1/10 to  l j  x e ra fin s)
(135) APO (new ed) Tomo IV .V o l.II  P a r t 1.383
(136) BNL FCr. #39f#85a
(137) Ribefcro 134 s ta te s  th a t  the  c a p ta in 's  pay was only f i f t y  
pardaos a y ea r. The above estim ate  i s  based on Que^roz 1036.
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a month* They too were provided arms by th e  s ta te*  There i s  
no inform ation av a ilab le  on ra te s  o f  pay fo r  th e  Canarese 
but the  K affirs  were allowed a r ic e  r a t io n  o f  two measures
a day, a paymebt o f eighteen  x e ra fin s  a year and were
(138)
a lso  nk allowed a c e r ta in  amount o f  c lo th  fo r  t h e i r  d re s s .
(138) R ibeiro  130; APO (New ed) Tomo IV * B o l.II.P a rt I .  
380,383,386-387
The lands g ran ted  to  la s c a r in s  v a ried  in  ex ten t and value 
so th a t  th e i r  annual income ranged between twenty f iv e  and 
f i f t y  f iv e  x e ra fin s  a year* (JCERAS XXXVI* 181)
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CHAPTER VI
This study o f the revenue and expenditure o f  the 
Portuguese ad m in is tra tio n  in  Ceylon f a l l s  in to  two p a r ts .  The 
f i r s t  i s  concenned w ith sources o f revenue* The ch ie f  sources 
of income to  the  crown -  cinnamon, e lephan ts, a recanu ts , 
land re n ts  and th e  p e a rl f ish e ry  are examined in  th a t  order* 
This i s  by no means an exhaustive l i s t  bu t the item s om itted 
are e i th e r  very  minor ones o r those adequately d iscussed  in
( i )
o ther works*
The second p a r t  i s  an examination o f the  budgetary
problems o f th e  Portuguese in  Ceylon and i s  mainly concerned
w ith whether th e  Portuguese crown d id  make a p r o f i t  out o f i t s
possessions in  Ceylon* In  th i s  re sp ec t a note on the  currency
used appears relavent*  A ll fig u re s  mentioned in  th is  chap ter,
and in  th is  whole study unless otherw ise sp e c if ied  are given
(2 )
in  K otte pard3o-xerafins, For the  purpose o f converting o th e r
( 1 )  T . A b e y a s i n g h e  1 6 * * -1 8 3 ?  P * E * P i e r i s -  T h e  k i n g d o m  o f  
J  a f  f n a p a t a m .  6 - 2 2
(2 ) Coins were minted in  Ceylon during  the cap ta in -genera lsh ip s 
o f de Sa and Azevedo. (Codrington- Ceylon coins and currency* 
99» 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 )  An in d ic a tio n  o f the  purchasing power o f  a Ceylon 
x e ra fin  i s  given by Fr* ManGfcl de As sump cab who rep o rts  th a t  
i t  could bpy in  Colombo in  1 6 3 0  two hundred and fo r ty  coconuts 
or twelve to  f i f te e n  fowls or th ree  la rg e  loaves o f bread
or t h i r ty  to  t h i r t y  s ix  measures o f r ic e .
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currencies to  th i s  u n it  th e  follow ing ta b le  has been used*
by Goa r e is = one K otte fan am
9 0  Goa re is = one Ceylon la rim
2 7 0  Goa r e is = one Kotte pardao or one K otte x e ra fin
5 4  Goa r e is = one Ja ffn a  fanam
2 7 0  Goa re is = one Ja ffn a  x e ra fin
4 5 0  Goa r e is = one Ja ffn a  pataca
5 4 0  Goa re is = one Ja ffn a  pardao
3 0 0  Goa r e is = one Goa pard&o or one Goa x e ra fin
SOURCES OF REVENUE
CINNAMON
Cinnamon was undoubtedly the g re a te s t  s in g le  source of 
revenue the  Portuguese possessed in  seventeenth  century Ceylon* 
Cinnamon grew w ild in  the K elani v a lley  and in  a broad co a s ta l 
s tre tc h  o f  K otte from Chilaw to  th e  Walawe Ganga. When fu l ly  
grown, th e  cinnamon t r e e  ( cinnamomum zeylanicum) was twenty f iv e  
to  fo r ty  f e e t  in  h e ig h t. The in n e r bark o f  the  t r e e ,  when peeled 
and d ried  was ex tensive ly  used in  south Asia and Europe as a 
condiment. The S inhalese also  used cinnamon o i l ,  ex trac ted  
from the  f r u i t  o f the  t r e e ,  fo r  m edicinal purposes bu t un like  
th e  bark , th e  o i l  was not produced fo r sa le  abroad during  the
(3) The sources used to  form ulate the ta b le  inc lude-
Codidngton -  Ceylon coins and currency. 92 5 P .E .P ie r is -  
The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam . 59* APO {new ed )lV * II-I. 379-403
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(4)
p e r i o d  o f  P o r t u g u e s e  m i l e .
I n  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c i n n a m o n  
h a d  b e c o m e  a c c e p t e d  a s  t h e  c a s t e  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  a  g r o u p  o f  
p e o p l e  k n o w n  a s  t h e  c h a l e a s .  T h e  c h a l e a s  a r e  s a i d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  
a  g r o u p  o f  i m m i g r a n t s  f r o m  s o u t h  I n d i a  a n d  i t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  
t h e  S i n h a l e s e  k i n g s  o f  K o t t e  a s s i g n e d  t h e  t a s k  o f  p e e l i n g  
c i n n a m o n  t o  t h e m  s o m e  t i m e  a f t e r  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  i n  t h e  i s l a n d .
B y  t h e  b e g i n i n g  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  
c i n n a m o n  h a d  b e c o m e  w e l l  r e g u l a t e d .  T h e  c h a l e a s  t h e m s e l v e s
w e r e  o r g a n i s e d  i n t o  t h r e e / d a p a r t m e n t s ^  o r  b a d d a s  -  t h e  m a h a b a d d a .—  — — —  - 1 1
t h e  s u l u b a d d a  a n d  t h e  k u n a m b a d d a .  T h o s e  c h a l e a s  w h o  b e l o n g e d  
t o  t h e  f i r s t  t w o  d e p a r t m e n t s  w e r e  o b l i g e d  t o  p e e l  c i n n a m o n  
u n d e r  t h e  o v e r a l l  s u p e r i n t e n d a n c e  o f  t h e i r  v i d a n a s .  T h e  m e n  
o f  k u n a m b a d d a  w e r e  e x c e m p t  f r o m  t h i s  d u t y  a s  t h e y  a c t e d  a s
t
p a l a n q u i n  b e a r e r s  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l .  W i t h i n  e a c h  b a d d a  
t h e r e  w e r e  a  n u m b e r  o f  d u r a y a s  o r  c h a l e a  h e a d m e n  w h o  
s u p e r v i s e d  t h e  p e e l e r s .  T h e  d u r a y a s  w e r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  
v i d a n a  w h o  w a s  i n  t u r n  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  v e d o r  d a  f a z e n d a .
O n c e  t h e  c i n n a m o n  w a s  c o l l e c t e d  a n d  d r i e d ,  i t  w a s  m a d e  i n t o  
b u n d l e s  ( f a r d o s )  w r a p p e d  i n  m a t s ( e s t e i r a s ) a n d  t i e d  w i t h  r o p e  
( c a i r o ) -  I n  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  s o m e  o f f i c i a l s  w h o  s u p e r v i s e d
(4) R ibeiro 161-162
(5) T.Abeyasinghe, 135-138; S.Arasaratnam -  Dutch power in  
Ceylon. 1658-1688, 184; AHU Caixa 3, 30.6.1613
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the co lle c tio n  o f cinnamon as w ell as those who bundled the 
produce were paid  wages in  cash by th e  Portuguese. In  the
(6)
seventeenth century th ese  payments were commuted fo r  land  grants*
The o b lig a tio n s  o f  th e  chaleas in  the  s ix teen th  century 
re la te d
were apparen tly  rxkxkfcfr* to  the  t r ib u te  the king o f K otte
agreed to  pay the  Portuguese. From 1518 or some time afterw ards
th is  t r ib u te  was fixed  a t  th ree  hundred bahars o f  cinnamon a
year and th i s  amount had to  be provided fre e  by the  chaleas
o f the  mahabadda in  re tu rn  fo r th e  lands they  held . Cinnamon 
%
produce^in excess o f  th i s  amount was bought by the  Portuguese 
a t  a p r ic e  o f  th ree  pardaos a bahar. During the  second h a lf  
o f the  s ix teen th  century  th e  p ee le rs  had imposed upon them 
the ad d itio n a l o b lig a tio n  o f providing a fu r th e r  one hundred 
bahars fre e  o f  charge to  th e  king o f  K otte . With the  death o f  
King Dharmapala in  1597» th e  chaleas were thus obliged  to  
supply four hundred bahars a year to  th e  Portuguese, the  new
(7)
ru le rs  o f  K otte .
During the  next h a l f  century  the demands o f the  s ta te
(6) Diogo Velho -  Orcamento do estado da In d ia . 130; Queyroz 1028; 
Ajuda 51-V -38.f.38; Ajuda 51-V H I-58.f.291v; S tudia IV. 266
(7) V itorino  Magalhaes Godinho -  Os descobrimentos e a economia 
mundial I I .  39-^0; S tud ia  IV. 2?55 Diogo Velho, 129;
Ajuda 51-V -36.f.38 | AHU Caixa 6, 10.11.1618
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on th e  chaleas grew inexorab ly . In  the  time o f  Azevedo
the  in tro d u c tio n  o f  a la rg e r  measure, increased  th e  burden
on th e  p ee le rs  by a th i r d .  By 1615 they were requ ired  to
(8)
supply a thousand bahars annually  to  the s ta te .  In  1632-1633
cap ta in -genera l Dom Jorge de Almeida increased  th is  amount
( 9 )by a fu rth e r  th ree  hundred and f i f t y  bahars. In  th e  i640fs
Dom F ilip e  Mascarenhas^ serv ing  as cap ta in -genera l reported
th a t  one thousand f iv e  hundred to  two thousand bahars o f
cinnamon were produced per year fo r  the  government w ithout 
( 10)
charge. While the  government demand ro se , the  q u an tity  produced
by the  chaleas to  s a t i s f y  in d iv id u a l requirem ents d id  not
f a l l .  At l e a s t  u n t i l  th e  l6309s i t  seems c le a r  th a t  one thousand
fiv e  hundred to  two thousand bahars were produced by the
( i i )
p ee lers  fo r  p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls .
This eittnaaon in c rease  in  output was achieved w ith the  
a id  o f  two s ig n if ic a n t  developments in  the  o rgan iza tio n  o f 
cinnamon production . F i r s t ly  th e re  was a general in c rease  in  
in d iv id u a l burdens. The h ighest q u a n tity  any p e e le r  was expected 
to  provide as recorded in  the ex tan t p a r ts  o f  Vaz F re ire #s
(8) T.Abeyasinghe, 142,150
(9) Evora C X V l/2-2 .f.li5v ; AP0(New ed) IV -II-I.3 9 2
(10) BM.Add Mss. 41996.f.7
(11) P .da T rinidade I I I . 20; TT,Ms da Convento da Gra9a , 
torao 6D.336; TT.LM.12.f.599; EM.Add.Mss.20893.f f . 9-10;
Filmoteca LM.13B11/3-5; Queyroz 34
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tombo was eleven arrobas or about th ree  hundred and f if£ y
pounds• Some p ee le rs  in  th e  e a rly  seventeenth  century
( 12)
delivered  only a f i f t h  o f th a t  amount. By the  end o f  the  
Portuguese regime in  Ceylonnhowever, th e  average o b lig a tio n
'  (13)
per p ee le r  had r is e n  to  some f iv e  hundred pounds. Secondly
the o b lig a tio n  o f pee lin g  cinnamon was extended to  cover people
o f castes o th e r than the  cha leas.T his process was begun by
A z e v e d o  w h e n  h e  r e q u i r e d  t h e  w o o d c u t t e r s  a n d  t h e  p a n n a y a s
(or those who supplied  fodder fo r  e lephants) o f th e  Seven
Korales to  supply cinnamon in s tead  o f p rovid ing  th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  
(1^)
se rv ices . This p o licy  o f  rep lac in g  outmoded or unnecessary 
serv ices w ith u se fu l ones, apparen tly  met w ith l i t t l e  opposition  
fo r , in  seventeenth century  K otte th e  ca s te  system had not 
y e t developed in to  a r ig id  and in f le x ib le  form. A fte r a l l ,  
the chaleas themselves when they  s e t t le d  in  K otte were o r ig in a l ly  
weavers* Thus in  the f i r s t  h a lf  o f the  seventeenth century 
in c reas in g  numbers o f  non-chalea^ S inhalese were re c ru ite d  fo r  
cinnamon p ee lin g . By 1650 these included people o f  the Hunu. 
Paduwa and Karawa c a s te s , lime burners, palanquin bearers  
and f is h e r  fo lk  re sp e c tiv e ly . The change o f  occupation d id  not
(12) P . E . P i e r i s  -  T h e  C e y l o n  l i t t o r a l .  64
(13) Queyroz 1028; S.Arasaratnam 185-186
(14) T T .M s . d a  C o n v e n t o  da G r a p a .  to m o  6D. 333
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(15)
enhance or d e tra c t from th e i r  s ta tu s  v is -a -v is  the cha leas.
I t  i s  l ik e ly  however th a t  once the o b lig a tio n  o f p ee lin g  cinnamon
was fo is te d  on a group o f people th e re  was l i t t l e  lik e lih o o d
o f th e i r  g e ttin g  r id  o f f t ?
During th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f the seventeenth century  there
also  accured a fundamental change in  the b as is  o f the  o b lig a tio n
o f the  p e e le rs . When Vaz F re ire  made h is  tombo th e  chaleas
were obliged to  pee l cinnamon in  re tu rn  fo r  th s  land they
held and the o b lig a tio n  o f each depended an the  wxtent and
q u a lity  o f  land  h e ld . By the  end o f th e  Portuguese period
however the  o b lig a tio n  had become associa ted  w ith the  person
ra th e r  than th e  lan d . By 1650 a l l  chaleas over twelve years o f
age were obliged to  p ee l cinnamon though the  amount to  be
produced varied  according to  the  land  hold ing . The b as is  fo r
th is  development was the  growth o f  the  theory  advanced by
the  Portuguese to  serve th e i r  needs, th a t  the  chaleas were
slaves o f  th e  k ing  and were th e re fo re  obliged to  serve the
s ta te  fre e  o f  charge. By the  middle o f  the century  the o b lig a tio n
twelve
o f  every male chalea over toamfcy years o f  age to  supply a 
fixed  q u a n tity  of cinnamon ir re s p e c tiv e  o f  land  held  had
(15) TT,LM.60 .f . 287
(16) When th e  Dutch conquered W alla llaw iti Korale in  th e  1640's 
they  found th e re  one or two v il la g e s  in h ab ited  by pannayas




become accepted p ractice#
When the  Portuguese obtained de fac to  co n tro l o f  the
cinnamon lands o f K otte in  the  ea rly  1590*s they a lso  in h e r ite d
the system o f  open trad e  in  cinnamon th a t  had p rev a iled  in
the previous decade. Production o f  cinnamon was under no
re s tr ic tio n *  Export o f  the  sp ic e , o ther than  the  q u an tity
s p e c if ic a l ly  made fo r the  state^w as done by p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls
who had obtained lic en c es  to  do so* Almost from the  o u tse t
Portuguese o f f ic ia l s  urged th a t  a c lo se r con tro l o f the  cinnamon
trad e  was d e s ira b le  from an economic as w ell as a p o l i t i c a l
p o in t o f  view. S t r i c te r  co n tro l, i t  was argued would avoid
the lo s s  o f  revenue caused by the export o f  cinnamon from p o rts
ou tside  Portuguese con tro l in  Ceylon while the  same measure
would e f fe c t iv e ly  deny revenue from cinnamon to  the  p o l i t i c a l
opponents o f  th e  Portuguese, n r in c ip a lly  the  ru le rs  o f  Kandy 
( 18) 
and the  Dutch.
Several measu
over th e  cinnamon trad e  were promulgated in  the  1590*s .
Colombo was designated as the  only p o rt from which th e  export 
o f  cinnamon was le g a lly  perm itted , while cinnamon could be
^e^designed to  promote g re a te r  co n tro l





disembarked only a t  an Ind ian  port# More im pftrtant^in 1595
the export o f cinnamon was declared  a p r iv a te  monopoly o f  the
cap ta in  o f  Colombo who was requ ired  to  s e l l  a fixed  a
(20)
proportion  o f h is  exports a t  co st p rice  to  the  sta te#
These measures though^eiSsured a g re a te r  degree o f con tro l 
over the  tr&de in  cinnamon, f a i le d  to  check the  f a l l  in  
cinnamon p ric e s  th a t  was causing g rea t concern among th e  
Portuguese# In  the th ree  decades preceding 1590 cinnamon 
p rice s  had remained a t  a r e la t iv e ly  high le v e l  due to  
in te rru p tio n s  in  supply caused by warfare# In  the  1590fs 
w ith the  subjugation  o f  the  whole o f  the  o ld  kingdom o f  Kotte 
and increased  production by the  chaleas p ric e s  f e l l  to  a lower 
level#  This tren d  continued in  th e  f i r s t  decade of the  
seventeenth century when th e  death  o f Vimaladharmasuriya 
removed the  immediate th re a t  to  the Portuguese hold on the  
lowlands* The only means o f rev ersin g  th i s  tren d  was a
(19) The f i r s t  co n trac t between the  s ta te  and th e  cap ta in  o f Colombo 
was made in  1590* By th is  agreement the cap ta in  promised to  s e l l  
a th i rd  o f th e  cinnamon he co llec ted  to  the  s ta te  a t  cost price#
I t  i s  no t known whether in  re tu rn  he obtained th e  p o s itio n  o f so le  
p r iv a te  ex p o rte r, though th is  appears lik e ly #  In  1595 th i s  
d e f in i te ly  d id  occur# The co n trac t made between Thome de Souza Ronches 
cap tain  o f  Colombo and Diogo Caiado, .juiz and desembargador who 
acted as th e  rep re se n ta tiv e  o f  th e  k ing  on 7 November J>595 sp ec if ied  
t h a t 1#.# o q fizereT canela forados e s te  con tra to  a perdera a 
metade pa oue accuzary co s in c o  (annos) mais de degredo p 
Maluquo, ##* (AHU Caixa 6, 10* li# l6 l8 ) In  re tu rn  the  cap ta in  o f  
Colombo had to  s e l l  a f i f t h  o f the  f i r s t  f iv e  hundred bahars he 
exported from Colombo a t  cost p r ic e  to  th e  s ta te#  The monopoly 
was however m odified by the  r ig h t  o f  sev era l persons and in s t i tu t io n s
(Contd#,)
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r e s t r ic t io n  o f  supply and th is  was a measure which any
( 20)
in d iv id u a l co n trac to r was u n lik e ly  to  welcome*
Thus a f te r  experimenting w ith o th e r forms o f  co n trac ts
(21)
with persons o th e r than  the  cap ta in  o f  Colombo, i t  was
decided in  1614 to  make trad e  in  cinnamon a ro y al monopoly.
Cinnamon could be exported only on b eh a lf  o f  the  s ta te  and
the annual exports were fixed  a t  a thousand bahars .P roduction
in  v illa g e s  p r iv a te ly  held  by the  Portuguese was not forbidden
but the  sa le  o f  cinnamon so produced to  any person o th e r than
the vedor o r h is  o f f i c i a l  rep re se n ta tiv es  was l i a b le  to  be
punished by a sentance o f f iv e  years se rv ice  in  th e  Far-E astern  
(22)
fleet.M oreover as the a u th o r it ie s  in  Ceylon made arrangements 
to  have the whole o f th e  thousand bahars made in  d ta te  held
(23)
v illa g e s  any production by in d iv id u a ls  appeared superfluous.
The cinnamon trad e  under royal monopoly in  th e  period  
161^-1638 f a l l s  in to  two d is t in c t  phases. During the  f i r s t
co n td .,
( I9 l  to  export fixed  q u a n titie s  o f  cinnamon. These exceptions 
were as follow s -  cap ta in -genera l Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo,
150 bahars;o th e r  Portuguese cap tains in  Ceylon, 100 b ahars; 
camara o f Colombo, ^0 bahars; fa c to r ,  12 bahars; escrivao .
6 bahars. A fter the a r r iv a l  o f  Jorge Frolim de Almeida (vedor o f 
Ceylonl597-? ) th is  agreement^ was amended to  ob lige 
de Souza Ronches to  s e l l  to  th e  s ta te  a t  cost p r ic e , 15$ o f 
a l l  cinnamon exported by him in  excess o f  f iv e  hundred bahars.
(20) T.Abeyasinghe, 151-1535 DR IV.241-244
(21) In  1607, fo r in stan ce  Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo was awarded th e  
so le  r ig h t o f  export o f  cinnamon fo r th ree  years in  re tu rn  fo r
a payment o f twelve thousand parc&os.




extending from 1615-1628 the  monopoly was la rg e ly  en in e ffe c tiv e
one^.The main purpose in  e s ta b lish in g  a royal monopoly, namely
the r i s e  in  cinnamon p ric e s  and revenue was not achieved. In
1628 the p r ic e  o f  cinnamon remained on th e  average what i t
had been in  1614-1615* Four possib le  reasons may be advanced
fo r  t h i s .  The f i r s t  was the v ic e -re g a l decree Azevedo h im self
issu ed  on 3 October 1614, The casados o f Colombo on rece iv ing
news o f  th e  establishm ent o f a royal monopoly by th e  viceroy*s
decree o f  22 A pril 1614, p ro tes ted  th a t  they  had a lready , a t
considerable expense to  themselves co llec ted  q u a n titie s  of
cinnamon fo r export and appealed to  the  v iceroy to  postpone the
date  o f enforcement* The v iceroy  thereupon decided on 30 October
1614 th a t  cinnamon produced before the  p u b lic a tio n  o f the  decree
o f 22 A pril 1614 could be so ld  f re e ly  u n t i l  1 January 1615*
This was ju s t  the  leeway specu la to rs were hoping fo r .  In  the
months o f  November and December a record q u an tity  o f  cinnamon
was exported from the is la n d . The vedor Antao Vaz F re ire  estim ated
the amount exported a t  about two thousand bahars*I t  was reported
th a t  five  sh ips loaded w ith cinnamon from Ceylon a rriv ed  a t
Cochin alone during th e  l a s t  few days o f  December 1614, P rices
(24)
th e re fo re  f e l l  even fu r th e r  in  the  f i r s t  year o f  the  monopoly.
(24) AHU Caixa 4, 3*2,1616 The f a l l  in  p rice s  was so sharp th a t  
the v iceroy  f e l t  constrained  to  send a ju d ic ia l  o f f ic e r  to  Colombo 
to  in v e s tig a te  i t s  cause.
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This e f fe c t  however was obviously sh o rt-liv ed *
Secondly the  royal monopoly l ik e  th e  p riv a te  monopolies 
th a t  had preceded i t ,  was breached by sp e c ia l p r iv ile g e s  
awarded by both k ing  and viceroy  to  p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls  g ran ting  
them the r ig h t  to  engage in  th e  cinnamon tra d e . Some o f  these 
p r iv ile g e s  had been g ran ts o f long stand ing . For example the 
r ig h t  o f  the  fam ily o f  the  conde de V idiguera, descendents of 
the famous Vasco da Gama to  im port a fixed  q u an tity  o f  cinnamon 
had been granted  to  them in  th e  days o f Dom Manual(1495-1521).
This p r iv ile g e  had been re-affirm ed  and am plified on 4 November 
1593 when the  k ing  granted Dora Francisco da Gama the r ig h t  to  
send s ix ty  bahars of cinnamon w ithout any payment to  the crown
(25)
save a small sum to  the Order o f C h ris t. A s im ila r  p r iv ile g e  had
(26)
been granted to  Dona C atherina, a r e la t iv e  o f th e  k ing . The
camara o f Colombo m aintained i t s  r ig h t  to  export fo r ty  bahars
(27)
on beha lf o f th e  casados o f th e  c i ty .  The cap ta in  o f  Colombo
in  recompense fo r  the lo s s  o f h is  income was allowed a fu r th e r
(28)
si)tty  s ix  bahars. The v iceroy Azevedo i s  also  sa id  to  have
conced/ lic en c es  to  c o l le c t  and exoort cinnamon to  many o f
(29)
h is  frien d s  and companions. His successors continued th i s  p ra c tic e .
(25) AHU Caixa 13» 20.12.1639; Goa Assentos do conselho da 
fazenda I I .  f f . 71-72
(26) AHU Caixa 5, 15.7.1617
(27) See above page
(28) AHU 3 3 .f . l2
(29) EH.Add.Mss. 20893.f .9 ;  Goa As C R .I .f .i6 l
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The bishop of  Cochin in  a report on Ceylon in  1619 estimated
th a t  these  lic en c es  allowed the  export o f  th ree  thousand
(30)
bahars o f cinnamon*This may have been an exaggeration, but 
one should note th a t  im portant re c ip ie n ts  o f  such lic en ces  
appear^ to  have included the cap ta in -g en era l and the vedor 
da fazenda* the  two o f f ic ia l s  responsib le  fo r  the  n ro tec tio n
(31)
o f the  k in g ’s monopijy*
The th i r d  fa c to r  causing th e  continued low p r ic e  fo r  
cinnamon was the  d e lib e ra te  and p e r s is ta n t  d isreg a rd  o f  the  
reg u la tio n s th a t  governed the monopoly i t s e l f  by many o f f ic ia l s  
in  Ceylon and India* Once more the  le ad  was provided by 
su p erio r o f f ic e r s .  Jorge de Alberquerque, cap ta in -genera l 
o f Ceylon (1621-1623) and Lan^arote de Seixa$^vedor(l6 l8-1622) 
are  but two examples o f  men who used th e i r  p o s itio n  as the 
k ing ’s se rvan ts to  defraud th e  k in g . I t  was l i t t l e  wonder 
th a t  the camara o f Colombo complained th a t  th e  royal monopoly 
was a monopoly only fo r  the poor. However a good deal o f  smuggling 
appears to  have been ca rrie d  on by le s s e r  o f f ic ia l s  from Colombo 
to o . Suspicion o f th i s  arose in  Europe when i t  was repo rted  th a t  
th ree  Portuguese Antonio de Pinho da Costa, Cosmo Cardoso and
(30^  TT.LM.12.f.599 In  a l e t t e r  to  th e  k ing  dated 19.11.1615 
Antao Vaz F re ire  p ro te s ted  thaLt Azevedo had a lready  g ran ted  perm ission 
to  in d iv id u a ls  to  export a t o t a l  o f 160 bahars.(AHU Caixa 
19.11.1615)
(31) Film oteca LM.13A. 26-27/2-2; AHU 33.1.11} AHU Caixa 6, 
11.12.1619
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Dom Diogo Coutinho had p e titio n e d  fo r  perm ission to  c o lle c t  
q u a n titie s  o f  cinnamon equal to  what th ey  had lo s t  when 
a ship carry ing  th e  sp ice sank soon a f te r  leav ing  Colombo p o r t. 
During the  in v e s tig a tio n s  i t  was found th a t  the o r ig in a l  re c e ip ts  
fo r the  sa le  o f th i s  cinnamon were not to  be found in  the  accounts 
o f the  fa c to r  Jorge Fernandes de Abreu. Although a thorough 
in v e s tig a tio n  by two o f f ic ia l s  from Goa subsequently c leared  
the  th ree  tra d e rs  and the f a c to r ,  i t  showed th a t  unauthorised
(32)
export o f cinnamon from Colombo was not such a d i f f i c u l t  p ro p o sitio n . 
F in a lly , as always, the cinnamon o f Ceylon had to  compete in  
the market w ith  the  coajber and fcfc* le s s  fra g ra n t but cheaper
7 (33)
cassia  o f the  Malabar co ast.
There i s  in s u f f ic ie n t  evidence to  d e te c t any d e f in i te  
trends in  the  p ric e  movements during  the  f i r s t  f i f t e e n  years 
o f the  royal monopoly. I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e  p ric e  paid  to  the
(32) Simancas SB.1522.f . 20; Pxlmoteca LM.13A.27/4,26-27/2-2,
Pllmoteca LM.14.118/3-4; TT.LM.26.f.244; TT.LM.28.f.360;
Filmoteca LM.15.67/4, 67-68/6-1; AHU 3 3 .f f . l6 - l6 v ;
Another in stan ce  th a t  aroused susp icion  o f m alpractices 
occured in  1629. Domingos F e re ira , th e  vidana o f the  chaleas 
bought°^feundred and seven bahars o f cinnamon from the  crown 
and paid  th e  money fo r  th i s  amount to  the  fa c to r ,  Francisco T ris ta o . 
However h is  name fa ile d  to  appear in  th e  l i s t  o f people who 
had obtained perm ission to  export cinnamon and to  F e re ira 1s 
su rp rise  th e  procedJs o f  these  hundred and seven bahars were 
not c red ited  to  him. (Goa C P e AS X f.193) The regimento issu ed  
on 13 September 1636 to  the  outgoing vedor Antonio de Fonseca 
Ozouro makes i t  c le a r  th a t  smuggling had occured from the  
p o rts  o f G alle , K alu tara, Ja ffn a  and Mannar whence i t  was taken 
to  Masulipatam and so ld . (Goa regimento e in s tru c c o e s .I I I . f f .2 - 8 )
(33) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda.IV .f.197
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p ee le r  remained constant throughout th i s  period  and indeed
(3*0
in  the decade a f te r  i t  a t  two x erafin s  a Bahar. This was
the  p r ic e  a t  which the  government bought from p ee le rs  in
cinnamon
s ta te  held v i l la g e s . The cost o f  Exzmsax to  the  government 
and to  lic e n c e  holders from p r iv a te ly  held v illa g e s  tended
(35)
to  be)6 h igher ranging from four to  fiv e  x era fin s  per bahar.
The cinnamon produced by p ee le rs  was bound in to  bales 
of about^hundred and twenty pounds each and s to red  in  warehouses 
in  Mutwal. The bulk o f th is  produce was loaded on to  the  cinnamon 
f l e e t  which a rriv ed  from Goa annually  in  October. From 1621 
about two hundred bahars were a lso  sen t d ir e c t  to  Basra fo r 
sa le  in  the P ersian  Gulf reg ion . O ccasionally  d ea le rs  in  Ceylon 
were sold sm all q u a n titie s  o f cinnamon fo r  export to  o ther 
a reas . These d ea le rs  were no t allowed to  buy d ir e c t ly  from the  
p ee le rs  or v illa g e  h o ld e rs . They had to  buy from the  vedor w ith
(3^) Queyroz 1028; Evora CX V l/2-3.f.ll5> Film oteca LM.19D.
78/1-4; P .da Trinidade 111,20; TT.LM.**5.f.352v
The a s se r tio n  by T.Abeyasinghe 150-151 th a t  the  ac tu a l 
p r ic e  paid  to  th e  p e e le r  declined  in  the f i r s t  fo r ty  years 
o f Portuguese ru le  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  prove. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  cinnamon 
co st the  Portuguese th ree  x era fin s  a bahar in  the  1570*s and 
two xerafin s in  l639»But th e re  i s  no proof th a t  Portuguese 
dealings in  the  1570*s were d i r e c t ly  w ith the p ee le rs  as they  
were in  l a t e r  tim es. There i s  evidence th a t  th e  p r ic e  paid  to  
the  f e e le r  rose a f te r  th e  a r r iv a l  o f the Dutch. While in  1639 
the  s ta te  obtained a bahar o f f iv e  fa rd o s( a c tu a lly  i^  frflhans 
o f  3 q u in ta ls  each) fo r two x e ra f in s . Dora F ilip e  Mascarenhas 
reported  in  the  l640’s th a t  two x e ra fin s  o r more had$ to  be 
paid  fo r  a bahar o f th ree  q u in ta ls .
(35) Evora C X V l/2 -3 .f.ll5 ; Film oteca LK.19D.78/j(-l/4;
AHU 210.f.250v
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the approval o f th e  .junta. The q u a n titie s  so ld  to  each tra d e r
seems to  hafee been in  the region o f f i f t y  to  a hundred bahars.
but the  t o t a l  q u an tity  so exported was o ften  considerab le .
For example in  1622 f iv e  hundred and two bahars o f cinnamon
were so ld  to  in d iv id u a l tra d e rs  fo r  a t o t a l  sum o f th ir te e n
thousand s ix  hundred/eighty four x e ra f in s .No complete p rxzss
s t a t i s t i c s  o f  cinnamon p ric e s  a t  Colombo in  th e  l a t e r  l620 , s
are av a ilab le  but i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  in  the  ea rly  1620’s the
(36)
p rice  per bahar remained a t or about twenty x e ra f in s .
From the  revenue p o in t o f  view the  most im portant 
fa c to r in  decid ing  the p r o f i t  to  the crown was the  le v e l o f 
p r ic e sk t Goa and Cochin fo r  i t  was a t  these  p o rts  th a t  the  
bulk o f the  Ceylon cinnamon was disposed o f . The p r ic e  le v e l 
a t  Goa was norm ally a t  l e a s t  ten  x e ra fin s  a bahar above th a t
(37)
a t Colombo due to  f re ig h t  c o s ts . The p ric e s  a t  Cochin, a p o rt
much c lo se r to  Colombo, were expected to  be somewhat lower
(38)
than a t  Goa. From the evidence av a ilab le  i t  appears th a t  p r ic e s
(36) Film oteca LM.19D 76/1-4; Film oteca LM. 13A. 26-27/2-1; 
TT.LM .l6.f.258; Assentos 1 .53 ; Goa provisoes dos v isorfeis.
I l l ,  2185220; Goa C.Pe AS V I .f .357
(37) According to  estim ates p resen ted  to  the  v ice ro y ’s council 
a t  Goa on 4 March 1637 the  f re ig h t costs from Colombo to  Goa
a kaha** o f cinnamon was estim ated a t  twelve x e ra f in s .
(Assentos 11.162) S im ilar estim ates were placed before th e  
conselho da In d ia  in  Lisbon on 16 March 1635* (Coimbra 645«f.68v)*~
(38) Cochin was le s s  than four hundred m iles by sea from Colombo.!
Goa was a fu r th e r  th ree  hundred and f i f t y  m iles away. _____   I
Lr
f a o t t i v  d o c v M M i l '  w l i t y j f t f e j  P v L K f l d '  Cm  k  f/* /try* J i k f i  a j f f v r v ’ ,
IfmeefHnwlstp gotfvt wajtoAkJ far Ikr Ctf!" 4 ^
Vtit f W  h> it h (wn otm-JsyifL. c- ^  ^ J
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a t  Goa d id  r i s e  to  somewhat over t h i r ty  x e ra fin s  a bahar in  
1620 from the  low le v e l o f  twenty two and a h a lf  x e ra fin s  th a t  
p rev a iled  in  1615. This r i s e  was no doubt the  r e s u l t  o f  the  
in te r ru p tio n  o f supply due to  the  reb e llio n s  o f 1616-1620.
With the  re tu rn  o f peace and continued v io la tio n  o f  th e  
ro y a l monopoly, p rice s  a t Goa re tu rned  to  the  1615 le v e ls  
by the  l a t e  1620*8.The cinnamon se t a t  Basra y ie lded  even l e s s ,  
fo r  th e  s e l l in g  p ric e  th e re  ranged from f if te e n  to  eighteen
(39)
x e ra fin s  a bahar. In  1628 however w ith the  outbreak o f  war
w ith Kandy cinnamon p r ic e s  showed a s l ig h t  upward tren d  re g is te r in g
(40)
twenty f iv e  x erafin s  a bahar a t  Cochin.
The revenue derived from cinnamon during the  period 
1615-1628 obviously varied  w ith  the  p r ic e  and th e  q u an tity  so ld .
In  1615 w ith  the  p re v a ilin g  low p rice s  the  t o t a l  cinnamon 
rw enue could no t have been much more th£n twenty thousand 
x e ra f in s . By 1619 according to  th e  f ig u res  o f the  f a c to r ,  Joao da 
Costa P e re s te l lo , the y ie ld  had r is e n  to  39»0$0 x e ra f in s . During 
the  perio d  1621-1627 the  in c rease  in  th e  q u an tity  exported 
by th e  s ta te  compensated fo r  th e  gradual f a l l  in  p r ic e s  keeping 
the  annual revenue between 20,000 and 30>000 xerafins.T he revenue
(39) Film oteca LM.19D.78/1-4; TT.LM .l6.f.258
(40) The p r ic e  a t  Basra however remained a t  eighteen x e ra f in s .
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in  1628 was 45,000 x e ra f in s ,The amount o f  cinnamon exported 
by th e  s ta te  reached thousand f iv e  hundred and s ix ty  bahars
in  1626 and thousand e ig h t hundred and f i f t y  one bahars in
(41)
1628,
The year 1629 marked a tu rn in g  p o in t in  th e  cinnamon 
trad e  during the  period  under survey. In  February th a t  year 
Dom Miguel de Noronha, conde de Linhares assumed o f f ic e  as 
v iceroy , fie determined to  enforce th e  monopoly in  a way never 
done befo re . The a u th o r it ie s  in  Ceylon were forbidden to  s e l l  
any cinnamon what so ever w ith in  the  is la n d . On 2 October 1629 
i t  was decreed th a t  w ith the  exception o f  sm all q u a n titie s  
sen t on the  king*s account to  Mannar and^Persian G ulf, a l l  
cinnamon was to  be taken d ir e c t  to  Goa and sold  th e re  on the  
orders o f  the  viceroy.The export o f  cinnamon was s t r i c t l y  
r e s t r ic te d  to  Colombo. The e f f e c t  was immediate. The p ric e  a t  
Goa shot up to  e igh ty  to  n in e ty  x e ra fin s  a bahar. C ontrolled  
s e l l in g  a t  one cen tre  enabled the Portuguese to  ob ta in  a sum o f
(42)
71»157 x era fin s  from th e  produce o f  1629. The c u ttin g  o f f  o f
(41) Film oteca LM.19D. 78/1-4* TT.LM .l6.f.258; Aftuda 51-V-44, 
f . 23v
(42) A.Garcia -  Archivo da relac&o de Goa. 408; Ajuda 51-VIXI-51. 
f f . 256,405; Goa -Assentos do conselho da fazenda I I I . f f . 84-05 




the  cinnamon supply in  1630-1632caused a fu r th e r  r i s e  in  
the p ric e  o f cinnamon* In  the  1630's th e  p r ic e  a t  Goa remained 
a t  around a hundred x e ra fin s  a bahar.To ensure th a t  p r ic e s  
remained a t  th i s  le v e l the export o f in f e r io r  cinnamon from
m
t h e  M a l a b a r  c o a s t  w a s  f o r b i d d e n *  W i t h  e x p o r t s  i n  p e a c e  t i m e  
a v e r a g i n g ;  w e l l  o v e r  tw o  t h o u s a n d  b a h a r s  a  y e a r ,  t h i s  m e a n t
w
a t o t a l  revenue o f 200,000 x e ra f in s .
(43) The t o t a l  exported in  1630 was a hundred bahars, No cinnamon 
was exported in  1631* A storm a t Colombo sank a l l  eleven ships
o f the  cinnamon f l e e t  o f  1632 a f te r  they  were loaded. (TT*Ms . da L iv. 
8 l6 .f.257v ,260 ; Filmoteca LM.14 114/3-4; TT.Ms da L iv. 1699.
f.313)
(44) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda I V. f .  199
(45) In  th is  context Antonio B ocarro 's estim ate o f  a revenue 
o f one hundred 3rant thousand x era fin s  from cinnamon in  the  
1630fs appears to  be an underestim ate. A contemporary document 
a t  Evora supports the estim ate given in  th e  te x t .  In  the  16^*3 
the p r ic e  a t  Goa was around hundred and twenty x e ra fin s  a bahar 
but the  q u an tity  sold th e re  declined  w ith the  lo s s  o f  some
of th e  cinnamon lands to  the  Dutch. The known export f ig u res  
in  the 1630*s are  as fo llow s.
1632 -  21*000 bahars
1633 -  2624 bahars
1636 -  2080 bahars
1637 -  2400 bahars
AP0 (new ed) IV -II-1 ,299 ; AHU 211 . f . l 27 ; Queyroz 1193;
Evora CXVl/2-3.f.115v; Goa Assentos do conselho da Fazenda.
IV. f .  123, V .ff .5 -6
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Every year about h a lf  the  cinnamon produced in  Ceylon
(46)
was shipped from Goa to  Lisbon in  the  annual fleet*A  sm all
proportion  o f th i s  was made up o f th e  cinnamon p r iv a te ly
imported by persons and in s t i tu t io n s  granted  sp e c ia l perm ission
by the  king* A much la rg e r  q u an tity  x?as taken by s a i lo r s  in
th e i r  ’l ib e r ty  chests} the  p r iv ile g e  o f  b ring ing  back a
c e rta in  q u a n tity  o f sp ices being one o f th e  inducements fo r
(47)
recru itm ent^ fo r  the  c a r re ira  da India* Both th ese  ca tegories
(46) No p rec ise  fig u res  are av a ilab le  to  us but in  1629 the  v iceroy 
proposed to  s e l l  1500 bahars o f cinnamon fo r tra n sp o r t to  Lisbon 
to  the  newly formed companhia da In d ia *a body formed in  la te
1620’s in  im ita tio n  o f  the English and Dutch jo in tO stock companies, 
t o  t a k e  over th e  t r a d e  between E u r o p e  a n d  the  E a s t *  The companhia 
a t  the  same time applied  to  th e  conselho da In d ia  a t  Lisbon 
fo r perm ission to  import 2000 bahars* The companhia however never 
traded  in  cinnamon though i t  d id  trad e  in  o th er sp ices fo r when 
perm ission to  tra n sp o r t cinnamon to  Europe was given the  supply 
had been cu t o f f  due to  wars in  Ceylon* By th is  time supplies 
were resumed in  1633* the  companhia had become defunct* (U niversity  
of London, King’s College L ib rary  -Portuguese departm ent, 
m anuscript e n t i t le d  ’Companhia das In d ia s *D.S.4987 At*2; BNL.PG.7640* 
f .6 0 ; AHU Caixa 12. j(. 6.12.1635; TT.LH.27.f.365; AHU 476 .f . 45
Assentos I*527)
(47) The ’liberdadeL-da can e lla i as defined  in  1615* allowed each 
s a i lo r  one man’s load  ofcinnamonfqus hua oessoa os possa le v a n ta r .)  
This was o r ig in a ll y understood to  mean a bundle o f n in e ty  s ix  pounds 
o r a t  most hundred and th i r t y  pounds.However in  tim e the  s iz e  o f 
the bundle so defined grew in  s iz e  so th a t  i t s  weight rose to  
250-300 pounds. By 1625 i t  was contended th a t  each s a i lo r  had th e  
r ig h t  to  take  two q u in ta ls  (or n ea rly  200 pounds). Less than  two 
decades l a t e r  the  s a i lo r s  claimed th a t  the  r ig h t  to  take up to  
tw elve la rg e  bundles. The p r iv ile g e s  claimed by cap ta in s and o th er 
o f f ic e r s  rose p roportionately*  Moreover another abuse c rep t in to  
the  system. The, customs dues were sometimes evaded by landing  th e  
cinnamon d irec tan d  by-passing the casa da In d ia *Merchants began to  
buy up sa ilo rs^  r ig h ts  and p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  trad e  which was 
supposed to  be a government monopoly. Ships overloaded w ith spice 
were o ften  wrecked on the voyage to  Lisbon. F in a lly  th e  a r r iv a l
(C ontd .,)
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o f imports were l ia b le  to  a duty o f 26$ of the  Goa value a t  
the casa da In d ia  in  Lisbon, bu t as th e  p r ic e  in  Europe was 
about f iv e  to  ten  tim es th a t  in  Goa, th i s  duty by no means
m
discouraged trad e  in  the  spice* Cinnamon was also  taken to  
Lisbon on b eh a lf o f  the  k ing  to  be so ld  a t  a p ro fit*  In  the  
ea rly  years o f  the  monopoly th e re  was l i t t l e  opposition  to  
the end o f open tra d e . The c r i t i c s  o f  th e  system were c h ie f ly
m
those who wished th e  monopoly tig h ten ed . The reason fo r th i s  i s  
not f a r  to  seek. Up to  1629 these  o f f ic ia l s  could v io la te  
the  monopoly w ith impunity and had nothing to  lo se  by i t s  
nominal p resence. A fter 1629 however w ith the  tig h ten in g  o f 
con tro ls  opposition  d id  emerge. I t  was led  by Diogo de Mello de 
Castro, the  en e rg e tic  i f  impetuous cap ta in -genera ls  o f  Ceylon.
(4$) (C ontd .,)
in  1644 o f a ship Nossa Senhora de Livramente w ith  4300 
q u in ta ls  (o r 1433 bahars approximately) o f  cinnamon in  1 l ib e r ty  
chests* alone provoked an in q u iry  which le d  to  the  l im ita tio n  
o f th is  l ib e r ty  to  one q u in ta l or 94-96 pounds p er s a i lo r .
(AHU Caixa 17, 6.9.1644; TT.LM.19.f.54v; AHU Caixa 16,* .28.1 .1644;
AHU Caixa 16, 25.3.1644; AHU Caixa 10, 9.2 .1626; AHU Caixa 18, 
26.6.1625; AHU 210 .f.l43v -l44v ; Goa Assentos do conselho 
da fazenda IV. f.123)
TW "AHU"31.f.i51v-153v; AHU Eaixa 8, 26.6.1625 
N.W.Posthumas -  Inqu iry  In to  th e  Sigtem h is to ry  o f  p ric e s  in  
Holland.I .  147
(49) AHU 3 3 .f f . 11-12; Goa Assentos conselho da fazenda I ,
f f . 126-127
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D e H e l l o ’ s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  m o n o p o l y  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  b a s e d  
o n  p o l i t i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  e c o n o m i c  g r o u n d s ^  T h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m o n o p o l y  a s  e n v i s a g e d  b y  t h e  c o n d e  d e  L i n h a r e s  r e m o v e d  
t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  a l l  c i n n a m o n  r e v e n u e s  f r o m  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l  
t o  t h e  v i c e r o y  a n d  t h i s  l o s s  s e r i o u s l y  u n d e r m i n e d  t h e  g e n e r a l ’ s  
c a p a c i t y  t o  p u t  h i s  f a v o u r i t e  p o l i c i e s  i n t o  e f f e c t *  H o w e v e r  
t h e  c a p t a i n - f e e n e r a l  h a d  a l s o  a n  e f f e c t i v e  e c o n o m i c
H e p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  l o s s  o f  c i n n a m o n  a s  a n  a r t i c l e  o f  
t r a d e  w a s  h a m p e r i n g  t h e  r o l e  h £  C e y l o n  h a d  t o  p l a y  a s  a  
p a r t  o f  t h e  t r a d i n g  c o m p l e x  o f  S o u t h  I n d i a .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  
f o r  d e  H e l l o  h i s  c o n t e n t i o n s  w e r e  p u t  f o r w a r d  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r s  
w h e n  t h e  r o y a l  m o n o p o l y  o f  c i n n a m o n  w a s  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
y i e l d i n g  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e v e n u e .  A s  t h e  v i c e r o y  c o m m e n t e d ^  
f o r  r e v e n u e  r e a s o n s  a l o n e  i t  w a s  u n t h i n k a b l e  a t  t h e  m o m e n t
t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  m o n o p o l y .  T h e  k i n g  a n d  h i s  c o u n c i l l o r s  c o u l d
(50) 
n o t  b u t  a g r e e .
ELEPHANTS
I n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  h e r d s  
o f  w i l d  e l e p h a n t s  s o m e t i m e s  n u m b e r i n g  u p  t o  tw o  o r  t h r e e
(50) AHU Caixa Jt$± 12, 6.12.1635; TT.LM.37.1'.!
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hundred anim als, wandered in  th e  fo re s ts  o f  the south-w estern
(51)
and n o rth -c e n tra l p la in s  o f Ceylon. They were in  demand in
many p a r ts  o f  In d ia  fo r  use in  war and tra n sp o rt as w ell as
fo r ceremonial purposes.
The Portuguese regime in  Ceylon had th ree  main sources
o f supply o f  e lephan ts. F ir s t ly  as ru le r s  o f  K otte they
received a fixed  number o f  anim als. In  the time o f th e  S inhalese
kings th e re  had been an e labo ra te  o rgan iza tion  to  ensure th a t
th e  k ing  received a c e r ta in  number o f  elephants annually .
According to  the  system the cap tu re , the  taming and the  feeding
o f elephants were the re s p o n s ib il i ty  o f th ree  groups o f people -
t*16 panikkayas. the kuruwe people and the  pannayas re sp e c tiv e ly .
(52)
Th^se groups held  land in  re tu rn  fo r  th e i r  s e rv ic e s . This system 
was continued a f te r  the Portuguese became m asters o f K otte.
In  1615 the  number o f elephants due according to  th is  system 
itfas t h i r t y  seven, o f  which t h i r t y  were from the  Dolosdas Korale 
o f the  Matara d isava and seven from th e  Magul Korale in  the  
Seven K orales. The number o f elephants a c tu a lly  received  by 
the  Portuguese however varied  from year to  year. In  1634 only
(51) Queyroz 73-74;1069; P .E .P ie r is  -  The Ceylon l i t t o r a l . 2-3
(52) For a d esc rip tio n  o f th is  system see T.Abeyasinghe 160-162
4 0 5
(53)
six teen  elephants are  recorded as having been so ld  from K otte.
However due to  th e  la ck  o f s t a t i s t i c s  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to
determine whether the  re b e llio n s  o f 1616-1620 and the  war o f
1628-1633 had any permanent e f fe c t  on th e  supply o f e lephan ts.
The d i f f i c u l ty  i s  g re a te r  because the  Portuguese o ccasio n a lly
organized elephants hunts in  areas o th e r than those in  which
such hunts were due to  take place according to  the tombo
(54) 
o f Vaz FVeire.
The second major source o f  supply was the  Vanni. The
Portuguese obtained a reg u la r  supply from th is  reg ion  long
before they  obtained co n tro l o f  Ja ffn a  i t s e l f .  As e a rly  as
the 1580*3 the  Portuguese in  Mannar received  two elephants
a year from the  king o f Ja ffn a  as a r e s u l t  o f  an accord
(55)
between the  two p a r t ie s .  In  1591 Ethirimanne Sin^ham, made 
king o f Ja ffn a  by a Portuguese exped itionary  force under 
Andre Furtado de Medonpa, agreed to  pay twelve elephants a year
(56)
as p a rt o f h is  t r ib u te  to  the Portuguese. A fter the conquest 
o f  Ja ffn a  in  1619, the  Portuguese took over the dues in  - 
elephants the  Vanniyars had h ith e rto  paid  to  the  king o f J a ffn a .
(53) Film oteca LM.19D.33/2-5; TT .LK .45.f.l?3; On 20 December
1637 Diogo de Mello de Castrp reported  a t o t a l  o f  s ix ty  animals 
obtained from a l l  sources during  th e  y ea r.
(5*0 P .da Trinidade I I I .  13-19
(55) Panduronga S .S .P issu rle n c a r  -  Regimento das fo r ta le z a s  
da In d ia , j 60
(56) I b id . ,  485
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These dues as recorded in  th e  fo ra l o f  Ja ffn a  in  1645 amounted
(57)
twenty seven tu sk le ss  elephants o r h a lf  th a t  number o f  tu sk e rs .
This supply was even le s s  dependable than  th a t  from Kotte
owing to  the  slender p o l i t i c a l  con tro l the  Portuguese had over
(58)
the Vanni c h ie f ta in s .
The th ird  source o f supply was Kandy. During the eleven 
years 1617-1627 the king o f Kandy d e liv e red  two elephants 
a year to  the  Portuguese as a mark o f vassalage. According to  
the t r e a ty  o f 163** which ended the war w ith Kandy, the Kandyans 
agreed to  pay a l l  a rrea rs  of t r ib u te  and continue t r ib u te  a t  
the r a te  o f one elephant a year fo r  the  next s ix  y ea rs . Thus 
during the twenty one years 1617-1638 th e  Portugugse received
( 59)
th i r ty  e ig h t elephants as tr ib u te  from Kandy. The Portuguese
also attem pted to  buy elephants from Kandy, though the
Kandyans n a tu ra lly  p re fe rre d  to  make g rea te r  p r o f i t s  by s e l l in g
( 60)
to  South Ind ian  tra d e rs  o r to  th e i r  Ind ian  customers d ir e c t .
With the  se izu re  o f Trincomalee in  1623, the in h a b ita n ts  o f 
the neighbouring v illa g e  o f Tambalagama were requ ired  to
( 61)
d e liv e r  a fixed  number o f  elephants to  th e  cap ta in  o f  the  f o r t .
(57) -AHU 220. f f .  l6 -l6 v ; P .E .P ie r is  - The kingdom o f Jaffnaoatam .18
(58) TT.Ms da L iv . 731.f.359v
(59) See above chapters I I ,a n d  IV.
(60) AHU 2 1 0 .f .i0 6 , 124
(61) TT.LM.45.f.363
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In  Kotte the r ig h t  to  hunt and trad e  in  elephants had 
t r a d i t io n a l ly  been a royal monopoly. Although the kings o f  
Ja ffn a  had p a r tic ip a te d  in  the  elephant trad e  in  the  s ix teen th  
century i t  seems u n lik e ly  th a t  the  trad e  in  elephants was a 
monopoly in  th a t  kingdom e sp e c ia lly  as the areas o f  th e  
elephant hunt were not under the  directizac p o l i t i c a l  con tro l 
o f  the Tamil kings.However once the  Portuguese obtained co n tro l 
o f the no rthern  kingdom they  attem pted to  extend th e i r  monopoly 
to  Ja ffn a . As a p ro v is io n a l measure the vedor Lanyarote de Seixas 
introduced a ta x  on elephant exports during h is  f i r s t  term  of 
o f f ic e . On 8 A pril 1630, the  conde de Linhares issued  a v ice reg a l 
decree d ec la rin g  th a t  elephant hunting in  th e  Vanni was to  be 
undertaken only fo r  the  s ta te .
The in s tru c tio n s  given to  the  vedor Diogo Mendes de B rito
in  1639 as w ell as evidence in  th e  fo ra l o f Ja ffh a  (1645)
in d ic a te  th a t  the  Portuguese m aintained a monopoly over sa le
o f  elephants in  Ja ffn a  a t  l e a s t  a f te r  1630. The infringem ent
o f th is  monopoly was ounishable by f iv e  years se rv ice  in  the
( 62)
f l e e t  o f  Malacca.
The Portuguese monopoly o f the  Ceylon elephant trad e  
however had sev era l gaps. In  the f i r s t  p lace , they  had l i t t l e  
r e a l  co n tro l over th e  supply from Kandy. The Kandyans by the
(62) AHU 220.f . 44; P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Jaffnapatagu30 
AHU Caixa 2, doc.246
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tre a ty  o f  1617 had the  r ig h t  to  s e l l  elephants abroad and they
(63)
o ften  used the  p o rts  o f  K otte and Ja ffh a  fo r th is  purpose.
Secondly, in  the  1620*s the Portuguese monopoly was r e s t r ic te d
to  trad e  w ith in  Ceylon. Once th e  elephants had been caught
and tamed they  were taken to  Colombo, Mannar or Ja ffn a  and so ld
(64)
by p u b lic  auc tion . At these  auctions they  were bought by 
p r iv a te  merchants who paid  customs dues o f seven and a h a lf
( 65)
p e rce n t. Thus the  trad e  in  elephants ou tside  Ceylon was f re e .
Two cap ta in s-g en era l o f  Ceylon are known to  have exported
( 66)
elephants on th e i r  account.
Elephants were taken by p r iv a te  tra d e rs  to  various 
p a r ts  o f  In d ia . In  the ea rly  s ix teen th  century Ceylon's ch ie f
(67)
market seems to  have been Tanjore. In  our period  th e re  i s
evidence th a t  elephants were so ld  to  Vi j  ayanagara^i B ijapur,
(68)
Golconda, Tanjore, Madura and the  Mughal empire. Ceylon elephants
(63) AHU 210.f . 106,124; Coimbra 460.f f . 228-230; TT.LM .43.f.l75
(64) AHU 210.f .  124; P .E .P ie r is  - The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam .31 
I t  seems l ik e ly  th a t  the  elephants caught in  Matara were
sold  a t  Colombo while those caught in  th e  Seven K orales wero 
escorted  overland to  Mannar and sometimes thence to  Ja ffn a  v ia  
Elephant P ass. During th e  second and th i r d  decades o f  the  
seventeenth century  many elephants were taken overland across a r id  
country to  Ja ffn a  probably because o f the higher p r ic e s  th a t  
could be obtained th e re . (TT.LM.12.f.344; TT.LM .l6.f.294)
(65) AHU 220.f . 45
Of these dues, seven percen t went to  the s t a t e .  The h a lf  
percen t was d ivided among customs o f f ic ia l s  as follow s -  
16/30 to  the  recebedor os re ce iv e r, 8/30  to  th e  escrivao  or 
se c re ta ry , 6/30  to  the kanakaoulle or n a tiv e  o f f i c i a l .
(66) TT.LM.1 6 .f f . 585,738
( 67) T.Abeyasinghe, 162; V rid d ag iriso n ,172
(68) Filmoteca LM.13B, 5-6 /3 -2 ; 11/3-55 P .da Trinidade 111,6;
Goa regimentos e in s tru cco es . I I I . f f . 2-8
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were sometimes presented  by the Portuguese s ta te  to  Ind ian
(69)
ru le rs  as tokens o f frien d sh ip  and esteem. In  the 1630*s Ceylon
(70)
elephants were also  sen t to  work in  th e  shipyards o f  Goa.
The k ing  o f P ortugal h im self aent a request fo r  Ceylon
(71)
elephants to  be sen t to  Europe. On the  Coromandel and the
Malabar co asts , the ch ie f com petition to  th e  Cey Ion elephants
(72)
came from elephants exported from the  Arakan reg ion .
In  the 1630*s the open trad e  in  Ceylon elephants ou tside 
the is lan d  was d isrup ted  by a measure o f  the  conde de L inhares, 
viceroy o f In d ia  (1629-1635)* The conde who had already  in s is te d  
on a monopoly in  elephant hunting in  1630 ordered th a t  auctions 
should cease and the  Ceylon adm in istra tion  should take over 
the sa le  o f e lephan ts. The sa le  o f elephants abroad by Portuguese 
o f f ic ia l s  had been t r ie d  in  Azevedo's day and abandoned fo r  
f in a n c ia l reasons. The motive o f the conde in  re tu rn in g  to  th is  
po licy  was Jjowever not one o f in c reas in g  th e  revenue obtained 
by the Ceylon government. In  f a c t  h is  p lans envisaged the  
lo ss  o f a l l  elephant revenue to  Ceylon. I t  was d ic ta te d  by a 
need to  ob ta in  a re lia b le  supply o f s a l tp e t re  and to  deny i t
(69) Ajuda 5 i-V III-5 1 .ff .1 9 8 , 207
(70) Goa Assentos do conselho da fazenda IV .f.6 5
(71) TT.LM.31. f . 153 The request o r ig in a l ly  sen t in  October 
1631 was repeated  in  A pril 1632 and January 1634. I t  i s  unknown 
whether the  request was even tua lly  complied w ith .
(72) TT.LM.3 6 .f .5
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(73)
t o  t h e  D u t c h .
T h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  t h e  e a s t  n e e d e d  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  s a l t p e t r e
f o r  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  g u n p o w d e r  f o r  t h e i r  o w n  u s e .  A s u r g e n t
h o w e v e r  w a s  t h e  n e e d  t o  s u p p l y  t h e  m o t h e r  c o u n t r y .  I n  E u r o p e ,
a t  t h e  b e g i n i n g  o f  o u r  p e r i o d , t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  a n d  t h e  p r i c e  o f
s a l t p e t r e  r o s e  s t e e p l y  d u e  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  
(74)
T h i r t y  Y e a r s *  W a r .  T h e  v i c e r o y  i n  I n d i a  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  i n s t r u c t e d
t o  s e c u r e  s u p p l i e s  o f  s a l t p e t r e  a n d  t o  d e n y  i t  t o  a l l  e n e m i e s
o f  P o r t u g a l .  T h e  c h i e f  e x p o r t e r s  o f  s a l t p e t r e  i n  A s i a  a t  t h i s
time were Madura and B e n g a l .  I n  1633 the conde de Linhares
s e n t  S e b e s t i £ o  P e s s a n h a  t o  M a d u r a  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t
t o  e x c h a n g e  s a l t p e t r e  f o r  C e y l o n  e l e p h a n t s .  T h e  a g r e e m e n t
e v e n t u a l l y  c o n c l u d e d  l a i d  d o w n  t h h t  t h e  N a y a k  w o u l d  s e l l
s a l t p e t r e  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  a t  a  p r i c e  o f  t w e n t y  s e v e n  a n d
a  h a l f  x e r a f i n s  a  b a h a r  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  e l e p h a n t s  d e l i v e r e d
a t  T u t i c o r i m  a t  a  p r i c e  a v e r a g i n g  s i x  h u n d r e d  a n d  s i x t y  s i x
(75)
s i x  x e r a f i n s  e a c h .
T h e  r e t u r n  t o  d i r e c t  s a l e  b y  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  o f f i c i a l s  
t o  t h e  c u s t o m e r  i n  I n d i a  a r o u s e d  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  C e y l o n .  P o r t u g u e s e  
o f f i c i a l s  l e d  b y  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l ,  D i o g o  d e  M e l l o  d e  C a s t r o
(73) TT.LM.4 0 . f . 6 9 5 T . A b e y a s i n g h e  1 6 2
( 7 4 )  R a y a c h a u d h u r i  1 6 8 ;  Gr.N. C l a r k  -  W a r  a n d  s o c i e t y  i n  t h b  
s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  6 2
( 75)  T T .L M .30 . f . 5 9 ;  C o i m b r a  ^ 5 9 . f . 1 8 2 ;  C o i m b r a  6 4 5 . f . 7  
E v o r a  CR A r m . V - V I , i 4 ~ 5 . f . l 6 5 s  T T . L K . 3 1 . f . 2 2 7
a r g u e d  a g a i n s t  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  o n  tw o  c o u n t s .  F i r s t l y  i t  w a s
/
c o n t e n d e d  t h a t  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  c a u s e d  a  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s  a s  t h e
p r i c e  f i x e d  f o r  s a l t p e t r e  w a s  t o o  h i g h  a n d  t h a t  f o r  t h e  e l e p h a n t s
w a s  t o o  l o w .  T h e y  h e l d  t h a t  b e t t e r  t e r m s  c o u l d  b e  o b t a i n e d
f r o m  m e r c h a n t s  f r o m  B e n g a l .  S e c o n d l y ,  i t  w a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e
e n d  o f  a u c t i o n s  a t  J a f f n a  a n d  H a n n a r  w o u l d  a l s o  l e a d  t o  t h e
e n d  o f  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  f o o d  s t u f f s  b r o u g h t  b y  m e r c h a n t s  f r o m
(76)
B e n g a l .  E v e n t u a l l y  a  c o m p r o m i s e  s e t t l e m e n t  w a s  r e a c h e d .  T h e  
e l e p h a n t s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  b e  a u c t i o n e d  i n  C e y l o n  a n d  t h e  f u n d s
(77)
s o  o b t a i n e d  w e r e  u s e d  t o  b u ^  s a l t p e t r e .
E s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  p r i c e  o f  C e y l o n  e l e p h a n t s  a s  f o u n d
i n  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  b o o k s  a n d  d o c u m e n t s  v a r y  a  g r e a t  d e a l .
H o w e v e r  tw o  p r i n c i p l e s  s e e m  c l e a r .  T h e  p r i c e  o f  a n  e l e p h a n t
v a r i e d  w i t h  i t s  s i z e ,  o t  m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y ,  i t s  h e i g h t  a s
m e a s u r e d  i n  c o v a d o s  o r  c u b i t s . S e c o n d l y ,  a  t u s k e r  w a s  d o u b l e
(78)
t h e  p r i c e  o f  a  t u s k l e s s  e l e p h a n t .  A p a r t  f r o m  t h e s e  tw o  f a c t o r s  
t h e  p l a c e  o f  s a l e  i t s e l f  m u s t  h a v e  h a d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  p r i c e .  E l e p h a n t s  w e r e  e x p e n s i v e  t o  f e e d  a n d  d i f f i c u l t
(76) AHU 210 .ff.l06 -106v ; TT.LM.37*f«l> D iario  do conde de
Linhares v ic e - re i  da In d ia , 157
(77) TT.LM.4 3 .f .i7 5 v j TT.LM.4 0 .f . 95? Assentos I I . 162;
TT.LM.37 .f . 155; Film oteca LM.20,19/2
(78) T.Abeyasinghe 163; P .E .P ie r is  -The kingdom o f ffaffnapatam .18 
24,31.
A covado measured t h i r t y  in c h es .(R ib e iro , 138)
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t o  t r a n s p o r t .  U n l e s s  w e l l  c a r e d  f o r  t h e y  c o n l d  s i c k e n  a n d  d i e .  
T h i s  c o u l d  p r o b a b l y  e x p l a i n  w h y  p r i c e s  a t  J a f f n a ,  a  p o r t
n e a r e r  t h e  c u s t o m e r ,  s e e m  t o  h a v e  b e e n  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  a t
C o lo m b o .  T h e  f o r a l  o f  J a f f n a  o f  1 6 4 5  g i v e s  a  l i s t  o f  p r i c e s  
p a i d  t o  t h e  V a n n i y a r s  f o r  t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f  e x t r a  e l e p h a n t s .
F o r  a n  e l e p h a n t ^  o f  5  c o v a d o s  -  6 0  x e r a f i n s
4§- c o v a d o s  -  5 0  x e r a f i n s  
4  c o v a d o s  -  4 0  x e r a f i n s  
3 -f  c o v a d o s  -  32 x e r a f i n s  
F e m a l e  o r  t u s k l e s s  e l e p h a n t s  f e t c h e d  m u c h  s m a l l e r  p r i c e s .  T h e  
f o r a l  g i v e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e t a i l s  
F o r  o n e  o f  5 - ^ r  c o v a d o s  -  1 6  x e r a f i n s  
4 J - - 3  c o v a d o s  -  1 2  x e r a f i n s
(79)
U n d e r  3  c o v a d o s  -  8  x e r a f i n s
T h e s e  p r i c e s  h o w e v e r  b y  n o  m e a n s  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  v a l u e  t h a t
c o u l d  b e  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  o p e n  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e y  a r e  t h e  a m o u n t s
f i x e d  b y  a  m o n o p o l i s t i c  b u y e r ,  l l o r e  r e a l i s t i c  p e r h a p s  \j ! re  t h e
p e n a l t i e s  i m p o s e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  n o n - d e l i v e r y  o f  f i x e d  t r i b u t e .
T h i s  a m o u n t e d  t o  o n e  h u n d r e d  p a r d a o s  p e r  t u s k e r  a n d  f i f t y
(80)
p a r d ^ t o s  f o r  a n y  e l e p h a n t .  T h e  a c t u a l  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  o f  e l e p h a n t s  
i n  C e y l o n  w a s  m u c h  h i g h e r  d u e  t o  c o s t s  o f  t r a n s p o r t  t o  t h e
( 7 9 )  P . E . P i e r i s -  T h e  k i n g d o m  o f  J a f f n a p a t a m ,  3 1
( 8 0 )  I b i d . 1 8
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p l a c e  o f  s a l e  a n d  o f  f e e d i n g .  I n  K o t t e  i t  p r o b a b l y  a v e r a g e d
( 8 1 )
b e t w e e n  tw o  h u n d r e d  a n d  t h r e e  h u n d r e d  x e r a f i n s  p e r  e l e p h a n t .
I n  J a f f n a  t h e  p r i c e  w a s  a r o u n d  f i v e  h u n d r e d  x e r a f i n s  e a c h .
T h e r e ,  i s  l i t t l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  p r i c e  o f i  e l e p h a n t s  i n
I n d i a  b u t  t h e  N a y a k  o f  M a d u r a  a g r e e d  t o  b u y  e l e p h a n t s  a t  t h e
( 8 2 )
r a t e  o f  tw o  h u n d r e d  a n d  t w e n t y  t w o  x e r a f i n s  a  c o v a d o .  Q u e y r o z *s  
e s t i m a t e  o f  a b o u t  t h o u s a n d  p a r d ^ b s  p e r  K o t t e  e l e p h a n t  m a y  w e l l  
h a v e  b e e n  b a s e d  o n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  i n  I n d i a ,  t h o u g h  i n s t a n c e s
( 8 3 )
o f  h i g h e r  p r i c e s  b e i n g  p a i d  a r e  k n o w n .
T h e  r e v e n u e  o b t a i n e d  b y  t h e  C e y l o n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f r o m
t h e  s a l e  o f  e l e p h a n t s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t i m a t e ,  a s  t h e  p r i c e  a n d
t h e  n u f o b e r  o f  e l e p h a n t s  v a r i e d  g r e a t l y .  A  l i s t  o f  t h e  r e v e n u e s  o f
o f  K o t t e  i n  1 6 2 0 * s  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  i n c o m e  f r o m  e l e p h a n t s  a t  f i v e
(84)
t h o u s a n d  x e r a f i n s .  T h e  l o w e s t  r e c o r e d  i n c o m e  f o r  K o t t e  w a s  t h a t  
o f  1 6 3 4  -  s i x t e e n  e l e p h a n t s  w e r e  s o l d  f o r  t h r e e  t h o u s a n d  xx
(85)
n i n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  n i n e t y  x e r a f i n s .  T h e  o n l y  c o m p l e t e  f i g u r e s
( 8 1 )  Q u e y r o z  7 2 9 ,  1 1 9 4 ;  T . A b e y a s i n g h e , l 6 3 - l 6 4
( 8 2 )  C o i m b r a  6 4 5 . f . 7
( 83)  Q u e y r o z  1 1 9 3 *  R i b e i r o f  ( 1 4 9 )  w h o  l i v e d  f o r  m a n y  y e a r s  i n  
C e y l o n g a v e  e i g h t  t h o u s a n d  p a r d ^ o s  a s  t h e  l o w e s t  p r i c e  o f  a  C e y l o n  
e l e p h a n t .  R i b e i r o f s  f i g u r e s  a r e  h o w e v e r  a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  r e l i a b l e .  
I n  1 6 3 3  t h e  G o a  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o n t r a c t e d  w i t h  F r a n c i s c o  T e l l e s ,  
c a p t a i n  o f  M a n n a r  t o  t a k e  d e l i v e r y  o f  t h r e e  e l e p h a n t s  a t  C o c h i n  
f o r  a  t o t a l  p a y m e n t  o f  s i x  t h o u s a n d  f i v e  h u n d r e d  x e r a f i n s  -
o v e r  tw o  t h o u s a n d  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  s i x t y  x e r a f i n s  p e r a n i m a l .
( G o a  f t s s e n t o s  d o  c o n s e l h o  d a  f a z e n d a  I V .  f . 65)
( 8 4 )  A j u d a  5 1 - V - 4 4 . f . 2 3 v
( 8 5 )  APO ( n e w  e d )  T om o I V . P a r t  I .  4 0 1 - 4 0 2
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for elephants obtained from the whole o f  Portuguese Ceylon
( 86)
o c c u r s  i n  1 6 3 7  w h e n  s i x j y  s i x  o f  t h e m  w e r e  c a p t u r e d *  S o l d  
a t  a n  a v e r a g e  p r i c e  o f  t h r e e  h u n d r e d  x e r a f i n s  e a c h  i n  C e y l o n  
t h e y  w o u l d  h a v e  y i e l d e d  1 9 > 8 0 0  x e r a f i n s .
ARECANUT
The nut o f  the areca palm ( areca catechu) had been
an a r t ic le  o f commercial value long before the a r r iv a l  o f  the
Portuguese in  the  e a s t . The chewing o f arecanut w ith b e te l
l e a v e s  w a s  a  s o c i a l  c u s t o m  a m o n g  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  C e y l o n  a n d  s o u t h
In d ia . The palm i t s e l f  could be c u ltiv a te d  in  most p a r ts  o f
the south-w estern p la in s  o f Ceylon and in  many p a r ts  o f Kotte
the nut had become the m ainstay o f lo c a l tra d e , fo r  the  Kotte
peasants had become accustomed to  pay fo r  th e i r  requirem ents
( 8 7 )
of c lo th  and s a l t  in  areca.
Y/hen the  Portuguese obtained possession  o f K otte, the 
only arecanut the government was e n t i t le d  to ,  was the  produce 
paid as d u e ^ n  kind by those who liv e d  in  royal v illa g e s  (gabadagam) • 
With the in c reas in g  a lie n a tio n  o f s ta te -h e ld  v illg e s  th i s  amount 
f e l l  to  th re e  hundred and seventy s ix  amunas o f twenty four 
thousand to  twenty fiv e  thousand nuts each in  the  l a s t  days
( 8 6 )  T T .L M .4 3 . f . l 7 5 v
( 87) A rasaratnam ,1 4 6
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of Azevedo's cap tain -general sh ip . Duiing th e  1620 fs and
1630*8 th is  amount seems to  hafce fa l le n  fu r th e r  to  th ree
(63)
hundred and fiv e  hmunas.
Soon a f te r  talcing over the adm in istra tion  o f Kotte
however, the  Portuguese found another means o f ob ta in ing
revenue from the  arecanut tra d e , by the im position  o f enhanced
customs dues. When the vedor Jorge Frolim de Almeida a rriv ed
in  Ceylon he found th a t  the re  was a considerable d iffe ren ce  
o f
in  the s c a le /p ric e s  between Colombo and G alle . While an amuna 
o f  arecanut could be sold  fo r ten  la r in s  in  Colombo, the  sa le  
p ric e  o f the  same q u an tity  a t  G alle was only four l a r in s . The 
duty a t  both p o rts  was fixed  a t  four fanams per amuna. The 
h igher p r ic e  a t  Colombo was no doubt due to  the g re a te r  demand 
fo r the product fo r  export from th e  m etropo lis. De Almeida 
determined to  gain  some b e n i f i t  fo r  the  crown from th is  
v a r ia tio n  in  p r ic e s . By h is  o rder the customs dues a t  Colombo 
were fixed  a t  one l a r in  an amuna while those  a t  Gall© were 
ra ise d  to  the  high le v e l o f te n  la r in s  an amuna. K odifica tions 
o f dues a t  o th er p o rts  probably followed s u i t .  By the  end o f 
the  s ix tee n th  century an amuna o f arecanut paid  one and a h a lf
(88) T.Abeyasinghe, 15^} Filmoteca LM.19D. 29 /30-5 /1 , 33/2-5
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la r in s  in  customs a t  He.'^ ombo and a l i t t l e  over a l a r in  a t
(89)
Weligama and Chilaw. The e f fe c ts  o f these  m odifications on
the revenue o f the  s ta te  and the p a tte rn  o f  the  arecanut
trade cannot be traced  due to  lack  o f evidence* However before
long th is  innovation was superseded by another -  th a t  o f
compulsory purchase o f a l l  arecanut produced in  Kotte*
The compulsory purchase o f arecanut i t s e l f  was no
innovation a t  a ll*  The Portuguese tombo made by Vaz F re ire
records th a t  the in h a b ita n ts  o f Alutagama had to  supply s ix ty
amunas o f arecanut a year in  exchange fo r  goods worth two
hundred and fo r ty  la r in s  to  King Rajasinha o f Sitawaka in  the
(90)
six teen th  century* However th is  p ra c tic e  was by no means 
widespread in  Kotte under the  S inhalese kings* The tombo of 
Jorge Frolim de Almeida makes i t  c le a r  th a t ,  a t  l e a s t ,  a t  the  
end o f the  s ix teen th  century, th e re  was open trad e  in  arecanu t.
I t  was the widespread ap p lica tio n  o f a p ra c tic e  h ith e r to  confined 
to  a small area  th a t  was new*
The reg u la tio n s governing compulsory purchase were framed
(39) TT*Ms da Convento da Grapa, tomo 6D. 3^1-3^2,3^7-3*$ 
Fanam -  a S inhalese coin which f e l l  in  value in  r e la t io n  to  
the la r in  and the x e ra fin  in  th e  l a t e  s ix te en th  century* In  
the  l$ 70*s and 1580*s a l a r in  was equ ivalen t to  seven fanams* 
Eiy 1599 & l a r i n  was warfcth f i f te e n  to  twenty fanams,
(99) P .E .P ie r is  - The Ceylon l i t t o r a l*  50
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so as to  ob ta in  fo r  the  crown the  t o t a l  q u a n tity  o f  arecanut
(91)
produced in  K otte a t  a fixed  p ric e  o f  four la g in s  an I^ amuna*
The to t a l  sum o f fou r thousand and one hundred and eleven 
amunas recorded in  Vaz F re ire ’s tombo thus represen ted  an 
estim ate made o f arecanut production o f K otte in  th e  ea rly  
years o f  the  seventeenth  century* By the  second decade o f the 
seventeenth cen tury  many o f f ic e rs  o f  the  ad m in is tra tio n ran g in g  
from the  cap ta in -g en era l h im self to  cap tains o f the  army and 
the vidanes o f  th e  baddas or departm ents, had acquired the 
r ig h t to  ob ta in  q u a n ti t ie s  o f arecanut a t  the p r ic e  paid  by
(9 2 )
th e  government.By th e  1620 's , the  v i l la g e r  had to  d e liv e r
a l l  the arecanut so purchased to  Colombo w ith an ad d itio n a l 
thousand nuts per amuna to  cover p o ss ib le  lo sse s  in  tra n sp o r t
(93)
and storage*
The reason given fo r o r ig in a l ly  enforcing th e  p ra c tic e  o f 
fwchtet
compulsory/ was the  need fo r money to  finance the  war ag a in st
(9*0
Kandy.However the  p ra c tic e  proved so p ro f ita b le  th a t  i t  was
re ta in ed  even when th e  Portuguese f in a n c ia l resources improved
considerably in  l a t e r  tim es. This new o b lig a tio n  bore in c re as in g ly
,fe> v
on the peasants o f  K otte w ith th e  passage o f time /th ree  reasons.
(91) TT.LM.18 .f.240v
(92) AHU 222*ff*171-171v; T*Abeyasinghe, 155-157; Goa Assentos 
do conselho da fazenda I I ,  f f . 211-212 — — —
T?35'lKtT '35 f^.~7T; x ix .d o c .i4 4
(94) TT. LM. 18. f  * 240v ; T, Abeyasinghe, 155
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Firstly^  the purchase p r ic e  had been fixed  a t  a tim e when arecanut 
p r ic e s  were begining to  r i s e  -  the  f ix in g  o f the r a te  forced 
them to  forgo a source o f revenue they  badly needed* Secondly, 
the  o b lig a tio n  to  produce a s e t  q u an tity  each year was r ig id ly  
enforced* Although w arfare and n a tu ra l d is a s te rs  o ften  baused 
the lo s s  o f arecanut tre e s  in  a lo c a l i ty ,  the  amount o r ig in a l ly  
fixed  had to  be deliv ered  to  Colombo. This sometimes forced 
v i l la g e rs  to  buy arecanut a t  th ree  or four tim es the fixed  
p rice  to  f u l f i l l  th e i r  o b lig a tio n s . T hird ly , a t  l e a s t  in  the 
1630’s the peasant o ften  did not n s x  receive even the four 
la r in s  per amuna they were e n t i t le d  to  according to  the tombo o f 
Vaz F re ire . The payment to  the producer was u su a lly  made by 
leng ths o f c lo th  each worth four l a r in s .The Portuguese made 
the peasant accept c lo th  worth only two o r th ree  la r in s  in  
exchange fo r  each amuna.Moreover the ameunfcut amount o f nuts per 
amuna had been t r a d i t io n a l ly  fixed  a t  twenty four to  twenty 
f iv e  thousand was g radually  increased  to  t h i r t y  two thousand.
This l a t t e r  development e f fe c t iv e ly  n u l l i f ie d  the r i s e  in  p rice
from four to  fiv e  la r in s  per amuna decreed by the  v iceroy
Pero da S ilv a  in  h is  regimento to  the new vedor Antonio da Fonseca
(95)"  - - - - - - - - -
Czouro on 13 September 1637.
Opposition to  compulsory purchase o f arecanut by the 
s ta te  came from two sources. In  1617 and again in  1621 the 
camara o f Colombo p e titio n e d  to  the king th a t  th is  system be
(95) TT.LM .I8.f.240v; Queyroz 1017>10275 Goa regimentos e 
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ended. The a b o litio n  o f  compulsory purchase would have freed  
the  v i l lg e  holding casados from th e  o b lig a tio n  o f supplying 
a fixed  q u a n tity  o f  arecanut to  th e  s ta te .  The p e t i t io n  
however made i t  c le a r  th a t  the  casados had nothing  ag a in st 
the  p r in c ip le  o f  compulsory purchase i t s e l f .  When the  s ta te  
requirem ent was abolished they  planned to  take over the  
whole system and apply i t  fo r  t h e i r  own b e n e f it .  The p e t i t io n  
o f the  camara was considered in  the  conselho da In d ia  a t  Lisbon 
which recommended the a b o lit io n  o f  compulsory purchase o f 
areca on cond ition  th a t  the q u it  re n ts  o f  the  v illa g e s  were 
ra ise d  p ro p o rtio n a te ly . No fu r th e r  s teps are known to  have 
been taken in  th is  re sp e c t. The second element to  oppose th is  
p ra c t is e  consisted  of the S inhalese them selves. When in  1636 
they made rep resen ta tio n s  to  th e  cap ta in -genera l in  a leng thy  
p e t i t io n ,  compulsory purchase o f arecanut was one o f  the  item s 
sing led  gut fo r  b i t t e r  a tta c k . The S inhalese un like  the  casados 
wanted the  whole system abo lished . Their hopes however had
(9 «
fa r  sm aller chances o f r e a l iz a tio n  than  those of th e  casados.
The evidence av a ila b le  however suggests th a t  d esp ite  
the  r ig id  in s is te n c e  on the  q u a n tit ie s  recorded in  th e  tombo. 
the a c tu a l amount o f arecanut received  by th e  government in
(96) Queyroa 1017, 10275 AUH Caixa 5, 21.11.1617; TT.LM. 18. f.240v 
AHU 33.f . 12; TT.Colleccao de S.Vicente XEX.doc. 144 
The only Portuguese known to  have opposed the  compulsory purchase 
in  to to  was L&n^arote de Seixas but even he argued th a t  i t  was 
ju s t i f i e d  in  the  case o f  S inhalese landholders fo r  un like  the 
Portuguese they  d id  not pay q u it  ren ts  to  the s ta te .
(AHU Caixa 6, 2.11.1618)
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our period  never reached the four thousand one hundred and
eleven amunas obtained in  l6l5» A document in  the  1620*s estim ates
the to t a l  re c e ip ts  from arecanut obtained by compulsory purchase
(97)
a t  s ix  thousand x e ra fin s  o f th re e  la r in s  each#If th is  estim ate 
was even approxim ately tru e  i t  would in d ic a te  th a t  purchases 
had fa l le n  to  twenty f iv e  percen t o f  the 1615 le v e l  fo r  the 
s e l l in g  p r ic e  o f arecanutjf in  1622 was twelve to  s ix teen  
la r in s  per amuna# I t  was probably in  an attem pt to  counter
th is  f a l l  in  supply th a t  the  Governor Fern&o de Alberquerque
sought in  1622 to  lower the p ric e  o f c lo th  which was u su a lly  
exchanged fo r  arecanut. Even in  163^ the amount purchased 
by the government was apparen tly  su b s ta n tia lly  le s s  than  the 
fig u re  o f  1615# In  th a t  year the arecanut purchased by the  
government to ta l le d  one thousand nine hundred and f i f t y  two 
and a h a lf  amunas# I t  was made up as follow s -
From Bulatgama -  1195 amunas
the vidane o f the mahabadda -  200 amunas
the  vidane o f  the  gem mining
v illa g e s  o f Denawaka -  200 amunas
the Alutukuru Korale -  6J- amunas
the Pasdun Korale -  S6j amunas
th e  Sabaragamuwa d isava -  2?^ amunas
the Matara d isava -  140 amunas
—  — "     II ■—  .  I I — —  I I—  -  I ■ I. I. < 1 .  ................... ................ — II I. .11— IN.  ■ !■■■
(97) AHU 3 5 .f.79
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the  Four Korales -  152 amunas
the  bullock-men o f  the  Seven
K orales -  20 amunas
the  vidane o f  th e  Pannayas -  2g amunas
1952-2 amunas
These f ig u re s  can be assumed as rep re se n ta tiv e  o f  the s i tu a t io n
(98) 
in  the 1630*s .
Though much o f th e  arecanut was exported to  south In d ia  
d i r e c t ly  from Colombo, some also  found i t s  way to  the Ja ffn a  
peninsu la from which area i t  was tran sp o rted  to  th e  Coromandel 
coast* In  f a c t  though arecanut was produced only in  n e g lig ib le  
q u a n titie s  in  Ja ffn a  i t s e l f ,  trad e  between the pen insu la  and 
south In d ia  depended la rg e ly  on i t s  sale* For th i s  reason 
Lan9aro te  de Seixas when captain-m ajor o f Ja ffn a  (1627-1630) 
proposed th a t  the export o f arecanut by lo c a l  merchants be 
forbidden so th a t  fo re ign  merchants would come to  ^a ffh a  and 
thereby  in c rease  i t s  customs revenues. This measure however 
proved to  be i l l -a d v is e d  as the  p ro h ib itio n  f a i le d  to  achieve 
i t s  o b jec tiv e  fo r  the  customers in  south In d ia  continued to  be 
supplied  from o ther p a r ts  o f Ceylon and th i s  p o licy  was even tually
(98) AHU 35 .f .7 9 ;  TT,CoTTeoqao de S.Vicente XIX.doc.144;
TT.LM.4 5 .f . 353 ; TT.LM. 15 .f .  181; AHU Caixa 7, 11.2.1632;
P .da T rinidade 111,20; Queyroz 1034; Film oteca LM.19D.33/2-5
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abanddned before any la s t in g  harm was dome to  the  trad e  in
(99)
J a ffn a .
The annual revenue derived from arecanut in  our period
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  es tim ate . In  1634 th e  gross revenue was
eleven thousand two hundred and s ix ty  two and a h a l f  x e ra f in s .
When th e  p r ic e  paid  to  the  /producer i s  deducted th is
leaves a n e t revenue o f approxim ately e ig h t thousand s ix
hundred x e ra f in s .The accounts o f  th e  fa c to r  Joao da Costa
P e re s te llo  estim ated the  revenue from arecanut in  I6 l8 -i6 i9
( 100)
to  be between e ig h t and nine thousand x e ra f in s . This could 
w ell have been the average revenue from arecanut in  the  1620*s 
and 1630*s .
LAND REVENUE
The f i r s t  twenty years o f Portuguese ru le  in  Ceylon 
had seeh two changes in  re sp e c t o f  land  tenure -  the in trd d u c tio n  
o f Portuguese s e t t l e r s  in to  th e  landholding c lass  and the  
extensive supplan ting  o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  se rv ice  tenure  by
( 101)
th a t  of payment of q u it  re n ts  fo r  th e  lands h e ld . Both th ese
(99) Film oteca LM.15. 28/2-3} TT.LM. 28. f.2?4} AHU Caixa 12, 6.12.1635
(100) Filmoteca LM.19D. 33/2-5} This view i s  fu r th e r  supported by 
an estim ate o f an annual revenue u f  n ine thousand x e ra fin s  a year 
in  the  1620*8 given in  another contemporary document. (Ajuda 51- 
V-44. f  .23v; TT.LM. 16. f  .258)
(101) These changes are  analysed in  d e ta i l  in  T.Abeyasinghe,
100-108. D iscussions o f  many questions r e la t in g  to  land  revenue*
as fo r  example the land  tenure  system o f K otte under S inhalese ru le r s ,  
though
re la v en t to  an understanding o f  our period  w il l  be om itted
o r su im arily  d e a lt  w ith where they  are adequately tre a te d  in  
T.Abeyasihghe's work.
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developments continued in  the  next twenty years and th e i r
combined e ffe c ts  determined th e  amount o f land  revenue obtained
by the  Portuguese government in  th e  years 1617 to  1638*
L i t t l e  evidence i s  av a ilab le  as to  the  ex ten t o f  land
held by the  Portuguese w ith in  K otte and to  what efctent i t
expanded, i f  indeed i t  d id  expand during  th i s  tim e. The tombo
o f Yaz F re ire  in d ic a te s  th a t  in  1614, the  Portuguese land  holdings
were concentrated in  the co a s ta l b e l t  from Colombo to  Matara
( 102)
and in  a few f e r t i l e  in land  a rea s . Revenue f ig u res  in  the 
same decade in d ic a te  th a t  approxim ately 21$ o f  a l l  land  in
(103)
Kotte was held  by Portuguese s e t t l e r s .  Evidence from Portuguese
sources however provewa considerable change in  land  holding
occured in  Ja ffn a  in  th is  p erio d . In  1618 th e  p r in c ip a l landholders
in  Ja ffh a  were a l l  Tamils. In  1645, i f  evidence from the
fo ra l  i s  to  accepted, Portuguese s e t t l e r s  had become the
(104)
p r in c ip a l landholders in  Ja ffn a . Although perhaps in  r e la t io n  
to  the  peasants th e  change from n a tiv e  to  Portuguese landholders 
was v i t a l ,  fo r  th e  Portuguese both misunderstood and misused
(105)
the  customary p ra c tic e s  o f the  lan d , from the  p o in t o f view
(102) T.Abeyasinghe, 114-115
(103) AHU Caixa 6, 13*11*1619 In  th e  1620 #s and 1630* s th e  ap p lican ts  
fo r  land  g ran ts  included those who fead served in  various p a r ts
o f th e  Portuguese empire. (TT.LM. 31* f *203)
(104)I.0*L.Conselho u ltram arino .I •
(105) T.Abeyasinghe,120; Queyroz, 1008,1015-1016,1025-1026
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of the Portuguese ad m in is tra tio n  i t  was th e  second change -
th a t  o f paying cash in s te ad  o f performing se rv ices  -  th a t
proved more important*
Portuguese land  p o licy  in  K otte as evolved in  the f i r s t
two decades o f  the  seventeenth  century  envisaged one p r in c ip a l
type of land holding* Land was to  be granted w ith th e  o b lig a tio n
of paying 12$ o f t h e i r  income to  th e  s ta te  as foro o r q u it
re n ts . The landholders were a lso  expected to  assume the ta sk
o f m aintaining a fixed  number o f  m ilitiam en, the  o b lig a tio n  of
each landholder in  th is  re sp ec t varying w ith the  income derived
from the  v i l lg e s  he held . Two exceptions to  th is  ru le  were to
be perm itted . F i r s t ly ,  the  land  form erly a llo ca ted  to  Buddhist
ofc Hindu temples -  th e  former viharagam and devalaRam. when
( 106)
held by m issionaries made no payment in  cash or se rv ic e . Secondly,
the se rv ice  tenure  was re ta in ed  in  a few cases when i t  was
thought to  be p ro f ita b le  o r convenient. Thus th e  cinnamon
p eelers and those who served in  th e  elephant hunt held  v illa g e s
in  re tu rn  fo r  these  se rv ic e s . The se rv ice  tenure v illa g e s  thus
preserved amounted to  approxim ately 9$ o f the t o t a l  number of 
(107) 
v illa g e s  in  K otte .
(106) Other lands when held  by m issionaries  paid  q u it  r e n ts .  
(AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632)
(107) T.Abeyasinghe, 121-126; AHU Caixa 4, 2 0 . l l . l 6 l5
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This system encountered sev era l d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  the
period  under consideration* The p r in c ip a l lan d h o ld ers , m ostly
Portuguese, though f i l i n g  to$pay the foros fo r  th e  lands they
held proved re lu c ta n t to  m aintain  the m ilitiam en as they
were requ ired  to  by the terras o f  th e i r  land  grants* Moreover,
the  S inhalese la s c a r in s  whose pay had been d iscontinued  in  th e
ea rly  seventeenth  century , refused  tp  pay foro fo r  th e i r  lands
u n t i l  these  payments were resumed* Thus up to  about 1626 while
the Portuguese s e t t l e r s  paid  t h e i r  q u it  ren ts  and evaded the
m ilita ry  o b lig a tio n s  the  S inhalese la sc a r in s  served in  war but
(108)
refused tp  pay land  re n ts .
Despite sp e c if ic  orders by th e  k ing , the  Portuguese
adm in istra tion  never succeeded in  fo rc in g  th e  casados to
(109)
m aintain m ilitiam en* In  the  case o f la s c a r in s  however, a
compromise se ttlem en t was reached in  th e  time o f  de Sa* Up to
1626, though th e  Portuguese held  land  by g ran ts  fo r  th ree  
(110)
l iv e s ,  the S inhalese had held v illa g e s  a t  pleasure* In  th a t  
year both th e  cap ta in -genera l de Sa and th e  vedor Ambrosio de 
F re ita s  da Camara recoramenddd to  the  v iceroy  th a t  land  g ran ts
(108) TT.LM .l6.f.294; AHU Caixa 4, 15.11.1615} AHU Caixa 6 , 
13.11.1619; TT.Kl.21.dT. 167} T.Abeyasinghe, 125- 126}
AHU Caixa 4 , 2 .1 .1616; AHU Caixa 4 , 20.11.1615
(109) TT.K1.16. f .  237
(110) In  th e  e a r ly  years o f  Portuguese ru le  g ran ts  were sometimes
made fo r  two l iv e s  but a f te r  th e  f i r s t  decade o f th e  seventeenth  
century g ran ts  were always made fo r  three* (TT.LM*26.f*658; 
TT*LM.21*f.35l5 DR.I,384-3855 AHU Caixa 4, 28*9*1615)
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t o  S i n h a l e s e  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  o n  t h e / t e r m s  a s  t o  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e .
T h i s  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  n a t i v e  h o l d e r  w o u l d  n o w  b e  a b l e  t o  n m r a i n a t e
h i s  c h i l d ,  b r o t h e r ,  n e p h e w  o r  i n d e e d  a n y  r e l a t i v e  t o  h o l d  t h e
( 111*
l a n d  o n  t h e  6 a m e  t e r m s  a s  h e  h a d  d o n e .  I n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h i s
s e c u r i t y  o f  t e n u r e  t h e  l a s c a r i n s  h a d  t o  p a y  q u i t  r e n t s  f o r  t h e
l a n d s  t h e y  h e l d .  T h e  v i c e r o y - i n - c o u n c i l  h a v i n g  a c c e p t e d  t h e s e
( 112)
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  t h e y  w e r e  i m p l e m e n t e d  i n  C e y l o n .  T h e  r e a c t i o n  
o f  t h e  l a s c a r i n s  t h e m s e l v e s  i s  u n k n o w n .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  
t h e y  a c q u i r e d  w e r e  o f  r a t h e r  d u b i o u s  v a l u e  ( f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
o f  t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  d e s p i t e  a l l  g u a r e n t e e s  f r o m  G o a  d e p e n d e d  o n
(113)
t h e  i n c l i n a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  d i s a v a s  a n d  t h e  c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l )  t h e y  
m a y  w e l l  h a v e  r e s e n t e d  t h e  p a y m e n t  o f  d u e s  t h e y  h a d  s o  f a r  
r e f u s e d  t o  p a y .  L a t e r  e v i d e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  
f o u n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o l l e c t  l a n d  r e n t s  f r o m  t h e  l a s c a r i n s  
e v e n  i n  t h e  1 6 3 0 * s .
A n o t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  w h i c h  h a d  l i t t l e  e f f e c t  o n  l a n d  r e v e n u e  
r e c e i p t s  b u t  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  l a n d h o l d e r s  
a n d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t s  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  i s  k n o w n  t o  
h a v e  o c c u r e d  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  T h i s  w a s  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  b y  t h e
(111) The r ig h t  to  r a is e  th e  foro a t  the end o f each’l if e *
was reserved by th e  ad m in istra tio n  but i t  was seldom excercised .
(112) B N L . P G . 1983.f f . 88-89; AHU CaiKa 9 , 6.2.1626; TT.LM.24, 
f.385 ; Ajuda 5 1 -V III-4 0 .f.2 l6 v
(113) T T .L M . 45. f.304v; T T .L M . 16. f . 580
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l a n d h o l d e r  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  b u y  a n d  s e l l  l a n d .  I t  i s  c l e a r
t h a t  t h i s  r i g h t  d i d  n o t  e x i s t  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  d e c a d e  o f  t h e
s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  I n d e e d  l a n d  s a l e s  w e r e  p r o h i b i t e d  b y
r o y a l  d e c r e e .  H o w e v e r  w h e n  o n  3 D e c e m b e r  l 6 l l  t h e  k i n g  d e c r e e d
t h a t  a l l  t h o s e  w h o  h e l d  l a n d  i n  C e y l o n  s h o u l d  r e s i d e  i n  t h e
i s l a n d ,  h e  a l l o w e d  a  p e r i o d  o f  f o u r  m o n t h s  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h o s e
(114)
w h o  d i d  n o t  w i s h  t o  r e s i d e  i n  C e y l o n  c o u l d  s e l l  t h e i r  l a n d s .  
N i n e  y e a r s  l a t e r  t h e  b i s h o p  o f  C o c h i n  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  
k i n g * s  p r o h i b i t i o n  o n  t h e  s a l e  o f  v i l l a g e s  w a s  b e i n g  v i o l a t e d
(115)
both w ith and w ithout th e  viceroy*s consent# B y  1629 th is
p r a c t i c e  h a d  b e c o m e  s o  c o m m o n p la c e  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  b o t h
a t  G o a  a n d  L i s b o n  h a d  a c c e p t e d  i t .  T h e  k i n g  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o
t h e  v i c e r o y  d a t e d  25 M a r c h  1629 m e r e l y  l a i d  d o w n  t h e  c o n d i t i o n
( 116)
t h a t  s a l e s  m u s t  b e  m a d e  o n l y  t o  p e r s o n s  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  i s l a n d .
A s  l o n g  a s  t h e  u n i t  b o u g h t  a n d  s o l d  w a s  t h e  v i l l a g e ,
(117)
t h e  p e a s a n t  o r  t h e  p a n g u k a r a y a  w a s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d .  I n  
K o t t e  t h e  v i l l a g e  w a s  m a d e  u p  o f  t h e  m u t t e t t u  ( o r  t h e  h o l d e r ( s  
s h a r e )  a n d  p a n g u s  o r  p o r t i o n s  o f  l a n d  h e l d  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  
c u l t i v a t o r s .  S o m e  o f  t h e  h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  p a n g u s  w e r e  o b l i g e d  t o  
c u l t i v a t e  t h e  v i l l a g e  h o l d e r  * s  m u t t e t t u  a n d  g i v e  h i m  t h e  t o t a l
da
(114) A.Garcia -  A rquivo/relacao da Goa. 122
(115) TT.LM.16 .f . 239; AHU Caixa 3, 31.3.1615; AHU Caixa 4 , 
7.9 .1615; AHU 3 3 .f . l9
(116) TT.LM. 26. f .  298
(117) However th e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  during  th e  period  o f
Portuguese ru le , landholders Portuguese and S inhalese a l ik e , began
to  e x tra c t more from th e  peasants in  v io la tio n  o f customary p ra c t ic e .
De Sa acknowledge th i s  as the  p r in c ip a l reason fo r  re b e llio n s  and 
discontentm ent. (TT.Colleccao de S .V icente XIX.doc.274)
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(118)
produce o f the  land  so c u ltiv a te d .
Thus changes in  land  holding a t  the  v illa g e  le v e l  had 
r e la t iv e ly  m arginal e f fe c ts  on the p easan ts . In  the l a t e  l620*s 
however buying and s e l l in g  pan?us themselves had a lready  go t 
under way. To understand the  economies o f these  tra n sa c tio n s  
i t  i s  necessary  to  re tu rn  to  the p ic tu re  o f  the  S inhalese v illa g e  
in  K otte. The o r ig in a l  simple m uttettu-pangu s tru c tu re  had in  
course o f tim e being m odified, c h ie f ly  due to  successive 
p a r t i t io n  o f shares among successive g en era tio n s. There had 
grown up by the  seventeenth  century , c e r ta in  arrangements by 
which the  r ig h tfu l  ho lder o f  a p lo t  who d id  not wish to  
c u ltiv a te  i t  could le a se  i t  to  another fo r  a fixed  share o f 
the  produce. Ande and o tu  were two forms o f such le a s in g . They 
were disadvantageous to  the  peasants in  th a t  while as a pangukaraya 
he gained th e  whole o f  th e  produce o f h is  p lo t ,  as an ande 
o r otu c u l t iv a to r  he gained only a p a r t .  Thus, such c u lt iv a tio n  
would be undertaken by the peasan t only i f  he d id  not hold a 
pangu or i f  th e  ande and o tu  lands were so s itu a te d  in  r e la t io n  
to  h is pangu th a t  he could c u ltiv a te  i t  w ith  l i t t l e  ex tra  
e f f o r t .  In  tim es o f labour s c a rc i ty , as the  K otte peasan t was 
not t ie d  to  the  s o i l  ande o r o tu  land  would be o f l i t t l e  value .
Much depended however on th e  f e r t i l i t y  o f  th e  p lo t  and the
(118) T.Abeyasinghe, 101-102
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share due to  the  ac tu a l holder o f  the  land . Even in  the  ea rly  
seventeenth century  when many lands in  some p a r ts  were abandoned 
by pangukarayas. in  o th e r areas considerable t r a c t s  were
(119)
c u ltiv a te d  under o tu  c o n tra c ts .
The r ig h t  to  buy and s e l l  pangus had ex isted  since the
s ix teen th  century . However in  th e  d is tu rb ed  years o f  the  ea rly
( 120)
seventeenth century  such sa le s  were few. With the  re tu rn  o f 
peace th e  demand fo r  land  apparen tly  in c reased , perhaps due to  
the in f lu x  o f refugees from the  Kandyan h igh lands. Portuguese 
casados noy found i t  p ro f i ta b le  to  buy pan&us from e x is tin g  
holders and convert them in to  ande or o tu  lan d s .
By the  1630* s th e re fo re  the  Portuguese ad m in istra tio n  was 
faced w ith th e  r e s u l t  o f  i t s  own p o licy  in  converting a system 
o f land  tenure  based on se rv ice  to  one in  which a cash payment 
was th e  nexus between the  landholder and the  government. There 
had been crea ted  no t merely a market fo r  land  bu t a lso  a small 
but growing c la ss  o f lan d le ss  p easan ts . The ad m in istra tio n  also  
found th a t  even those aspects o f  se rv ice  tenure  which they  wished 
to  preserve -  th e  se rv ice  o f  the  cinnamon p e e le rs , elephantji
( i lS )  P .E .P ie r is  -  The Ceylon l i t t o r a l .  3-5f 12,14,19,355 Knox 68-69; 
R ibeiro 32
Ande involves equal d iv ison  o f crop a f te r  c e r ta in  dues have been 
se p a ra te d .( Queyroz 101?)
Otu involved th e  payment by th e  c u l t iv a to r  to  the landholder o f  e i th e r  
G Ts. basket f u l l  o f g ra in  or one man's burden o r (b) one th i r d  
o f th e  produce o r (c) the  amount sown in  the  f ie ld  or one and a h a lf  
or tw ice the amount.
H.W.Codrington - A nclln t land tenure  and revenue An Ceylon. 9
H .C .P .B e ll-Report on the  Keffalle d i s t r i c t .  116
(120) At l e a s t  two in stan ces are recorded in  th e  tombo o f Vaz F re ire  
(P .E .P ie r is  -The Ceylon l i t t o r a l . 34.82)
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hunters and feed e rs , wood c u tte rs  ( cortadores) and the  bu llock -
c a r t  men were a l l  a ffe c te d  as they  had begun s e l l in g  th e i r  lands*
The reac tio n  o f th e  Ceylon a u th o r it ie s  was d e c is iv e . Dora Jorge
de Almeida in  1634 ordered th a t  a l l  lands purchased from the
above ca teg o ries o f  se rv ice  landholders be immediately re s to red
to  them. The process o f  breaking  up th e  economy o f K otte was
( 121)
proving economically disadvantageous to  the  Portuguese.
There i s  much le s s  evidence as to  land  tenure and land
revenue in  Ja ffn a  than  in  re sp ec t o f K otte . However i t  seems
c le a r  th a t  th e  changes in  K otte in  the  f i r s t  twenty years o f
Portuguese ru le  were to  some ex ten t d u p lica ted  in  J a ffn a . Portuguese
s e t t l e r s  en tered  th e  ranks o f  the  land  holding c la ss  and the
old  system o f  land  tenu re  was supplanted in  many areas by the
( 122)
holding o f land  on payment o f  q u it ren ts  to  th e  crown. The 
s u b s t itu tio n  o f  q u it  re n ts  in  l i e u  o f g ra in  ta x  on land  occured 
c h ie f ly  in  areas where th e  Portuguese s e t t le d  and a t  the  end o f  
the  Portuguese period  i t  was the o ld  g ra in  ta x  and no t the new
(123)
system o f  q u it  re n ts  th a t  survived . In  one re sp ec t however the  
Portuguese revenue a u th o r i t ie s  in  Ja ffh a  s e t  ou t to  reap the
(121) Queyroz 1034; Evora C X V l/2-3 .f.ll5v ; The cortadores o r 
woodcutters performed th e  im portant ta sk  o f  c u ttin g  a way through 
the  jungle and o f ca rry in g  munitions fo r  th e  army.
( 1 2 2 )  S . A r a s a r a t n a m  -  T r a d e  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e c o n o m y  o f  t h e  T a m i l s  
i n  J a f f n a  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u t y .  ( I n  
T a m i l  c u l t u r e  I X .  3 7 1 * 3 7 3
( 123) Film oteca LM .15.38/2-3; TT.LM. 31. f .  430
b en e fits  o f  th e i r  experience in  Kotte* The foro  or q u it  re n ts  
fo r the lands o f  K otte was only 12% p f  th e  assessed  revenue*
This l e f t  88$ fo r  the  landho lder. This foro had been considered 
too low by th e  a u th o r it ie s  in  Lisbon but l i t t l e  could be done 
without arousing  d isco n ten t once the  lands had been granted 
and the qui:fcj£ re n ts  f ix ed . In  1630 Lancarote de Seixas, cap ta in - 
major o f Ja ffn a  suggested th a t  henceforth  the foro fo r  lands in  
Ja ffn a  should be fixed  a t  from two th ird s  to  th ree  q u arte rs  o f 
the to ta l  revenue* The v iceroy  the  conde de L inhares, always on 
the a le r t  fo r fre sh  sources o f  revenue^ re comended the change 
to the king. Wiser counsels however p rev a iled  in  Lisbon. I t  was 
perhaps f e l t  th a t  th e  burden o f  the  higher tero to i foro might 
be passed on to  th e  peasan t. Also perhaps i t  was f e l t  th a t  d isco n ten t 
in  Ja ffn a  might w ell provoke a r is in g  akin to  th a t  o f 1627, and 
th is  was a r e a l  danger w ith th e  Portuguese a t  war w ith Kandy.
On 15 March 1634 th e  k ing  wrote back requesting  th a t  no innovations 
be made in  m atters o f  land  p o licy .
The land revenues Ja ffn a  in  th is  period  seem to  have
rise n  very rapidly* On conquest th e fe  could not have been more
(124)
than th ree  thousand f iv e  hundred pardfeos a year* With th e  new 
tqrabo o f  Antao Vaz F re ire  increased  assessments made th e  land
(125)
revenue r i s e  to  seven thousand f iv e  hundred pardaos. The labours 
of Amaro Roiz ra ise d  th e  f ig u res  s t i l l  f u r th e r . By 1646 th e  f ig u re
(124) AHU Caixa 2, 246
(125) AHU Caixa 10, 5.12.1627
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(126)
had come up to  10,720 pardKos. In  K otte due to  the  re fu sa l of
the  la s c a r in s  to  pay foro the  land  revenue a t  the  commencement
of th is  period  remained a t  about four thousand seven hundred
pardaos# I t  was estim ated th a t  had the  la sc a r in s  paid  th e i r  dues
the t o t a l  revenue would have amounted to  twenty two thousand 
J127 )
pardaos. This ta rg e t  however was probably never reached. In  
the  l620fs th e  land revenue from foros remained a t  around
s ix  thousand x erafin s  and the  estim ates o f  land  revenue given by
Antonio Bocarro in  1634 in d ic a te s  th a t  th i s  amount had not been
s u b s ta n tia lly  inc reased . Even in  ta k in g  in to  account the  y ie ld
of the twelve v illa g e s  sp e c ia lly  reserved  to  meet th e  expenses
of the army o f  conquest, the  t o t a l  land  revenue in  K otte in
(128)
the 1630*8 was only about eighteen thousand pardaos#
THE PEARL FISHERY
PearJ o y ste rs  were to  be found along both th e  Ind ian  and
the Ceylon coasts  o f the  Gulf o f Iiannar. They were found in
concentrations s u f f ic ie n t  to  make a la rg e  sca le  f ish e ry  p ro f ita b le
f ish in g
only during  c e r ta in  y ea rs . Even in  th ese  years th e  Jgjcachmy had 
to  be engaged in  during the  months o f  February, March and A pril
(126) AHU 220.f.24v
(127) AHU Caixa 6, 13.11.16195 TT.LM.l6 . f . 257% Ajuda 51-V-44. 
f.23v
(128) Film oteca 19D 33/2-55 APO (New ed) torao IV.Ranrindfc Vol.I* 
P a r t 2 , 401-4025 Queyroz 729
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to  ob ta in  the  b e s t re su lts*  Although f ish in g  fo r  p e a rls  was 
p erio d ic  and seasonal the d ivers were kept occupied by f ish in g  
fo r chanks, a ta sk  which could be done throughout the  year*
Chanks were la rg e  s h e lls  used fo r  making ornaments and d rink ing  
v e sse ls . While the  income derived by the  ad m in is tra tio n  from 
chank f ish in g  was very  m inute, th a t  from the  p e a rl f ish e ry , i f  and
(129)
when one was held  was considerab le .
The Portuguese in te r e s ts  in  the  p e a rl f ish e ry  dated from
the 1540*s when th e  J e s u its  converted la rg e  numbers o f  fishermen
and d ivers on th e  T irunaveli coast o f  In d ia . With the  estab lishm ent
o f a base a t  Mannar in te r e s t  changed to  co n tro l. The Portuguese
w ith th e i r  command over the seas and th e i r  in flu en ce  over the
d ivers were w ell p laced  to  take over the  f ish in g  r ig h ts  from
the Nayak o f  Madura who had h ith e r to  held  them. In  th e  s ix te e n th
century the Portuguese who needed th e  BgxHflflnrtaiciH co-operation  o f
the Nayak apparen tly  came to  an arrangement w ith him by which
the Nayak obtained a l l  the p ea rls  brought up by a fix ed  number
(130)
of d iv e rs . With th e  conquest o f  J a ffn a , however, th e  Portuguese
(129) S.Arasaratnam 146; S.Arunaehalam -The h is to ry  o f  the 
p ea rl f ish e ry  o f  th e  Tamil co as t. 99? R ibeiro 71; Ajuda 51-V-34. 
if. 126} Coimbra 459.f f . 188,201
The reasons fo r  th e  seasonal natu re  o f  the p e a r l f ish in g  were probably 
the prevalence o f monsoon winds during  o th er p a r ts  o f  the  y ea r. The 
viceroy on 8 February 1635 wrote to  th e  k ing  s ta t in g  th a t  f ish in g  
fo r p ea rls  was p o ss ib le  only in  February-Karch o r November- both 
inter-m onsoonal p e rio d s .
(130) S.Arnachalam, 99*113-114
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became by fa r  the  most powerful force in  th e  reg ion . By the  
1630*s the  Portuguese held  th a t  the  Nayak had no r ig h t  a t  a l l  
to  f is h  fo r  p e a r ls .  This contention  however was much more d i f f i c u l t  
to  enforce o f f  the  In d ian  coast than th a t  o f f  Mannar, e sp e c ia lly  
as th e  Portuguese o f f i c i a l s  could not always t r u s t  th e  J e s u its  
not to  conspire w ith  the  d iv e rs  and th e  Nayak o f Madura to  hoodwink 
th e  cap tain  o f  Mannar. In  1634 and again in  1637 th e  Portuguese 
used armed v esse ls  to  p a t ro l  the  coasts and prevent th e  Nayak
(131)
from f ish in g  fo r p e a r ls .
During the  t h i r t y  years 1604-1634 no p e a rl f ish e ry  was
held . I t  i s  not known whether th is  in te rv a l  was in  p a r t  due to
the  expulsion o f  th e  J e s u i ts  from the F ishery  Coast in  1608 and
th e i r  absence from th e  a rea  fo r  the  next dozen y ea rs , bu t th e
absence o f a fltehgy. f ish e ry  even a f te r  th e i r  re tu rn  in  1621
in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  main reason may have been the  lack  o f  a
(132)
s u f f ic ie n t  concen tra tion  o f  o y ste rs  .From 1634 to  a t  l e a s t  1639
(133)
p e a r l  f ish in g  on a g re a te r  o r le s s e r  sc a le  was c a rr ie d  on annually . 
When h eld , the p e a rl f ish e ry  was h ighly  com plicated
(131) Film oteca LM.19B.27/2-4; Simancas S P .  1469.f .  194; Coimbra, 
459.f f .1 8 4 ,188,201; Coimbra 6 4 5 .f .7 ; TT.LM.40.f.69; AHU Caixa 6,
1.12.1619
(132) R e i m e r s  55; DR 1.3^2; DR 11.145; T T .L M .I 8 . f .4 l
T h e r e  i s  h o w e v e r  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  r e n e w e d  i n c o m e  f r o m  
t h e  p e a r l  f i s h e r y  w a s  a  f a c t o r  t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  
J e s u i t s .  F o r  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  e x p u l s i o n  a n d  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  
J e s u i t s  s e e  D . F e r r o l i  - T h e  J e s u i t s  i n  M a l a b a r  1 .312-334
(133) C o i m b r a  459.f f . 188,201; T T .L M .3 7 .f . 425 
1636 w a s  a  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n .
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ven tu re . The d ec is io n  whether o r  no t to  hold a f ish e ry  was
made on the  b as is  o f  a p i lo t  survey c a rr ie d  out in  September
o f th e  previous y ea r. On the shores o f f  Ceylon, th e  p i lo t  survey
was arranged by th e  fac to r  o f  Mannar who sen t out boats w ith
h a lf  a dozen d iv e rs  in  each to  check on l ik e ly  lo c a tio n s . The
oy ste rs  co lle c ted  by these  d iv e rs  were taken  back to  Mannar
to  be examined fo r  p ea rls  and th e  r e s u l t  n o tif ie d  to  th e  v iceroy
w ith an appropria te  recommendation. On th e  Ind ian  coast s im ila r
surveys were made by th e  Portuguese cap tain  a t  T u tico rin . The
re a l  d ec is io n  about holding th e  f ish e ry  was made i n  th e  spot
fo r  th e  v iceroy  a t  Goa had not th e  ex p e rtise  to  analyse th e  reasons
(134)
th a t  la y  behind th e  recommendations sen t to  him.
Once the  d ec is io n  to  hold the  f ish e ry  was confirmed a t  Goa 
however, th e  v iceroy  appointed an o f f i c i a l  to  adm inister the  
f ish e ry . In  th e  s ix te en th  century  the  cap ta in  o f  Mannar was o ften  
chosen fo r  th i s  ta sk  but th is  arrangement d id  no t always prove 
s a t is fa c to ry  as many o f  th e  cap tains proved more in te re s te d  in
(135)
th e i r  own incomes than  the k ing*s. In  1636 th e  v iceroy  nominated 
Antonio da Fonseca Ozouro, already  named as vedor o f  Ceylon to  
be in  charge o f th e  f ish e ry  and the  superv ision  o f the^ f ish e ry  
thencefo rth  became an ex -o ffic io  ta sk  o f  th e  vedor. Byi the
(134) TT.LM*4 0 .f .3 1 iv ;  TT.LM.3 7 .f . 410; Assentos I I .  97-93 
P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Jaffnanatam .39
(135) S.Botelho-  0 tombo da estado da In d ia .245s AHU 282.f . 25
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regimentos o f 1636 and 1639 issu ed  by Viceroy Pero da S ilv a  i t
was decreed th a t  th e  vedor should journey p erso n a lly  to  Mannar
every year to  perform th i s  ta s k . In  case he was unable to  do th is
he was requ ired  to  send a personal nominee to  a c t as h is
(136) 
re p re se n ta tiv e .
In  the month before th e  f ish e ry  a t  a p lace on the sea-shore
near the  oy ste r-b ed , a whole s e r ie s  o f  temporary bu ild ings were
b u i lt  under the g en era l su p erv isio n  o f  th e  captain  o f  Mannar.
These bu ild ings were designed to  servo- as resid en ces, shops,
and storehouses. The vedor a rr iv ed  ju s t  before the  fisheyy  s ta r te d  
re g is te re d
and RcfcEEHDt th e  number o f  v e sse ls  and d ivers  which were to  take 
p a r t .  The f ish in g  i t s e l f  la s te d  fo r  about two months a f te r  which 
the whole m akeshift se ttlem en t was d ism antled . For th e  du ration  
of the  f ish e ry  a few Portuguese armed v esse ls  stood by to  prevent 
a ra id  by p ir a te s  o r adven tu rers. S o ld iers  from th e  g arriso n  o f
( 137)
Ja ffn a  provided a guard on shore.
(136) Assentos I I .  94; TT.IuM.42.f.9; T I.L M .45.f.36l; Goa 
regimentos e in s tru cco es  I I I .  f f .2 -8
The dec ision  to  leave the vedor permanently in  charge o f  the  
f ish e ry  was taken in  1638 and th e  in s tru c tio n s  to  the  e f fe c t  
were d ra f te d  in  e a rly  1639*
(137) S.Arunachalam 99; P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f  Jaffnapatam . 5. 
39-40; R ibeiro  7072;
R ib e iro 's  estim ate o f th re e  to  f iv e  hundred v esse ls  engaged in  
the  f ish e ry  i s  an exaggeration . The ac tu a l number must have 
been around two hundred w ith about one hTra±ggtd- thousand five  
hundred d iv e rs .
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Throughfcut th e  Portuguese period  th e  p e a rl f ish e ry  was
e s s e n tia l ly  based on p r iv a te  e n te rp r is e , organized, d ire c te d
and supervised by government o f f i c i a l s .  The f ish in g  boats were
p r iv a te ly  owned and th e  d iv e rs  were paid  by th e  owners o f  th e
boats w ith a share o f  th e  catch . However the Portuguese
adm in istra tion  derived  a la rg e  revenue from each p e a r l f ish e ry .
The f i r s t  and most im portant source o f revenue was th e  ta x  on
the d iv e rs . According to  th e  fo ra l  o f  Ja ffn a  each in d iv id u a l
C h ris tian  d iv e r paid  two and a h a lf  patacas o r four and one s ix th
xerafin s waradxgg: fo r  the  r ig h t  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  f ish e ry .
(138)
I J o n - C h r is t ia n s  p a i d  d o u b le  t h i s  am o u n t. The inco m e fro m  t h i s
(139)
source had been around f iv e  thousand pardaos in  th e  1570’s .
(140)
By the 1580*5 i t  had r is e n  to  s ix  thousand four hundred pardaos.
Towards the end o f our period  i t  amounted to  over seven thousand
^ (1 4 1 )
two hundred pardaos. Next in  importance was th e  bolga or dues 
paid  by merchants fo r  th e  r ig h t  to  buy and s e l l  a t  th e  s i t e  o f  
the  temporary se ttlem en t during th e  d u ra tio n  o f  the  f ish e ry .
The income from th i s  source i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  es tim a te . In  th e
oftt
1590*s i t  was repo rted  to  have yielded^thousand th re e  hundred 
and seventy f iv e  pard&os. Queyroz estim ates th a t  i t  y ie lded
(138) P .E .P ie r is  -The kingdom o f  Jaffnapatam . 42
(139) S tud ia IV ,263-264; Ajuda 51-V -3^ .f.3?5  D.Velho- Orcamento 
do estado da I n d ia .125
Tl55yTandurongsTl3.S.Pissurlenca -  Rep&mentos das fo r ta le z a s  da




two hundred and seventy th re e  pardaos in  the  l64Q, s . A le s s
im portant source was the  re n ts  o f  th e  shops b u i l t  by th e
Portuguese a t  the se ttlem en t and th e  stamp duty on a l l  goods
sold  in  th e  a rea . The r ig h t  o f  search ing  th e  beaches a f te r
the  f ish e ry  fo r  p e a r ls ,  l o s t  o r fo rg o tten , was a lso  so ld  fo r
(143) (144)
a small sum.Besides th ese  revenues, which were a l l  farmed ou t,
a t  the s t a r t  o f  th e  f ish e ry , th e  vedor co llec ted  o th e r customary
dues.For example th e  people o f  K ilak ara i had to  supply two
two (145)
p ea rls  o f  f iv e  c a ra ts  each and two o thers o f /c a ra ts  each.
The to ta l  revenue derived  from the  f ish e ry  v a ried  from year to
year but th e  average income which had hard ly  reached kx ten
(146)
thousand x e ra fin s  in  the s ix te en th  century had r is e n  to  about 
twelve thousand by th e  1630*s .
I f  revenue was h igh , so were th e  expenses. The cap ta in  o f  
Mannar su ccessfu lly  claimed a sum o f  th re e  hundred pardaos 
fo r h is  p a in s . The vedor was paid  anjl ex tra  two hundred pard£6s . 
This la v ish  payment o f  bonuses continued down to  the payment 
o f  a sum o f four x e ra fin s  to  every so ld ie r^  o f  the Ja ffn a
(142)Panduronga S .S .P is s r le n c a  -  Regimentos das fo rta lex a s  da 
In d ia . 485; Queyroz 1194
(143) The revenues estim ated  from these  sources in  th e  1590*s were 
300,200 and 300 pardaos re sp e c tiv e ly . According to  Queyroz these  
amounts had f a l le n  to  70,40 and 20 pardifbs by 1645-46.
Queyroz 1194; P .S .S .P is su r le n c a r , 480-485
(144) S.Arunachalam,104
(145) P .S .S .P issu rle n c a r  371; P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f 
J  a f  fhapatam, 42
(146) Svora C V /2 -7 .f.57v ; AHU 500 .f . 57; S tud ia IV. 263-264; 
Ajuda 5 i-V -3 6 .f .3 7
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g a rriso n  who served in  guarding the  f ish e ry . The expenses rose 
so high th a t  in  the  1640*s i t  became hard ly  worthwhile
(149)
to  hold a f ish e ry  a t  a l l .
REVENUE AND EX PEN D ITU RE
During the  p eriod , 1617-1638 th$ accounts o f  th e  revenue
and expenditure o f K otte were kept separa te  from those o f  Ja ffn a .
In  1640 the  king approved o f a suggestion made by th e  v iceroy
th a t  the revenues o f  Portuguese Ceylon should be considered as
(148)
a whole, but apparen tly  no steps were taken to  implement th is
measure fo r  F r. Fernao de Queyroz w ritin g  four decades l a t e r
about th e  revenues o f Portuguese Ceylon in  1645 gave separa te
(1*0 )
estim ates fo r Ja ffn a  and K otte.
Portuguese sources so fa r  traced  give us estim ates o f  the
revenue o f K otte only a t  th ree  p o in ts  in  our period  -  1619,1620 
(150)
and 1634. These rep resen t th e  accounts o f th e  fa c to r  o f  Ceylon, 
an estim ate by an unknown author and th e  f ig u re s  o f  Antonio Bocarro 
re sp e c tiv e ly . However, fo r  purposes of o b ta in in g  a balanced view, 
estim ates fo r the  years 1615 and 1645, which f a l l  ou tside  th e
(147) P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Ja ffn ap a taa . 43
(148) Film oteca LM.21 8/2
(149) Queyroz 1192-1194
(150) TT.LM. 16 .f . 258; Ajuda 51-V-44.f.23v; APO (new ed) 
Tomo IV .V o l.I I .P a rt 1.400-403
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(151)
s c o p e  o f  t h i s  v o r k  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  h e r e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  n o n e  o f  
t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o f  r e v e n u e  a n d  e x p e n d i t u r e  w h i c h  t h e  v e d o r
(152)
o f  C e y l o n  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e n d  t o  t h e  k i n g  h a s  e v e r  c o m e  t o  l i g h t .  
T h e s e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  e x t r e m e l y  u s e f u l  i n  s h o w i n g  t h e  a n n u a l  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  r e v e n u e  a n d  e x p e n d i t u r e  w h i c h  w e c a n  o n l y  g u e s s  
a t  n o w .  E s t i m a t e s  o f  e s q p e n d i t u r e  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  f o r  t h e  y e a r
(153)
1 6 3 4 .  H o w e v e r  w i t h  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  i s o l a t e d  s c r a p s  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  v a r i o u s  d o c u m e n t s  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  b u i l d  u p  a  
c o h e r e n t  i f  n o t  c o m p l e t e  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c e s  o f  t h e  
P o r t u g u e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  K o t t e .
T h e  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r e v e n u e  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  
K o t t e  i n  y e a r s  o f  p e a c e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 6 1 8 - 1 6 2 8  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s  
F r o m  t h e  s a l e  1 0 0 0  b a h a r s  o f c i n n a m o n  3 0 , 0 0 0  x e r a f i n s
t h e  s a l e  o f  2250 a m u n a s  o f  a r e c a  9 , 0 0 0  x e r a f i n s
t h e  s a l e  o f  3 7  e l e p h a n t s  a t  2 5 0  x e r a f i n s
e a c h  9,250  x e r a f i n s
(154)
th e  sa le  o f  gems mined in  th e  Two K orales 1,000 x e ra fin s
(151) T T .L M .1 6 .f . 2575 Queyroz 1192-1193
(152) A .Botelho de Souza 1 .31; TT.LM.2 6 .f . 256 ; T T .L M .2 2 .ff.83 -88v ; 
AP0 VI. 1219- 1220; TT.LM. 13 .f .  193; TT.LM. 17 .f . 85; TT.LM.20.f.67
TT.LM. 38. f.396v; TT.LM. l 6 . f .  355
(153) AP0 (new ed) Tomo IV .P art 1.379-399
(154) In  1615 Vaz F re ire  estim ated ke? th e  revenue from gems a t  
2850 x e ra f in s . (T.Abeyasinghe 166) The ac tu a l proceeds o f  th a t  year 
amounted to  2300 x e ra f in s . (AHU Caixa 4,15.11.1615) In  I 6l 6 basing 
th e i r  fo re c a s t on th e  ac tu a l revenues o f  1614 and 1615 Vaz F re ire  
and B althazar Marinho estim ated the  y ie ld ed  to  be 2500 x era fin s  
annually . (TT.LM. l 6 . f . 258) These hopes however were not f u l f i l l e d  
in  subsequent y ea rs . In  the l620*s the  annual revenue was about 
1000 x e ra f in s . (Ajuda 5i-V -44.f.23v) In  1625 th e  vedor reported  to  
th e  k ing  th a t  th e  income from gems was 400-600 x era fin s  j, (TT.LM.23. 
f . 253)b u t here th e  vedor was arguing a case fo r  th e  sa le  o f gems
w ith in  Ceylon and may have underestim ated th e  revenue.
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(155)
port dues 1 2,000 xerafins
q u it re n ts  on lan d  4-, 700 x e ra fin s
(156)
the coconut ta x , f in es  and customs dues 3,000 x e ra fin s
68,950 x e ra fin s
le s s  the  p r ic e  p a iJ  fo r  1900 amunas
o f areca 2,533 x e ra fin s
66,4-17
le s s  the  co s t o f  f r e ig h t  o f  1000 bahars 
o f  cinnamon -2000 x era fin s  + th e  cost o f 
mats and cord used to  bundle cinnamon e t c . ,
(157)
400 x era fin s  2,400 x era fin s
64-, 017 x era fin s
The revenue obtained in  tim es o f peace in  the  next decade was 
much g re a te r .
From the  sa le  o f 2000 bahars o f  cinnamon 200,000 xera fin s
the sa le  o f  2250 amunas o f  arecanut 9>000 x era fin s
the  sa le  o f  37 elephants a t  250 x e ra fin s
each 9f250 x e ra fin s
fch the s a le  o f  gems mined in  the
(158)
Two Korales 500 x e ra fin s
(155) This estim ate i s  from th e  accounts o f  the  fa c to r  JoSo da Costa 
P e re s te llo  in  1618-1619.
(156) Queyroz 729
(157) AP0 (New ed) Tomo IV .P art 1 .391; TT.LM.16 .f . 258 ;
The f re ig h t  costa  have been estim ated a t  th e  r a te  o f two x e ra fin s  a bahar.
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(159)
p o rt dues 8,500  x era fin s
q u it  re n ts  on land  and revenues o f
( 160)
garden land  held  by crown 6,000 x era fin s
the twelve v illa g e s  soperated  to  supply
( 161)
the array o f conquest 13*333 x era fin s
(162)
the coconut ta x , f in e s  and customary dues 3*000 x era fin s
249,563 xerafin s
le s s  the  p r ic e  paid  fo r  1,900  amunas o f
areca 2,533 x era fin s
247,750 x era fin s
(158) IN 1634 according to  Antonio Bocarro the  revenue from gems was 
300 x e ra f in s ,T his seems an unusually  low fig u re  and may have been 
due to  the  d isorganized  s ta te  o f  th e  m inify v illa g e s  a f te r  the 
r is in g s  o f 1630^1633* In  1644 th e  v iceroy  reported  to  the  k in s  
th a t  the revenues from gems was 1000-1300 x e ra fin s  a y ea r,
(159) Bocarro*s estim ate  o f  th e  p o rt dues o f Colombo, Negombo,
Chilaw, Puttlam  was 8,250 x e ra f in s ,
(160) Bocarro*s estim ate o f  foros_ in  1630 (APO New ed, Torao IV,
P a r t I ,V o l . I I #401-402) was 5,528 x e ra f in s , To th is  must be added the
i/1 0  charged from th e  gardens and p ro p e rtie s  o f  Colombo 101 x e ra fin s  
th e  revenue o f two gardens held  by the  government 203 x e ra fin s
th e  revenue o f th e  gabada v illa g e s  o f the  Two Korales 150 x e ra fin s
(161) The ac tu a l p ra c t ic e  was th a t  these  v il la g e s  supplied  the 
r ic e  fo r  th e  army d ir e c t ly .  The above estim ate  i s  th a t  given by 
Bocarro,
(162) The dekum o r customary tiarcx annual g i f t  and th e  marala 
o r  death duty  both y ie ld ed  2336 x era fin s  in  1634, For fu r th e r  
inform ation  on these  sources o f  revenue see T.Abeyasinghe,171-180
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le s s  th e  cost o f  f re ig h t  and packing 2000 bahars
o f cinnamon 4,800 x e ra fin s
242,250 x e ra fin s
The c o n tra s t in  revenue between the  1620*s and th e  1630*s 
however must be kep t in  p e rsp ec tiv e . The f ig u re s  above rep resen t 
merely the  average re c e ip t during  a year o f  peace. The ac tu a l 
revenue in  1617 probably d id  not exceed 45,000 x e ra f in s ; th a t  in  
1628 was about 75,000 x erafin s  and th a t  in  1629 over 100,000 x e ra f in s .
Moreover, while th e  l620*s were mainly years in  which peacefu l 
conditions p rev a iled  in  K otte , the  ea rly  1630*s saw most o f  Kotte 
wrested from Portuguese co n tro l. Thus w hile th e  ac tu a l revenue 
co llec ted  in  th e  period  1617-1629 probably averaged 60,000 x e ra f in s . 
th a t  in  the  period  1630-1638 could not have been much hbxz over
150.000 x era fin s  a y ea r. Even th i s  increase,how ever, d id  not 
immediately r e s u l t  in  increased  means fo r  th e  cap ta in -g en era l o f 
C eylon,for,from  the  ea rly  l630*s th e  conde de L inhares appropriated  
the t o t a l  revenue from cinnamon g iv in g  the  Ceylon government
30.000  x erafin s in  exchange.The lo c a l  ad m in istra tio n  b en efited  
from the  ex tra  revenue only a f te r  1636 when th e  k ing  in  response to  
the  p ro te s ts  o f  Diogo de Hello de C astro , cap ta in -g en era l o f 
Ceylon^ decreed th a t  revenue from Ceylon sources could be used fo r 
th e  needs o f o th e r p a r ts  o f the estado only  a f te r  th e  needs of
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(163)
the is la n d  had been s a t is f ie d .
The fix ed  annual expenditure o f  K otte in  th i s  period
(164)
was as follow s -
To the s a la ry  o f  the  cap ta in -genera l 4000 xerafin s
the  in te rp r e te r  (lingua) and th e  tr e a s u re r
(banaca) o f  the cap ta in -genera l 90 x erafin s
the subsistance  allowance o f  t h i r t y  la s c a r in s
forming th e  cap ta in -general*s bodyguard 480 x erafin s
the  cap ta in  o f  the  cap ta in -genera l • s bodyguard- 
4 measures o f r ic e  a day and 2 x era fin s  a xarafcfr 
month 66 x era fin s
4 to rch  b e a re r’s fo r  the  cap ta in -genera l -
2 measurers o f r ic e  a dayf one x era fin  a months xerjtfjmx 
as pay + 5 x era fin s  a year fo r  o i l  to  each 115 x era fin s  
the  r ic e  supplied  to  the  cap ta in -genera l*s
residence a t  Malwana- s ix ty  cand ils  420 x era fin s
(165)
the s a la ry  o f  vedor da fazenda 4000 x era fin s
(163) TT.LM.36 .f . l5 v
(164) F igures have been reduced to  the  n e a re s t x e ra f in . The cost 
o f  the r ic e  allowance has been ca lcu la ted  on the  b as is  o f 
seven Ceylon x era fin s  a c a n d il.T his estim ate  i s  c lo se r to  the 
p ric e  le v e ls  in  the l620*s than in  th e  l630*s. On 6 November 
1634 the  w rite r  o f the fazenda repo rted  th e  cost o f  r ic e  a t
a t  10-12-| x e ra fin s  a c a n d il.The item s o f  expenditure un less 
otherw ise in d ic a ted  have been taken from Antonio Bocarro*s 
account o f  the  Estado da In d ia . 1634. (APQ.New ed. Tomo IV .P art I I .
V o l.I .380-399)
( 165) Bocarro gives the vedor*s s a la ry  as 2666 x era fin s  o f  Goa
Contd.,
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the w r i te r  o f th e  fazenda or revenue department 
the s a la r ie s  o f  the  a ttendan ts  o f the  vedor 
inc lud ing  a to rch  bea re r, washerman and a 
paraso l b eare r 
the purchase o f paper fo r  records -  14 reams 
a t  8 x e ra fin s  each 
the a ra tc h i and 20 la s c a r in s  who formed th e  
vedor*s bodyguard -  a t  4J- la r in s  a month p er 
la s c a r in  and 9 la r in s  a month fo r  the  a ra tc h icrssy
the  cap ta in  o f  Colombo
the subsistance allowance of 30 la sc a r in s  and an
(167)
a ra tc h i in  the c a p ta in 's  bodyguard 
the fa c to r
the w ri te r  to  th e  fa c to ry
o ff ic e
B a i l i f f  o f the custom s/at Colombo (Meirinho da
740 xerafins
380 x e ra fin s
112 x e ra fin s
396 x e ra fin s  
2222 x e ra fin s
512 x e ra fin s  
400 x era fin s  
100 x e ra fin s
fazenda e alfandesra^ 100 x e ra fin s
( 165) Contd., which i s  about 2960 x era fin s  o f Ceylon.
A x e ra fin  o f  Go a in  the  1630's was approxim ately 333 r e i s . A Ceylon 
jay  a fs n was worth 300 r e i s . Queyroz i s  no t c e r ta in  on the  is s u e  
fo r  he s ta te s  on one occasion th a t  the vedor*s pay was over 3000 
x erafin s  and on another th a t  i t  was over 4000 x e ra f in s . (Queyroz 
1040,1073) However two contemporary estim ates made fc£ persons in  
Ceylon agree th a t  h is  s a la ry  was 4000 x e ra f in s . (Ajuda 51-V III-40. 
f.216 ; TT.LH.l6.f .571)
(166) TT.LM.19 .f . 6; TT.LM.2 1 .f . 103; Simancas SP .1530 .f.l30
( 167) The te n  Portuguese re ta in e rs  mentioned in  a l i s t  o f 
expenses in  1607 seem to  have been d iscon tinued . (T.Abeyasinghe 186)
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the  su b sisten ce  allowance (mantimento) and the  curry  
allowance (conduto) of th e  b a i l i f f  and the  
w rite r  to  the fac to ry  
the  purchase o f paper fo r  the  customs house 
the customs o f f ic e r  ( contador da alfandega)
7 a s s is ta n ts  a t  the customs o ff ic e  
p i lo t  
constable
( 168)
the  cap ta in  of Galle
the  w r i te r  to  the fac to ry  a t  G alle , the  b a i l i f f  
(169) 
and h is  men
the  cap ta in  o f Chilaw
10 la s c a r in s  a t  Chilaw a t  th e  r a te  o f one Goa 
x e ra fin  a month 
the  b a i l i f f  (^g irlnho) and w rite r  ( escrivao ) o f 
Chilaw
the  kanakapulle a t  Chilaw 
the  cap ta in  o f Negombo 
the  cap ta in  of Puttalara
(169)
the  judge (ouvidor)
x e ra fin s70 ________






x e ra fin s
x e ra fin s
x e ra fin a
x e ra fin s
2£o
260
x e ra fin s
x e ra f in s
x e ra fin s
132 x e ra fin s
x e ra f in s98 
20
440 x e ra f in s  
200 
400
x e ra fin s
x e ra f in s
x e ra f in s
( 168) Given in  estim ates o f 1607 quoted by T.Abeyasinghe 187*
Absenfc from Bocarro*s l i s t*
(169) Bocarro gives th e  ouvidor*s sa la ry  as 333 x e ra f in s . 1 tan&a 
and 40 r e is  which i s  about 370 x e ra fin s  o f Ceylon. However in  I 0O7
h is  sa la ry  was already  400 x e ra fin s  and the  ouvidor received  a d d itio n a l 
functions in  1621. His sa la ry  th e re fo re  could hard ly  have f a l le n .
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4 men who a s s is te d  th e  ouvidor
(171)
th e  j a i l  guard
(170)
71 x era fin s  
48 x e ra fin s  
58 x e ra fin s  
4000 x e ra fin s
th e  b a i l i f f  (m eirinho) o f the  conquest
th e  expenses o f the  h o sp ita l
th e  cost o f  mats and ropes used to  bundle 1350
bahars o f  cinnamon and fo r  c lo thes o f  th e  K a ffirs  700 x era fin s
(172)
th e  re n t o f  e ig h t storehouses 384 x era fin s
(173)
th e  manufacture of gunpowder a t  Malwana 200 x e ra fin s
th e  manufacture and re p a ir  o f  arms a t  th e  iro n  works
a t  Malwana 
th e  rece iv e r  ( recebedor) o f Negombo 
the  kanakapulle o f Negombo and four a s s is ta n ts  
the  subsistance allowance o f th e  rece iv ers  
( recabedores3 o f Chilaw and Puttlam  
th e  two kanakapulles who a s s is te d  the rece iv e rs  
o f Chilaw and Puttlam  
th e  s a i lo r s  who man th e  vessel^  which tran sp o rts  
supp lies up to  Malwana
1620 x e ra fin s  
70 X erafins 
60 x era fin s
70 x e ra fin s
48 x era fin s
380 x era fin s
(170) A document dated  1607 s ta te s  th a t  th e re  were s ix  such a s s is ta n ts  
and they  co st &50 x e ra f in s , (T*Abeyasinghe,l87) In  1634 the  ouvidor^  
re tin u e  were paid  4 la r in s  a month each*
(171) T*Abeyasinghe,i87
(172) This item  may have appeared in  th e  accounts od 1634 only 
because o f  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f storehouses b u i l t  by the  vedor 
Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara in  th e  1620*s*
(173) The absence of any estim ate o f  the  expenses o f  the gunpowder fa c to ry  
e s tab lish ed  by de Sa a t  Colombo i s  s trik in g *
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(174)
the ca p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld  1000 x e ra fin s
the r ic e  supplied  to  the cap ta in -m ajo r-o f-th e -
f ie ld  to  feed h is  s t a f f  365 x e ra fin s
(175)
the 18 cap tains a t  200 x e ra fin s  each 3600 x e ra fin s
the two quarterages (q u a r te is ) fo r  §00 so ld ie rs
(176)
a t  10 x era fin s  each a quarterage 1J,000 x e ra f in s
the curry  allowance ( conduto)fo r  600 so ld ie rs
a t  i  Goa x e ra fin  a month 7»920 x e ra fin s
the r ic e  supplied  to  the  s ix  hundred so ld ie rs  a t
2 measures a day 12,000 x e ra fin s
the r ic e  supplied  to  20 cap tains a t  5 measures
a day 427 x e ra f in s
the cu rry  allowance fo r  20 cap tains a t  3 x erafin s
o f  Goa a month 792 x e ra fin s
(177)
the s a la ry  fo r  280 K affirs  a t  a fanam a day 1708 x e ra f in s
the r ic e  allowance fo r  280 K affirs  a t  2 measures
(177)
a day 2,800 x e ra f in s
the f iv e  gunners a t  Colombo,Menikkadawara,
Malwana and Sabaragamuwa 250 x e ra fin s
(174)Bocarro, s estim ate i s  confirmed by the l e t t e r  o f  appointment 
o f  Francisco B rito  de Almeida appointed ca p ta in -m a jo r-o f-th e -fie ld  
on 27 September 1626 and th ree  o th e r sources. (JCBRAS X I.4715 
Simancas SP.1530.f.30v; AHU Caixa 16, 18.1.1644; Queyroz 104)
(175) Also in  Queyroz 1036
(176) Each Portuguese so ld ie r  was paid  in  two insta lm en ts  o f te n  
x e ra fin s each a year. ( i . e .  18 x e ra f in s og Goa or 20 x era fin s  o f  
Ilotte in  a l l )  Queyroz 104; JCBRAS XI. 471
(177) The K a ffir  contingem m t in  th e  Portuguese array appeared 
a f te r  1631#
1449
the  allowance paid to  the  fa c to r  fo r sp e c ia l journeys
made to  pay th e  troops 272 x e ra fin s
the 3 kanakapulles and 2 measurers a t  Malwana,
Menikkadawara and Sabaragamuwa 173 x era fin s
the two surgeons a t  Menikkadawara and Sabaragarauwa 190 x e ra fin s  
the  allowances paid  to  th e  m issionaries 3»970 xerafin s
73t x e ra fin s
The lack  o f in te g ra tio n  th a t  charac te rized  the  
accounting system in  Portuguese Ceylon as seen in  the 
separation  o f the  estim ates o f  Kotte from those o f Ja ffn a  
could also  be no ticed  w ith in  Ja ffn a  i t s e l f .  During th e  period  
1618-1633 the estim ates o f revenue and expenditure o f  the  
kingdom o f  Ja ffn a  proper were kept separa te  from those o f 
th e  Mannar-Kantota a rea . The reason fo r  th i s  was mainly 
h is to r ic a l .  The Portuguese who had held th e  is la n d  o f  Mannar 
s ince  1560 had by 1618 already  organized a machinery under the  
fa c to r  o f  Mannar fo r  purposes o f c o lle c tio n  o f  revenue and 
the  disbursement o f expenses* When Ja ffn a  was conquered in  
1619 a new fa c to r  was appointed to  th a t  Kingdom but the  old 
system a t  Mannar was allowed to  continue. For our purposes 
however th e  fig u res  fo r  th e  whole o f  the kingdom o f Ja ffn a  
w il l  be considered to g e th e r.
Inform ation on the  revenues o f  Ja ffh a  can be obtained 
a t  th ree  po in ts o f time -  a t  the time o f conquest, in  1627
4 5 0
and f in a l ly  in  1634. F il ipe de Oliveira estimated that the
revenue o f  Ja ffn a  excluding Mannar and Mantota in  the  days
( 1 7 8 )
of the  kings o f  Ja ffn a  had been as follow s -  
18,665 x e ra fin s  in  cash
cand ils o f  g ra in  o f which 178§- were r ic e  
O il, b e te l ,  b u tte r  and milk 
Customary g i f t  o f  bananas tw ice a year 
Elephants
The revenue co llec ted  a t  Mannar in  1619 probably amounted 
kfbt to  a thousand o r a thousand f iv e  hundred x e ra f in s .
The revenue a c tu a lly  obtained in  th e  years 1619-1624 
f e l l  somewhat sh o rt o f  de O l iv e ir a ^  f ig u re s .In  the  f i r s t  
year o f conquest the  t o t a l  revenue co lle c ted  was hard ly  
7,360 x e ra f in s . In  1620 however the  vedor, Lan^arote de Seixas 
v is i te d  Ja ffn a  and made a l i s t  o f revenues to  be co lle c te d . 
This l i s t  provided fo r  an annual income o f  16,400 x e ra fin s  
in  cash to g e th e r w ith te n  elephants a year as w ell as sm all 
q u a n titie s  o f  c lo th  and g ra in . The 7$ du ty  fix ed  fo r  c e r ta in
(178) The whole o f the  revenue l i s t e d  in  th e  te x t  d id  not 
accrue to  th e  king o f Ja ffn a . Even as e a r ly  as th e  1580*s 
the  k ing  o f  Ja ffh a  appears to  have paid  th e  Portuguese two 
elephants a y ea r. By the terms o f th e  se ttlem en t o f  1591 
th e  Portuguese obtained twelve elephants as w ell as th e  
revenues o f  the  provinces o f  Weligamam and Wadamar a t  ch i • The 
l a t t e r  was worth over 3000 x e ra f in s . Between 1591 and 1618 
the  ru le r s  o f  Ja ffn a  also  granted v illa g e s  and is lan d s  to  
Portuguese so ld ie rs  and m issionaries who d id  no t pay any dues.
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exports and im ports brought in  an e x tra  sum o f th re e  hundred
(179)
and t h i r t y  s ix  x e ra fin s  a year# These f ig u re s  exclude the
revenues o f Mannar and Mantota.
The v i s i t  o f  th e  vedor Ambrosio de F re ita s  da Camara
in  1624 brought fu r th e r  changes i n  th e  revenue structu re#
F irs tly , he commuted many o f the  t r a d i t io n a l  se rv ices fo r
(180)
payments in  cash. Secondly,he imposed new taxes l ik e  the
( 181)
stamp duty on c lo th . De F re ita s  a lso  imposed on c e r ta in  
groups o f people such as th e  s lav es o f th e  Hindu ten p les  
and some o f  the elephant/? hun ters an f^ o b lig a tio n  to  pay 
a fixed  sum to  the  state.F in a lly ?th e  sum paid  to  th e  s ta te
fcy two o f th e  p riv ile g ed  sec tio n s o f  the  kingdom, th e  Portuguese
1 x -3
s e t t l e r s  and the  m iss io n arie s , w e re g re a t ly  augmented by
( 182)
a close examination o f th e i r  c laim s. The cash revenues o f 
Ja ffn a  was thus ra ise d  to  a sum exceeding 25.000 x e ra fin s  a
( 183) (1855-----------
year. They remained around th i s  le v e l  t i l l  1634. In  the
(179)These fig u res  are  based on th e  accounts o f Antonio Teneles, 
the  f i r s t  fa c to r  o f  Ja ffn a  fo r  th e  period  1 October 1619 to
25 A pril 1624. (AHU Caixa 10, 25.2.1627)
(180) The in c rease  in  cash revenue by th i s  means was almpst 
2000 x e ra f in s .
(181) This duty was expected to  y ie ld ed  only some 166 x erafin s a t  
the  out s e t .  I t  may have been imposed as a su b s t itu te  fo r  the
payment o f  dues in  c lo th  made in  th e  tim es o f Tamil k ings.
(182) These groups probably s t i l l  re ta in ed  the  r ig h t  to  hold
w ithout payment o f dues, the  land  obtained from th e  Tamil kings
on th ese  term s. This may w ell account fo r  the  absence o f the 
J e s u its  from the l i s t  o f those who paid  dues. The payment o f 
800 x e ra fin s  by th e  Franciscans and 605 x e ra fin s  by the  casados 
as foro in d ic a te s  the  ex ten t o f  th e  d ispossession  o f the  Tamil
(Contd.,)
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next fev: y ea rs tth e  holding o f the  p e a rl f ish e ry  ra ise d
revenues by about 50% •
Estim ates o f  expenditure o f Ja ffn a  and Mannar are
av a ilab le  w ith in  th i s  period  only fo r  th e  year 1634.
According to  Antonio Bocarro th e  expenses o f Ja ffn a  in
th a t  year was 14,572 x e ra fin s  made up as follow s -
To the s a la r ie s  o f  m issio n aries  3*600 x e ra fin s
the  expenses o f  Trincomalee 1*876 x e ra fin s
the  co st o f  th e  g a rr iso n  o f  Ja ffn a  6,932 x era fin s  
ie s
the s a l a r /  o f the  captain-m ajor and
o th e r o f f ic ia l s  2 ,l6 4  x e ra fin s
(185)
14,572 x e ra fin s  
The expenses o f Mannar in  th i s  tim e amounted to  a fu r th e r
12,000 x e ra f in s ,th e  p r in c ip a l item s o f expenditure being
TISS)
as follow s -
To th e  cap ta in  o f  the  f o r t  1333 x e ra fin s
th e  fa c to r  333 x e ra fin s
(182) Contd,
landholders in  th e  f i r s t  s ix  years o f Portuguese ru le  in  Ja ffn a .
(183) The l i s t  made by de F re ita s  gave an estim ated revenue o f 
about 2$,415 x e ra f in s .The a c tu a l revenue c o lle c te d  between
25 A pril 1624 and 22 A p ril 1625 was only 23,050 g e ra fin s  according
to  th e  fa c to r  o f Ja ffn a  Manoel de B a irro s .
(184) AP0 (New ed) Tomo IV .P art I I .V o l .1 .418,420
(185) Ib id  420-424 When f i r s t  appointed the  captain-m ajor
o f Ja ffh a  had an annual sa la ry  o f 200 m il r e is  ( approxim ately
740 x e ra fin s )  and an allowance o f  100 x e ra fin s  fo r  te n  a tten d an ts .
By 1634 h is  sa la ry  had r is e n  to  1111 x e ra f in s . (P .E .P ie r is -  
The kingdom o f Jaffnapatam - 1; APO (new ed) TomoIV.Part I I .
V o l.1 .4175 Assentos I I . 50)
(186) APO (New ed) Tomo IV .P art I I .V o l . I .363-365
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the  w rite r  133 x era fin s
o th er o f f i c ia l s  400 x era fin s
th e  h o sp ita l 360 x e ra fin s
the  30 la s c a r in s  o f  the  captain*s
guard 360 x e ra fin s
Doctor and o f f i c i a l  in  charge o f
h o sp ita l 168 x era fin s
the  twenty so ld ie rs  o f the  g arriso n  
a t  9 pardaos a q u a rte l and 2 
pardaos a month as mantimento 800 x era fin s
180 s a i lo r s  to  man the  s ix  ships th a t  
guard the  ea s t coast a t  9 pardaos 
a quaartel and two pardaos a month 
as mantimento 7*200 x e ra fin s
th e  p r ie s t s  and the  f iv e  churches
a t  Hantota 500 x e ra fin s
11*587 x erafin s
Thus a f te r  about 1625 th e  revenues o f  Ja ffn a  alone were 
s u f f ic ie n t  to  cover the  expenses o f  both Mannar and Ja ffn a ,
In  the 1630’s ,  as in  K otte^the f in a n c ia l s i tu a t io n  improved 
d ram atica lly . With th e  p e a r l f ish e ry  y ie ld in g  a reg u la r revenue 
and the  revenues o f Ja ffn a  fu r th e r  ra ised  by the  e f fo r ts  of 
Amaro Roiz and th e  new fo ra l  o f  164-5* Dom F H ipe Mascarenhas 




IN the  1620's fo r  the f i r s t  time in  over a h a l f
a century Ceylon ceased to  be a f in a n c ia l burden on the  
( 188)
Estado da In d ia . During the  years 1621-1628 the Portuguese
adm in istra tion  in  Ceylon both in  K otte and Ja ffn a  was able to
cover a l l  expenses w ith the  revenue received from lo c a l 
(189)
sources. The war w ith Kandy d id  lead  to  a d e f ic i t  in  the
next s ix  years but a f te r  the  peace t r e a ty  p f 1634 the Portuguese
f in a n c ia l p o s itio n  improved considerably owing to  th e  high
cinnamon p riced  which p rev a iled . Ceylon's incomes began to
be used fo r  Portuguese p ro je c ts  elsewhere in  A sia. The
Portuguese had a t leng th  solved the  problem o f th e  budgetary
d e f ic i t  th a t  had hampered th e i r  war e f fo r t  ag a in s t Kandy 
*
fo r so lo n g . But even by th e  l a t e  1630*s i t  was a lready  too 
l a te  fo r  th e  king o f  Kandy, d espairing  o f  any la s t in g  
se ttlem en t w ith  the Portuguese.had by then  c a lle d  in  the  Dutch.
(187) P .E .P ie r is  -  The kingdom o f Jaffhanatam . 46-55
(188) AHU 500.ff.53-54v; A^Uda 51-V -36.f.38; Ajuda 51- 
V III-58 .f.291v ; T.Abeyasinghe 182-183,191
(189) Filmoteea Reis Vizinhos X. 7 -8 /5 - l j  TT.LM.24.f.24j 
TT.Lli. 26. f  .272
CHAPTER VII
I f  In  1616 th e  p rospec ts  o f  th e  tem poral conquest
o f Ceylon seemed prom ising, those fo r th e  s p i r i tu a l  conquest
seemed even m ore/so. In  K otte th e  F ranciscan m issionary
a c t iv i ty  which had slow ly go t under way a f te r  15^3» had
spread more w idely and ra p id ly  a f te r  th e  lowlands came under
the  Portuguese co n tro l in  th e  1590 •s and was by now firm ly
established* The J e s u i ts  who had en tered  th e  m issionary
f ie ld  l a t e r  in  1602, were though le s s  numerous,as active*
Two o ther re lig io u s  o rd e rs , the  A ugustinians and th e  Dominicans
( i )
had a lso  es tab lish ed  foo tholds a t  Colombo*In th e  northern  
kingdom o f J a ffn a , m issionary  a c t iv i ty ,  though le s s  ex tensive 
than in  Kotte; had achieved comparable success* Most o f  th e  
in h a b ita n ts  o f  th e  is la n d  o f  Mannar, which had been co n tro lled  
by the  Portuguese since  15^0, had a lready  been converted 
to  C atholicism  before 1616 by th e  J e s u i t  m issionaries* 
M issionary ou tposts had a lso  been e s tab lish ed  in  th e  mainland 
around Mantota* A church had ex is ted  in  th e  Ja ffh a  se ttlem en t
A
i t s e l f  since  th e  exped ition  o f  Andre Furtado de M^donpa in  
1591* Though the  r a te  o f  conversion in  no rthern  Ceylon may 
have been checked in  th e  e a rly  seventeenth  cen tury  by th e
(1 ) T.Abeyasinghe 192-203; P*da Trinidade I I I*  15&-160; 
rT .LM ,12.f*45^
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d ispu te  between Dora Frey Andreis de Santa Maria, bishop o f
Cochin and th e  J e s u its  which even tually  re su lte d  in
the  expulsion o f th e  l a t t e r  from th e  F ishery  Coast in  160b,
the e f fo r ts  o f  a v o la t i le  Franciscan f r i a r  Pedro Betancor
continued (2)
ensured the /p ropagation  o f C h r is t ia n ity  in  Ja ffh a  and Mannar*
Even in  Kandy, a t  thef time a t  war w ith  th e  Portuguese, th e
pro-C atho lic  in c lin a tio n s  o f  th e  ch ild ren  o f Kusumasana Devi
ensured th a t  C atholic p r ie s ts  were provided w ith a courteous
welcome w ith in  the  palace though they  won few converts among
(3)
the  n o b il i ty  o r th e  people*
In  both Kotte and Ja ffh a , th e  re lig io u s  developments 
o f the  years 1617-1619 proved c r i t i c a l*  They s e t  th e  p a t te rn  
o f m issionary e n te rp ris e , success and f a i lu r e  fo r  th e  decade 
to  come* In  K otte the  year 1617 i n i t i a l l y  saw a s e t  back 
fo r th e  m issionary e ffo rt*  The re b e llio n  o f N ikap itiya  Bandara 
had d i s t in c t  re lig io u s  overtones. The reb e ls  sen t a sp e c ia l 
detachment fo r  th e  purpose o f k i l l i n g  th e  C atholic p r ie s t s  
a t  Mathiagama to  w&om had been assigned as se rv an ts , two o f 
the  Buddhists monks apprehended by th e  cap ta in -g en era l fo r
(2) Queyroz 242-243, 663-686; P .da T rinidade I II*  193-19**; 
CALR V.32-40
(3) P .da Trinidade 111*146 claims th a t  th e re  was a church in  
Kandy c a lle d  Bom Jesus* U nfortunately  th e re  i s  no av a ila b le  
contemporary estim ate o f  the  number o f  C h ris tian s  in  Ceylon 
in  l6l6* In  1606 th e re  were 30*000 converts in  K otte. 
T.Abeyasinghe 202
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preaching in  p u b lic  ag a in s t the  Portuguese and C h ris tian ity *
Rebel fo rces had lik ew ise  made a p o in t o f  d es troy ing  a l l  
churches and m issionary s ta tio n s  e s tab lish ed  in  th e  Ja ffn a  
in te r io r ,  J e s u i t  and Franciscan alike* But th e  Buddhist re lig io n
in  Ceylon was not very s tro n g ly  s tru c tu re d  and in  so f a r  as
i t  had freq u en tly  le a n t  upon the  support o f  th e  ru le r  i t  
was a t  th i s  period  betrayed , f i r t h  by th e  Hindu zeal o f Rajasinha 
and then  by th e  p o l i t i c a l  weakness o f  Kandy* Far more im portant 
than th e  sho rt-term  lo sse s  in f l ic te d  by N ikap itiya  was th e  
accord in  1617 by the  k ing  o f Kandy w ith th e  Portuguese.
This ensured th a t  once th e  re b e llio n s  were over, th e  m issionaries 
in  Portuguese t e r i t o r y  would be fre e  from th e  fe a r  o f 
Kandyan in cu rsions ag a in s t o u tly in g  s ta t io n s .
The s ix teen  tw enties marked perhaps th e  most successfu l 
decade fo r  th e  C atholic  m issionary e f f o r t  i n  Kotte* Since the  
in cep tio n  o f  Portuguese ru le  th e re  had been sev e ra l fa c to rs  
favouring the  growth o f  Catholicism  w ith in  th e  kingdom.
Embracing th e  new re l ig io n  brought w ith i t  p r e f e r e n t ia l  ju d ic ia l
trea tm en t, fo r th e  p e n a ltie s  imposed on C h ris tian s  were le s sw
heavy than  those imposed on o thers  .Moreover C h r is t ia n ity  brought
(4)T*Abeyasinghe 208 The broader aspects o f  th e  C atholic  
m issionary p o licy  and th e  •s in ce rity *  o f th e  converts have 
not been examined here as they  are  w ell d e a l t  w ith  in  
T.Abeyasinghe 206-214*
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w ith i t  ta n g ib le  economic advantages* C h ris tian s  were exempt 
from m arala o r a  leyy  on the  movable e f fe c ts  o f  each person 
on h is  death* More im portant, conversion to  Catholicism  was 
in c re as in g ly  being regarded as a p recond ition  o f  appointment 
to  o ff ic e  and a recommendation f r o i  th e  lo c a l  p r ie s t^  an
(5)
e s s e n tia l  r e q u is i te  fo r  th e  award o f p o s itio n s  o f  tru s t*
In  th e  1620fs these  fa c to rs  were strng thened  by th re e  major 
considerations* The Buddhists and Hindus o f the  land  had 
been denied th e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  p u b lic  worship and o f  access to  
th e i r  monks and re lig io u s  leaders* By th e  th i rd  decade o f the 
seventeenth century a new generations which knew l i t t l e  about 
th e i r  fo re fa thers*  re lig io n  had grown up. Moreover long 
periods o f residence s t  in  Kotte had given some o f  the  
m issionaries a b e t te r  understanding o f  th e  customs, b e l ie f s  
and a t t i tu d e s o f  th e  lo c a l  people and perhaps a b e t te r  command 
o f  the  lo c a l  language and idiom. These c e r ta in ly  were an a id  
in  making more e f fe c tiv e  th e  explanation  o f th e  new d o c trin e . 
F in a lly  in  th e  16204s th e  m issionary bodies had th e  vigorous 
support o f th e  cap ta in -genera l Constantino de Sa de Noronha, 
who l ik e  most Portuguese o f th e  tim e regarded conversion to
(5) T.Abeyasinghe 208 ; DR 11*136; Film oteca -  Livro dos 
provisoes e a lvares a favour da Christandade*f f *27-39v 
Evor* GR Arm V - V X . .108-109
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(6)
C h ris t ia n ity  as an index o f lo y a lty  to  th e  Portuguese regime.
D u rin g  t h i s  d e c a d e  t h e  F r a n c is c a n s  m a in ta in e d  t h e  l e a d
they  had always held , both in  th e  number o f  m issionaries
working in  Kotte and in  th e  number o f  converts made. By 1621
they  had e s tab lish ed  fo r ty  f iv e  p a rish  churches, most o f
them in  th e  d isava o f H atara. Seven years l a t e r t t h i s  number had
increased  to  f i f t y  fo u r. The t o t a l  number o f  Franciscans
working in  Kotte varied  between fo r ty  f iv e  and fo r ty  seven
f r i a r s .  Normally te n  o f  these  resided  a t  th e i r  headquarters
in  the  convent o f  Sant© Antonio a t  Colombo w hile th e  r e s t
served in  th e  p a rish e s . The Franciscans l ik e  th e  o th er
m issionaries in  Ceylon solved the  problem o f th e  shortage o f
p a rish  p r ie s t s  by p lac ing  sev era l parished  in  th e  same
neighbourhood under th e  same p r ie s t^ .  In  1628 th e  Franciscans
(7)
had over s ix ty  thousand converts to  t h e i r  charge. The 
J e s u i t  m ission too m aintained a steady  i f  gradual goirth, 
once th e  Seven K orales, the  cen tre  o f  t h e i r  a c t iv i ty ,  was 
p ac if ie d  in  1619* In  th a t  year th e re  were only f i f te e n  J e s u its  
in  K otte . A year l a t e r  the  number had r is e n  to  seventeen.
(6) TT.LM.4-5.f.303 A J e s u i t  rep o rt o f  1641 po in te  out th a t  
e a r l ie r^  th e  n a tiv e  had avoided confession as th ey  feared  th a t  tfrtj 
w iH  be punished by th e  p r ie s t  and a lso  th a t  they  would d ie  
a f te r  making a confession . CALR IV. 151
(7) P .da  Trinidade 111.111,115; Boudens 3^-38 basing  h is  estim ate  
o f  P .da Arin idade  111.135-1^8 and Queyroz 71^719 estim ates
over 70,000 converts by November 1628. But F r. Simao de Nazareth, 
p ro v in c ia l o f  the Franciscans estim ated th e  number to  be around
50,000 on 13 December 1629. Film oteca LM13A.2 1 -2 2 /^ 2
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In  1627 th e re  were eighteen  J e s u i ts  in  th e  f i e ld .  About
h a lf  th e  number u su a lly  remained in  th e  J e s u i t  College o f
Colombo w hile the  r e s t  served in  o u tly in g  p a r ish e s . In  1620
the  J e s u i ts  made two hundred and f i f t y  ad u lt converts and
the years th a t  followed were marked w ith in c re as in g  success.
By th e  l a t e  1620's the  t o t a l  number o f C h ris tian s  in  th e i r
(8)
charge must have been around te n  thousand.This period  also
marked a g re a t expansion in  th e  work o f the  o th er two o rders
which had entered Kandy in  th e  e a rly  seventeenth century  -
the  A u g u st i n i  a n s  and  D o m in ic a n s . By t h e  end  o f  1623 t h e
former had e s tab lish ed  f iv e  p a rish  chirches a t  B©ntota,/Rambukkana,
Dungaha and A ttanagalla . Under the  en e rg e tic  d ire c tio n  of two 
p r io rs
successive/£xai±xx o f  th e  convent o f Our Lady o f  Grace (Convento 
da Nossa Senhora da G raca). Agostinho da Grapa and Joseph 
Madre de Deus, the  Augustinians g re a t ly  extended th e i r  
m issionary a c t iv i ty ,  c h ie f ly  in  th e  Four K o ra les .In  1628 th e  
A ugustinians claimed e ig h t p a rish  churches ou tsid e  th e  w alls 
o f  th e  Colombo fo rt.B y  1630 th is  number had increased  to  tw elve.
The number o f  Augustinians a t  work in  Kotte in  th e  e a rly  
1620 #s was only e ig h t b u t in  1630 th e re  were a t  l e a s t  
twelve Augustinians under th e  new p r io r  o f  th e  new convent,
F r. Manoel de Assuxnpcao. The number o f  converts made by these
(8) CALR 11.225-229,233-234; CALR I I I  29030
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A ugustinians i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  es tim ate . They them selves
claimed a t o t a l  o f s ix  hundred and f i f t y  converts in  1628
alone. T heir t o t a l  flock  could no t have amounted to  more than
(9)
a few thousands. The Dominicans, th e  l a s t  o f  th e  fou r re lig io u d  
orders to  o f f i c i a l ly  gain  en try  in to  K otte , were hampered 
by th e  lack  of resources and personnel. In  August 1635 
the conde de V idiguera g ran ted  them perm ission to  take  charge 
of th re e  p arish es  in  Sabaragamuva and the  Two K orales. S ix  
months l a t e r  th e  v iceroy  en tru s ted  a fu r th e r  th re e  p a rish e s  
in  th e  same area  to  them. These g ran ts  were followed by another 
from Frey Luis de B rito , bishop o f Cochin which awarded 
the Dominicans perm ission to  e s ta b lis h  a fu r th e r  s ix  p a rish e s  
in  Sabaragamuwa. The Dominicans however had only  s ix  o r 
seven m issionaries in  Ceylon in  th i s  period  and construc ted  
only s ix  o f th e  tw elve p a rish  churches they  were expected to
(io)
b u ild . N evertheless by 1630 th e re  were eigh ty  two churches
and almost 80,000 C h ris tian s  in  K otte .
In  J a ffn a , th e  subjugation  o f th e  kingdom in  1619-
1620 le d  to  a rap id  extension in  th e  f i e ld  o f  m issionary
a c t iv i ty .  H ith e rto , though m issionaries preached w ith in
th e i r
the  lands o f  th e  Tamil Hindu kingd, tkw ra a c t iv i t i e s  were
(9) Queyroz 720 , 1056; TT.EM.da L iw .731ff.404v,373-400,496 
TT.Hs da L iv . 1699.f f .2 4 5 ,381- 381v; ENL FG 5 9 .f .3 4
AHU Caixa 8 , 15.1.1624; AHU Caiwa 16, 18.1.1644
(10) Boudens 55-56; AHU 210 .f.27v ; AHU Caixa 10,10.9.1633 
BNL PGr. 1 7 7 .ff*356-357; Filmoteca LM.16B.17/2;
Evora C V /2-6 .ff.5 l8-J19
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la rg e ly  confined to  th e  is lan d s  o f f  Ja ffh a  and th e  p o r t and
se ttlem en t o f  Ja ffh a  i t s e l f .  Moreover, though they  had
obtained considerab le g ran ts  o f  land  before 1619, th ese
were s u f f ic ie n t  to  su s ta in  only a handful o f p r ie s t s .  In
ad d itio n , C h r is t ia n ity  had up to  1619 to  compete on more or
le s s  equal terms w ith Hinduism which was th e  r e lig io n  o f
( 11)
the Tamil k ing  and th e  m ajo rity  o f  h is  su b je c ts . With th e
conquest o f  Ja ffh a  came th e  d e s tru c tio n  o f  Hindu tenqples and
the  co n fisca tio n  o f  temple lan d s . While Hinduism l o s t  i t s
secu la r support a la rg e  s ta te  m issionary e f f o r t  was organized
w ith th e  a c tiv e  support and encouragement o f  th e  f i r s t
captain-m ajor o f  J a ffh a . The f i r s t  to  take  advantage o f th i s
s i tu a t io n  were th e  F ranciscans, who sin ce  th e  expulsion o f
the J e s u i ts  from the  F ishery  Coast had been in  charge o f th e
C hria tians in  Ja ffh a . The Franciscans av a ila b le  fo r  th e  ta sk
of conversion were however deemed in s u f f ic ie n t  by F ilip e  de
O liv e ira , th e  captain-m ajor who appealed through th e  p ro v in c ia l
o f th e  J e s u i ts  on th e  Malabar coast fo r  m iss io n a rie s . The
response was immediate. In  1622 F r.Pero R ebello , a p ro fesso r
o f theology a t  the  College o f Cochin was sen t over and th re e
( 12)
o ther m issionaries  followed soon a f t e r .  The re a c tio n  o f  th e  
Franciscans to  the  dec ision  to  c a l l  i n  th e  J e s u i ts  i s  unknown,
(11) See above chapter I .  page* 46 .-47
(12) Sk CALR I I I .  118-120
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but i t  i s  evident th a t  once th e  J e s u i ts  moved in to  Ja ffn a
(13)
d ispu tes d id  a r is e  between them afcd th e  F ranciscan f r a i r s .
In  1627 th e re  were twenty four Franciscans and s ix te e n  J e s u its  
working w ith in  th e  Ja ffh a  p en in su la . In  1629 th e  number o f 
Franciscans had r is e n  to  t h i r t y .  Apart from th i s  th e re  were 
seven Ch r is t ia n s  in  charge o f over tvn  thousand C h ris tian s
dfc>
in  Mannar jiand M antota. The t o t a l  number o f  converts made 
in  th e  16209s i n  th e  Ja ffn a  pen insu la  i s  hxx no t easy to  
determ ine. A contemporary J e s u i t  l e t t e r  claim s th a t  in  1627 
th e re  were some fo r ty  one thousand C h ris tian s  under J e s u i t
(15)
p a s to ra l care in  J a ffh a . The Franciscans claimed to  have made
(16)
f i f t y  two thousand converts between 1624- and 1626 alone.
The l a t t e r  claimed a t  l e a s t  i s  probably an exaggeration fo r 
in  a l e t t e r  to  th e  k ing  on 13 December 1629, Fr.Simao de Nazareth 
p ro v in c ia l o f th e  F ranciscans, estim ated  th e  number o f  converts
(17)
made by h is  o rder in  Ja ffh a  a t  a t o t a l  o f  t h i r t y  thousand.
The m issionary f ie ld  in  Ja ffh a  in  th i s  period  continued to
be monopolised by th ese  two o rders w ith th e  exception o f  a
lone Dominican who es tab lish ed  a convent in  Ja ffh a  in  th e
(18)
e a rly  l 6209s .
(13) TT.LM.22.f. 19
(14) TT.LM.23*f!93» Film oteca LM.13A. 21-22/4-2; AHU Caixa 12, 
4.2.1637
(15) Queyroz 659} Boudens 49} P .da tr in id a d e  I I I , 193 
CALR in . 129- 130 ; CALR IV .95-96
(16) Boudens 43; Coimbra 459.1.116
(17) Filmoteca LM 13A.21-22/4-2
(18) BF th e  1640's th e  number o f  Dominicans had r is e n  to  two.
F r. Luis Caceges -  H is to r ia  de S.Domingos IV. 270; P .E .P ie r is -  
The kingdom o f Jaffhapatam  -28-29
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M issionary success however was la rg e ly  bound up w ith 
p o l i t i c a l  power and Portuguese fo rtunes in  th e  war ag a in st 
Kandy 1628-1634 had a close and d ir e c t  re la tio n sh ip  w ith th e  
spread o f Catholicism  in  both K otte and Ja ffn a . In  both 
a reas , fo r  sh o rt periods th e  success o f  S inhalese arms 
served to  end th e  run o f C atholic trium phs. The f i r s t  blow 
to  the  m issionary e f f o r t  came in  J a ffh a . In  1628 a Sindfclese 
army aided by many o f  th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f  Ja ffh a  forced th e  
Portuguese to  retifce in to  Ja ffh a  f o r t  where th ey  were hemmed 
in  fo r  two weeks. During th is  sh o rt period  th i r te e n  churches
(19)
were bu rn t to  the  ground and much church p ro p erty  was destroyed.
The S inhalese invasion  o f Ja ffh a  in  1629 re su lte d  in
fu rth e r  u n ce rta in ty  and in s e c u r ity . Though Ja ffh a  remained
q u ie t fo r  th e  next th re e  years and p r ie s t s  made to u rs  o f
th e i r  p a rish e s  from th e i r  c e n tra l base a t  Ja ffh a  f o r t ,  m issionary
a c t iv i ty  fin th e  sc a le  o f  th e  e a r ly  1620fs does not seem to
( 20)
have been resumed t i l l  1632.
I f  d is a s te r  s tru ck  th e  m issionary e f f o r t  in  Kotte 
l a t e r  than  i t  d id  in  Ja ffn a , i t ^  s truck  w ith g re a te r  d f fe c t .
In  1630-1631 fo r  s ix te en  months Portuguese power was v i r tu a l ly  
confined to  th e i r  fiorts on th e  co as t. A ll ex te rn a l v es tig es  
o f C h r is t ia n ity , churches, crosses and the  l ik e  were destroyed
(19) Simancas S P .1523.f.5
(20) See above chapter IV1.Page 27S*.
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by th e  trium phant S inhalese forces* Many o f th e  recen t converts
( 21)
re tu rned  to  th e  f a i th  o f  th e i r  fo re fa th ers*  The gains o f
the p a s t century  seemed wiped ou t in  a few days*With th e
re tu rn  o f peace w ith  Kandy and o f  o rder en Portuguese t e r i to r y ,
however th e  m issionaries re tu rned  to  th e  f ra y  w ith undizninished
vigour* In  K otte , s ix ty  Franciscans were m obilised fo r  work
in  the  parished  and by 1638 f i f t y  s ix  new churches had been 
(22)
b u ilt*  The J e s u i ts  d id  no t la g  behihd. In  1632 th e re  were
twenty th re e  J e s u i ts  in  K otte , n ine teen  o f them engaged in
(23)
work in  th e  p a r ish e s . The Dominicans not only  reconstruc ted
the s ix  churches o f t h e i r  o rder th a t  had been destroyed but
b u i l t  a fu r th e r  s ix  in  th e  period  1634-1638. The f ig u re  o f
(24)
twelve m issionaries  th e  Dominicans had on the  f ie ld  was e a s i ly
(25)
surpassed by th e  Augustinians who had up to  eighteen  churches*
By 1638 th e  number o f C h ris tian s  in  K otte would have neared 
th e  one hundred thousand mark* In  Ja ffn a  to o , m issionary 
a c t iv i ty  re tu rned  to  f u l l  s tre n g th  a f te r  1632* In  1634 twenty 
f iv e  Franciscans and f i f te e n  J e s u i ts  were working in  the  
parished  in  th e  Ja ffn a  pen insu la  while a fu r th e r  te n  Franciscans 
attended to  th e  s p i r i tu a l  needs o f  th e  C h ris tian s  o f  Mannar
(21) P .da T rinidade I I I . I l l  5 CALR 11.230
(22) APO (New ed) Tomo IV .V o l.IP art I I .  57; TT.LM.45*f.304
(23) CALR 111.34-35
(24) Queyroz 720; Boudens 565 TT.LM.45*f.304; Coimbra 460
ff.86 -87v ; TT.Md da L iv 674*f.288v; AHU Caixa 10, 10.9.1633
(25) APO (New ed) Tomo IV .B o l.IIP a rt 1 .59 ; Boudens 4 5 
TT.LM .35.f.l78; Don P e te r  -S tu d ies in  Ceylon church h is to r y .117-126
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and Mant&la, In  1634 the  Franciscans alone claimed to  have
seventy one thousand n a tiv e  C h ris tian s  in  t h e i r  charge in
(27)
the Ja ffn a  pen insu la  and th e  ad jo in ing  is la n d s . The J e s u i ts
had w ell over t h i r t y  thousand converts in  th e i r  hands in  th e
1630*8 w hile th e  in h a b ita n ts  o f  Mannar under Franciscan guidance
(29)
formed another s iz a b le  group o f C h ris tia n s ,
In  terms o f th e i r  o r ig in a l o b je c tiv e# ,th e  conversion
of th e  whole is la n d , the  Portuguese m issio n aries  f a i le d .
Almost a l l  the  in h a b ita n ts  o f the  Ja ffn a  pen insu la  and the
is lan d  o f  Mannar had been bap tised  by 1638, About h a lf  the
in h a b ita n ts  o f K otte were likew ise  converted bu t Buddhism
and Hinduism remained s tro n g ly  entrenched in  th e  Vanni,
th e  kingdom o f Kandy and in  some o f  th e  f ro n t ie r  d i s t r i c t s
(29)
of Kotte i t s e l f #  N evertheless^ even tak in g  in to  account the  
amount o f  s ta te  support they  ob ta ined , in  view of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
they  encountered as a lien s  dependant on an a l ie n  power, th e  
achievement o f  the  C atholic m issionaries  was a s t r ik in g  re f le c t io n  
o f th e  zea l and enthusiasm they  brought w ith them to  th e i r  
ta s k .
(26) CALR I I I . 3^35?
(27) Boudens 43
(28) APO (New ed) Tomo IV .V o l.II  P a r t 11.57 estim ates th a t  
th e re  were te n  Franciscans in  th e  Mannar-Mantota a rea ,
CALR IV. 155-156; TT.LM.38.f,97
(29) Even o f those converted a m ajo rity  were C h ris tian s  only 
in  name. (TT.LM.30.f,253) 3y th e  end o f  Portuguese ru le  
th e re  were 200,000-250,000 C atholics in  ^ey lo n .( Queyroz 1059; 
Aras aratnam ,217)
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Throughout the 1620*s and 1630's a l l  m issionaries  were 
under th e  o v e ra ll superv ision  o f  the  bishop o f Cochin. With 
the growth o f th e  number o f  m issionaries and o f C h ris tian s  
in  Ceylon th e re  g radually  arose a r e a l is a t io n  th a t  th e  bishop 
o f Cochin could no t e f fe c t iv e ly  exerc ise  h is  d u tie s  in  re sp ec t 
o f the  is la n d  w ithout making reg u la r  v i s i t s  to  (Seylon. T his, 
the bishop o f  Cochin found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  do, owing to  
h is  d u tie s  in  Cochin i t s e l f  and th e  dangers o f cro ssing  
the  G ulf o f  Mannar a t  c e r ta in  tim es o f  th e  y ea r. The so lu tio n  
proposed was th e  establishm ent o f  a new b ish o p ric / in  Ceylon.
A bishop in  Ceylon, besides ensuring  g re a te r  e c c le s ia s t ic a l  
d is c ip lin e  might a lso  provide a sa lu to ry  check to  th e  g re a t 
powers o f  th e  cap ta in -g en era l, and x±xa a u se fu l source o f 
r e l ia b le  inform ation 6n events in  Ceylon. The p roposal fo r 
a new b ish o p ric  in  Ceylon was o r ig in a l ly  made as e a r ly  as 
1622 but was given l i t t l e  se rious considera tion  t i l l  1630 
when the  conde de L inhares, v iceroy  o f  In d ia  renewed th e  suggestion . 
He proposed th a t  th e  bishop o f  Ceylon should a lso  be in  charge 
o f th e  former sea o f  MeUapor which the  v iceroy  contended was 
w ith in  easy reach o f Ja ffn a . This suggestion , having fearing been 
considered in  th e  council a t  Lisbon^ was re fe rre d  to  the  conde 
de V idiguera, th e  former v iceroy  fo r  h is  opin ion . The conde 
de V idiguera no t merely approved o f the  suggestion  but am plified
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the  proposal suggesting th a t  the  new bishop should take w ith
him s u f f ic ie n t  secu la r c lergy  to  take over a l l  churches
w ith in  twenty m iles o f  Colombo thus re le a s in g  th e  monastic
orders fo r  th e  more d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  o f converting  th e  f ro n tie r
a reas . Eventually  however i t  was decided in  Lisbon th a t  the
C h ris tian s  o f  S.Thome had th e i r  in d iv id u a l problems which
might no t be adequately served by a bishop in  Ceylon and the
king th e re fo re  p e titio n e d  the  pope fo r  an e n t i r e ly  new b ish o p ric .
As th is  s tep  would reduce the  area  o f  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e
Cochin b ish o p ric  under which Ceylon had h ith e r to  been placed
i t  was decided to  inc lude the  archb ishopric  o f  Cranganore
in  the  new b ish o p ric  o f  Cochin. These suggestions however
were no t approved in  time by the  pope to  have any e f fe c t
(30)
while the  Portuguese held  Ceylon.
One o f  the  questions th e  new bishop was expected to  
reso lve  when appointed was th a t  o f  the  dem arcation o f p a rish  
boundaries and the  d e lim itin g  o f  d i s t r i c t s  a llo c a te d  to  the 
four m onastic o rd e rs . When the J e s u i ts  en tered  K o tte ,th e
(30) Boudens 585 Evora GR Arm. 5 -V I.l4 -5 .p p .6 6 ; Filmoteca 
LM 17 22/4-5 ; Filmoteca LM 20 36/2; T T .L M .l6 .f.ll4 ;
Film oteca LM 19B 2 0 /l ;  Eilm oteca LM 14 18-19/4-3; TT.Ms da 
Convento da Graca. tomo 2E f f . 387-391* Coimbra 460.f . 34
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the  bishop o f  Cochin had decreed th a t  they  were to  concentrate
( 3 1 )
on th e  Seven K orales. S im ila rly  in  th e  1620's the  Augustinians
were a llo c a te d  th e  Four Korales and th e  Dominicans ,
Sabaragamuwa w hile th e  Franciscans re ta in ed  th e  la rg e s t
( 3 2 )
and most populous d isava , th a t  o f  M atara.These d iv is io n s
however were no t r ig id ly  enforced and each o rder sought to
gain  e sp ec ia l p r iv ile g e s  to  encreach upon areas a llo ca ted
to  others* The is su e  was fu r th e r  com plicated by th e  a llo c a tio n
o f temple landsyreg ard less  o f t h e i r  lo c a tio n ^ fo r  the  sustenance
of various re lig io u s  orders* Thus, J e s u i ts  and A ugustinians
as w ell as Franciscans held  land  in  Matara* The a c q u is itio n  
vof new te i/ i to ry  by th e  Portuguese in  J a ffn a , Trincomalee and
( 3 3 )
B a ttica lo a  le d  to  even g re a te r  d isp u tes  among th e  clergy* At 
leng th  in  1628 th e  k ing  ordered the  v iceroy  to  appoint responsib le  
persons au thorized  to  make a summary se ttlem en t o f a l l  such
( 3 * 0
d isp u te s .
The m issionaries  throughout the  period  1618-1638 were 
m a te r ia lly  supported by th e  s ta te*  They were awarded, fo r  each
(31) AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 16, 12.1.1644; 
Boudens 46; Queyroz 10555 T.Abeyasinghe 1995 F e r ro li  -  
The J e s u i ts  in  Malabar Vol*I*312
(32) Queyroz 1083; TT.Ms da L iv .731 .ff.204*  206v 
Boudens 54; Reimers 52;
(33t34& Film oteca LM 13A.4/1 ; ;  P . da T rinidade I I I .2 3 0
(34) TT.LM.26.f.406; TT.LM.27.f.82
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member working in  a p a rish  e i th e r  an annual g ran t termed 
o rd in a ria  amounting to  a hundred x e ra f in s  a year o r lands 
y ie ld in g  approxim ately th e  same revenue. The Franciscans 
in  K otte fo r  in s tan ce  received  in  1629 an allowance in  
money amounting to  f iv e  hundred x e ra f in s  a  year* They a lso  
held lands which were worth 2050 x e ra f in s  a year according 
to  the  torabo o f  Vaz F re ire . In  a d d itio n  they  ,  l ik e  th e  o th e r
th ree  orders received  fo u r candilm o f  r ic e  p er y ear fo r  th e i r
convent. This l a s t  g ran t was estim ated  as worth fo r ty  e ig h t
(35)
xerafin s a y ea r. The m issionaries  as a ru le  p re fe rre d  to
hold land  ra th e r  than  K TBiiw ix rece iv e  a payment in  money.
The value o f land  tended to  r i s e  g ra d u a lly  w ith  risfen&i p r ic e s ,
while g ran ts  in  money remained f ix e d . For in stance^  the
Franciscans received  an ac tu a l revenue o f 2677 x e ra fin s  from
th e ir  v illa g e s  in  1621. Moreover possessio n  o f v illa g e s
ensured a ready supply o f  unpaid lab o u r fo r  th e  co n stru c tio n
of churches and s im ila r  functions*  These advantages however
were gained p a r t ly  a t  th e  expense o f  th e  s ta te  which lo s t
prospects o f  increased  revenue and labour se rv ic e s . Perhaps th i s
was why th e  k ing  in  1615 ordered t h a t / l l  th e  land  granted to
re lig io u s  bodies in  Ceylon should be resumed and th e  m issionaries
(36)paid a fix ed  salary* Attempts to  enforde th is  o rder by the
6
(35) AHU Caixa 7 , 3.2.1621
(36) Simancas SP l4 ?4 .f.2 3 8 v
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the bishop of Cochin in  l6 l j ,th e  conde de Linhares in  1630
and v iceroy  Pero da S ilv a  in  1638 were a l l  checked by th e
e f fe c t iv e  lobb ies these  re lig io u s  o rd e rs , p a r t ic u la r ly  the
(37)
J e s u i t s ,  m aintained both a t  Goa and Lisbon# In  Ja ffn a  however 
the  p o lic y  o f  annual payments in  money which had p rev a iled  
since i t s  conquest continued t i l l  1633#
The amounts d isbursed  by the  s ta te  in  th e  m aintainance 
o f m issio n aries  may be roughly ca lcu la te d  as follow s -
In  cash In  land g ran ts
Ja ffn a  -  25 Franciscans 
16 J e s u its  
1 Dominican 
Mannar -  7 Franciscans
Trincomalee -  
B a ttica lo a  -  
K otte -  Franciscans
25 ,00  x era fin s  
1600 x e ra fin s  
100 x e ra fin s  
700 x e ra fin s  -
100 x e ra fin s  -
100 x e ra fin s
(38)
500 x e ra fin s  2050 x e ra fin s
(37) TT.LM.12.f.404; TT.LM#i6.f.73^; AHU 35*f*40v;
AHU Caixa 10, 7*12.1632; AHU Caixa 8 , 24.2.1625; Queyroz 1054; 
BM Add.Mss 9853*f*157v? Simancas S P .1522 .f.l2v
(38) This was the value of th e  v il la g e s  according to
Vaz F r e i r e 's  tombo. In  1621 they  were a c tu a lly  worth 2677 
xerafins#  (AHU Caixa 7» 3*2.1621) o r  i f  we accept Queyroz,(10£4) 
3364 x e ra f in s . A decade l a t e r  according Queroz th e i r  value 
had r is e n  to  4200 x e ra fin s  and by 1638 to  5010 xerafins#
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(39)
J esu its  300 xerafins 1445 xerafins
( 1*0 )
Dominicans 600 x e ra fin s  150 x e ra fin s
A ugustinians 500 x e ra fin s  140 x e ra fin s
Sixteen cand ils  o f  r ic e
supplied to  the  four convents
a t  12 x e ra fin s  a cand il 192 x era fin s
7192 x e ra fin s  3795 x e ra fin s  
The s p i r i tu a l  conquest o f Ceylon had thus been a llo c a te d  
about eleven thousand x e ra fin s  a y ea r, a l i t t l e  over ten  
percent o f  th e  t o t a l  Portuguese expenditure in  Ceylon#
(39) This repreqf&ted the  income o f  th e  v il la g e s  held  by th e  
J e s u its  in  1632 as given in  th e  tombo. As the  la rg e s t  
v illa g e  held  by them, Munneswaram (revenue = 770 x e ra fin s)  
d id  no t pay foro  as i t  was a temple v il la g e  th e  Je su itsp a id  
only e ig h ty  x e ra fin s  as land  rents#The a c tu a l revenue o f  th e  
lands held  by J e s u i ts  was much g re a te r  than  the  estim ate 
given above# On 30 October 1632 th e  .junta resumed Munneswaram 
to  be used as a source o f r ic e  to  supply th e  army and gave 
th e  J e s u i ts  twelve v illa g e s  worth 878 x e ra fin s  a year in  
exchange# A fter payment o f  foro o f  one hundred f iv e  x e ra fin s  fo r  
th e  new v illa g e s  th is  l e f t  th e  J e s u i ts  th e o re t ic a l ly  in  th e  
same f in a n c ia l  position#  Throughout the  16209s and i6309s
the  J e s u i ts  were clamouring fo r  in c reased  grant? to  support 
a g re a te r  number o f m issionaries in  the Seven Korales# Sometime 
before 1638 th e  fixed  cash payment was ra ise d  to  four hundred 
xerafins#
TT.LM. 38. f . 1015 TT.LM. 45# f . 304v; TT.LM. 15. f  f .  36 l-36 lv , 368-369 5 
AHU Caixa 10, 7.12.1632; AHU Caixa 7» 3.2 .1621; TT Ms da L iv . 
674. f .  293v; TT.LM. 61. f  # 76
(40) The Dominicans held  A thuraliya , th e  August i n i  and the  
th ree  v i l lg e s  o f  Horana, Dunagaha and Rambukkana.
(41) I f  p r ic e  i s  any in d ic a tio n , th e  r ic e  supplied  seems to  
have been o f the  b es t q u a li ty .
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The Portuguese o f  th e  seventeenth  century  never
discussed  th e  expenditure on th e  propagation o f  re lig io n
so le ly  in  terms o f  p o l i t i c a l  advantages# To them th e  temporal
and s p i r i tu a l  conquest o f  the  is la n d  was bjrt two aip em
(42)
e s s e n tia l  aspects o f  th e  same en terp rise#  In  th e  tw en tie th  
century  however th e  question  as ti l  whether th i s  expenditure 
could be j u s t i f i e d  even from a p u re ly  p o l i t ic o -m il i ta ry  
po in t o f view appear rel£v{nt#
I t  i s  evident th a t  S inhalese and Tamil opposition  
to  Portuguese ru le  stemmed in  p a r t  from the  p o licy  o f 
conversion# Apart from th e  d e s ire  to  p ro te c t th e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  
re lig io u s  b e l ie f s  th e  S inhalese had s p e c if ic  com plaints 
ag a in s t C atholic p r ie s ts#  A C h ris tian  b u r ia l  co s t th re e  to  
four xerafins#  a payment which many could i l l - a f fo rd #  The 
m issionaries paid  only  h a lf -p r ic e  fo r  a l l  th e  p rov isions 
they  bought from th e  peasants# The ch ild ren  who were forced 
to  a tten d  to  church school were sometimes compelled to  
c u l t iv a te  the  church garden# The peasants were compelled 
to  labour to  b u ild  new churches and residences fo r  p r ie s t s  
w ith  l i t t l e  o r no payment# I t  i s  no su rp rise  th a t  th e  f i r s t
(42) This however d id  no t prevent secu la r o f f ic ia l s  from 
delay ing  or even w ithholding th e  payments due to  th e  m issionaries  
in  tim es when money was scarce#
film o teca  LM 20. 3 6 /-2 -3 j TT.LM.3 6 .f .!5 v ;  TT.LM.21.f.223
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ta rg e ts  fo r  a ttac k  in  case o f  a re b e llio n  were th e  m issio n aries
m
and th e  churches.
In  our period  th i s  disadvantage was p a r t ly  counteracted  
by th e  p a r t i a l  success o f th e  p ro se li ty s in g  campaign i t s e l f .
By l6 lS  su b s ta n tia l numbers o f  converts had been made in  
both K otte and J a ffn a . Though m issionary a c t iv i ty  continued 
to  evoke opposition  the  S inhalese and Tamils were now 
irrev o cab ly  div ided  in to  those who embraced the  new f a i th  
and those who d id  n o t. Though many o f th e  converts accepted 
Catholicism  under p o l i t i c a l  o r economic p re ssu re , th e  m issionaries 
could henceforth  r e ly  on an in c re as in g  number o f  lo y a l 
C atho lics, e sp e c ia lly  those  o f  the  second and th i r d  g en e ra tio n s , 
p a r t ic u la r ly / th e s e  looked to  p r ie s t s  fo r  p ro te c tio n  ag a in s t
1 m
the more rapacious v i l lg e  h o ld e rs . I t  was th i s  element which 
g re a tly  f a c i l i t a t e d  the  conquest o f  Ja ffn a  and played a v i t a l  
p a r t in  a le r t in g  th e  Portuguese a t  Colombo a f t e r  th e  b a t t le  
of Randeniwela as w ell as in  th e  defence o f th e  c i ty .  We 
could a lso  perhaps surmise th a t  th e  few hundred S inhalese 
la sc a r in s  who remained f i t t i n g  fo r  de Sa a f te r  h is  d efea t 
were p r e t ty  c e r ta in ly  those who p re fe rre d  th e i r  new re lig io n
(43) JCERAS XIX 129? Evora (2t Arm.V-VI 1 4 -5 ff .1293130;
APO (new ed) Tomo IV V o l.II  P a r t I .  377; Queyroz 1050-1052 
Coimbra 460 ff.94 -94v ; TT.LM. 31. f .  627; TT.LM.3 6 .f . 423;
Film oteca LM 13A 6 0 /l
(44) TT.LM.2 7 .f .  114; TT.LM.2 8 .f . 274; P .da T rinidade I I I .
163-165; Film oteca LM13A. 19/4-5
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to the  o ld . Furthermore the  m issionaries a lso  served as army 
chaplains and ap a rt from keeping up the  moral®, o f  the  so ld ie rs  
o ften  proved to  be e f fe c t iv e  f ig h tin g  men them selves.
From a se cu la r  p o in t o f  view the  m issionaries  proved 
th e i r  worth in  o th e r spheres. They were g en e ra lly  concerned 
with works o f  c h a rity  and played an im portant ro le  in  th is  
resp ec t through the Santa Casa da M isericord ia  or  the  Holy
house o f  ftercy, branches o f  which were e s tab lish ed  in  Colombo
( 4 5 )
and Ja f fn a . They cared fo r the  sick  and ran  the h o sp ita ls  of
(4-6)
Colombo and Hannar. F in a lly , they  e s tab lish e d  schools to  teach  
the  lo c a l  people both a t  th e  p a rish  le v e l  and a t  Colombo. At 
p arish  schools the  stu d en ts  were taugh t only  read ing , w ritin g  
and re lig io n  but L a tin  and theology were taugh t a t  the  J e s u i t
m
College o f Colombo.
But i f  the  m issionaries were an assen t to  Portuguese 
p o l i t i c a l  power, th ey  derived  even g re a te r  b en e fits  from i t .
In  Ceylon C atholicism  es tab lish ed  i t s e l f  and survived in  the 
f i r s t  h a l f  o f  the  seventeenth  century  only where Portuguese 
power could give i t  a s s is ta n ce  and p ro te c tio n .
(45) TT.LM.46.f.33
(46) Queyroz 1041-1042; T.Abeyasinghe 217; Ajuda 51-V -36.f.37
(47) D eta iled  inform ation  on th e  J e s u i t  educational system i s  
provided by Rev. W.L.A.Don P eter*s th e s is  on *The educatiobal 
work o f  th e  J e s u i ts  in  Ceylon*.London U n iv e rs ity ,1955*
Useful inform ation on th e  educational a c t iv i t i e s  o f  a l l  four 
o rders i s  given by F r. S .G .Perera in  H is to r ic a l Sketches 76-82. 
The Franciscans prodded to  ac tio n  ty  J e s u i t  success planned th ree  
Colleges o f  h igher education in  Ceylon in  1615 but l i t t l e  
even tually  came o f i t .  (AHU Caixa 4, 2 6 . l l . l 6 l6 )
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CONCLUSION
Luso-Kandyan re la tio n s  remained th e  key fa c to r  in  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  o f  Ceylon throughout the  period  1617-1638*
The Portuguese had now f u l ly  e s tab lish ed  themselves as ru le r s  
o f  K otte and in  1619 they  brought th e  p ro te c to ra te  o f  Ja ffn a  
under d i r e c t  rule* Kandy alone remained o u ts id e  Portuguese 
control* The advantages to  the  Portuguese, o f  the  conquest o f  
Kandy were undeniable fo r  i t  would have given them complete 
con tro l over the  whole is la n d , sim pering in te rn a l  ad m in is tra tio n  
and defence ag a in st o u ts id e  enemies* N evertheless the  numerous 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in  a p o licy  o f conquest convinced many 
responsib le  o f f ic ia l s  th a t  an accord w ith  Kandy was the b es t 
way to  surmount th is  problem*
A p eacefu l so lu tio n  to  the  Kandyan problem depended on 
the g ran t to  Kandy, o f  c e r ta in  concessions .Kandyans had to  be 
allowed to  export th e i r  products f re e ly , a s tep  which ran  
counter to  Portuguese e f fo r ts  to  o b ta in  a monopoly co n tro l 
over th e  lu c ra tiv e  tra d e  in  cinnamon and e lephan ts. Further 
a p o licy  o f c o n c ilia tio n  would have involved a ton ing  down o f  
the  harsh  an ti-B uddh ist, anti-H indu and anti-M uslim  a t t i tu d e  
o f the  Portuguese m issionaries* The success o f  such a p o licy  
a lso  re s te d  upon c e r ta in  p o l i t i c a l  concessions* In  the  1620*s 
these included the abandonment o f  the  p ro je c t o f  fo r t i fy in g  
B a ttica lo a  and Trincomalee* In  th e  l630*s i t  involved a t  l e a s t
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a p o licy  o f  r ig id  n o n -in te rv en tio n  in  Kandyan in te rn a l  a f f a i r s .
As the  Portuguese du ring  th i s  period  never r e a l ly  abandoned
hope o f  conquering Kandy, they  were unw illing  to  f u l f i l l
*
these  co n d itio n s, so th a t  d e sp ite  th e  t r e a t ie s ' made to  meet 
p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  ex igencies, they  d id  not come to  any 
la s t in g  se ttle m en t.
A m il i ta ry  so lu tio n  was lik ew ise  incapable o f  achievement. 
The Portuguese a t  Goa, who found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  meet 
e x is tin g  commitments could f i n j  l i t t l e  money, men o r  arms 
to a id  the  cap ta in -g en era l to  p rosecu te  a p o lic y  o f  conquest.
Though from th e  1620*s Portuguese Ceylon y ie ld ed  s u f f ic ie n t  
revenues to  pay i t s  way in  years o f  p e a c e )u n til a f te r  1633 
th e re  was l i t t l e  su rp lus to  spend on w arlike p rep a ra tio n s . 
M oreoverjthe cap ta in -g en era l in  Ceylon had the  d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  
o f re c o n c il ia t in g  th e  various elements w ith in  Ceylon on whom 
he depended, fo r  m il i ta ry  se rv ic e  and th is  he f a i le d  to  do so.
The p o lic y  o f  re -se ttle m e n t o f  th e  la s c a r in s  which was 
designed to  g ive them s e c u r ity  and ensure t h e i r  lo y a lty  was 
fo ile d  by casado o p p o sitio n .C o n flic ts  o f  in te r e s ts  a lso  arose
( i )
among th e  Portuguese them selves -  between soldados and casados. 
F in a lly  the  Portuguese had th e i r  a t te n tio n  and energ ies 
in c re a s in g ly  d iv e rte d  by th e  Dutch th r e a t ,  both w ith  regard  to
(1) TT.LM.i3.f.27; TT.LM.15.f.7; TT.LM.31.f.4l
4 7 8
sea borne communications w ith  Goa and th e  defence o f  th e  
Portuguese possessions in  the  is la n d  i t s e l f *  W ithin Ceylon, 
fo r  example, th e  replacem ent o f  Azevedo's r i n j  oQ mud fo r ts  
on the  Kandyan f ro n t ie r  by an o u te r r in g  o f  f o r ts  o f  stone 
and m ortar on th e  c o a s t, r e p r e s e n ts  a no tab le  d iv e rs io n  
o f e f f o r t  from the  Kandyan e n te rp ris e  caused by the  p rospects 
o f  Dutch in te rv e n tio n .
However, i f  th e  Portuguese were d is t ra c te d  both by
ex te rn a l problems and by d iv is io n s  w ith in  th e i r  ranks so
were th e i r  opponents, both  S inhalese and Tamils* The Portuguese
recovered so qu ick ly  from a p e rilo u s  s i tu a t io n  in  1617 only
because o f  S eneratf s w illin g n ess  to  make common cause w ith
them ag a in st N ik ap itiy a  Bandara^who was seen as a r iv a l  fo r
S inhalese loyalty*  In  th e  l630vs one o f  S e n e ra t 's  own sons,
V ijayapala, P rince o f  M atale was engaged in  se c re t correspondence
w ith th e  Portuguese fo r  an a ll ia n c e  ag a in s t h is  own b ro ther
(2)
Rajasinha* Moreover, th e  c u ltu ra l  and l in g u i s t i c  d iv id e  
th a t  separa ted  the  S inhalese  and th e  Tamils enabled th e  
Portuguese to  use th e  S inhalese la s c a r in s  in  Ja ffh a  and to  
make use o f  Tamil troops in  th e  g a rriso n s  o f  Trincomalee 
and B atticaloa*
The o f f i c i a l  Kandyan regfttion to  the  perm utations o f
(2) P .E .P ie r is  -  P rince  Vi.jayapala o f Matale* 3-6
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Portuguese p o lic y  was la rg e ly  determ ined by th e  ch a rac te r
o f th e  monarch. The g e n tle , sc h o la r ly  Senerat sought peace
whenever pxxacfcfekfc possib le*  The y o u th fu l, en e rg e tic  Rajasinha
was more warlike* He to o , t r i e d  to  secure a peacefu l so lu tio n
a t  f i r s t  bu t when a f te r  163^- i t  became c le a r  th a t  th e  Portuguese
would l e t  s l ip  no opportun ity  o f  conquering Kandy, he determ ined
to  in v i te  th e  Dutch to  a id  him in  an a l l - o u t  e f f o r t  ag a in st
the Portuguese* With th e  a r r iv a l  o f  th e  Dutch th e  Portuguese
c o n f lic t  ag a in s t th e  two a l l i e s  became th e  dominant theme
(3)
o f the  day*
"V
Portuguese retortions to  Kandyan moves were lik ew ise  
s tro n g ly  in fluenced  by th e  personal a t t i tu d e s  o f  lead in g  
f ig u re s . In  the  f i r s t  in s ta n c e ^ th is  meant th e  a t t i tu d e s  o f  
the cap ta in -g en era l and £hrhaps o f  th e  vedor* But i t  i s  a lso  
c le a r  from evidence th a t  a considerab le  measure o f  d e ta ile d  
superv iso ry  co n tro l over p o lic ie s  in  Ceylon was exercised  
by the  v iceroy  and council in  Goa, whether in  p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic o r re lig io u s  m atters* This i s  sca rce ly  su rp ris in g  
when i t  i s  re c a lle d  th a t  th e  yxwamrjc governor Fernao de Alb$rquerque 
had h im self served as cap ta in  o f  Colombo and th a t  h is  son 
Jorge ac ted  as cap ta in -g en e ra l, th a t  th e  bishop o f  Cochin 
had spent two years in  Ceylon reo rg an iz in g  th e  e c c le s ia s t ic a l
(3) K.W.Goonewardane, XVIII
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system in  Ceylon a decade before he became v icero y  o r th a t  
in  the  days o f  the  conde de Linhares h is  council contained 
th e  fo rc e fu l and experienced ex-vedor Ambrfrsio de F re ita s  
da Camara* There was some con tro l from P o rtu g a l and Spain, 
bu t th e  o f f i c ia l s  there^handicapped in  th e  main by lack  
o f personal experience o f  th e  is la n d  probleias^ could exerc ise  
only a r a th e r  genera l supervision*
W ithin Ceylon th e  e f f ic ie n t  working o f  th e  ad m in istra tiv e  
system was marred by c o n f lic ts  o f  ju r is d ic t io n  between various 
o f f i c i a l s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  between the  fredor and th e  cap ta in - 
general* Moreover, th e  p e rso n a lity  o f  th e  men who occupied 
these  p o sts  was o ften  as im portant as the  powers a ttached  
to  the  p o s ts  themselves* Of the cap ta in s-g en era l o f  the  
time Constahtino de Sa stands out as the  most in te re s tin g *
As an able and en e rg e tic  ad m in is tra to r, anda good commander 
in  the f ie ld  he was respected  by a ll*  His understanding  o f  
some o f  th e  problems faced by the  S inhalese won him a regard 
th a t  no Portuguese genera l had ever gained* However, i t  i s  
d e a r  th a t  he was by no means as up rig h t as h is  son and 
biographer Jo%  Rodriguez de Sa l^ de Menezes t r i e s  to  make 
him out to  be* He was p e r fe c t ly  capable o f  deception and
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(4)
and subterfuge and o f  p lac in g  p r iv a te  p r o f i t  before the  in te r e s ts
(5)
o f the  s ta te*  Of th e  o th e r cap ta in s-g en era l Diogo de Mello
was th e  most e f fe c t iv e , both in  th e  m il i ta ry  and the  ad m in is tra tiv e
spheres. De Mello had m^ny o f th e  q u a l i t ie s  o f  de Sa but was
much le s s  w ill in g  to  l i s t e n  to  advice and was c e r ta in ly
more impetuous* Of the r e s t , th e  mediocre and weak Don Nuno
Alvares P e re ra , the se lf-c e n tre d  Jorge de Albfefrquerque
and th e  aged, ta c t le s s  Jorge de Almeida should never have been
appointed to  the  p o s t. On the o th e r hand, in  F ilip e  de O liv e ira
the  able bu t ru th le s s  and bigoted captain-m ajor o f  Ja ffn a
the Portuguese found th e  id e a l instruem ent fo r  th e  execution
o f th e i r  p o lic y  in  Jaffna*
The p o st o f  vedor too a t t r a c te d  men o f  a b i l i ty ,  no tab ly  
Lan^arote de Seixas, Miguel P inheiro  Ravasco, Ambrosio de 
F re ita s  da Camara and Amaro Roiz. These and o th ers  continued 
the  work o f  recording  and c o lle t in g  the  revenues in  th e  t r a d i t io n  
o f the f i r s t  two vedores o f Ceylon, Jorge Frolim de Almeida 
and Antao Vaz Freifce. However, i t  was p a r t i c i l a r l y  in  th e  
revenue spherq th a t  th e  Portuguese in  th e  1620fs f a i le d  to  
make th e  b e s t o f  th e i r  resources* The key to  th i s  was th e
(4) One c le a r  in stan ce  was h is  attem pt to  deceive Senerat as
to  th e  r e a l  purpose o f  th e  co n struc tion  o f  the  f o r t /  a t  Trincomalee*
(5) See foo t-no te  68 o f  chapter II*
4 8 2
v io la tio n  o f  th e  cinnamon monopoly. This p ra c t ic e , condoned
by o f f i c ia l s  in  both Goa and Ceylon, caused a lo s s  which
can be b es t gauged by comparing th e  revenues o f  the  l620 , s
with those o f  th e  i630#s .  *
The two deca^fdes under co n s id era tio n  saw l i t t l e
innovation in  ad m in is tra tiv e  methods o r m issionary p o lic y .
Yet they  are  s ig n if ic a n t  in  th a t  th ey  rep resen ted  th e  age when
Portuguese customs and manners, th e  Portuguese language and
the  C atho lic  r e l ig io n  made th e i r  deepest im prin t on the  
( 6) 
is la n d .
(6) Portuguese in flu en ce  on female d ress in  th e  low -country 
was preserved t i l l  th e  n in e teen th  cen tu iy  and a Portuguese 
d ia le c t  was spoken in  Ceylon t i l l  about th e  same tim e. Many 
Portuguese words have been absorbed in to  both S inhalese and 
Tamil. Roman C atho lics (m ostly descendents o f  converts in  
Portuguese tim es) remains* the  la rg e s t  C h ris tian  element in  
Ceylon.
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